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This thesis critically examines the means, animators and continuity of American 
ou te te o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s 
presidency. It takes the form of a structured-focused comparison of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, 
and al-Qaeda i  the Isla i  Magh e . Most e isti g studies of O a a s fo eig  a d 
counterterrorism policies have analysed these campaigns in isolation from one 
another, or marganlised them. This thesis presents the first holistic study of the 
Obama ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se agai st all th ee of al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates and speaks to a series of larger trends in the contemporary practices of 
American military intervention in the global south. It argues that there was far more 
to the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq 
than a single technological development (drones) and a single practice of statecraft 
(targeted killings). Security force assistance programmes are shown to have also 
been at the centre of hat is o eptualised as O a a s s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism, and the larger retooling of the coercive practices of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south during the era of perceived imperial decline which 
followed the Global Financial Crisis and Iraq War. It also argues that there was more 
animating the military response to al-Qaeda's affiliates than just counterterrorism 
and national security concerns. Working within the historical materialist tradition, al-
Qaeda's affiliates are shown to have challenged two core practices of American 
imperialism: the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers. This thesis 
contributes to International Relations scholarship more broadly by shedding new 
light on the relationship between military assistance programmes and the spatial 
arrangement of American power. An alternative perspective on al-Qaeda s halle ge 
to A e i a  p i a  f o  elo  is also ad a ed  outli i g the o e e t s 
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This thesis critically examines the means, animators and continuity of U.S. 
ou te te o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s 
presidency. It helps fill a series of gaps within the relevant International Relations (IR) 
and the American foreign policy literatures. These stem from its holistic study of the 
overlapping counterterrorism campaigns against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabaab. These campaigns, 
which form a constituent part of the larger War against al-Qaeda fought after 9/11, 
speak to three interconnected developments within contemporary American foreign 
and security policy. First, the geographical diffusion of the principal focus of U.S. 
military intervention away f o  the e t al attlefields  of Afgha ista  a d I a  to 
states such as Mali, Somalia and Yemen. 1  Second, Af i a s e e ge e as a  
increasingly key site of counterterrorism operations in the global south (and, it is 
argued, of American imperialism more broadly). And third, the retooling of the 
coercive practices of U.S. military intervention during the era of perceived imperial 
decline which followed the Global Financial Crisis and Iraq War. This thesis is 
animated by the following primary research question: 
 
What does the O a a ad i istratio s ilitar  respo se agai st al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates tell us about the means and drivers of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq?  
                                                          
1 The geography of U.S. counterterrorism operations after 9/11 has been subject to considerable 
de ate. As o e s hola  has poi ted out, [ ]e o d the obvious areas of Afghanistan, Iraq, and the 
o de  a eas of Pakista , the e is, at p ese t, little ag ee e t o  he e the attlefield is . Laurie R 
Bla k, Defi i g the Battlefield i  Co te po a  Co fli t a d Cou te te o is : U de sta di g the 
Parameters of the )o e of Co at , Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, 39.1 
(2010), 1–38 (pp. 3–4). A key geographical distinction needs to be made between U.S. combat 
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and what the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review f a ed as a  
i  ou t ies e a e ot at a . DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , , p. i 
<http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
Measured on a range of indexes- the size of its military footprint, financial cost, media coverage- the 
p edo i ate fo us of A e i a  ilita  ope atio s afte  /  fo used o  the t o e t al attlefields  
of Afghanistan and Iraq. Outside of these states, U.S. combat operations have been collectively 
studied as the Wa  o  Te o  o  the pe iphe . “ee Ma ia ‘ a , The Wa  o  Te o  a d the Ne  
Periphe , i  Foreign Policy at the Periphery: The Shifting Margins of US International Relations since 
World War II, ed. by Maria Ryan and Bevan Sewell (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017), pp. 






The following three sub-research questions are asked to substantiate this analysis: 
 
1. How can we theorise the goals of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south? To what extent were these marked more by continuity or change 
duri g O a a s preside ? 
 
2. How did the O a a ad i istratio s ilitar  response to al-Qaeda s affiliates 
fit i to the preside t s o erar hi g foreig  policy doctrine and the evolution 
of U.S. counterterrorism operations after 9/11? What does this tell us about 
the preside t s o erar hi g approa h to ilitar  i ter e tio  i  the glo al 
south?  
 
3. How were the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south retooled, if at all, duri g O a a s preside ? What as the pla e of 
drone launched targeted killings vis-à-vis military assistance programmes in 
this process?  
 
This thesis addresses these questions from a historical materialist perspective. Taken 
as a whole, it makes three timely contributions to the relevant literatures on the 
means, drivers and continuity of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanista  a d I a  du i g O a a s p eside .  
 
As it pertains to the debate on the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis takes aim at what it coins the drone-centrism 
which has characterised much of the existing IR and U.S. foreign policy literature. One 
inadvertent consequence of the essentialization of a single technological 
development (drones) and a single practice of statecraft (targeted killings) has been 
to wash out the parallel rise of security force assistance programmes as a disciplinary 
mode of state violence employed alongside (and at other times in place of) drone 
strikes to police the challenge of antithetical social forces from below. Whilst drone 
st ikes e e a  i po ta t o po e t of the O a a ad i ist atio s app oach to 
military intervention in some states outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, they are shown 
to have formed a consistent part of a variegated small-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism which was also supported by the use of Special Operation Forces 
and Private Military and Security Contractors. On this basis, this thesis advances an 
empirically richer understanding of how the Obama administration retooled the 




perceived imperial decline which followed the Global Financial Crisis and Iraq War. 
Security force assistance programmes are shown to also have been at the centre of 
this p o ess a d a ke  i st u e t i  the O a a ad i ist atio s ou te te o is  
toolbox.  
 
As it pertains to the drivers of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis argues that there was more animating the military 
response to al-Qaeda's regional affiliates than just counterterrorism. AQAP is shown, 
on multiple occasions, to have attempted to conduct transnational terrorist attacks 
against continental America. All three of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates also 
threatened the security and stability of the regions within which they operated (the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel). Moving beyond the official 
justification given for these campaigns by American policymakers, this thesis draws 
out the politi al e o o  a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s military response 
to al-Qaeda s affiliates. AQAP, al-Shabaab and AQIM are shown to have challenged 
two core practices of American imperialism: the reproduction of open-doors and 
closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy of the American state and capitalist-
market relations). More specifically, they acted to both capture and govern territory, 
thereby contesting the territorial integrity of the Malian, Somali and Yemeni states, 
and also sought to disrupt global energy security. On this basis, this thesis maps the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates to the 
historical practices of American imperialism in the global south and the goal of 
maintaining the primacy of the American state and the global capitalist order which 
it has underwritten since 1945. 
 
Without losing sight of its p i a  esea h uestio , this thesis  thi d o t i utio  
to the American foreign policy subfield is to advance an alternative theoretically 
informed explanation for the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy 
afte  / . The O a a ad i ist atio s poli i g of ad e sa ial so ial fo es, a d 
reliance on military assistance programmes to this end, is argued to be consistent 
with the historical patterns of coercive U.S. statecraft in the global south. Viewed 




e pla atio s fo  the o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli  hi h 
are shown to be unable to fully capture what the War against al-Qaeda was for. This 
thesis similarly helps pierce the temporal parochialism which has characterised much 
of the u e t stud  of the o ti uit  i  O a a s ou te te o is  poli ies. This is 
accomplished by broadening the debate on the continuity in Obama's presidency 
beyond the Bush administration to fully situate it within the historical practices of 
American imperialism in the global south. On this basis, far from being the strategic 
ha ge-age t  hi h a  e pe ted hi  to e, O a a s app oa h to ilitary 
intervention in the global south is shown to have remained broadly consistent with 
those of all administrations since the end of the Second World War.  
 
Running parallel to these contributions to the existing debate on the means, goals 
and continuity of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq 
du i g O a a s p eside , this thesis also akes t o oade  o t i utio s to a d 
wider IR scholarship.  
 
First, working within the historical materialist tradition, this thesis advances a richer 
explanation for the use of military assistance programmes in the coercive practices 
of U.S. military intervention in the global south. This is accomplished by coupling their 
theorisation as a key tool for stabilizing preferred state formations in the global south 
with the literature on how the spatial o ga isatio  of A e i a  po e  has set soft  
limits on how all administrations have been able to project U.S. coercive power into 
the global south. In doing so, this thesis documents how military assistance 
programmes can be theorised as a key tool for resolving one of the tensions inherent 
within American imperialism: how to defend, deepen and wherever possible extend 
open-doors and closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy of the American state 
and capitalist-market relations) without imposing direct control over territory in the 
global south. Whilst recognising that the heightened constraints on the use of 
military force engendered by the Global Financial Crisis and the Iraq War also 
contributed toward the reliance on military assistance programmes in the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates, this thesis sheds e  light 





Second, this thesis pierces the dualism which has decoupled much of the existing 
study of the goals of U.S. military intervention from those of al-Qaeda. Whilst the 
War against al-Qaeda has been subject to immense debate, most of this literature 
has ee  a al ti all  fo used o  the U.“. s age . This thesis instead argues that 
eithe  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates o  the 
broader evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the global south unfolded 
in a vacuum devoid of al-Qaeda s o  a tio s a d st ategi  goals. “e siti e to the 
utuall  i pli ated  ualit  of U.“. ilita  i te e tio  i  the glo al south, this 
thesis unpacks al-Qaeda s sophisti ated app oach to economic warfare. In doing so, 
it advances on existing historical materialist scholarship by theorising how al-Qaeda 
and its affiliates posed a direct challenge to the practices of American imperialism 
from below. More specifically, this thesis documents how al-Qaeda and its affiliates 
atte pted to leed  the A e i a  state to the poi t of a k upt  th ough a th ee 
pronged strategy of:  (1) conducting direct attacks against targets of economic 
significance within the continental U.S.; (2) exploiting the particular spatial 
organisation of American power by attempting to tie down American ground forces 
in military campaigns across the global south; and (3) disrupting the reproduction of 
open-doors and closed frontiers throughout the global south (with a particular 
emphasis on disrupting global energy security and governing territory).  
 
M  ai  i  the fi st se tio  of this i t odu tio  has ee  to outli e this thesis  p i a  
research question and contributions to the relevant American foreign policy and IR 
literatures. The remainder of this chapter has two aims: first, to outline the originality 
and the scope of this critical study of means, goals and continuity of U.S. 
ou te te o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s 
preside ; a d se o d, to iefl  su a ise this thesis  esea h desig . This 







Literature Review: What is the timeliness and originality of this thesis?   
 
The aim of this literature review is to summarise the current state of the field in 
elatio  to the de ates a ou d the ea s, d i e s a d o ti uit  i  O a a s 
counterterrorism policy outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. In doing so, this literature 
review expands upon the originality and timeliness of this study. This is an important 
task given the sheer scale of the u e t de ate o  O a a s ou te te o is , 
foreign and security policies. The existing literatures on al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates 
(AQAP, AQIM and al-Shabaab) are first reviewed in order to contextualise the 
empirical focus of my analysis. 
 
The literature on al-Qaeda s regional affiliates 
 
Whe  o ei ed i  te s of a ‘ussia  doll, the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Qaeda's regional affiliates was nestled within the larger War against 
al-Qaeda fought across the global south after 9/11. Speaking to their importance in 
the evolution of American counterterrorism policy after 9/11, combat operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq have been subject to considerable academic debate.2 Similarly, 
the ha a te  a d o se ue es of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
al-Qaeda s o e in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan have 
                                                          
2 For a sample of this literature, see Terry Anderson, Bush s Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
; Ja es A Bake  III a d Lee H Ha ilto , The I a  “tud  G oup ‘epo t ,  
<https://www.iraqsolidaridad.org/2006/docs/gei-1.pd> [accessed 11 March 2017]; S. Niva, 
Disappea i g Viole e: J“OC a d the Pe tago s Ne  Ca tog aph  of Net o ked Wa fa e , Security 
Dialogue, 44.3 (2013), 185–202; Seth Jones, I  the Gra e ard of E pires: A eri a s War i  
Afghanistan (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2010 ; Austi  Lo g, Wha k-a-Mole or Coup de 
G a e? I stitutio alizatio  a d Leade ship Ta geti g i  I a  a d Afgha ista , Security Studies, 23.3 
(2014), 471–512; David Kilcullen, Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterrorism (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2016); Jason Burke, The 9/11 Wars (London: Penguin UK, 2011); Steven Metz, 
I su ge  a d Cou te i su ge  i  I a , Washington Quarterly, 27.1 (2003), 25–36; Ahmed S 
Hashim, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq (New York: Cornell University Press, 2005); 
G ego  Fo te ot, Ed a d J Dege , a d Da id Toh , O  Poi t: The U ited “tates A  i  Ope atio  
I a i F eedo ,  <https://usa a .a . il/ a / gs / a l/do load/ sipu s/O Poi tI.pdf> 
[accessed 11 April 2018]; Bob Woodward, O a a s Wars (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011); Hew 
“t a ha , “t ateg  o  Ali i? O a a, M Ch stal a d the Ope atio al Le el of Wa , Survival, 52.5 
(2010), 157– ; Da id W Ba o, Fighti g" The Othe  Wa ": Cou te i su ge  “t ateg  i  Afgha ista , 
2003- , Military Review, 87.5 (2007), 32– ; Ale  “ Wil e , Ta geted Killi gs i  Afgha ista : 
Measu i g Coe io  a d Dete e e i  Cou te te o is  a d Cou te i su ge , Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism, 33.4 (2010), 307– ; ‘o e t Eg ell, Wi i g Hea ts a d Mi ds ? A C iti al A al sis of 




also been widely studied. Much of this literature has focused on determining the 
effectiveness and consequences of drone launched targeted killings.3 In the later 
ea s of O a a s p eside , the ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to the Isla i  
State in Iraq and Syria were also widely interrogated.4  Running parallel to these 
studies has been a sizable body of literature on U.S. counterterrorism operations 
elsewhere in the global south including Latin America, the Philippines, and the 
Caucasus. 5  In contrast, whilst there has been a sizable literature on each of al-
Qaeda s i di idual egio al affiliates, he  take  as a hole, the  ha e ee  
comparatively understudied in relation to other branches of the al-Qaeda movement: 
al-Qaeda s o e, al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic State. More tellingly, despite their 
e t al pla e i  the e olutio  of U.“. ou te te o is  ope atio s du i g O a a s 
presidency, there is yet to be a holistic study of either the means or drivers of the U.S. 
military response to all three of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. Fo  i sta e, hilst 
Maria Ryan has spoken to the importance of military assistance programmes and the 
defence of material interests in the counterterrorism campaigns against two of al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates al-Shabaab and AQIM), the military response to AQAP is 
                                                          
3 See, for example, “ Ak a  )aidi, Who Be efits f o  U“ Aid to Pakista ? , Economic and Political 
Weekly, 2011, 103– ; Pat i k B Joh sto  a d A oop K “a ahi, The I pa t of U“ D o e “t ikes o  
Te o is  i  Pakista , International Studies Quarterly, 60.2 (2016), 203–19; Peter Bergen and 
Kathe i e Tiede a , Washi gto s Pha to  Wa : The Effe ts of the U“ D o e P og a s i  Pakista , 
Foreign Affairs, 90.4 (2011), 12– ; Muha ad W Asla , A C iti al E aluatio  of A e i a  D o e 
Strikes in Pakistan: Legalit , Legiti a  a d P ude e , Critical Studies on Terrorism, 4.3 (2011), 313–
; ‘o ald “ha , Ia  G aha , a d Majed Akhte , The U ea a le Hu a ess of D o e Wa fa e i  
FATA, Pakista , Antipode, 44.4 (2012), 1490– ; B ia  Gl  Willia s, The CIA s Co e t P edato  
Drone War in Pakistan, 2004– : The Histo  of a  Assassi atio  Ca paig , Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 33.10 (2010), 871–92. 
4 Da id E Joh so , Fighti g the Isla i  “tate  the Case fo  U“ G ou d Fo es , Parameters, 45.1 
(2015), 7– ; Tho as Ju eau, Co tai i g the Isla i  “tate , Middle East Policy, 22.3 (2015), 36–43; C 
Ale a de  Ohle s, Ope atio  I he e t ‘esol e a d the Isla i  “tate: Assessi g Agg essi e 
Co tai e t , Orbis, 61.2 (2017), 195–211. 
5 A le e B Ti k e , Colo ia a d the U ited “tates: F o  Cou te a oti s to Cou te te o is , 
Current History, 102.661 (2003), 77– ; Ma k P “ulli a  a d Ju e Beittel, Lati  A e i a: Te o is  
Issues , Congressional Research Service, 2016 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf> [accessed 
 Ap il ]; A d e  Fei ke t, U.“. Milita  Ope atio s i  the Glo al Wa  o  Te rorism: Afghanistan, 
Af i a, the Philippi es, a d Colo ia , Congressional Research Service, 2005 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32758.pdf> [accessed 11 April 2018]; Amitav Acharya and Arabinda 
A ha a, The M th of the “e o d F o t: Lo alizi g the War o  Te o  i  “outheast Asia , Washington 
Quarterly, 30.4 (2007), 75– ; “te e  ‘oge s, Be o d the A u “a af-The Lessons of Failure in the 
Philippi es , Foreign Affairs, 83.1 (2004), 15– ; Doug “tokes, Wh  the E d of the Cold Wa  Does t 
Matter: The U“ Wa  of Te o  i  Colo ia , Review of International Studies, 29.4 (2003), 569–85; Barry 
Deske  a d Ku a  ‘a ak ish a, Fo gi g a  I di e t “t ateg  i  “outheast Asia , Washington 
Quarterly, 25.2 (2002), 161– ; Joh  Ge sh a , Is “outheast Asia the “e o d F o t? , Foreign Affairs, 




e luded f o  he  u e t stud  of hat she has du ed the Wa  o  Te o  o  the 
pe iphe .6 
 
Daniel Byman has written the most comprehensive study of al-Qaeda's affiliates to 
date. Drawing from organizational theories, he has sought to explain why al-Qaeda s 
core leadership sought affiliated groups and, in doing so, assess whether they 
strengthened the al-Qaeda movement as a whole. 7  Beyond Byman's study, al-
Qaeda s affiliates ha e ee  studied as a a o ete  fo  the o e all st e gth of the 
al-Qaeda o e e t. Whilst fo  so e the  speak to the o e e t s o ti ued 
vitality and ideological sophistication;8 for others, they reflect its deepening internal 
contradictions and weakness.9 Drilling down further into the existing literature on al-
Qaeda regional affiliates, three broad camps of scholarship can be identified:  
 
The first and largest body of scholarship has interrogated the challenges which al-
Qaeda's affiliates presented to regional and international security. Much of this 
literature has traced the evolution of AQAP's, AQIM's and al-“ha aa s ideolog  a d 
their relationship with other militant groups.10 A smaller number of studies have 
                                                          
6 This thesis also depa ts f o  ‘ a s e isti g stud  of the a  o  te o  o  the pe iphe  gi e  its 
focus on the Obama administration. Whilst ‘ a  has iefl  dis ussed the e olutio  of a  i  
countries the [U.“.] is ot at a  afte  , the fo us of he  esea h has ee  o  the st ategi  o igi s 
of such operations during Bush s p eside  ith a pa ti ula  fo us o  Do ald ‘u sfeld s pu suit of 
full-spe t u  do i a e  th ough i egula  a fa e operations. See Ma ia ‘ a , Full “pe t u  
Do i a e : Do ald ‘u sfeld, the Depa t e t of Defe se, a d U“ I egula  Wa fa e “t ateg , –
, Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25.1 (2014), 41–68. 
7  All told ho e e , B a  is dis issi e of the gai s of affiliatio , o ludi g that di e ge t 
preferences and priorities, branding problems, shirking at the local level, adverse selection, and costly 
control me ha is s all ake affiliates of uestio a le alue to the o e o ga izatio . Daniel Byman, 
Buddies o  Bu de s? U de sta di g the Al Qaeda ‘elatio ship ith Its Affiliate O ga izatio s , 
Security Studies, 23.3 (2014), 431–70 (p. 431). 
8 Leah Fa all, Ho  Al Qaeda Wo ks-What the O ga izatio s “u sidia ies “a  a out Its “t e gth , 
Foreign Affairs, 90.2 (2011), 128–138. 
9 Ba ak Me delsoh , Al-Qaeda s F a hisi g “t ateg , Survival, 53.3 (2011), 29–50. 
10 A d e Le “age, The E ol i g Th eat of Al Qaeda i  the Isla i  Magh e , Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, 2011, pp. 1–16 <http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-
.pdf> [a essed  O to e  ]; Pete  J Pha , The Da ge ous P ag atis  of Al-Qaeda in the 
Isla i  Magh e , The Journal of the Middle East and Africa, 2.1 (2011), 15–29; Ricardo René Larémont, 
Al Qaeda i  the Isla i  Magh e : Te o is  a d Cou te te o is  i  the “ahel , African Security, 4.4 
(2011), 242–68; Alta Grobbelaar and Hussein Solo o , The O igi s, Ideolog  a d De elop e t of Al-
Qaeda i  the Isla i  Magh e , Africa Review, 7.2 (2015), 149– ; Ch istophe  “ ift, A  of 
Convergence: AQAP, Ansar Al-“ha ia a d the “t uggle fo  Ye e , CTC Sentinel, 5.6 (2012), 1–6; Jason 




sought to determine whether al-Qaeda's affiliates are best classified as terrorist, 
insurgent or criminal organisations.11  
 
Speaking to their particular place within the al-Qaeda movement, a second body of 
scholarship has explored how the process of becoming a formal al-Qaeda affiliate 
altered the goals and behaviour of these groups. Of particular interest to these 
scholars is how al-Qaeda's affiliates have balanced their global commitment to 
advancing the cause of Salafist Jihadism with their local political ambitions.12 
 
A third camp of literature has been empirically focused on the propaganda output of 
al-Qaeda's regional affiliates. This has taken two forms: how formally becoming an 
affiliate changed the discourse of these groups, and what grievance narratives and 
images al-Qaeda's affiliates thereafter employed in their English language 
propaganda.13 
 
Taken together, these three camps of scholarship have made many important 
contributions to the academic study of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. The  a e d a  
from later in this thesis in order to contextualise my analysis of the evolution of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations against each al-Qaeda affiliate after 9/11 and the 
challenge which each posed to the core practices of American imperialism within 
their region. Whilst there has been a wealth of scholarship on the militarisation of 
                                                          
Political Violence, 30.1 (2018), 116– ; Os a  Gakuo M a gi, “tate Collapse, Al-Shabaab, Islamism, 
a d Legiti a  i  “o alia , Politics, Religion & Ideology, 13.4 (2012), 513–27. 
11 “e gei Boeke, Al Qaeda i  the Isla i  Magh e : Te o is , I su ge , o  O ga ized C i e? , Small 
Wars & Insurgencies, 27.5 (2016), 914– ; Vale ia ‘osato, H id O de s  et ee  Te orism and 
O ga ized C i e: The Case of Al Qaeda i  the Isla i  Magh e , African Security, 9.2 (2016), 110–35 
<https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2016.1175877>; David M Anderson and Jacob McKnight, 
U de sta di g Al-Shabaab: Clan, Islam and Insurgency in Ken a , Journal of Eastern African Studies, 
9.3 (2015), 536–57. 
12  Jean-Lu  Ma et, Al-Qaeda i  Isla i  Magh e : A Glo al  O ga izatio , Studies in Conflict & 
Terrorism, 31.6 (2008), 541– ; B e Loidolt, Ma agi g the Glo al a d Lo al: The Dual Agendas of 
Al Qaeda i  the A a ia  Pe i sula , Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34.2 (2011), 102–23. 
13 Ma uel ‘ To es “o ia o, The ‘oad to Media Jihad: The P opaga da A tio s of Al Qaeda i  the 
Isla i  Magh e , Terrorism and Political Violence, 23.1 (2010), 72– ; Ma uel ‘ To es “o ia o, The 
Evolution of the Discourse of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magh e : The es, Cou t ies a d I di iduals , 
Mediterranean Politics, 16.2 (2011), 279– ; Ha o o J I g a , A  A al sis of I spi e a d Da i : 
Lesso s f o  AQAP a d Isla i  “tate s P opaga da Wa , Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40.5 (2016), 
1–19; Michael Page, La a Challita, a d Alistai  Ha is, Al Qaeda i  the A a ia  Pe i sula: F a i g 




U.S.-African policy, no study is yet to have specifically focused on the means and 
d i e s of the O a a ad i ist atio s military response to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates. 14  The studies which have been published on U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in Yemen, for example, have largely focused on the role of drone launched 
targeted strikes and failed to probe beyond dis upt[ing], degrad[ing], dismantl[ing] 
a d ulti atel  defeat[i g] 15  the affiliate as the ultimate objective of these 
campaigns. 16  On this basis, they have contributed toward two of the larger 
limitations of the existing U.S. foreign policy and IR literatures which this thesis works 
to e ise: d o e e t is  a d the u iti al ep odu tio  of the ad i ist atio s 
narrative that the primary aim of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq was simply to preserve American national security. In contrast, 
whilst the literature on the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel 
have reached beyond drone warfare, the existing explanations for the animators of 
U.S. counterterrorism operations have lacked theoretical depth.17  On this basis, they 
have been unable to fully capture the political economy considerations driving the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM.18  
                                                          
14 Fo  a sa ple of the lite atu e o  the U.“. s i easi g ilita  p ese e i  Af i a, a d the e t al 
role of AFRICOM therein, see Hussei  “olo o , The Af i a  “tate a d the Failu e of U“ Cou te -
Terrorism Initiatives in Africa: The Cases of Nige ia a d Mali , South African Journal of International 
Affairs, 20.3 (2013), 427– ; Ada  Moo e a d Ja es Walke , T a i g the U“ Milita s P ese e i  
Af i a , Geopolitics, 21.3 (2016), 686– ; Ni olas Va  de Walle, U“ Poli  to a ds Af i a: The Bush 
Lega  a d the O a a Ad i ist atio , African Affairs, 109.434 (2009), 1– ; Go  Olse , The 
A iguit  of U“ Fo eig  Poli  to a ds Af i a , Third World Quarterly, 38.9 (2017), 2097–2112; J Peter 
Pha , AF‘ICOM f o  Bush to O a a , South African Journal of International Affairs, 18.1 (2011), 
107– ; J Pete  Pha , The De elop e t of the U ited “tates Af i a Co a d a d Its ‘ole i  
A e i a s Af i a Poli  u de  Geo ge W. Bush a d Ba a k O a a , The Journal of the Middle East and 
Africa, 5.3 (2014), 245–75. 
15  Leo  E Pa etta, The Fight Agai st Al Qaeda: Toda  a d To o o ,  
<http://archive.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1737> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
16 W A d e  Te ill, D o es o e  Ye e : Weighi g Milita  Be efits a d Politi al Costs , Parameters, 
42.4/1 (2012), 17– ; Leila Hudso , Coli  “ O e s, a d Da id J Calle , D o e Wa fa e i  Ye e : 
Fostering E i ates th ough Cou te te o is ? , Middle East Policy, 19.3 (2012), 142–56; Christina 
Hell i h, Fighti g Al Qaeda i  Ye e ? Rethinking the Nature of the Islamist Threat and the 
Effe ti e ess of U.“. Cou te te o is  “t ateg , Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35.9 (2012), 618–33. 
17 See, in particular, ‘i ha d ‘ee e a d )oë Pelte , F o  Ne  F o tier to New Normal: Counter-
Terrorism Operations in the Sahel-“aha a , The Remote-Control Project, Oxford Research Group, 2014 
<http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Sahel-Sahara-report.pdf> [accessed 
10 October 2017]. 
18 Key here is Je e e  Ke a s esea h. The Wa  agai st al-Qaeda, he has argued, provided the 
p ete t fo  the ilita isatio  of the U.“. s Af i a  poli  a d the agg essi e pu suit of ate ial 
(predominantly energy) interests across the continent. More controversially, Kennan has argued that 
the threat of terrorism across North Africa had been fabricated by American and Algerian security 





These are particularly problematic limitations within the existing literatures on al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates. As is carved out in chapter 3, during the three-year period 
between the drawdown of combat operations against al-Qaeda s o e i  Pakista  i  
the autumn of 2011 until the beginning of combat operations against the Islamic 
State in September 2014, the military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates as 
the principal front of the War against al-Qaeda. The president was explicit in this, 
noting in June 2014 that toda s p i ipal th eat o lo ge  o es f o  a 
e t alized al Qaeda leade ship  ut athe  f o  decentralized al Qaeda affiliates 
a d e t e ists, a  ith age das fo used i  ou t ies he e the  ope ate .19 
The broader trend in contemporary American foreign and security policy which the 
military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates di e tl  speaks to a d- 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq- is also of particular 
empirical importance to American foreign policy scholars. As Maria Ryan has argued, 
this is "not just because of what they tell us about the geographic scope of the War 
o  Te o  … ut also e ause of the ha a te  of the U“ i te e tio  i  these 
regions".20 Moreover, the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates is important because it is these types of military intervention, not 
the counterinsurgency campaigns fought in Afghanistan and Iraq, which are most 
likely to define the future practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south.21 
This t e d as al ead  appa e t du i g O a a s p eside . Speaking in September 
, O a a e phasised that the st ateg  of taki g out te o ists ho th eate  us, 
                                                          
military intervention in the global south; Kennan does not employ any clear theoretical framework to 
situate a d e plai  this d a i . Like ‘ a s esea h, Ke a s o eptualisatio  of the ole of U.“. 
material interests in animating the military response to AQIM lacks theoretical depth. See Jeremy 
Kee a , Te o  i  the “aha a: The I pli atio s of U“ I pe ialis  fo  No th & West Af i a , Review of 
African Political Economy, 31.101 (2004), 475– ; Je e  Kee a , Wagi g Wa  o  Te o : The 
I pli atio s of A e i a s Ne  I pe ialis fo  “aha a  Peoples , The Journal of North African Studies, 
10.3–4 (2005), 619– ; Je e  H Kee a , Al Qaeda i  the West, fo  the West , i  Counter-Terrorism 
and State Political Violence: The War on Terror as Terror., ed. by S Poynting and D Whyte (London: 
Routledge, 2012), pp. 215–34. 
19 Emphasis added. Ba a k O a a, ‘e a ks  the P eside t at the Natio al Defe se U i e sit , 
2013 <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-
national-defense-university> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
20 ‘ a , The Wa  o  Te o  a d the Ne  Pe iphe , pp. –42. 
21 B ia  M Bu to , The P o ise a d Pe il of the I di e t App oa h , Prism: A Journal of the Center for 




hile suppo ti g pa t e s o  the f o t li es  hi h ould e olled out agai st the 
Isla i  “tate had al ead  ee  successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for 
ea s .22  
 
The literature on the means of Obama s counterterrorism policy 
 
I  the de ade leadi g up to O a a s i augu atio , the de ate o  A e i a  po e  
swung full circle. In the early years of the Bush administration, the U.S. was held up 
as an emergent empire, the most powerful state within the international system.23 
B  O a a s p eside  ho e e , the U.“. as idel  take  to e lo ked i to a pe iod 
of inexorable decline.24 Within these debates, the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) was held up as the death k ell of the u ipola  o e t  that the U.“. had 
enjoyed since the collapse of the Soviet Union.25 By accelerating the relative shift in 
economic preponderance away from North America to the Asia-Pacific, it was taken 
to have hastened the rise of Chinese economic and political power.26 Consistent with 
Paul Ke ed s se i al stud  o  the elatio ship et ee  e o o i  st e gth a d 
                                                          
22 Ba a k O a a, T a s ipt: P eside t O a a s “pee h o  Co ati g I“I“ a d Te o is , CNN, 2014 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/index.html> 
[accessed 16 September 2017]. 
23 Mi hael Co , E pi e  De ial: The “t a ge Case of the U ited “tates , International Affairs, 81.1 
(2005), 15–30; Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire (London: Allen Lane, 
; Ja k “ de , I pe ial Te ptatio s , The National Interest, 2003, 29–40; John Ikenberry, 
Li e alis  a d E pi e: Logi s of O de  i  the A e i a  U ipola  Age , Review of International Studies, 
30.04 (2004), 609–30; Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of 
the Republic (London: Macmillan, 2007); Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire (London: Verso, 2005). 
24 Concerns about the durability of American primacy were not new. See Mi hael Co , Whate e  
Happe ed to A e i a  De li e? I te atio al ‘elatio s a d the Ne  U ited “tates Hege o , New 
Political Economy, 6.3 (2001), 311–40. B  O a a s inauguration the international system was 
contended to have been transiting into a 'Post-American' epoch defined by multi (or even non) 
polarity. See Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008). 
See also ‘i ha d Haass, The Age of No pola it , Foreign Affairs, 87.3 (2008), 44–56. 
25  See Ch istophe  La e, This Ti e It s ‘eal: The E d of U ipola it  a d the Pa  A e i a a , 
International Studies Quarterly, 56.1 (2012), 203–13. 
26 See Joh  Ike e , The ‘ise of Chi a a d the Futu e of the West: Ca  the Li e al “ ste  “u i e? , 
Foreign Affairs, 87.1 (2008), 23– ; Joh  Mea shei e , The Gathe i g “to : Chi a s Challe ge to US 
Po e  i  Asia , The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3.4 (2010), 381–96; Randall L Schweller 
a d Xiao u Pu, Afte  U ipola it : Chi a s Visio s of I te atio al O de  i  a  E a of U“ De li e , 
International Security, 36.1 (2011), 41–72; Willia  H O e holt, Chi a i  the Glo al Fi a ial C isis: 
‘isi g I flue e, ‘isi g Challe ges , The Washington Quarterly, 33.1 (2010), 21–34; Joseph S Nye Jr, 
A e i a  a d Chi ese Po e  afte  the Fi a ial C isis , The Washington Quarterly, 33.4 (2010), 143–
; Wu Xi o, U de sta di g the Geopoliti al I pli atio s of the Glo al Fi a ial C isis , The 




Great Power status, the GFC also fuelled concerns about the long-term sustainability 
of America's military dominance.27 These concerns were given further impetus by the 
Iraq War (2003-2011). This conflict had generated a sizable literature on the limits of 
the U.“.  o e hel i g o e tio al ilitary superiority when exercised against 
non-state actors in the global south.28  
 
These studies centred on the core theme of American decline have fed into a 
narrower debate on how the Obama administration retooled the means of U.S. 
counterterrorism policy. Many have argued that Obama exhibited a profound 
scepticism about the capacity of American ground forces to compel other actors to 
modify their behaviour in ways favourable to American interests. 29  His 
ad i ist atio s use of a g a -bag of different tools of U.S. coercive power to 
i i ise the size of the ilita  footp i t  i  the glo al south has ee  studied as 
part of several different conceptual models. These have included light-footprint,30 
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the Bu de  of Wa : The O a a Do t i e a d U“ Fo eig  Poli  i  the Middle East , International 
Affairs, 92.1 (2016), 97–113 (p. 104); David E Sanger, Co fro t a d Co eal: O a a s “e ret Wars a d 
Surprising Use of American Power (New York: Crown, 2012), p. xvi. 
30 Fe a do M Lujá , Light Footp i ts: The Futu e of A e i a  Milita  I te e tio , Center For A 




surrogate,31 and shadow warfare.32 Nevertheless, as is unpacked in chapter 4, much 
of the current academic de ate o  the ea s of O a a s ou te te o is  
operations in the global south has essentialized a single technological development 
(drones) and a single practice of U.S. statecraft (targeted killings).33 Drilling down 
deeper into the emerging interdisciplinary field of drone studies, several distinct 
camps of literature can be identified. These speak to the richness of the current study 
of drone warfare in terms of both its interdisciplinary plurality and theoretical 
di e sit . Du i g the ea l  ea s of O a a s p eside , the legality of drone 
launched targeted killings under International Humanitarian Law was a focus of 
considerable debate. 34  The same was true for the ethics and morality of such 
operations.35 Other scholars have since theorised how the rise of drone warfare have 
altered the practices, geography and understanding of military intervention.36  In 
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R Brunstetter and Arturo Jimenez-Ba a di, Clashi g o e  D o es: The Legal a d No ati e Gap 
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more recent years, the drivers and consequences of drone proliferation have also 
garnered considerable traction.37 This has overlapped within the emerging debate on 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, and their potential implications on the 
practices and norms of military intervention.38  
 
Taken as a whole, the emerging interdisciplinary field of drone studies sheds 
o side a le light o  a  diffe e t aspe ts of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
institutionalisation of drone warfare. Working within the historical materialist 
tradition, as is discussed in more detail in chapter 4, Ruth Blakeley has also 
do u e ted ho  the O a a ad i ist atio s use of the aft as o siste t ith 
the dis ipli a  state iole e f o  a o e  that has ee  a ke  pilla  of A e i a  
imperialism. 39  Missing from the existi g de ate o  the O a a ad i ist atio s 
retooling of the means of U.S. military intervention in the global south, however, is a 
comprehensive analysis of the relationship between drone launched targeted killings 
and military assistance programmes. This is a particularly problematic omission given 
that, as is a gued th oughout this thesis, thei  dual use du i g O a a s p eside  
can be theorised as different sides of the same coin: the adoption of a small-footprint 
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approach to counterterrorism in order to defend the reproduction of closed frontiers 
and open-doors in the global south. 
 
Military assistance programmes, which for the purposes of this thesis I define to 
include both the Department of Defence (DOD) security cooperation and 
Department (DOS) security assistance programmes,40 were a key instrument in the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ou te te o is  tool o . Thei  use i  o te po a  
counterterrorism operations across the global south has been the subject of growing 
debate.41  Nonetheless, when measured both in terms of its size and theoretical 
diversity, the existing literature on the role of military assistance programmes in 
O a a s ou te te o is  poli  is fa  less de eloped tha  that o  d o e a fa e. 
More problematically, mirroring a similar debate within the drone literature,42 many 
of the current studies of military assistance programmes have aimed to determine 
their strategic effectiveness and efficacy.43 From a Coxian perspective, these detailed 
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empirical investigations have been characterised by a strong problem-solving logic. 
By this I mean that the stated goals of these programmes (e.g. building the military 
capacity of foreign security forces in order to satisfy U.S. national security objectives) 
has ee  u iti all  ep odu ed as the given fra e o k fo  a tio .44 The aim of 
these studies is the eafte  to ake these elatio ships a d i stitutio s o k 
s oothl   deali g effe ti el  ith pa ti ula  sou es of t ou le 45 (e.g. obstacles 
to a hie i g the P eside t s stated goal of dis upti g, dismantling, and defeating al-
Qa ida a d its affiliates a d adhe e ts ). 46  They have often not, on this basis, 
attempted to problematize what the use of these programmes was intended to 
accomplish beyond the U.“.  stated se u it  goals. Whilst there have been several 
critical studies of the use of military assistance programmes du i g O a a s 
presidency these studies have generally lacked theoretical depth.47  
 
I  o t ast, this thesis ad a es o  the e isti g de ate o  the ad i ist atio s 
retooling of the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south by 
placing military assistance programmes at the centre of both its empirical and 
theoretical analysis. The relationship between military assistance programmes and 
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the rise of drone warfare is fleshed out in detail, being conceptualised in chapter 4 
as o siste t pa ts of O a a s tu  to a d a s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism. As noted above, this thesis also advances on the existing 
explanations for the use of military assistance programmes within the historical 
materialist canon. In chapter 2, it explores their relationship to the particular spatial 
organisation of American power hi h is theo ised to ha e set soft  li its o  ho  
all administrations can project their coercive power into the global south. 
 
The literature on the animators of Obama s counterterrorism policy 
 
The processes and narratives through which the Bush administration securitised al-
Qaeda as an existential threat to American security have been the subject of 
considerable debate.48 Speaking at a joint session of Congress in September 2001, 
the president claimed that [t]hese terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to 
dis upt a d e d a a  of life .49 Bush as e pli it i  his ad i ist atio s unrelenting 
o it e t to agi g this st uggle fo  f eedo  a d security for the American 
people .50 Constructivist informed studies have demonstrated how this rhetorical 
coupling of al-Qaeda threatening American security on the one hand and the need 
to conduct military operations against the group across the global south on the other 
e ai ed a pe siste t the e of O a a s ou te te o ism discourse.51 Key to this 
p o ess as the U.“. e ai i g at a  agai st the o e e t. As the president 
made clear in 2010: 
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I thi k it s i po ta t to u de sta d that e a e at a  agai st a e  spe ifi  
group: Al Qaida and its extremist allies that have metastasized around the 
globe, that would attack us, attack our allies, attack bases and Embassies 
around the world [...]. 52 
 
Speaking to the place of al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  this a ati e, du i g a Ma   
national security speech for example, Obama held-up AQAP as ei g the ost a ti e  
of al-Qaeda s  affiliates. As he o ti ued, hile o e of AQAP s effo ts app oa h 
the s ale of / , the  o etheless o ti ued to plot a ts of te o , like the 
attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day i   hi h e da ge ed 
American security.53  
 
This discourse is important because the goals of U.S. counterterrorism operations 
du i g O a a s p eside  e e ofte ti es pu li all  e plai ed i  te s of 
preserving American national security. As was detailed in the 2011 National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism, [t]he most solemn responsibility of the President 
and the United States Government is to protect the American people, both at home 
and abroad .54 As it continued, [t]he American people and interests will not be 
secure from attacks until [the threat of al-Qa ida a d Its Affiliates a d Adhe e ts] is 
eliminated—its primary individuals and groups rendered powerless, and its message 
elegated to i ele a e . 55  Furthermore, as Obama reflected at the end of his 
presidency, whilst transnational terrorist organisations may have no longer posed 
a  e iste tial th eat to the su i al of the A e i a  state, the terrorist threat 
[ e ai ed] eal a d it is da ge ous .56  This narrative is particularly problematic 
given its uncritical reproduction throughout much of the extant academic debate 
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on the animators of U.S. counterterrorism policy.57 What this fails to capture is the 
historical use of p ete ts to sell  ilita  i te e tio  i  the glo al south.58 As David 
Gi s has a gued, a d a ati  e e t ill e o t i ed to gi e the istake  
i p essio  that a fo eig  po e  has th eate ed ital atio al i te ests  a d 
thereafter be used to justify otherwise unpopular military interventions. 59  This 
argument is broadly consistent with the revisionist, Open-Door critique that there 
has been more animating the War against al-Qaeda than just the national security 
concerns raised by the Bush and Obama administrations, and that political economy 
factors were also at play.60 Working within the historical materialist tradition where 
the use of pretexts to justify U.S. military intervention in the global south has long 
been recognised, this thesis builds on such critiques.61 It does so by tracing in rich 
empirical detail an alternative animator of the U.S. counterterrorism operations 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq: the defence of closed frontiers and open-doors from 
al-Qaeda s halle ge f o  elo . 
 
Historical materialism is a rich theory of IR which advances a critical reading of 
A e i a  fo eig  poli . To su a ise  u de sta di g of the theo s o e te ets 
briefly here, historical materialists put forward a structural account of world politics 
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Cold Wa  G a d “t ateg  f o  Cli to  to O a a , European Journal of International Relations, 20.1 
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which places class interests and material relations at the centre of their analysis. In 
this respect, it reaches beyond the Realist focus on national security concerns and 
the Liberal Internationalist focus on democracy promotion as animators of American 
foreign policy.62 Historical materialism holds that U.S. military intervention has been 
key a conduit for stabilising, and in turn integrating, the global south into a global 
capitalist order which acts to reinforce American primacy. Key, in this regard, has 
ee  a ou i g the ep odu tio  of ope  doo s apitalist a kets  a d losed 
fro tie s te ito iall  so e eig  states  th oughout the glo al south. 63  Many 
scholars worked within the historical materialist tradition to shed a critical light on 
the coercive practices of statecraft across the global south during the Cold War.64 
During the early years of the War against al-Qaeda, the goals of the Bush Doctrine 
and the 2003 invasion of Iraq were also the subject of considerable debate. 65 
O a a s presidency, in contrast, is yet to be subject to meaningful debate from a 
historical materialist perspective. Whilst those working within the tradition have 
considered the prospects of his presidency and his use of drone launched targeted 
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A road: The U ited “tates  Glo al ‘ole i  the st Ce tur  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 
75. 
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the Cold Wa , i  The War o  Terroris  a d the A eri a  E pire  after the Cold War, ed. by Alejandro 
Colas and Richard Saull (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–23 (p. 2). See also Aleja d o Colás, Ope  
Doors and Closed Frontiers: The Li its of A e i a  E pi e , European Journal of International 
Relations, 14.4 (2008), 619–43. 
64 Gabriel Kolko, Confronting the Third World: United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1980 (New York: 
Pantheon, 1988); William I Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and 
Hegemony (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: 
The North in the South, pp. 80–105; Noam Chomsky and Edward S Herman, The Washington 
Connection and Third World Fascism (New York: South End Press, 1979).  
65 “tokes, Wh  the E d of the Cold Wa  Does t Matte : The U“ Wa  of Te o  i  Colo ia ; Colás a d 
“aull; Leo Pa it h a d “a  Gi di , The U i ue A e i a  E pi e , i  The War on Terrorism and the 
A eri a  E pire  After the Cold War, ed. by Alejandro Colas and Richard Saull (London: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 24– ; Pete  Go a , The Bush Tu  a d the D i e fo  P i a , i  The War on Terrorism 
a d the A eri a  E pire  After the Cold War, ed. by Alejandro Colas and Richard Saull (London: 
Routledge, 2006), pp. 131– ; “i o  B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al 
Capitalist O de , i  The War o  Terroris  a d the A eri a  E pire  After the Cold War, ed. by 
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killings, 66  the e is et to e a histo i al ate ialist i fo ed stud  of O a a s 
counterterrorism, foreign and security policies as a whole. This is a key gap which this 
thesis works to fill, the timeliness of which can be mapped in relation to Ma ia ‘ a s 
stud  of the Wa  o  Te o  o  the pe iphe .67  
 
Ryan has also examined the means and goals of U.S. counterterrorism operations in 
hat the  Quad e ial Defe e ‘e ie  QD‘  la elled as a  i  ou t ies the 
[U.“.] is ot at a .68 Paralleling this thesis, she has argued that the use of military 
assistance programmes in counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and 
Iraq as a i ated, i  pa t,  the pe eptio  that Isla ist te o is , he e e  it 
existed, might pose a threat to long-standing or newly emerging strategic or material 
interests .69 Whilst empirically rich, her analysis of the political economy logic of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in and around Africa lacks theoretical depth. In her most 
recent publication on the rise of security cooperation programmes du i g Bush s 
presidency, Ryan cites the work of two leading historical materialist scholars: Doug 
“tokes a d “a  ‘aphael. “he does so to a gue that o e of the disti guishi g 
features of post-World War II American hegemony has been its successful co-option 
of other nations that stand to benefit economically and strategically from US 
p i a . 70  Rather than being threaded throughout her entire analysis, this 
efe e e to “tokes a d ‘aphael s dual thesis logi  is olted o to he  o lusio . To 
this e te t, hilst oth this thesis a d ‘ a s esea h speak to the sa e set of 
developments, I maintain that her research is unable to fully capture and explain the 
political economy animators of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
                                                          
66 Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, pp. 165–66; Doug Stokes and 
Sam Raphael, Global Energy Security and American Hegemony (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
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the Transnationalist: A Reappraisal of the Unilateralist Impulse in US Foreign Policy, 2001– . 
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Afghanistan and Iraq. Beyond this, I also argue that it is unable to situate them within 
the historical p a ti es of U.“. i pe ialis  i  the glo al south hi h p edate Bush s 
presidency (the principal temporal focus of her analysis). As I argue in chapter 2, not 
only can a deep engagement with historical materialist theory shed alternative light 
on the means and animators of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq but, through its focus on military assistance programmes, it can 
also help us theorise the relationship between them. Furthermore, as is argued in 
chapter 3, historical materialism can also make a sizeable contribution to the debate 
around the character of, and tensions within, the Obama Doctrine as a whole. Its 
emphasis on antithetical social forces as a principal target of U.S. military 
inte e tio  i  the glo al south p o ides a  e pla atio  fo  his ad i ist atio s 
Janus-Faced approach to military intervention in the global south. By this I mean its 
pe ha t fo  leadi g f o  ehi d  a d pu sui g a o st ai ed, ultilate al espo se 
to the state-based security challenges that emerged during his presidency on the one 
ha d; ut agg essi e e e ise of U.“. oe i e po e  a d illi g ess to lead f o  
the f o t  agai st o -state actors, such as al-Qaeda, on the other.  
 
The literature on the continuity in Obama s counterterrorism policy 
 
O a a, it has ee  a gued, a e i to offi e dete i ed to e d a see i gl  e dless 
a  o  te o .71 During the 2008 presidential campaign, Obama positioned himself 
as the only candidate willing to immediately repudiate the excesses of the Bush 
administration's War on Terror: unilateral democracy promotion, enhanced 
interrogation methods and the detention of terrorist suspects at Guantanamo Bay.72 
This fuelled the expectation (if not more accurately the hope) that the direction of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy would be fundamentally reoriented. 73  Both the 
                                                          
71 Jessi a “te , O a a a d Te o is , Foreign Affairs, 94.5 (2015), 62–70 (p. 62). 
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practices of, and discourse surrounding, U.S. counterterrorism policy have since 
widely been argued to have been defined by a high degree of continuity.74 Those 
advancing this continuity thesis can broadly be divided into three broad camps of 
scholarship. These are, those who have argued that Obama: (1) refused to make; (2) 
failed to implement; (3) or faced insurmountable structural barriers to abandoning 
the broad contours of his predecessors War on Terror.75  
 
Those working within the first camp have argued that, in addition to mishearing the 
aggressive response to al-Qaeda which was foreshadowed on the campaign trail, 
O a a ag eed ith the Bush ad i ist atio s second term recalibration of American 
counterterrorism policy.76 For these authors, the largest point of departure between 
the two presidents was on their respective approach to the Iraq War. Scholars 
working within the second camp of scholarship, conversely, have explained the 
continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy after 9/11 as a consequence of the sheer 
complexity of defeating transnational terrorist organisations, and the time it 
i e ita ilit  takes fo  O a a s p efe ed p e e ti e st ategies to take effect.77 The 
iggest poi t of depa tu e fo  these s hola s as O a a s te de  to a d ilita  
under-rather than over-reach in the global south.78 From an IR theory perspective, 
both neoclassical realist and constructivist scholars have advanced structural 
explanations for the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism practice and discourse policy. 
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To summarise these briefly he e, hilst fo  eo lassi al ealists, O a a s age  as 
li ited  his ad i ist atio s espo se to shifts i  the i te atio al dist i ution of 
power, principally relative U.S. decline; 79  constructivists have maintained that 
O a a s age  as li ited  the institutionalisation of the War on Terror as a 
dis u si e egi e of t uth  hi h lo ked i  e tai  a ati es, poli ies a d 
bureaucratic assemblages.80  
 
As discussed above, both agent- and structured- focused explanations for the 
continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11 have been advanced 
within the existing American policy subfield. The limitations of the latter are outlined 
in chapter 2. Whilst there have been exceptions to this general rule, what is worth 
discussing is the larger limitation which runs across both the agent and structured 
focused explanations carved out above, namely their temporal parochialism.81 The 
o ti uit  i  O a a s ou te te o is  poli  a d app oa h to ilita  i te e tio  
in the global south more broadly) has generally been measured against that of his 
immediate predecessor, George W. Bush. This has oftentimes reduced the study of 
the goals of O a a s ou te te o is  poli  to a oidi g a d/o  e ed i g the 
mistakes of his predecessor. This temporal parochialism, whether intentional or not, 
has fed into a larger narrative surrounding much of the contemporary debate around 
A e i a  fo eig  a d se u it : that /  ha ged e e thi g . In contrast, this thesis 
begins from the historical materialist informed assumption that neither the 9/11 
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atta ks o  O a a s ele tio  led to a fu da e tal shift i  the oe i e p a ti es of 
U.S. statecraft in the global south. 82  It does so by situating the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates ithi  the la ge  
practices of coercive U.S. statecraft in the global south that were institutionalized 
following the Second World War. This enables it to take aim at this discontinuity 
thesis a d ad a e a  alte ati e e pla atio  fo  the o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  
and counterterrorism policy which I maintain is better able to capture its essentially 
imperial logic. 
 
Reflections on the originality, timeless and scope of thesis 
 
Despite the sheer scale of the literature around these subjects, as I have explored 
throughout this brief literature review, there are major gaps in the extant debates on 
the means, goals and co ti uit  i  O a a s ou te te o is  poli . The o igi alit  
and timeliness of this thesis lies in both its detailed empirical study of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates a d the histo i al 
materialism theoretical f a e o k hi h i fo s this stud . To the autho s 
knowledge, this thesis represents the first holistic study of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se agai st all th ee of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates 
and the fi st o e a hi g stud  of O a a s foreign, security and counterterrorism 
policies from within the historical materialist tradition.  
 
Research design: methods and methodology 
 
Having outlined the originality and timeliness of this thesis, my focus now shifts 
toward outlining its research design.83 To preface this discussion, it is important to 
clearly define what I am understanding an al-Qaeda affiliate to be and then to 
determine their place within the larger al-Qaeda movement. This enables me to 
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clearly identify what branches of the al-Qaeda movement are included as part of my 
empirical analysis, and offer some working definitions to this end. 
 
Al-Qaeda s o ga isatio al st u tu e has ee  the su je t of o side a le s hola l  
debate. Al-Qaeda s e pulsio  f o  its state-sponsored sanctuary in Afghanistan 
following the 2001 U.S. invasion was the catalyst for its evolution into an amorphous, 
transnational movement.84 B  O a a s i augu atio  i  Ja ua  , al-Qaeda was 
no longer the same movement, in terms of neither its organisational structure nor its 
geographical reach, that had conducted the 9/11 attacks.85 The e e e a  Al 
Qaeda s athe  tha  the si gle Al Qaeda of the past .86 A key driver of al-Qaeda s 
expansion were its regional affiliates. For the purposes of this thesis, these are 
understood as a Salafist-Jihadist group which had pledged bayat (an oath of 
allegiance) to al-Qaeda s e i  ho, i  tu , a epted this pledge.87 By virtue of their 
bayat to al-Qaeda s e i , al-Qaeda s affiliates hold a disti t pla e i  the al-Qaeda 
movement. Drawing from the existing academic and policy literatures, I have 
constructed a loose typology of the al-Qaeda movement in Figure 1.1 to help 
explain these.88 
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Figure 1: The different major branches of the al-Qaeda movement 
 
Branch of the al-
Qaeda movement 
 
Core At the centre of the al-Qaeda movement is its senior 
leadership based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan tribal areas. 
Al-Qaeda s o e is headed  a  emir who, by virtue of their 
claimed religious and political authority, purports to 
a age the e ti e o e e t s strategy and operations.89 
Al-Qaeda s o e has p o ided oad st ategi  a d 
theological guidance to al-Qaeda affiliates, and the other 
branches of the movement sketched below. Osama Bin 
Laden was al-Qaeda s fi st e i . Follo i g his death i  Ma  
2011, he was succeeded by Ayman al-Zawahiri. 
Adherents The 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy defined an al-
Qaeda adhe e t as [i]ndividuals who have formed 
collaborative relationships with, act on behalf of, or are 
otherwise inspired to take action in furtherance of the goals 
of al-Qa ida —the organization and the ideology—including 
by engaging in violence regardless of whether such violence 
is targeted at the United States, its citizens, or its 
interests. 90. The relationship between al-Qaeda s o e on 
the one hand and al-Qaeda s adhe e ts o  the othe  has 
been compared to that of two states which can choose, but 
are not compelled, to cooperate on operations of shared 
interest.91 Defined in this way, the West African based Boko 
Haram and the Indonesian based Jemmah Islamyian can be 
classified as al-Qaeda adherents. 
Associated Forces An associated force is a legal concept first defined in the 
2001 AUMF. Al-Qaeda associated groups were defined as 
o ga ized, a ed g oups that ha e e te ed the fight 
alongside Al Qaeda or the Taliban, and are co-belligerents 
with Al Qaeda or the Taliban in hostilities against the United 
“tates o  its oalitio  pa t e s . 92  Haqqani Network, 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Tehreek-e-Taliban qualify as al-Qaeda 
associated forces. 
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has been compared by one member of Jema`a Islamiyya to that of a business affiliate. As one Jema`a 
Islamiyya e e  oted, [ ]e a e f ee. We ha e ou  o  fu ds, ou  o  e . We a e i depe de t, 
like Aust alia a d the U.“. But he  it o es to a  ope atio  e a  joi  togethe  uoted i  Nelly 
Lahoud a d othe s, Lette s f o  A otta ad: Bi  Ladi  “ideli ed? , Combating Terrorism Center (DTIC 
Document, 2012), pp. 1–59 <https://ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/CTC_LtrsFromAbottabad_WEB_v2.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]; p.10. 
92 Quoted in Ca la Hu ud, Al Qaeda a d U.“. Poli : Middle East a d Af i a , Congressional Research 




Offshoots Al-Qaeda has also spawned offshoot groups that have 
repudiated the leadership of al-Qaeda s o e, a d ha e 
broken away from the movement. The most prominent of 
such groups is the Islamic State which evolved from the 
nucleus of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) under the leadership of 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.93 Thereafter, the Islamic State vied 
for leadership of the global Salafist-Jihadist movement, 
competing against al-Qaeda for the loyalty of other militant 
groups across the global south.94 
 
Al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates a  e o side ed fo al a hes of the al-Qaeda 
movement separate from its adherents, associated forces and offshoots. As it 
pertains the key relationship between al-Qaeda s o e and al-Qaeda s affiliates, 
speaking in late 2015, Director of the National Counterterrorism Centre Matthew 
Olse  i sisted that the o e leade ship of al-Qaida continue[d] to wield substantial 
influence over affiliated and allied groups such as the Yemen-based al-Qaida in the 
A a ia  Pe i sula . 95  This assessment runs counter to the far more thorny 
relationship between al-Qaeda s o e a d al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates hi h is 
pai ted i  the A otta ad Pape s , do u e ts aptu ed du i g the Ma   aid 
agai st Osa a i  Lade s o ple  hi h shed key light on how al-Qaeda s se ior 
leadership understood their relationship with their affiliates. 96  Agreeing with the 
Co ati g Te o is  Ce t e s assess e t, I hold that al-Qaeda s o e e e ted a 
loose (and at times contested) strategic control over AQAP, AQIM and al-Shabaab. 
This is understood in terms of the capacity of al-Qaeda s o e to defi e the st ategi  
                                                          
93 Following a dispute over the Isla i  “tate of I a s I“I  p oposed e ge  ith the “ ia  ased Al-
Nusra Front- itself a flash point in a larger series of disagreements between al-Qaeda s e i  A a  
al-Zawahiri and Al-Baghdadi ega di g the o e e t s la ge  st ategi  di e tio - al-Qaeda s o e 
formally repudiated its ties with ISI in February 2014. For a more comprehensive examination of the 
g oup s e olutio  f o  a  al-Qaeda affiliate into its own rival Salafist-Jihadist movement see Ahmed 
S Hashim, ‘The Islamic State: From Al‐Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate’, Middle East Policy, 21.4 
(2014), 69–83. 
94 For a more in-depth comparison of the differences between al-Qaeda s a d the Isla i  “tate s 
ideology and tactics, see Joh  Tu e , “t ategi  Diffe e es: Al Qaeda s “plit ith the Isla i  “tate of 
Iraq and Al-“ha . , Small Wars & Insurgencies, 26.2 (2015), 208–25.  
95 Emphasis added. Quoted in Humud. p.3. 
96 These documents shed light on three different perspectives amongst al-Qaeda s se io  leade ship 
on how to manage the relationship with al-Qaeda s affiliates:  ha dli e s, illi g to disso iate a  
affiliate which used the al-Qaeda a d ut did ot o sult ith the o e e t s se io  leade ship; 
 oppo tu ists, ho ha pio ed affiliates as a ehi le fo  e te di g the o e e t s ea h a oss 
the glo al south; a d  a d p ag atists, i ludi g i  Lade  hi self, ho … a ted to maintain 
o u i atio … to u ge est ai t a d p o ide ad i e e e  if it fell o  deaf ea s, ithout g a ti g 




aims of the movement at large, provide theological justification for their acts of 
violence and offer strategic advice.97 Beyond that, the position of al-Qaeda s affiliates 
as formal branches of the al-Qaeda movement also meant that they were expected 
to ot o l  e ploit lo al g ie a es a d ta get the se u it  se i es of the apostate  
regimes in the regions they operated in, but take actions to support the global cause 
of Salafist-Jihadism. 98  Al-Qaeda s affiliates, o etheless, etai ed o side a le 
operational control over their own activities.99 They were largely responsible for their 
own fund-raising, recruitment and operatio s agai st the apostate  egi es hi h 
they sought to overthrow. 100  As B a  thus puts it, al-Qaeda affiliates can be 
thought of as agents of al Qaeda and, more broadly, as recipients of delegated 
autho it .101 
 
Tying these threads together, the military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates 
qualify as a subclass of the same type of event: counterterrorism operations outside 
of Afghanistan and Iraq. To make clear, I have not elected to study the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP, AQIM and al-Shabaab simply because 
the  a e i te esti g  o  e ause a ple data e ist fo  stud i g the .102 This is a 
potential limitation of the structured-focused comparison method identified by 
Ale a de  Geo ge a d A d e  Be et, t o of the ethod s leadi g figures. Rather, 
                                                          
97 This included, for example, advice for AQIM not to declare a local caliphate until the affiliate was in 
the position to provide for the basic needs of the local population. Al-Qaida Pape s , The Associated 
Press, 2014, p. 7 <https://www.longwarjournal.org/images/al-qaida-papers-how-to-run-a-state.pdf> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 
98 In effect then, as has already been argued, al-Qaeda s affiliates e e e pe ted to balance their local 
political ambitions with their global commitment to advancing the cause of global Salafist-Jihadism. 
See Loidolt; Marret. 
99 This can be explained, in part, by the limited communication between al-Qaeda s o e a d its 
regional affiliates: a reality which ruled out a hierarchical command-and-control relationship. To put 
the scale of these challenges into some perspective, AQIM s leade ship oted that afte  fo all  
becoming an al-Qaeda affiliate, despite ou  ultiple lette s to the , the  had e ei ed, i  epl , 
just a fe  essages, f o  the t o sheiks, i  Laden (God rest his soul) and Ayman (al-)a ah i . 
‘uk i i Calli a hi, AP E lusi e: Al-Qaida Rips into Prima Donna Terrorist for Failing to Deliver Big 
Ope atio s , Associated Press, 2013, pp. 4–5 <http://www.pulitzer.org/files/2014/international-
reporting/callimachi/02callimachi2014.pdf> [accessed 11 December 2017]. 
100 For a more detailed discussion of al-Qaeda s ideolog  a d its elatio ship to st ategi  ai s, see the 
first section of chapter 2. 
101  B a , Buddies o  Bu de s? U de sta di g the Al Qaeda ‘elatio ship ith Its Affiliate 
O ga izatio s , p. . 
102 Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 




whilst marginalised within the existing U.S. foreign policy and IR literature, these 
campaigns speak to a series of major developments within contemporary American 
fo eig  a d se u it  poli . “tud i g the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  response 
to all three of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates e a les this thesis to shed a i he  light 
on: (1) the geographical diffusion of the principal focus of U.S. military intervention 
i  the glo al south a a  f o  Afgha ista  a d I a ;  Af i a s e e ge e as a  
increasingly key site of counterterrorism operations (and of American imperialism 
o e oadl ; a d  the O a a ad i ist atio s etooli g of the oe i e 
practices of U.S. military intervention during the period of perceived imperial decline 
which followed the Iraq War and Global Financial Crisis. To qualify however, U.S. 
counterterrorism operations against AQI and the Syrian based Nusra Front (an 
offshoot of the AQI successor group the Islamic State of Iraq) have been excluded 
from this analysis.103 This is due to their operations in, and emergence from, the 
battlefield theatre of Iraq. The military response against al-Qaeda s o e based in the 
Federally Administrated Tribal Areas of Pakistan has also been excluded from this 
thesis  st u tu ed-focused comparison because they were affixed to combat 
operations in Afghanistan.104 I  sho t, this thesis  e pi i al a al sis d a s i sight 
from the counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda s adhe e ts, asso iated 
forces and its offshoots to the degree that they help contextualise its critical study of 
the means, goals and continuity of the military response to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates. They are not, however, the focus of its structured-focused comparison in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
                                                          
103 Humud, p. 3; Hashim,‘The Islamic State: From Al‐Qaeda Affiliate to Caliphate’, p. 77. 
104 Following their expulsion from Afghanistan, al-Qaeda s o e leadership relocated to the Federally 
Ad i iste ed T i al A eas of Pakista . Follo i g O a a s ele tio , the ad i ist atio  u dled these 
two states together as different fronts of the same combat theatre: AFPAK. As explained by Richard 
Hol ooke, “pe ial E o  to Afgha ista  a d Pakista , i  August , the AFPAK  la el as ot just 
an effort to saved eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that 
there is one theatre of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the 
western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate.   O  the easte  side, it s 
the sovereign territory of Pakistan.  But it is there on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that 
the international terrorist movement is located. Al Qaeda and other organizations of its sort and 
e ha e to thi k of it that a , ot to disti guish et ee  the t o . ‘i ha d Hol ooke, “pee h at 
the 45th Munich Security Conference - / / , Munich Security Conference, 2009 
<https://www.securityconference.de/en/activities/munich-security-conference/msc-




The parameters and scope of this thesis  st u tu ed-focused comparison are 
dis ussed i  o e detail at the sta t of hapte  . To su a ise the ethod s o e 
tenets briefly, as proposed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, structured-
focused comparison are structured because they require the researcher to write 
ge e al uestio s that efle t the esea h o je ti e a d that these uestio s a e 
asked of ea h ase u de  stud  to guide a d sta da dise data olle tio .105 The 
method is focused in that only certain dimensions of each case are examined. The 
first three questions of this thesis' structured-focused comparison open up the 
political economy animators of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
regional al-Qaeda s affiliates. The  ask:  
 
1. Did AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM attempt to conduct terrorist strikes against the 
continental U.S. or the U.S. military presence overseas? 
 
2. To what extent did AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM attempt to disrupt the 
reproduction of open-doors access to the markets, resources and labour of 
the global south?  
 
3. To what extent did AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM attempt to disrupt the 
reproduction of closed frontiers throughout the global south? 
 
The se o d set of th ee uestio s hi h fo  this thesis  structured-focused 
comparison open up the debate on the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. They ask: 
 
4. What was the role of drone-launched targeted killings in the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM? 
 
5. What was the role of Special Operations Forces and Private Military Security 
Contractors in the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP/al-
Shabaab/AQIM? 
 
6. What was the role of security force assistance programmes in the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM? 
 
                                                          




The content of these questions is informed by my analysis throughout the first 
section of this thesis (chapters 2-4). 
 
Overcoming the methodological challenges of Obama s Secret Wars 
 
As a presidential candidate, Obama had pledged to govern as one of the most 
transparent administrations in American history.106 On his second day in office, he 
e t as fa  as to issue a P eside tial Me o a du  hi h lea l  spelt out that [t]he 
Government should not keep information confidential merely because public officials 
might be embarrassed by disclosure, because errors and failures might be revealed, 
o  e ause of spe ulati e o  a st a t fea s .107 Throughout his presidency however, 
these principels were violated as the legal justification for overseas targeted killings 
(including against American citizens)108 and information on U.S. Special Operation 
Forces and their activities were withheld.109 According to the veteran New York Times 
jou alist Da id “a ge , the O a a ad i ist atio  a ked a o gst the ost losed, 
control freak ad i ist atio  [he had] e e  o e ed . 110  To paraphrase Donald 
Rumsfeld, as it pertains to many of the specific details of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, American foreign policy scholars have 
often been left grappling with a se ies of k o  u k o s : thi gs that e o  
know we do not know about what has been dubbed the se et a s  fought  the 
                                                          
106 Barack Obama, P ess ‘elease - Obama Pledges Most Transparent and Accountable Administration 
i  Histo ,  <http:// .p eside .u s .edu/ s/?pid= > [a essed  No e e  ]. 
107 Quoted in Da id Wei , A Jou alist E plo es O a a s T a spa e t  Go e e t , CBS News, 2009 
<https://www.cbsnews.com/news/a-journalist-explores-obamas-transparent-government/> 
[accessed 11 November 2017]. 
108 Despite pledging to improve the transparency of the drone programme, much of legal justification 
for, and the targets of, the drone campaign was withheld during his presidency. Christopher Fuller, 
The Assassi  i  Chief: O a a s D o e Lega , i  The Obama Doctrine A Legacy of Continuity in US 
Foreign Policy?, ed. by Michelle Bentley and Jack Holland (Oxon: Routledge, 2016), pp. 131–49 (pp. 
140–41). This veil of executive secrecy was only (partially) pierced in strikes which killed American 
citizens, and even then, only reluctantly. This obstruction was most notable in the case of the strike 
against Anwar Al-Awlaki.  
109 To provide one example, DOD officials refused to publicly acknowledge the Joint Special Operations 
Co a d s J“OC  e iste e u til se e al ea s i to the Obama presidency. It has also been reported 
that JSOC commanders were forbidden from keeping written records of their operations in case they 
became the subject of future Freedom of Information Act requests. Mark Mazzetti, The Way of the 
Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth (New York: Penguin, 2013), p. 64. 
110 D la  B e s, “a ge : 'This Is the Most Closed, Co t ol-F eak Ad i ist atio  I e E e  Co e ed , 
Politico, 2013 <https://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2013/10/sanger-this-is-the-most-closed-




Obama administration. 111  As one investigative journalist has aptly put it, the 
esea he  is ofte  left ith this ki d of shado  world, and you pick up every 
discrete fact that you can—k o i g all the hile that ou e o l  getti g a gli pse 
of so ethi g a d ot the hole thi g .112   
 
The primary method adopted to overcome the methodological barriers presented by 
executive secrecy is a qualitative content analysis of a range of primary and 
se o da  sou e ate ial. This ethod s ste ati all  a al ses the o te t of 
o u i atio , o de si g the spee hes a d iti gs of A e i a  poli ake s to 
themes and subjects which pertain to my primary research question.113 This requires 
me, as a researcher, to draw descriptive and analytical inferences from a range of 
appropriate source material. 114  This i ludes a thi k  a al sis of the a o i al 
defence documents published by the DOD after 9/11 including amongst others, the 
National Security Strategy, the National Strategy for Counterterrorism (known prior 
to 2011 as the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism) and the Quadrennial 
Defence Review. These documents capture the broad contours of U.S. national 
security and counterterrorism policy during the War against al-Qaeda. Further depth 
is given to my qualitative content analysis by the review of the national security 
spee hes a d state e ts of ke  ad i ist atio  offi ials, DOD s figu es a d the 
president himself. A fine grained review of the reports written by the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional Research Service (CRS) adds a 
third crease to my qualitative content analysis, providing an extra layer of depth to 
my critical re-examination of the means, goals and continuity of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates.  
 
                                                          
111 The executive secrecy which surrounded U.S. counterterrorism operations in a  i  ou t ies e 
a e ot at a  was maintained by, amongst other measures, a reliance on the state secret privilege, 
a crack-down on whistle-blowers, and the obstruction of freedom of information requests. See Sanger. 
112  Ta a M Kel e , Co e i g O a a s “e et Wa , Columbia Journalism Review, 2011 
<http://archives.cjr.org/feature/covering_obamas_secret_war.php> [accessed 11 November 2017]. 
113  A ash He da ia  Pashakha lou, Full  I teg ated Co te t A al sis i  I te atio al ‘elatio s , 
International Relations, 31.4 (2017), 447–65 (p. 3).p.3 




My qualitative content analysis of these official primary and secondary sources is 
complemented by my review of a small sample of the 250,000 diplomatic cables 
leaked by the whistle-blower group WikiLeaks in November 2010. The academic 
utility of the WikiLeaks disclosures has been the subject of keen debate.115 Given the 
veil of executive secrecy which was cloaked over the Obama's administration's 
counterterrorism operations, I weave through a number of WikiLeaks cables to add 
additional depth to my empirical analysis. As ith Biego , I ai tai  that [i]  
contrast to on-the-record statements, public documents and the like, the cables, 
p o ided a  u filte ed  ie  of offi ial opi io  – one which, whilst generally 
o siste t ith the U.“. go e e t s pu li  lai s, e e theless provides additional 
insight into the perspective of diplomats on the ground.116 Furthermore, in the case 
of U.S. counterterrorism operations against AQAP, my use of the WikiLeaks  cables 
enables me to shed light on the host-go e e t s pe spe ti e of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in their country. There are of course limitations to the 
academic use of the WikiLeaks cables due to the ambiguity and speculative nature of 
many of the cables. This being said, when employed as part of my subsequent 
structured-focused comparison, I maintain that their use enables me to reach beyond 
what policymakers were saying publicly and shed light on the perspective of the host-
government on U.S. counterterrorism operations in their states. My selection of the 
specific cables used in chapters 5, 6 and 7 has been determined by these twin goals. 
 
For data on the number of air and drone strikes conducted by the Obama 
administration as part of its military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates, this 
thesis draws from the New America A e i a s Cou te te o is  Wa s  data ase. 
                                                          
115 WikiLeaks  founder Julian Assange has derided IR scholars working within the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom for their relatively scant use of the diplomatic cables. During a July 2015 interview with 
Spiegel, he went as far as to claim that the International Studies Asso iatio  ope ated a uiet, offi ial 
poli  of ot a epti g a  pape  that is de i ed f o  WikiLeaks  ate ials . Micheal Sontheimer, 
“pigel I te ie  ith Julia  Assa ge We A e D o i g i  Mate ial , Spiegel Online, 2015 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-wikileaks-head-julian-assange-
a-1044399.html> [accessed 11 November 2017]. This claim has been flatly rejected with Daniel 
Drezner, for example, arguing that the WikiLeaks cables say little new or substantive about U.S. foreign 
policy. Daniel W D ez e , The A ade i  U i e se Is I diffe e t to WikiLeaks , The Washington Post, 
2015 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/07/30/the-academic-universe-
is-indifferent-to-wikileaks/?utm_term=.590107560497> [accessed 11 November 2017]. 




Unlike the Bureau of Investigative Journalism D o e “t ikes A d Co e t A tio  
database which has also been widely used by academics and commentators, New 
America provides a breakdown of U.S. direct actions in Somalia and Yemen by type, 
e.g. airstrike, drone strike, ground operation.117 When used as part of my structured-
focused comparison, this greater level of detail enables me to more accurately map 
the relationship between drone strikes vis-à-vis other direct exercises of U.S. coercive 
power (Special Operation Force kill/capture raids, manned airstrikes) in the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP a d al-Shabaab. To generate figures on 
the volume of military assistance given to partner states across the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel, I rely on the Security Assistance Monitor (SAM). 
Managed by the Centre for International Policy, “AM ai s to i fo  poli ake s, 
media, scholars, NGOs and the public (in the United States and abroad) about trends 
and issues related to U.S. foreign security assista e . 118  The four interactive 
datasets which SAM have generated on security aid, economic aid, training of foreign 
militaries and arms sales, amongst other goals, are intended to help fill the la k 
hole  which has traditionally confronted those examining this aspect of American 
foreign policy. 119  The Security Aid Database is used throughout my structured-
focused comparison to add texture and depth to my empirical analysis. The Security 
Aid Database catalogues the funds obligated (although not necessarily distributed) 
for U.S. military assistance programmes from 2000 onward.120  
 
                                                          
117 New America determines a strike- whether this is conducted by a manned aircraft, drone or Special 
Operation Force- o  the asis of at least t o edi le  edia sou es e if i g it. The p efe e e has 
been, however, for four. See https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/americas-counterterrorism-
wars/methodology/ 
118  “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , A out Us , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<https://securityassistance.org/about_us> [accessed 11 November 2017]. 
119 Ma ga et Loo e , “e u it  Assista e Mo ito  Data ase Ai s to Fill Bla k Hole  of U.“. Fo eig  
Assista e Co e age , I ter atio al Jour alists  Net ork, 2016 <https://ijnet.org/en/blog/security-
assistance-monitor-database-aims-fill- la k-hole -us-foreign-assistance-coverage> [accessed 11 
November 2017]. 
120 The SAM generates the figures included in this database from a wide range of primary sources 
including: (prior to its discontinuation in FY 2012) the Section 1209 report, the Foreign Military 
Training and DoD Engagement of Activities of Interest report, the Section 1009 reports on U.S. 
counter-drug aid published by the DOD; the Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ)- Foreign 
Operations published by the DOS; reports published by the CRS and the GOA; and Freedom of 
Informatio  A t FOIA  e uests. Fo  a o e o plete dis ussio  of the “e u it  Assista e Mo ito s 
methodology, see Use s Guide , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 






This introduction has made a central contribution to this thesis moving forward. It 
has spelt out the contribution made by, and originality of, my critical study of the 
means, animators and continuity of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s p eside . As detailed in the first section of 
this chapter, this thesis makes three timely contributions to the American foreign 
policy subfield worth briefly recapping here: 
 
 First, it traces how there was more to the means of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq than just drone-launched targeted 
killings. Military assistance programmes were also a key component of how 
the Obama administration retooled the coercive practices of military 
intervention in the global south in the era of perceived imperial decline which 
followed the Iraq War and Global Financial Crisis; 
 
 Second, it opens up the political economy animators of counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq to a more comprehensive analysis. 
More specifically, the defence of open-doors and closed frontiers is shown to 
ha e also ee  a o e  putti g the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i to otio ; 
 
 And third, working with the historical materialist tradition, this thesis 
advances an alternative theoretically informed explanation for the continuity 
i  U.“. fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli  du i g O a a s p eside . This 
helps pierce the temporal parochialism that has characterised much of the 
existing debate on the subject, more firmly situating the study of the means 
and goals of the contemporary practices of U.S. military intervention in the 
global south within the historical practices of American imperialism. 
 
This thesis also makes two broader contributions toward IR scholarship:  
 
 It sheds new light on the relationship between the spatial organisation of 
American power and the use of military assistance programmes to armour 
the reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors in the global south; 
 
 and it pierces the dualism which has decoupled much of the existing study of 
the goals of U.S. military intervention from those of al-Qaeda and its affiliates, 
in order to advance a richer theorisation of how, through a sophisticated 
strategy of economic warfare, the movement challenged the practices of 





To help the reader navigate the remainder of this thesis, a detailed chapter 
breakdown has been provided below. This thesis is divided into two sections. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 (section one) outlines the theoretical, conceptual and empirical 
foundation of my analysis. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 (section two) build on this foundation 
and provides the empirical body of this thesis. It is organised around my structured-
fo used o pa iso  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates.   
 
Chapter 2 Theorising the means and goals of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south: a historical materialist framework of analysis 
 
The principal aim of this chapter is to unpack the historical materialist 
theoretical framework which animates my critical re-examination of the goals 
of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates. Afte  this thesis  o e eta-theoretical commitments are unpacked, 
the first section of this chapter outlines my understanding of two concepts 
which are key to my analysis later in this chapter: coercive power and 
imperialism. In the second section of this chapter, three alternative 
theoretically informed explanations for the continuity in U.S. 
counterterrorism and foreign policy after 9/11 are outlined and critiqued: 
neorealism, neoclassical realism and constructivism. In the final section of this 
hapte , I the  o ti ue to u pa k histo i al ate ialis s u de sta di g of 
the goals of, and continuity in, U.S. military intervention in the global south. 
My reading of historical materialism is then positioned within the wider canon. 
I conclude this chapter by advancing a richer explanation of the use of military 
assistance programmes. This is accomplished by combining Stokes and 
‘aphael s e phasis on military assistance programmes as a key conduit for 
defending and stabilizing preferred state formations in the global south from 
antithetical social forces with Colas a d “aull s theo isatio  of ho  the spatial 
arrangement of American power sets soft  li its to ho  all ad i ist atio s 
can project U.S. coercive power into the global south. 
 
Chapter 3 “ituati g the O a a ad i istratio s ilitar  respo se to al-Qaeda s 
affiliates within the Obama Doctrine and U.S. counterterrorism operations after 9/11 
 
The p i ipal ai  of this hapte  is to situate the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  oth the p eside t s 
overarching foreign and security doctrine and the evolution of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in the global south after 9/11. This chapter 
begins by carving out the uneasy relationship et ee  O a a s 
counterterrorism policy on the one hand and his overarching foreign policy 




military intervention in the global south is explained in relation to historical 
ate ialis s e phasis o  a titheti al so ial fo es as a p i ipal ta get of 
American military intervention in the global south. In the second section of 
this chapter, the la k-bo  of al-Qaeda s ideolog  a d st ategi  goals is the  
opened up. This provides the space for me to conceptualise al-Qaeda as an 
antithetical social force which challenged the practices of American 
imperialism from below. In the final section of this chapter, a six-stage 
periodization of the War against al-Qaeda is constructed from the 9/11 
atta ks to the e d of O a a s p eside . Du i g the th ee-year period 
between the drawdown of combat operations against al-Qaeda s o e i  
Pakistan in the autumn of 2011 until the beginning of combat operations 
against the Islamic State in September 2014, the military response to al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates is sho  to ha e ee  the p i ipal fo us of the 
War against al-Qaeda. This chapter concludes by reflecting on what this 
pe iodizatio  e eals a out Af i a s e e ge e as a  i easi gl  ke  site of 
U.S. military intervention in the global south, and the central role of AFRICOM 
and military assistance therein. 
 
Chapter 4 Bringing security force assistance back in: Unpa ki g O a a s s all-
footpri t  approa h to ou terterroris  
 
This principal aim of this chapter is to challenge the prevailing understanding 
of how the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south 
e e etooled du i g O a a s p eside . This is i  o de  to p o ide a i he  
understanding of the means of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilitary response 
to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  hapte s ,  a d . This chapter begins by 
defining two of the concepts which are key to setting some limits to my 
subsequent structured-focused comparison: counterterrorism and security 
force assistance. The second section of this chapter begins by demonstrating 
the theoretical poverty of the existing explanations of the goals of drone-
launched targeted killings. From this foundation, it then continues to outline 
and critique what I coin the drone-centrism of the extant IR and U.S. foreign 
policy literature. The final section of this chapter then works to reconcile the 
rise of drone warfare with the parallel rise of security force assistance 
programmes du i g O a a s p eside . Both drone-launched targeted 
killings and security force assistance programmes are conceptualised as 
having formed constituent parts of a variegated small-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism which also made auxiliary use of Special Operations Forces 
and Private Military Security Contractors.  
 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 Re-examining the means and drivers of the Obama 
ad i istratio s ilitar  respo se to AQAP, al-Shabaab and AQIM  
 
Chapters 5-7 build on the theoretical and analytical framework outlined in the 
first section of this thesis. It takes the form of a structured focused 
o pa iso  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP 




each chapter provides a chronological roadmap of some of the major 
developments in the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations against 
the affiliate after 9/11. This process, which George and Bennett have labelled 
soaki g a d poki g , o te tualises  su se ue t a al sis of the ea s 
and drivers of the Obama ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to the affiliate i  
the second and third section of each chapter. 121  Drawing from both my 
historical materialist theoretical framework (chapter 2) and my theorisation 
of al-Qaeda s sophisti ated app oa h to e o o i  a fare (chapter 3), the 
second section of each chapter advances an alternative explanation of the 
drivers of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se against al-Qaeda s 
affiliates. AQAP, al-Shabaab and AQIM are shown to have threatened not just 
American national security, but the reproduction of closed frontiers and 
open-doors in and around Africa. Drawing from my conceptualisation of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s s all-footprint approach to counterterrorism 
detailed in chapter 4, the third and final section of each chapter revisits the 
means of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to ea h affiliate. I 
argue that although the exact configuration of the small-footprint approach 
to counterterrorism varied, security force assistance was central to the means 
of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
defence of closed frontiers and open-doors.  
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
This hapte  su a ises this thesis  ke  fi di gs. It egi s  eite ati g the 
gap for, and originality of, this thesis within the existing scholarship on 
O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli . F o  he e, its o t i utio s to 
the existing debates on the means, animators and continuity of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are reviewed. 
Some of the limitations of this study are briefly discussed in the second 
section of this chapter. Possible areas for future research are then also 
discussed. This chapter concludes by reviewing some of the implications of 
 fi di gs fo  Do ald T u p s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli ies. I a gue 
that the study of al-Qaeda s affiliates a d histo i al ate ialis  a  offe  
important insight into this emerging body of American foreign policy 
scholarship. 
  
                                                          






Theorising the goals and continuity of U.S. military intervention in the 




The previous chapter outlined the o igi alit  of, a d o t i utio  ade , this thesis  
critical re-e a i atio  of the ea s a d goals of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. Ha i g laid this fou datio , the p i ipal 
aim of this chapter is to unpack the historical materialist theoretical framework which 
informs my understanding of the goals of, and continuity in, U.S. military intervention 
in the global south. A primary target of U.S. military intervention in the global south 
is shown to have been antithetical social forces which have challenged the practices 
of U.S. imperialism from below. I understand U.S. military intervention as having 
been key to maintaining the primacy of both the American state and capitalist-
market relations more broadly. This is because they have worked to armour the 
ep odu tio  of open-doors (capitalist markets) and closed frontiers (sovereign 
states . 122  Despite tactical adjustments in how U.S. coercive power has been 
exercised and the pretexts which have been put forward by American policymakers 
to justify it, I thus argue that the goals of U.S. military intervention in the global south 
have remained constant. I conclude this chapter by documenting how programmes 
designed to train, equip, advise and accompany foreign security forces have been key 
to resolving a core tension inherent within American imperialism: how to defend, 
deepen and extend open-doors and closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy 
of the American state and capitalist-market relations) without directly controlling 
territory in the global south. The exercise of U.S. coercive power through, rather than 
over, politically sovereign states configured to be open to the transnational flow of 
apital is a gued to ha e set soft  limits to how all administrations are able to project 
U.S. coercive power into the global south. Whilst the deterritorialized logic of 
                                                          




American imperialism can be violated, as seen recently in Iraq, protracted military 
occupations exert a significant penalty which encourages, if not determines, their 
correction.  
 
As noted above, this chapter positions my theoretical framework within the key 
scholarly debates around the goals of and continuity in the contemporary practices 
of U.S. military intervention in the global south. In this respect, I have been careful 
to avoid talking past alternative theoretically informed explanations for the 
continuity in U.S. counterterrorism and foreign policy after 9/11. In weaving through 
neorealist, neoclassical realist and constructivist informed explanations, I am able to 
directly speak to the gap for, and value-added of, historical materialism as a 
theoretical lens for studying U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan 
and Iraq. As discussed in the introduction, this contribution is key for how this thesis 
is positioned within the American foreign policy subfield. Historical materialism 
advances a richer understanding of the continuity in U.S. foreign and 
counterterrorism operations after 9/11- an understanding which is better placed to 
problematize what these military interventions were for, capture their relationship 
to the historical practices of U.S. intervention in the global south and explain their 
relationship to the hierarchical structures of American power. Given the richness of 
the literature on the roots and drivers of contemporary American foreign policy, it is 
important to qualify that I have not attempted to engage with all the different 
theoretically informed accounts of U.S. intervention in the global south (although 
substantial effort has been made to engage with the most notable contributions). 
Rather, this chapter advances an indicative (rather than definitive) account of the 
animators of American military intervention in the global south. 
 
Chapter Outline  
 
As noted above, the primary aim of this chapter is to outline the theoretical 
framework which animates my critical re-examination of the means and goals of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates. To this end, the 




 outli i g  u de sta di g of I‘ theo  as a le s  hi h a  e used to interpret 
and make sense of a complex social reality to the degree that I am able to make some 
coherent clai s a out it. M  atte tio  the  shifts to ualif i g the iti al ess  of 
my analysis, and distancing myself from positivist approaches to IR. I then continue 
to outline my critical realist ontology and understanding of causality. This discussion 
opens up the space for me to then clarify the weight given to economic factors vis-à-
vis alternative animators of U.S. military intervention in my analysis, and how I claim 
to confidently speak about the goals of American foreign policy in the global south. 
Rounding off this discussion, my understanding of the blended character of structure 
and agency is then established. I conclude the first section of this chapter by outlining 
my understanding of two concepts which are central to my entire analysis: coercive 
power and imperialism.  
 
The second section of this chapter continues to outline and critique three alternative 
explanations for the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism and foreign policy since 9/11: 
neorealism, neoclassical realism and constructivism. I begin by arguing that 
neorealism is unable to capture what al-Qaeda has wanted or how it has tried to 
accomplish its strategic objectives. From here, my attention shifts to outlining and 
critiquing the neoclassical realist and constructivist informed explanations for the 
continuity in American foreign and counterterrorism policies since 9/11. Both 
perspectives are shown to have washed out the larger structures of global capitalism 
in animating U.S. military intervention in the global south. To add empirical depth to 
this critique, I weave together the Open-Door literatures on American foreign policy 
from the twentieth century onward. My analysis here has two goals. The first is to 
pierce the temporal parochialism which has characterised much of the existing study 
of the o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli . This gi es 
additio al eight to  all to situate this thesis  iti al e-examination of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se agai st al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  the 
wider historical practices of U.S. imperialism in the global south. This helps move the 
debate on the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy beyond the current focus on 
how such operations were fought, to engage more deeply with the question of what 




open-door access to the markets, resources and labour of the global south as a key 
animator of U.S. military intervention in the global south. This, in turn, helps 
contextualise the need for, and some of the core tenets of, my historical materialist 
theoretical framework. 
 
Tying the two previous sections together, the final section of this chapter continues 
to u pa k histo i al ate ialis s o e theo eti al o it e ts. It egi s  
e a i i g the theo s u de sta di g of the goals of, a d o ti uit  ithi , U.“. 
military intervention in the global south. I then distance myself from arguably the 
most influential school of contemporary historical material scholarship within the IR 
canon: neo-Gramscianism. Whilst I remain sympathetic to the neo-Gramscian effort 
to expand the debate on the character of U.S. intervention in the global south to 
include a greater focus on the pursuit of spontaneous consent, I maintain that the 
character of U.S./global south relations has remained overwhelmingly coercive. 
Second, as it pertains to the debate on who the A e i a  state s poli i g of 
antithetical social forces in the global south has benefited, I argue that William 
‘o i so s talk of a dete ito ialized t a s atio al apitalist states o e looks the 
dual logi  of A e i a  po e , a d the o ti ui g atio al logi  of U.“. i pe ialis . 
I conclude the third section of this chapter by first discussing how military assistance 
has been widely recognised within historical materialist scholarship as a central 
instrument in the U.S. coercive power toolbox. From here, a richer explanation for 
the use of military assistance as a key tool of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south is advanced tied to the spatial organisation of American power. 
 
Research design: meta-theoretical commitments  
 
The aim of the first section of this chapter is to clea l  outli e this thesis  esea h 
design. I begin this discussion by briefly outlining several of the core meta-theoretical 
commitments which inform this thesis. These include my understanding of IR theory; 
the iti al ess  of  a al sis;  iti al realist ontology and understanding of 
causality. This discussion opens up the space for me to then clarify the weight given 




global south in my subsequent analysis, and how I claim to confidently speak about 
the goals of U.S. military intervention in the global south. Rounding off this discussion, 
my understanding of the blended character of structure and agency is then 
established.  
 
IR theory as a lens  
 
The state of IR theory today is subject to immense debate. For some, the discipline 
has been increasingly squeezed on two fronts: by practitioners outside the discipline 
who prize 'practical' forms of knowledge; and by scholars within the discipline who 
have fetishized narrow forms of empirical enquiry.123 What can be said with a greater 
certainty is that IR scholars are free to choose today from an extended toolbox of 
different theoretical perspectives. What is often overlooked, however, is that there 
is now a plurality of different understandings of what IR theory actually is.124 As 
Du e, Ha se  a d Wight ha e poi ted out, the e is o su h thi g as theo , ut 
the e a e a  t pes of theo .125 Drawing from Be e skoette s e e t o k, I 
understand IR theory as a st a t e tal f a e o ks  hi h help us ith 
generating knowledge about the world and offering a general language across 
e pi i al a eas of e pe tise . 126  They generally combine three elements: (1) an 
interpretive (or heuristic) element which provides a framework for making sense of 
the o ld out the e , ig ati g its othe ise e dless o ple it  a d a iguit ;  
an explanatory element which privileges some criteria as being more significant than 
others in explaining some dimension of IR; and (3) and a normative element which 
seeks to change the practices of IR.127 Within the context of my thesis, historical 
materialism is employed to interpret and explain a complex social reality to the 
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124 Feli  Be e skoette , Deep Theo izi g i  I te atio al ‘elatio s , European Journal of International 
Relations, 2017, 1–32 (p. 1). 
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degree that I am able to make some coherent claims about it. The implication of this 
u de sta di g of theo  is that [i]f e use o e le s e ill see the o ld i  o e 
pa ti ula  a  … [ ]ha ge the le s a d the o ld a  look e  diffe e t .128 
 
Criticalness of thesis 
 
This thesis must not be read as an explanatory enquiry draped in the methods and 
la guage of asual a al sis a d h pothesis testi g. I a  ot seeki g to a s e  h  
the Obama administration responded militarily to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates, 
positing a direct causal relationship between A (al-Qaeda s affiliates threatening U.S. 
material interests in the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa and the Sahel) and B 
(U.S. military intervention against al-Qaeda s affiliates . I also do not attempt to test 
historical materialism against alternative theoretical lens within the parameters of 
my later structured-focused comparison. This implies that the strength of any 
theoretical lens can only ever be relative. 129  Rather, my aim is to use historical 
materialism to shed alternative light on the animators of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq and draw out their relationship to the 
historical practices of U.S. imperialism. 
 
Whilst conscious of the critique of Robert Co s p o le -solving/critical theory axiom 
this thesis should be firmly read as a critical enquiry.130 The iti al ess  of this thesis, 
for want of a better term, can principally be understood in two ways. First, I am 
critical of the alternative theoretical lenses which have been used to explain the 
continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy after 9/11. In short, not only do I 
a k o ledge that there is no such thing as theory in itself, divorced from a 
standpoint in time and space  ut that theo  is al a s fo  so eo e a d fo  so e 
pu pose .131 Second, I am also critical of what American policymakers have said U.S. 
counterterrorism policy after 9/11 has been for, and the subsequent reproduction of 
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these narratives throughout the academic literature. Taken together, this thesis calls 
into question the historical contingencies and coercive practices of U.S. statecraft 
which offer a richer understanding of the means, goals and continuity of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. As Co  poi ts out, 
iti al theo  is o e ed ot just ith the past but with a continuing process of 
histo i al ha ge .132 To this end, I am careful to situate my later empirical analysis 
of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates 
within not only a study of the evolving means and geography of the War against al-
Qaeda (chapter 3) but the patterns of U.S. intervention in the global south from the 
late nineteenth century onwards (later in this chapter).  
 
Critical realist ontology 
 
The iti al ess  of this thesis o ple e ts its iti al ealist o tolog . As a 
philosophy of science rather than a substantive theory of IR, critical realists maintain 
that reality exists separately, and by extension prior, to its empirical observation.133 
This reality consists of both observable and unobservable social structures. Critical 
realists depart from postmodernists, who share both of these commitments, on the 
basis that it is still nevertheless possible for our interpretation of the social world to 
accurately capture it as it exists.134 The value-added of a critical realist ontology for 
my thesis is twofold. First, critical realism helps me capture the interaction between 
social structures and the powers which emerge from them (even if this is contingent 
on these social structures being accepted social constructions). This offers a deeper 
insight into the interplay of different social structures, on both the domestic and 
i te atio al le els, hi h e plai  the d i e s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilitary 
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response to al-Qaeda s affiliates. “e o d,  iti al ealist o tolog  also 
complements my animating theoretical lens. 135  When coupled with historical 
materialism, critical realism provides ontological depth to my analysis. It enables me 
to move beyond a potentially parochial focus on discursive and ideational factors 
(beliefs, rules and norms) to get at the material factors (including the mode and social 
relations of production) which shaped them.136  
 
Beyond these two contributions, critical realism also advances a richer understanding 
of causality, namely one sensitive to the complex and essentially blended objectives 
of A e i a  i te e tio  i  the glo al south. C iti al ealists o test ausalit s 
mechanistic conceptualisation by positivist schola s as he  A the  B . As Ku ki 
e plai s, ausal e pla atio s that a ou t fo  the i te a tio s of sets of so ial 
elatio s a d o ati e st u tu es i  histo i all  situated ausal o ple es  a e 
instead favoured.137 The critical realist reading of casualty, I maintain, enables me to 
ette  aptu e the goals a i ati g the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
al-Qaeda s affiliates. As B ia  “ h idt has a gued, e plai i g American foreign 
poli  is i fi itel  o ple , i  pa t, e ause of the halle ges posed  so a  
di e se fa to s at pla .138 This is an important qualification to make because I am 
not arguing that the pursuit of markets, resources and labour in the global south was 
the only goal a i ati g the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
affiliates. They do not, as one historical materialist scholar has succinctly put it, tell 
us e e thi g a out o ld politi s o  e e  e e thi g a out U.“. fo eig  poli .139 
Rather, the argument advanced throughout this thesis is that the reproduction of 
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closed frontiers and open-doors of the global south formed part of a larger mix of 
observable and unobservable strategic, security-related and ideational factors which, 
when taken together, can explain American military intervention in the global south.  
 
Whilst conscious that what U.S. policymakers have said military intervention is for 
can align with their intentions, I agree with William Robinson that American foreign 
poli  is ot to e a al sed o  the asis of hat poli ake s sa  they do, but on 
what they actually do .140 The risk otherwise is to uncritically reproduce the pretexts 
given for, rather than necessarily the goals of, U.S. intervention in the global south. 
On this basis, I maintain that the goals of American policymakers can be deduced by 
which groups have been directly and indirectly targeted for U.S. military intervention. 
A d e  Ba e i h has oted, [t]he p ese e of A e i a  t oops a d the illi g ess 
to employ U.S. military muscle offer the best measure of what policymakers actually 
alue . 141  Whilst U.S. foreign policy discourse can be useful for framing and 
contextualising my analysis, I maintain that what is key are the coercive practices of 
U.S. statecraft, and their relationship to the management and defence of a global 
liberal economic order which has functioned to reproduce American primacy. 
Co siste t ith iti al ealis s e phasis o  u o se a le so ial st u tu es, hilst 
I am sensitive to the difficulties (if not impossibility) of untangling how the structures 
of transnational capitalism have put U.S. foreign policy into motion, I nevertheless 
maintain that these structures exert pressures through, and are mediated by, the 
American state. Thus, they can be indirectly observed through the exercise of U.S. 
military power in the global south. 
 
Structure and agency  
 
I  keepi g ith this thesis  o tologi al o it e ts, I oadl  alig  self ith the 
critical realist informed reading of structure and agency. One of the earliest and most 
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influential proponents of such an approach was Alexander Wendt who drew heavily 
from Giddens theory of structuralisation. 142  A o di g to We dt s st u tu atio  
theo , st u tu e a d age  a e esse tiall  le ded. As he e plai s, [e]a h is i  
some sense an effect of the other; they are co-dete i ed .143 Colin Wight has also 
recognised the codetermined quality of agency and structures. For him, they are 
utuall  i pli ated , ot edu i le o e to the othe .144 Throughout my analysis, I 
am therefore careful not to reduce the military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates to 
either the agency of key Obama administration officials or the structures - both 
material and social - which shaped the direction of U.S. counterterrorism and foreign 
policy. Both, I argue, were dialectically shaped, and in turn co-constituted, by the 
other and any distinction between the two is purely analytical.145 In this regard, my 
understanding of structure and agency aligns with that of Colin Hay. Structure and 
age  a e est u de stood, he a gues, as etal allo s  fused ithin a coin. As he 
e plai s, [f] o  ou  a tage-point they do not exist as themselves but through their 
elatio al i te a tio . 146  I thus remain sensitive to the dialectical interaction 
between structure and agency. Whilst I recognise, for example, that the maintenance 
a d ep odu tio  of a glo al apitalist o de  hi h fu tio s to e su e the U.“. s 
continued primacy was a key structural constraint which conditioned the direction of 
U.S. counterterrorism policy after 2009, I nevertheless maintain that the Obama 
administration had agency to the degree that it could shape how it responded to this 
pressure.  
 
Core concepts: coercive power and imperialism 
 
Ha i g esta lished this thesis  eta-theoretical foundations, my attention can now 
shift to defining two of the core concepts which are woven throughout this entire 
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thesis: coercive power and imperialism. Both arguably qualify as essentially 
contested concepts within the discipline. They have been taken to mean different 
things to different scholars, and these perspectives are informed by the different 
theoretical lenses which have been employed to study them. Acknowledging this, my 
aim here is to clearly detail what I understand these two core concepts to be. This 
discussion is key because I maintain that neither the contemporary debates on, nor 
direction of, American foreign policy can be fully understood without an appreciation 




Invariably, any discussion of power within the social sciences begins with Robert 
Dahl. Dahl defined power as a relational phenomenon in which actor A has power 
to the e te t that he a  get B to do so ethi g that B ould ot othe ise do .148 
Although alternative theorisations of power have been advanced by constructivist 
and liberal scholars, within the IR literature, realists are argued to have traditionally 
o opolized  the o ept.149 Given its centrality within international politics since 
the Second World War, much of the conceptual debate around power has centred 
around the U.S.150 Within these debates on American power, several scholars have 
                                                          
147 Indeed, it is worth pointing that arguably the three largest debates within the subfield of American 
foreign policy since 9/11 can be directly mapped to shifts in the perception of American power: the 
first, the debate on an emergent American Empire which crystallised against the backdrop of U.S. 
unipolarity and the aggressive exercise of U.S. coercive power in the early years of the Bush 
administration; the second, which crystallised in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis and 
deteriorating security situation in Iraq, on American decline and a return to economic multipolarity; 
a d the thi d, follo i g Do ald T u p s i augu atio  i  17, on the durability of the Liberal World 
Order which the U.S. underwrote following the Second World War. Different elements of these 
debates are weaved throughout this thesis.  
148 ‘o e t A Dahl, The Co ept of Po e , Beha io al Science, 2.3 (1957), 201–15. 
149  Feli  Be e skoette , Thi ki g A out Po e , , pp. –22 
<https://www.academia.edu/3331138/Thinking_About_Power?auto=download> [accessed 11 
February 2018]. For Realists, the state with the greatest relative concentration of material resources, 
 the i tue of thei  e  possessio , is ge e all  u de stood as ei g the ost po e ful  i  the 
international system. Power, in other words, is understood as both the cause and product of an 
asymmetry in military, technological, and economic capabilities that a state cam exercise in pursuit of 
its foreign policy. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, World out of Balance: International 
Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), p. 11. 
150 Bryan Mabee has written a comprehensive account on several different dimensions of American 
power: its character, its relationship to the historical development of the American state, its goals and 




sought to shed light on its multiple forms.151 Of particular importance is the ground-
eaki g o k of Ba ett a d Du all. “peaki g to its pol o phous ha a te ,152 
the  oadl  defi ed po e  as the p odu tio  i  a d th ough spe ial elatio s of 
effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and 
fates .153 They typologized power as having four dimensions which are summarised 
in the figure below. 
  
                                                          
incorporating a greater focus on the role of domestic institutions and other domestic actors in shaping 
American foreign policy. Bryan Mabee, Understanding American Power: The Changing World of US 
Foreign Policy (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
151 See Mabee; Biegon. 
152 Mi hael Ba ett a d ‘a o d Du all, Po e  i  I te atio al Politi s , International Organization, 
59.01 (2005), 39–75 (p. 40). 




Figure 2: Barnett and Duvall s typology of power 
 
Type of power Explanation  
Compulsory power Co siste t ith Dahl s defi itio  of po e , o pulso  
po e  is u de stood as the direct control by one actor 
over a othe .154 It takes the form of actor A compelling 
actor B to modify their behaviour or controlling their 
conditions of existence in a way in which it would 
otherwise have not. 
Institutional power Like compulsory power, Barnett and Duvall conceptualise 
the outcome of institutional power as actor A compelling 
actor B to behave in a way in which they otherwise would 
not. Crucially however, institutional power is understood 
as being more diffuse than compulsory power. The 
relationship between actor A and actor B is mediated by 
the formal and informal institutions which connect and 
constraint them.155 
Structural power “t u tu al po e  o e s the o stitutio  of su je ts' 
apa ities i  di e t st u tu al elatio  to o e a othe .156 
Actor A has structural power to the degree that they can 
determine the social interests and capacities of actor B via 
the asymmetrical and constitutive relationship between 
the two. Ea h a to s espe ti e positio  i  this o-
constitutive relationship shape their social capacities, 
interests and self-understandings. 
Productive power Productive power concerns the diffuse construction, via 
dis ou se a d so ial p a ti es, of e s of ea i g . It is 
distinct from structural power in focusing on more 
generalised and diffused social processes- particularly the 
discursive processes and practices which create, and give 
meaning, to social identities and capacities. As Barnett and 
Duvall explain, p odu ti e po e  o e s the 
constitution of all social subjects with various social 
powers through systems of knowledge and discursive 
p a ti es of oad a d ge e al so ial s ope .157 
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155 Barnett and Duvall, pp. 51–52. 
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Ba ett a d Du all s fou -stage typology of power provides a useful starting point for 
narrowing down the theoretical and empirical scope of this thesis. Given the focus 
o  the O a a ad i ist atio s military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates,  a al sis 
is primarily concerned with what they have conceptualised as compulsory power.158 
In order to better capture the overwhelmingly coercive character of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations across the global south however, I move beyond 
Ba ett a d Du all s o eptualisatio  of o pulsi e po e . I stead, I d a  f o  
Biego s o e e e t coercive power framework. Coercive power can be understood 
as the deli e ate deplo e t of ate ial esou es to eli it a e tai  esponse, 
change a given behaviour, realise a specific outcome and/or gain leverage over 
a othe  a to . 159  Cha elli g Dahl s u de sta di g of po e , Biego s 
conceptualisation of coercive power is concerned with how the U.S. seeks to compel 
other actors to modify their behaviour in ways that they otherwise would have not. 
I pli it ithi  Biego s o eptualisatio  of oe i e po e  is a deg ee of o fli t 
between actor A (the U.S.) and actor B (the targeted party).160 This misalignment of 
interests is resolved in favour of the U.S. through its capacity to exercise greater 
material resources to compel actor B to change their behaviour. Coercive power is 
ot, ho e e , est i ted to the use of ilita  fo e .161 Actor B may modify their 
behaviour on the prospect, rather than actual exercise, of U.S. coercive power.162 
Biego s oe i e po e  f a e o k fu the  ad a es o  Ba ett a d Du all s 
understanding of compulsory power by including intentionality as a prerequisite of 
the concept. 163  This focus on intentionality provides for a more sophisticated 
understanding of U.S. strategy, particularly as it relates to military intervention in the 
global south. 
 
                                                          
158 Whilst the exercise of U.S. productive and institutional power helped shape and give meaning to 
U.S. counterterrorism policy since 9/11, U.S. efforts to compel al-Qaeda s affiliates to odif  thei  
behaviour in ways which they otherwise would has been its most direct response to the movement. 
159 Biegon, p. 95. 
160 Biegon, p. 51. 
161 Biegon, p. 95. 
162 Biegon, p. 52. 
163 Fo  Ba ett a d Du all, [ ]o pulso  po e  is p ese t he e e  A's a tio s o t ol B's a tio s o  
i u sta es, e e  if u i te tio all . A  e a ple of this i ludes i ilia s u i te tio all  killed i  




Despite this empirical focus on the exercise of U.S. coercive power however, I am 
careful not to ignore its relationship to the other elements of power outlined by 
Barnett and Duvall. As Biego  poi ts out, oe i e po e  is al a s deplo ed ithi  
oade  geopoliti al o te ts  hi h, i  tu , it i fo s.164 Imbued throughout my 
e a i atio  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilitary response to al-Qaeda s affiliates 
is a concern with the relationship between security force assistance (an indirect 
i st u e t of U.“. oe i e po e  a d the O a a ad i ist atio s defe e of the 
global economic order which it has underwritten since the end of the Second World 
War (a key pillar of U.S. structural power).165 Barnett and Duvall allude to the merits 
of su h a joi ed up  app oa h to A e i a  po e  he  the  ote [t]a o o ies ot 
only highlight distinct types but also point to connections between them .166 The 
nexus between the exercise of U.S. coercive power on the one hand and the 
reproduction of a global capitalist order which functions to maintain American 
primacy on the other is at the core of much historical materialist scholarship.167 
Analytically, it provides a cleavage through which to substantiate my argument that 
the e as o e to the goals of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
Qaeda s affiliates tha  just ou te te o is , a d that deepe  st u tu al p o esses 
including the reproduction of open-markets and closed frontiers were also at play.  
 
Theorising the structure of American power: Hegemony or imperialism? 
 
Running parallel to these debates on the different logics of American power and their 
relationship to one another, the hierarchical structure of American power has also 
been the subject of considerable debate. The aggressive exercise of U.S. coercive 
power in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks heightened scholarly attention on the 
structural arrangement of American power along the lines of both imperialism and 
hegemony. 168  Ma  a gued that the U.“. had take  a  i pe ial tu  a d as 
                                                          
164 Biegon, p. 112. 
165 My conceptualisation of military assistance programmes as an indirect tool of U.S. coercive power 
can be found in chapter 4. 
166 Emphasis added. Barnett and Duvall, p. 44. 
167 See Stokes and Raphael. 
168 For a more in-depth discussion of the conceptual differences between imperialism and hegemony 




seeking to become an empire. 169  This development was welcomed by some. 170 
Others criticised it.171 In hindsight, the debate on whether the U.S. had become an 
empire generated more heat than light.172 B  O a a s i augu atio  i  Ja ua  , 
it had receded behind a new wave of declinism. 173  Piercing the high degree of 
presentism which has characterised much of the contemporary debate around the 
subject, the question here is how do I understand the hierarchical structure of 
American power for the purposes of my analysis?  
 
Making this determination is particularly important because, despite its different 
interpretation by Lenin and Kautsky,174 imperialism is a concept with deep roots 
                                                          
A e i a s Li e al Hege o /E pi e , i  Hege o  o  E pi e? The ‘edefi itio  of U“ Po e  u de  
George W. Bush, ed. by Charles-Philippe David and David Grondin (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1–
; Da iel H Ne o  a d Tho as W ight, What s at “take i  the A e i a  E pi e De ate , A e i a  
Political Science Review, 101.2 (2007), 253– ; Mi ia  P s a d “tefa  ‘o el, Hege o , Not 
E pi e , Jou al of I te atio al ‘elatio s a d De elop e t, .  , –79. 
169 Fo  a  e elle t s opsis of this e  i pe ial dis ou se  hi h e e ged du i g this pe iod,  see 
Doug “tokes, The Hea t of E pi e? Theo isi g U“ E pi e i  a  E a of T a s atio al Capitalis , Thi d 
World Quarterly, 26.2 (2005), 217–36 (pp. 218–20). 
170 See Michael Ignatieff, Empire Lite (London: Random House, 2003); Niall Ferguson. 
171 See Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy; Mann. 
172 Given the westward expansion of the original Thirteen Colonies across North America during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it can legitimately be argued that what we know now as the U.S. 
is a product of empire. See, ‘i ha d “aull, E pi e, I pe ialis , a d Co te po a  A e i a  Glo al 
Po e , International Studies Perspectives, 9.3 (2008), 309–18 (p. 314). 
173  See Gideo  ‘a h a , Thi k Agai : A e i a  De li e , Foreign Policy, 2011 
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/01/03/think-again-american-decline/> [accessed 11 November 
]; Qui , The A t of De li i g Politel : O a a s P ude t P eside  a d the Wa i g of A e i a  
Po e ; La e, This Ti e It s ‘eal: The E d of U ipola it  a d the Pa  A e i a a ; Doug Stokes, 
A hilles  Deal: Dolla  De li e a d U“ G a d “t ateg  afte  the C isis , Review of International Political 
Economy, 21.5 (2014), 1071–94. 
174 Two approaches to imperialism have traditionally been dominant within the historical materialist 
cannon. The first of these is the Leninist inter-imperial rivalry tradition which maintains that conflict 
between rival capitalist powers is inevitable as they vie, in a zero-sum struggle, for monopoly control 
of the markets, resources and labour of the global south. See Vladimir Ilich Lenin, Imperialism the 
Highest Stage of Capitalism: A Popular Outline (London: Penguin Classics, 2010). Viewed through this 
prism, contemporary American foreign policy is understood as being animated by the goal of 
maximising its economic control over the global south - a dynamic argued to have informed the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. John Bellamy Foster, The Ne  Age of I pe ialis , Mo thl  ‘e ie , .  , –
15. The second approach to imperialism which has been applied to the study of contemporary 
American foreign policy was advanced by Karl Kautsk . ‘eje ti g Le i s e phasis o  the ze o-sum 
natu e of apitalist o petitio  i  the glo al south, Kautsk s theo  of ult a-imperialism emphasised 
the positive-sum character of inter-capitalist rivalry. According to Kautsky, capitalist powers are 
capable of coordinating amongst themselves to advance their shared economic interests throughout 
the global south. Ka l Kautsk , Ult a-I pe ialis , Ne  Left Review, 1970, 41–46. See also Doug 
“tokes, Ma is  a d U“ Fo eig  Poli , i  Obama and the World: New Directions in US Foreign Policy, 





within historical materialist scholarship. It is used to explain how states in the global 
south have been integrated into a global capitalist order managed by the U.S. In this 
regard, the historical materialist conceptualisation of imperialism departs from its 
more mainstream study through its attempt to historically ground the practice within 
the particular configuration of political power and capitalist socioeconomic 
development that has prevailed after the Second World War. 175  Within this 
framework, historical materialists argue that contemporary American imperialism 
can be distinguished from the earlier forms of imperialism practiced by the European 
colonial powers on the basis of its spatial organisation. Sovereign states - not 
territorial dependencies - are accepted as the primary conduits for reproducing the 
primacy of the American state and capitalist-market relations.176  Put differently, 
historical materialists argue that American imperialism has been informally exercised 
through a system of sovereign states rather than the direct control of territory in the 
global south.177  The U.S. has generally been averse to territorial acquisition and 
protracted military occupations in the global south.178 Whilst it has maintained an 
expansive global architecture of military bases (what Chalmers Johnson once labelled 
a  E pi e of Bases ,179 the U.S. has promoted political sovereignty across the global 
south on the condition that states remain open to the transnational flow of capital.180 
As “i o  B o le  puts it, the U.“. is a  e pi e full  attu ed to a post-colonial 
o ld .181 
 
Fo  so e histo i al ate ialist i fo ed s hola s ho e e , the full ess  of 
American power is best conceptualised as hegemony rather than imperialism.182 This 
is because, as Biegon has argued, hegemony speaks to the importance of ideational 
                                                          
175 See, Colás; Saull. 
176 Panitch and Gindin, p. 30.  
177 Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, p. 53. See also Peter Gowan, 
The Glo al Ga le: Washi gto s Faustia  Bid for World Do i a e (London: Verso, 1999), p. vii; 
B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al Capitalist O de , p. . On this basis, the 
U.S. is argued to have pursued a pe ulia  ki d of i pe ialis  that a ti el  p olife ates o peti g 
e t es of politi al autho it  a d ealth a u ulatio . Colás, p. 620. 
178 Colás, p. 637. 
179 Chalmers Johnson. 
180 Blakele , D o es, “tate Te o is  a d I te atio al La , p. . 
181 B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al Capitalist O de , p. . 




and ideological factors in maintaining U.S. dominance.183 Mo eo e , it also allo s 
for an analytical focus on the construction of consent and consensual relations, 
including through international institutions, and for an accounting of the non-
te ito ial aspe ts of U“ ule .184 As discussed in greater depth later in this chapter, 
these accounts draw theoretical insight from the works of Antonio Gramsci and 
Robert Cox. More broadly, whilst it is beyond the scope of my analysis to unpack 
these different theoretically informed approaches in their entirety, it is worth 
pointing out that the concept of hegemony has enjoyed widespread currency within 
the mainstream of the discipline.185 This is in contrast to the study of imperialism 
which has generally been the preserve of critical IR scholarship.186 
 
Whilst acknowledging the de-territorialised character of imperialism, I maintain that 
the character of American intervention in the global south has been overwhelmingly 
coercive. Whilst the neo-Gramscian emphasis on the dyadic pursuit of consent and 
coercion is useful to a point, if it is upon this contribution that the academic value of 
hegemony is staked, I would caution throwing the imperialist baby out with the 
bathwater. The consent of other core nodes of capitalist production in Western 
Europe and the Pacific has indeed been key to the reproduction of American 
primacy.187 U.“. oe i e po e  a  o l  e effe ti el  pa la ed i to a sta le a d 
durable political leade ship , it has o e tl  ee  a gued, he  it ad a ed the 
                                                          
183 Biegon, p. 26. 
184 Biegon, p. 26. 
185 That being said, a broad distinction can be made within IR scholarship between two camps of 
theo isi g o  hege o :  ealist i fle ted s hola s ho u de sta d the p a ti e as a leadi g states  
domination over subordinates as a result of its material resources; and a liberal inflected reading 
which conceives the practice as leadership, exercised through international institutions, which 
rewards the cooperation of subordinate states. See Biegon, p. 28. For a Liberal reading of hegemony 
see A d e  Hu ell, Hege o , Li e alis  a d Glo al O de : What “pa e fo  Would‐ e G eat 
Po e s? , International Affairsffairs, 82.1 (2006), 1–19; John Ikenberry, Liberal Order and Imperial 
Ambition: Essays on American Power and International Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2006). For an 
alternative English school reading of hegemony, see Ian Clark, Hegemony in International Society 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
186 There are, of course, some exceptions to this general rule. John Ikenberry, a liberal internationalist, 
for example, has written extensively about American imperialism. See John Ikenberry, Liberal 
Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (New York: Princeton 
University Press, 2012). 
187 B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al Capitalist O de , p. . See also Stokes 




coordinated interests of an expanding yet still imperial, liberal capitalist o de .188 
Nonetheless, it is crucial to distinguish the character of American primacy in two 
different areas of the globe: the global north made up the advanced capitalist 
economies of Western Europe, North America, Australasia, Japan and South Korea; 
and the global south which encompasses the less economically developed states of 
Latin America, Africa, and Asia.189 As Ruth Blakeley has argued, U.S. policies in the 
late  ha e ee  dominated  oe i e st ategies .190  Indeed, according to one 
estimate, the U.S. intervened over two hundred times in the global south during the 
Cold War alone. 191  Speaking to the deterritorialized character of American 
imperialism, the aim of these interventions was not to absorb territory into the 
American imperium, but rather to prevent states being internally reconstituted along 
anti-capitalist lines. 192  On this basis, I conceive of the hierarchical structure of 
American power on a two-tiered basis. Whilst we must remain careful not to conflate 
the two concepts, strategies of hegemony and imperialism have been pursued 
simultaneously by the U.S. since the Second World War.193 In short, whilst hegemony 
best captures the hierarchical structure of U.S. power in Western Europe, Japan and 
Australia, imperialism best captures the hierarchical structure of U.S. power in the 
global south.  
 
 
                                                          
188 Emphasis added. B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al Capitalist O de , p. 
48. 
189 Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, pp. 2–3. 
190 Emphasis added. Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, p. 8. 
191 Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, p. 14. 
192 As “aull puts it, the use of fo e has ot ee  a out dest o i g these auto o ous politi al u its—
as classical empires tended to—but rather as a prelude to reconstituting states internally organized 
to ette  ealize the ep odu tio  of glo al st u tu es of A e i a  po e . Saull, p. 310.  
193 My thinking here is consistent with Ikenberry ho has also a gued that a iatio s i  hie a h  
e ist a oss the a ious egio al eal s of A e i a  do i atio . As he a gues, the li e al  
dimensions of American hegemony have been strongest, and most consistently reproduced, in its 
relations with Western Europe and Japan. Here, speaking directly to the role of consent in their 
reproduction, American power has been largely exercised through multilateral rules and institutions. 
Elsewhere however, as he stresses in the cases of Latin America and the Middle East, A e i a  
i ol e e t has ofte  ee  udel  i pe ial . Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and 




Explaining the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism operations after 9/11: 
neorealism, neoclassical realism and constructivism 
 
Having now laid out the meta-theoretical and conceptual building blocks of my 
subsequent empirical analysis, my focus now shifts toward establishing the 
contribution made by my adoption of historical materialism to re-examine the goals 
of U.S. military intervention in the global south. To accomplish this, three alternative 
theoretically informed explanations for the continuity in U.S. foreign and 
counterterrorism policy after 9/11 are outlined and critiqued: neorealism, 
neoclassical realism and constructivism. I begin by arguing that the state centrism of 
neorealism has meant that those working within the tradition have been unable to 
capture what al-Qaeda wants, and the strategy it has adopted to pursue its goals. In 
greater depth, I then continue to examine the neoclassical realist and constructivist 
informed explanations for the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy 
after 9/11. This discussion unfolds in two stages. First, I demonstrate the gap in 
existing neoclassical realist and constructivist scholarship in capturing the material 
animators of U.S. counterterrorism operations. Both approaches are then also shown 
to fail to problematize what U.S. counterterrorism operations were for, having 
focused largely instead on how they have been fought and the differences between 
the Bush and Obama presidencies. To give weight to this critique, I then continue to 
advance an alternative explanation of continuity in U.S. foreign policy in the global 
south which pierces the temporal parochialism which has characterised the neo-
classical realist and constructivist perspectives. This is accomplished by weaving 
together the literature on the Open-Door reading of U.S. foreign policy across four 
epo hs:  the fo t  ea s follo i g Willia  Ha s pu li atio  of the Open Door Note 
i  ;  the Cold Wa ;  the u ipola  de ade  hi h follo ed the ollapse of 
the Soviet Union; and (4) the War on Terror. This enables me to document how the 
pursuit of open-door access to the markets, resources and labour of the global south 
has been a key and consistent goal of U.S. intervention in the global south up to, and 









Lo g o side ed the dis ipli e s do i a t theo , Waltzia  neorealism advances 
hat it lai s is a s ie tifi  theo  of I‘.194 Whilst a comprehensive discussion of 
eo ealis s o e theo eti al te ets ould e edu da t he e, hat is i po ta t to 
note is that security is placed at the centre of their theorising on international 
politics.195  As has ee  ightl  poi ted out, [ ]o theo  of i te atio al politi s 
emphasizes security more than neorealism, which posits it as the primary motivation 
of states .196 Waltz argued that the anarchical, self-help character of international 
politics pushes states to maximise their security as a prerequisite for securing their 
o ti ued su i al. Waltz is e pli it i  aki g this poi t, e phasisi g that [t]he goal 
the s ste  e ou ages the  to seek is se u it .197 This logic has been replicated 
within later iterations of neorealism. Whilst disagreeing on the means which states 
have pursued to accomplish this goal, arguing contrary to Waltz that they are power 
rather than security maximisers, offensive neorealists also place security at the 
e t e of thei  a al sis. Whilst [s]tates a  a d do pu sue othe  goals , Joh  
Mea shei e  has o te ded, se u it  is thei  ost i po ta t o je ti e .198 
 
Realist scholars have argued that since the end of the Second World War the U.S. has 
pursued a grand strategy of deep engagement. This has centred on three overlapping 
objectives: minimising challenges to American national security; promoting global 
e o o i  g o th a d its o  do esti  p ospe it ; a d a agi g the glo al 
institutional order to secure necessary interstate cooperation on terms favourable to 
[A e i a] i te ests .199 More recently, other neorealists have called on the U.S. to 
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adopt a ealist g a d st ateg  of offsho e ala i g. 200  Its proponents call for 
democracy promotion and the pursuit of a liberal world order to be abandoned as 
the animating goals of its foreign and security policy. This is in favour of a more 
austere approach to international engagement centred on containing the rise of 
hegemonic powers in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. As Van Apeldoorn 
a d De G aaff ha e poi ted out, the e t al te ets of offsho e ala i g  ha e ee  
consistently violated since 9/11.201 Others have criticised neorealism for failing to 
a ou t fo  eithe  the Bush ad i ist atio s de la atio  of a glo al Wa  o  Te o  o  
the 2003 invasion of Iraq.202 Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the decision to 
invade Iraq was opposed by neorealists themselves, with Mearsheimer, Walt and 
Waltz a o gst othe s  a gui g that it as a dist a tio  f o  the g eate  th eat  to 
American security posed by al-Qaeda. 203  As a non-state actor devoid of either 
conventional armed forces or geographically fixed borders, al-Qaeda nevertheless 
sits u easil  ithi  eo ealis s fo us o  G eat Po e  i al , the se u it  dile a 
and the balance of power. Mearsheimer himself has conceded this point: 
 
Realism is a theory about state behaviour. It assumes that the state is the 
principal actor in the international system and that there is no higher 
authority above it. So there is no place in the theory for non-state actors like 
Al-Qaeda.204 
 
Whilst Mearsheimer maintained that al-Qaeda s ope atio  ithi  the state-system 
provided an inlet through which structural realist thought could be applied to the 
movement, the commitment to theoretical parsimony meant that the core tenets of 
neorealism could not be expanded to include a more comprehensive focus on non-
state actors.205 Much as how the state is treated as a unitary black-box in structural 
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realist scholarship, the same is true for al-Qaeda. Neorealists are unable to capture 
what al-Qaeda wants, and how al-Qaeda has gone about trying to accomplish this. 
As Mea shei e  puts it, ealis  has ha dl  a thi g to say about Al-Qaeda per 
se .206 According to Mearsheimer and Walt, transnational terrorist groups such as 
al-Qaeda have, contrary to what both Bush and Obama administration officials have 
said, ha dl  [ ee ] e iste tial th eats a d a el  le d the sel es to ilitary 
solutio s .207 As Mearsheimer had previously argued: 
 
the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out 
of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and 
terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on 
American soil is probable—e e  i i e t. But this is si pl  ot the ase… 
we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, 
it is a minor threat.208 
 
To summarise then, in both its offensive and defensive variants, neorealists 
privilege security as a key animator of state behaviour. Despite its traditional 
dominance within the discipline, neorealists have struggled to explain the direction 
of contemporary American foreign policy, including the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the 
War against al-Qaeda. As I have also shown, neorealists are also unable to capture 
what al-Qaeda wants, and how al-Qaeda has gone about trying to accomplish this. 
This omission is problematic because, as I will argue in chapter 3, it fails to consider 
al-Qaeda s sophisti ated app oa h to e o o i  a fa e, a d its atte pt to leed  
the U.S. to the point of bankruptcy in order to accomplish its strategic aims. In short, 
I will argue there was far more underpinning al-Qaeda s hallenge to American 
imperialism than just conducting terrorist attacks against the continental U.S. and its 
outposts overseas. A clear, if nevertheless fluid, political economy logic was also at 
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play and can help shed light on the goals of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside 
of Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 
Neoclassical realism and constructivism 
 
As I discussed in the introductory chapter, the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism 
policy between the Bush and Obama administrations has been the subject of 
considerable debate. Unpacking both the neoclassical realist and constructivist 
informed explanations for this enables me to document how the role of material 
interests in animating U.S. counterterrorism operations has been largely ignored in 
the existing debate on the subject. As I will show, neither the existing constructivist 
nor neoclassical realist informed accounts have been able to capture one key practice 
of American imperialism in the global south: the defence of open-door access to 
markets, resources and labour. Beyond this, my review of these two bodies of 
literature also sheds light on the temporal parochialism which has characterised 
u h of the e isti g stud  of O a a s ou te te o is  poli . This gi es additio al 
weight to my call to situate this thesis  iti al e-examination of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se agai st al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  the ide  
historical practices of U.S. intervention in the global south, which reach back beyond 
the Bush administration. As will be shown, both neoclassical realist and constructivist 
s hola s ha e, fo  the ost pa t, easu ed the o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d 
counterterrorism policy against his immediate predecessor.209 Whilst this is indeed 
an appropriate temporal bracketing for determining the degree of continuity and 
change in the goals of U.S. counterterrorism policy after 9/11, whether intentionally 
or not, it reifies the misconception that the War against al-Qaeda marked a 
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fundamental discontinuity in U.S. military intervention in the global south. One 
implication of this temporal parochialism is that much of the existing debate on the 
o ti uit  i  O a a s ou te te o is  a d fo eig  poli  has ee  fo used o  
changes in how such operations were fought, not what they were for. Within this 
vacuum, the goals of O a a s ou te te o is  poli  ha e ofte  ee  edu ed to 
avoiding and/or remedying the mistakes of his predecessor. This has resulted in a 
failure to consider the deeper structural processes at play in U.S. military intervention 
in the global south including the defence of open-doors and closed frontiers. 
 
Neoclassical realism  
 
Within the past decade, neoclassical realism has emerged as an increasingly popular 
theory of foreign policy. It has been widely used to structure empirical analyses of 
American foreign policy.210 As first coined by Gideon Rose, neoclassical realism is a 
synthesis of two schools of Realist scholarship: classical realism and neorealism.211 It 
departs from the latter in that it conceives itself not as a theory of international 
politics concerned only with explaining how systemic pressures and the logic of 
anarchy explain state behaviour, but rather as a theory of foreign policy capable of 
explaining variances in the behaviour of functionally similar units.212 In this regard, 
neoclassical realists explain foreign policy decision making as the mediation of 
                                                          
210 Fo  a  o e ie  of T pe III  eo lassi al ealis , the ost e e t ite atio  of the app oa h hi h 
aims to advance a more coherent theory of foreign policy, see Norrin M Ripsman, Jeffrey W Taliaferro, 
and Steven E Lobell, Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016). 
211 As ‘ose ightl  otes, Classi al ‘ealis  is ot a u ified od  of s hola l  thought. It is ot  
intention to wash out the different branches of classical realist thinking. I am using the label here, as 
is consistent across the literature, as a catch-all label for this large body of disperse scholarship. Gideon 
‘ose, Neo lassi al ‘ealis  a d Theo ies of Fo eig  Poli , World Politics, 51.1 (1998), 144–72 (p. 
153).  
212 Against the backdrop of the rise of what would later become neo-classical realism in the 1990s, 
Kenneth Waltz would explicitly argue that neorealism was not a theory of foreign policy. According to 
him, one of the core purposes of a theory is to establish the dominion to which it can be applied. In 
the ase of eo ealis , a state e t i  theo  of I‘, this as to e plai  ho  the i te a tio  of states 
generates a structure that then constrains them from taking certain actions and disposes them toward 
taking othe s . Fo  Waltz the , the pu pose of neorealism as a theory of international politics, was to 
explain variations in unit behaviour on the basis of system level pressures (e.g. anarchy and the 
relative distribution of power). This is in stark contrast to a theory of foreign policy which, he maintains, 
would explain why states similarly affected by system pressures would behave differently. Kenneth N 




system-level pressures through a ide a d di e se g a -bag of domestic-level 
fa to s .213 These domestic variables have included, amongst others, the relationship 
between foreign policymakers, strategic cultures and ideas, and resource 
extraction.214 Co eptualised i  this a , a state s sha e of the elati e dist i utio  
of power is understood to set the basic parameters of its foreign policy. Speaking to 
the eo  o po e t of neoclassical realism, structural pressures (principally the 
i te atio al dist i utio  of po e  e ai  fi st a d fo e ost  in their theorising of 
foreign policy.215 Differences in domestic politics and ideas, however, are woven 
through to explain variations in state behaviour and foreign policy making.216 By 
opening-up the black-box of the state beyond its narrow conception by neorealists, 
but retaining its emphasis on the relative distribution of power as the primary 
animator of state behaviour, some neoclassical realists claim to advance on 
neorealism  i ui g it ith a g eate  e pla ato  i h ess . 217  Whether 
neoclassical realism does in fact ep ese t the e t-stage  i  eo ealis  has, 
nonetheless, been the subject of growing revision.218   
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Within the sub-discipline of U.S. foreign policy, Adam Quinn and Nicholas Kitchen 
have drawn from neoclassical realist theory to probe the continuity in American 
foreign and counte te o is  poli  du i g O a a s p eside . Co siste t ith the 
theoretical framework traced above, both prioritise shifts in the relative distribution 
of material resources in the international system (e.g. U.S. relative decline) as the 
primary constraint on meaningful change. 219  According to Quinn, the Obama 
administration inherited severe system-level constraints on the use of military force. 
These were a consequence of U.S. relative decline which, on the domestic level, 
translated into rising indebtedness and reduced defence spending. As Quinn was 
nevertheless careful to note, pointing to what he sees as a misreading of Waltzian 
st u tu alis , [s]t u tural factors speak to what is possible and sensible, not to what 
ill a tuall  e do e .220 To this end, Quinn argued that these structural pressures 
e e, i  tu , ediated  the p eside t s o  fo eig  poli  o ld ie  a d age . 
At this perceived intersection between the election of the post-War on Terror 
president on the one hand and the beginning of a  post-A e i a  o ld  o  the 
other,221 Quinn maintained that there was a reassuring synchronicity between the 
o e tu  of U.“. elati e de li e a d O a a s less a itious fo eig  a d se u it  
policy. 222  Ke  to Qui s e pla atio  fo  the ge e al o ti uit  in U.S. 
counterterrorism policy then was increased fiscal constraint, although attention was 
also gi e  to O a a s so ialisatio   atio al se u it  elites a d do esti  politi al 
considerations. 223  The major point of departure between the Bush and Obama 
preside ies, he a gued, as the elu ta e to egi  ajo  e  o e seas 
ope atio s .224 
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As ith Qui , Kit he  has a gued that the U.“.  geopoliti al sla k  as sig ifi a tl  
shortened by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.225 
Writi g du i g O a a s fi st te  i  offi e, he ai tai ed that the ad i ist atio  
had sought to a a do  the Wa  o  Te o  as a st ategi  o ept  i  o de  to eo ie t 
American grand strategy. 226  The Wa  o  Te o  had, Kit he  a gued, p o ed a 
strategic dive sio  f o  the u de l i g st u tu al shifts i  the i te atio al s ste  
- principally, the rise of new economic powers in East Asia.227 Kitchen argued that the 
Obama administration had sought to refashion U.S. counterterrorism policy into a 
more effective, lo e -p ofile  asti g to ette  alig  it ith the ealities of st u tu al 
decline.228 B  O a a s se o d te  ho e e , Kit he  had alked a k this positio  
so e hat, t i g the Wa  o  Te o  to the st ategi  o  of pe a e t a  hi h 
he traced as running across U.S. foreign policy from the inception of the Cold War 
onward.229 Whilst the War on Terror had failed to sustain itself as a grand strategic 
vision for the U.S., it had, nevertheless, continued to heavily inform American foreign 
and counterterrorism policy in several ways: a reliance on drone strikes as a tool of 
issue management, a scepticism about the fungibility of U.S. military power, a focus 
on the management of the global economic order, and a greater reliance on the 
economic tools of U.S. statecraft to accomplish policy goals.230 Questio i g Qui s 
e phasis o  fis al o st ai t, Kit he  ai tai ed that the O a a ad i ist atio s 
sense of the limits of power should be understood not in terms of American 
capabilities, but in terms of the kind of outcomes it is practically possible for any 
state s i di idual apa ilities, di e tl  applied, to deli e  i  i te atio al politi s .231 
These pressures pushed the Obama administration into pursuing a two-pronged 
strategy of divested hegemony in which partners were tasked with assuming greater 
responsibility for regional security and proxy forces were employed elsewhere.232 
According to Kitchen, these practices of divested hegemony spoke to a deeper shift 
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in the character of Ame i a  leade ship et ee  the Bush a d O a a s p eside ies. 
This was defined by a movement away from the more activist u ipola  do i a e  





Since its inception during the 1980s, constructivism has transformed IR scholarship. 
Given its influence on the discipline, it would be redundant to explore its core 
theoretical commitments to the same degree as neoclassical realism.234 What needs 
to be briefly said is that constructivists privilege the social - rather than material - 
basis of international politics at the centre of their theorising, advancing a competing 
understanding of the character of international anarchy, power, and change in 
international politics.235 In this respect, one central pillar of constructivist scholarship 
is to tease out the interplay between actors, the social construction of their identities, 
cultures and interests, and the shared frameworks of norms of appropriate 
behaviour which govern and regulate their agency. 236  Applied to the study of 
contemporary American foreign policy, constructivists emphasise that ideas, identity 
and discourse matter, and are key to explaining how the Bush administration came 
to construct (and in turn come to fight) a global War on Terror.237  
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Working within this tradition, Richard Jackson has advanced an alternative structural 
e pla atio  of the o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli . He has 
explained this continuity as a consequence of discursive and ideational, not material, 
st u tu es. The fou datio al p e ise of Ja kso s a al sis is that the ope -ended 
War on Terror declared by President Bush was not an inevitable response to the 9/11 
attacks. Rather, its institutionalisation as the dominant optic of American foreign 
policy was the result of the deliberate policy decisions taken by key Bush 
administration officials. According to Jackson, the War on Terror was institutionalised 
as a dis u si e egi e of t uth  hi h e edded e tai  fou datio al dis ou ses, 
policies and bu eau ati  asse lages. It e a e, i  this espe t, a powerful social 
structure (a hegemonic discourse) that both expresses and simultaneously co-
o st u ts U“ i te ests a d ide tit . 238  In explaining the continuity in U.S. 
counterterrorism operations after 9/11, Jackson thus focuses on the legacy of the 
Bush ad i ist atio s so ial, politi al a d ultu al o st u tio  of the Wa  o  Te o , 
a d ho  this p o ess d e  f o , a d i  tu  ei fo ed, A e i a  cultural grammar  
and identity.  
 
For Jackson, the War on Terror was institutionalised into American culture, political 
practices and foreign policy through two channels. The first, the speech acts and 
cultural iconography which policymakers drew from to present, justify, and give 
meaning to their response to the 9/11 attacks. The second, through the War on 
Te o s embedding into the institutions and procedures of government, on both the 
federal and state government levels.239 According to Jackson, these two elements 
were co-constitutive to the extent that language and narrative gives meaning to, and 
the efo e akes possi le, the ate ial p a ti es .240 This framing speaks to the 
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weight which the discursive - and by extension the ideational - is given within 
Ja kso s a al sis. The Wa  o  Te o  is o eptualised as a powerful discursive and 
cultural structure which locked Obama (and likely his successors)241 into continuing 
these discursive and material practices, limiting the possibility of meaningful 
change.242 Jackson is explicit in making this argument, noting that the a  o  te o  
is now a powerful structure of American politics – a truth regime – and one which 
would be extremely difficult to change in the absence of a serious crisis or rupturing 
e e t .243  To this end, drawing explicit reference to the movie Groundhog Day, 
Obama is argued to have been trapped into repeating the material and discursive 
practices of the War on Terror created by his predecessor.244  
 
Bringing Open-Doors back in: the need for an alternative reading of the continuity 
in U.S. counterterrorism operations after 9/11 
 
What connects the debate amongst both neoclassical realist and constructivist 
s hola s o  O a a s ou te te o is  poli  is that the ole of U.“. ate ial i te ests 
in animating the military response against al-Qaeda is largely ignored. The core 
question of what U.S. counterterrorism operations were for- that is to say, what they 
were intended to accomplish- is largely left unproblematised in both neo-classical 
realist and constructivist accounts. I  Qui s theo isi g, economic factors are 
o ei ed i  a u idi e tio al fashio . A sh i ki g pool of esou es a aila le fo  
de otio  to atio al se u it  poli …at a ti e he  othe s a e i easi g thei s ,245 
oupled ith O a a s o e judi ious approach to the use of military force, is 
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understood to have driven the tactical changes in how U.S. counterterrorism 
operations were conducted. Kitchen, in contrast, places slightly greater import on 
hat he la els geoe o o i s  i  i fo i g U.“. fo eig  and counterterrorism 
policy.246  Ne e theless, O a a s fo us o  deepe  st u tu al issues i  the glo al 
e o o  is u de stood as p i ipall  taki g the fo  of p o oti g e o o i  
growth in the Asia-Pacific through multilateral trade deals like the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership.247 In this respect, 
like Quinn, Kitchen is unable to capture the political economy logics animating the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  i te e tio  i  the glo al south. Taken together 
then, oth Qui s a d Kit he s oadl  eo lassi al ealist i fo ed e pla atio s 
of the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11 are 
characterised by a restrictive focus on how shifts in the international distribution 
influenced a recalibration in how U.S. coercive power was exercised across the Bush 
and Obama presidencies. What the exercise of U.S. coercive power was intended to 
accomplish, and its relationship to the larger structures of global capitalism, are 
largely left unexplored.  
 
Although explored in his earlier work on Obama, Jackson has also ignored the pursuit 
of material interests as an animator of U.S. counterterrorism operations. In his 2011 
article in International Politics, Jackson acknowledged that sectional interests 
throughout the U.S. - both institutional (Department of Homeland Defence/ the CIA) 
and commercial (private military contractors/ defence contractors) - had a direct 
material stake in the continuation of the War on Terror.248 As he traced:  
 
the discourse of the war on terror both reflected existing material interests 
associated with US hegemony internationally, and reinforced and embedded new 
material interests. US foreign policy has always been directed towards the 
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protection and maintenance of its political and material interests and the 
maintenance of hegemony within the international system.249 
 
As Ja kso  o ti ued to ote, the Wa  o  Te o s i stitutio alisatio  had ee  so 
pe suasi e that it a e to efle t the logi , st u tu es a d p o esses of US capitalism 
and political, and reaffirm[ed] and resinscribe[d] existing power structures of the 
so iet . 250  Despite acknowledging the political economy logic of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations however, two important caveats need to be made to 
Jackso s a al sis. Fi st, his a al sis of the elatio ship et ee  U.“. 
counterterrorism operations and the larger structures and practices of American 
i pe ialis  is athe  olted o . It is i t odu ed late i  Ja kso s a al sis, a d se  
into a wider discussio  of the ultu al g a a  of U.“. ou te te o is  ope atio s. 
“e o d, this th ead is o spi uousl  a se t f o  Ja kso s late  esea h o  the 
o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli  pu lished i   a d 
2016 respectively.251  
 
This omission is problematic, in part, because whilst discourse and ideas are partial 
explanations for military intervention throughout the global south, political and 
economic structures are also key. Thus, they should not be absent from the debate 
on the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11. As Doug 
Stokes has pointed out, the drivers of U.S. counterterrorism operations should not 
be reduced simply to e tai  hege o i  dis ou ses .252 The system-management 
role which the U.S. has played in the global economy since the Second World War 
has privileged it as the key mediator between the global economic order on the one 
hand and revisionists on the other.253 In this regard, the American state has retained 
the capacity to define threats to international security and the appropriate response 
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to them.254  This is important because the discursive construction of the War on 
Terror, and the core themes around U.S. national identity and culture which they 
have absorbed, can be understood as a means to an end, rather than an end in 
themselves. As Jackson captured in his earlier work, they had a clear instrumentalist 
logi  hi h fu tio ed to help justif  a d sell  the pu suit of A e i a  st ategi  
interests in the global south.255 In other words, just as how it is important to avoid 
the trap of economic reductionism, we should also guard against a cultural and 
discursive reductionism which blends out the material structures and historical 
practices which also contribute toward putting U.S. foreign policy in motion.256  
 
Tying these two threads together, what is needed is to open up the debate on the 
continuity in American foreign and counterterrorism policy both theoretically (to 
better capture the animating role of material interests) and temporally (to reach back 
beyond the 9/11 attacks, and situate this analysis within the deeper historical 
practices of U.S. intervention in the global south). The Open-Door reading of 
American foreign policy offers a good starting point to this end. This is a rich body of 
scholarship which encompasses notable contributions from both historians and IR 
scholars. As can now be examined, it sheds alternative light on the continuity in 
American military intervention in the global south across not only the Bush and 
Obama presidencies, but from the beginning of the twentieth century onward.  
 
An alternative explanation for the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism operations 
after 9/11: bringing Open-Doors back in 
 
To give weight to my critique of the existing theoretically informed explanations for 
the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11, I trace the 
pursuit of Open-Door access to the markets, resources and labour of the global south 
across four recent epochs in contemporary American foreign policy: (1) the forty 
ea s follo i g Willia  Ha s pu li atio  of the Ope  Doo  Note i  ;  the Cold 
Wa ;  the u ipola  de ade  hi h follo ed the ollapse of the “o iet U io ;  
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and the War on Terror. Each of these epochs is mapped to the work of one or more 
author working within the Open-Door tradition: (1) William Appleman Williams; (2) 
Gabriel Kolko; (3) Andrew Bacevich; and (4) Christopher Layne, and Bastiaan Van 
Apeldoorn and Nana De Graaff. Historical materialist scholars have drawn from this 
body of revisionist historiography to theorise the goals of American military 
intervention (including counterterrorism) in the global south. Thus, outlining the core 
conceptual tenets of the Open-Door canon also helps to contextualise my more 
detailed dis ussio  of the theo s o e te ets i  the e t se tio  of this hapte . It 
also provides key context for my later structured-focused comparison. 
 
The Open-Door Strategy prior to the Second World War 
 
The Open-Door thesis of American foreign policy was first espoused by William 
Apple a  Willia s, the p i kl  do e  of Ne  Left e isio is .257 Williams  p i a  
contribution to the study of American foreign policy was to explore the interplay of 
commercial and ideological factors in animating U.S. intervention in the global south. 
The e t al th ust of Willia s Ope -Door thesis was that, by the early twentieth 
century, American foreign policymakers had internationalised the idea that 
prosperity and stability at home had become dependent upon overseas economic 
e pa sio . This fi  o i tio , e e  dog ati  elief ,258 Willia s  ai tai ed, had 
propelled A e i a  fo eig  poli  ake s to esta lish the o ditio s u de  hi h 
A e i a s p epo de a t e o o i  po e  ould e te d the A e i a  s ste  
th oughout the o ld .259 Unlike the European colonial powers however, American 
imperialism was to be pursued without the e a ass e t a d i effi ie  of 
t aditio al olo ialis .260  
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According to Williams, the close of the western frontier at the end of the nineteenth 
century was the catalyst for the pursuit of an international Open-Door that 
decoupled the territorial expansion of the American state from its relentless pursuit 
of new markets. With the close of the Western frontier during the late nineteenth 
century, the safety- al e of U.“. e o o i  e pa sio  si e the ou t s 
independence, Williams postulated that the pursuit of commercial expansion had 
spilled over into both Latin America and the Pacific. Whilst China was the focus of 
Willia  Ha s  Open-Doo  Note, Willia s si gled out Lati  A e i a as the 
la o ato  of A e i a  fo eig  poli  fo  all u de de eloped a eas .261 He e the 
effort to expand American exports, develop and control raw materials, and initiate 
o po ate e te p ises  e e oupled ith a o it e t to de elopi g a egio al 
politi al s ste  ased o  lo al ule s lo al to the asi  i te ests of the U“ .262 
 
The Open-Door Strategy during the Cold War 
 
Willia s  Ope -Door thesis informed a large body of revisionist historiography 
(sometimes dubbed the Wisconsin School) which contested the orthodox reading of 
the causes of the Cold War.263 These scholars argued that the direction of U.S. foreign 
policy after the Second World War could not be explained by Soviet machinations 
alone. Rather, it was a p odu t of the U.“.  dual agenda of making the world safe for 
capitalism and ensuring U.S. primacy within this global capitalist world order.264 The 
pursuit of an Open-Door in the global south would have been pursued regardless of 
the intentions of the Soviet Union. Containment was an auxiliary goal of American 
foreign and security policy - one behind maintaining the openness of the markets, 
labour and material resources of the global south. In short, this revisionist body of 
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historiography added a horizontal dimension to the study of the Cold War. This spoke 
not only to the East/West competition, but North/South relations and the larger 
structures of capitalist exchange which underpinned them.  
 
Gabriel Kolko advanced one of the most influential Open-Door readings of American 
foreign policy during the Cold War.265 He argued that the primary objective of U.S. 
intervention in the global south after the Second World War was to secure privileged 
access to markets, resource and labour. This defined the structural relationship 
et ee  the U.“. a d states i  the glo al south, ei g the single most important 
factor in its post- a  o du t i  the Thi d Wo ld .266 Whilst American policymakers 
justified military interventions in the global south under the pretexts of anti-
colonialism and the Cold War, these goals were subordinate to the pursuit of its 
material interests. To this end, Kolko argued, the pe siste t sea h fo  a  effe ti e, 
relatively inexpensive means for using military force to attain political objectives 
e e ged as a e t al the e i  A e i a s elatio ship to the Thi d Wo ld afte  
.267 Ce t al to Kolko s e pla atio  of U.“. i te e tio  i  the glo al south as 
an emphasis on its largely coercive character. As others have has argued drawing 
e pli it efe e e to Willia s  o eptualisatio  of the titula  Tragedy of American 
Diplomacy, the defence of politically sovereign states capable of reproducing open 
o de s a d losed f o tie s egula l  e s a ed [the U.“.] i  o plex socio-political 
struggles that generally stemmed from this very support for friendly regimes and 
apitalist i te est .268  Key to these practices of intervention, Michael McClintock 
argued, was unconventional warfare: counterinsurgency operations, usually led by 
the CIA, which fell below the scale of full scale military intervention. During the Cold 
War, the practices of unconventional warfare were exercised to prevent the roll-out 
of alternative modes of production (e.g. communism) and modes of economic 
de elop e t e.g. auto a  hi h th eate ed the U.“. s o ti ued a age e t of 
                                                          
265 Fo  Pai te , Kolko had itte  the the o l  o p ehe si e account of U.S. relations with the third 
o ld i  the Cold Wa . Da id “ Pai te , E plai i g U“ ‘elatio s ith the Thi d Wo ld , Diplomatic 
History, 19.3 (1995), 525–48 (p. 526). 
266 Emphasis added. Kolko, p. 291. 
267 Kolko, p. 6. 




the markets, resources and labour of the global south. These practices were seen 
across Africa (Angola, Congo), Latin America (Columbia, Cuba, Guatemala, Nicaragua), 
and South East Asia (the Philippines).269  
 
The Open-Door Strategy during the Unipolar  decade  
 
In the decade bookending the collapse of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the 
9/11 attacks on the other, the Open-Door thesis was revisited by Andrew Bacevich.270 
Writing prior to the 9/11 attacks, Bacevich argued that the Clinton administration 
had sought to universalise the liberal capitalist world order which had been confined 
to the West (and its tributaries) during the Cold War. Despite the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Bacevich maintained that the underlying goals of American foreign 
poli  had e ai ed o sta t. As he put it, [ ]athe  tha  a ki g the ul i atio  of 
U.“. st ateg , the ollapse of the Be li  Wall si pl  i augu ated its latest phase .271 
The commitment to e o i g a ie s that i hi it the o e e t of goods, apital, 
ideas, a d people  had e ai ed.272 With the collapse of the Soviet Union however, 
the entire world could be made safe for capitalism and democracy. As with Kolko, 
Bacevich placed particular weight on the role of coercive power in the pursuit of 
these goals - a de elop e t hi h oi ided ith the DOD s pu suit of full-spectrum 
dominance during this decade. 273  Drawing reference to the interventions in 
Colombia, Somalia and Yugoslavia, Bacevich a gued that the ilita  o po e t of 
U.S. policy became more ot less i po ta t  du i g this pe iod. 274  That these 
practices of military intervention in the global south did not end following the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, spoke to the deeper motives at play beyond the Cold 
War which continued to animate them.275 
 
Addi g a fu the  la e  to Ba e i h s e phasis o  the e t alit  of U.“. oe i e po e , 
globalisation and neo-liberalisation have also been understood as distinct 
components of the Clinton administ atio s pu suit of a glo al Ope -Door.276 Peter 
Gowan conceptualised this process as part of what he labelled the Dollar Wall Street 
Regime: the international monetary and financial order underwritten by the 
American state which had been constructed following the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in the 1970s. Whilst neoliberalism tilted the balance of class relations 
within states toward rentier interests, leading to an upward redistribution of wealth 
and the growth of the financial sector, globalisation functioned to pry open markets 
in the global south to the e t  of p odu ts, o pa ies, fi a ial flo s a d fi a ial 
ope ato s f o  the o e ou t ies .277 These two practices - globalisation and neo-
liberalisation - worked to reinforce, rather than substitute for, the exercise of U.S. 
coercive power identified by Bacevich.    
 
The Open-Door Strategy during the War against al-Qaeda 
 
Christopher Layne drew from the Open-Door canon to conceptualise U.S. 
i te e tio  i  the glo al south du i g Geo ge W. Bush s fi st te  i  offi e.278 Layne 
argued that American poli ake s had i te alised the idea that politi al a d 
e o o i  li e alis  a ot flou ish at ho e u less the  a e safe a oa d .279 For 
Layne, it was the ideological commitment to the Open-Door ideology, not the 
structural distribution of power nor security concerns, which explained the American 
state s pu suit of e t a egio al hege o  i  Weste  Eu ope, East Asia, a d the 
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Persian Gulf War following the Second World War. 280  I  sho t, hilst the U.“.  
o e hel i g ate ial po e  p o ided the pe issi e o ditio s 281 for overseas 
commercial expansion, according to Layne, it was the belief amongst American 
policymakers in the Open-Doo  ideolog  hi h p o ided the oto s of 
e pa sio .282 On this basis, Layne argued that that the muscular unilateralism which 
defi ed the Bush ad i ist atio s  i asio  of I a  as o siste t ith, ot a 
radical departure from, the goals of American foreign policy after the Second World 
War.283 There was more animating the military response to the 9/11 attacks than just 
counterterrorism. The War against al-Qaeda had provided the neoconservative 
elements within the Bush administration a pretext through which to not only 
entrench American dominance within the Middle East, but also project it into Central 
Asia.284 Writing at the end of Bush s p eside , Bacevich made a similar argument. 
Speaking directly to the military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates i  the A a ia  
Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, he argued that:  
 
[t]he conflict in which the United States finds itself currently embroiled—
which since 2001 alone has seen U.S. forces invade Afghanistan and Iraq, 
while also conducting operations in places as far afield as Somalia, Yemen, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines—by no means qualifies as an exception. The 
United States is engaging in its Long War not to avert the rise of a new 
caliphate—an exceedingly unlikely prospect—but for the same reason that it 
has gone to war so many times in the past: to assert dominion over a region 
that American political leaders view as strategically critical.285 
 
Running parallel to the constructivist and neoclassical realist informed explanations 
of the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism and foreign policy after 9/11 explored 
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earlier, the Obama administration is also argued to have retained the commitment 
to the pursuit of a global Open-Door. The work of Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn and Nana 
De G aaff is u ial he e. Dista i g the sel es theo eti all  f o  La e s 
neoclassical realist informed reading of the Open-Door thesis, they explained the 
continued promotion of neoliberal globalization after 2009 as a consequence of the 
social nexus between American policymakers and transnationally orientated 
corporate elites.286 For Apeldoorn and De Graaff, the Open-Door grand strategy had 
remained the dominant world- ie  of A e i a  poli ake s, a p o ess shaped  
the ideology and interests of the leading sections of the US corporate community to 
which US grand strategy-makers are closely li ked .287  
 
Situated within a broader study of the continuity in U.S. grand strategy since the end 
of the Cold Wa , the  a gued that the Bush ad i ist atio s pu suit of o e seas 
economic expansion was distinguished from the historical patterns of intervention in 
the global south by its greater emphasis on coercion, not consent, to open-up 
markets overseas.288 To this end, Apeldoorn and De Graaff contend that whilst the 
Obama administration was more sensitive to the limits of American power in an 
perceived era of A e i a  de li e, it ot o l  ep odu e[d] the Ope  Doo , ut also 
o ti ue[d] the elati e e phasis o  oe io  of his i ediate p ede esso .289 
What had changed, however, was that the GFC had weakened the foundations of U.S. 
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imperialism in two respects: it had eroded the material basis of American power and 
undermined the appeal of neoliberalism as the prevailing economic paradigm.290 
O a a s st ateg  fo  e o o i  e o e , the  ai tai ed, had t o p o gs: the fi st, 
to restore confidence in U.S. financial markets; the second, consistent with the long 
standing drive in U.S. foreign economic policy identified by Williams, Bacevich and 
Layne to open new overseas markets for capitalist penetration.291 Albeit in a revised 
form, the Obama administration remained wedded to the pursuit of Open-Door 
access to the markets, resources and labour global south. 
 
The Open-Door reading of U.S. intervention in the global south 
 
Taken together, the Open-Door canon helps pierce the temporal and theoretical 
parochialism which has characterised the constructivist and neoclassical informed 
explanations for the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11. 
Those working within the tradition have traced how, from the beginning of the 
twentieth century, there has been a continuity in the goals of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south, namely economic expansion, to be secured through 
the opening up of new overseas markets and resources. There is nevertheless 
elasticity here. First, as Bacevich has noted, the preferred tools and geographical 
focus of the Open-Doo  st ateg  ha e e ol ed e o d Willia s  o igi al 
conceptualisation of them. The relative decline in U.S. industrial power has pushed 
A e i a  poli ake s to pu sue a  updated st ateg  of the Ope  Door [which] 
deemphasizes commerce in favour of coercion .292 This dovetails with my earlier 
conceptualisation of the hierarchical structure of American power in the global south 
as i pe ialis , ot hege o . A fu the  lea age et ee  Willia s  o igi al 
conceptualisation of the Open-Door thesis, and its subsequent pursuit by the Obama 
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administration, is that its geographical focus has shifted away from the Pacific and 
Latin America toward the oil rich Middle East.293 As examined in chapter 3, Africa has 
also emerged as an increasingly key site of U.S. overseas economic expansion.  
 
What the Open-Door reading of American foreign policy lacks, however, is a 
consistent theoretical lens for explaining the goals of U.S. intervention in the global 
south. The Open-Door canon shares an common interpretive grounding. This is found 
in its focus on the idea held by American policymakers that the domestic prosperity 
and stability of the U.S. is dependent upon overseas economic expansion. 
Nevertheless, its explanatory component - the part which privileges some criteria as 
being more significant than others in explaining some dimension of IR - is uneven. In 
other words, how the belief shared by American policymakers in the Open-Door has 
shaped foreign policy formation, and its evolution over time, remains uneven. Whilst 
Layne grounded his reading of the Open-Door reading of American foreign policy 
within an overarching neoclassical realist theoretical framework, van Apeldoorn and 
de Graaff have worked within a more critical political economy perspective. Different 
theoretical lenses, or in some cases none at all, have been adopted to explain these 
dynamics. On the basis, the Open-Door literature provides a good starting point for 
opening up the debate on the continuit  i  O a a s ou te te o is  poli  oth 
theoretically (to better capture their political economy logic) and temporally (to 
reach back beyond the 9/11). By itself, however, it advances an unsatisfactory 
account of the continuity in, and the goals of, America intervention in the global 
south up to, a d du i g, O a a s p eside . What is eeded is a o e o ust 
theorisation of the role of material interests in animating U.S. intervention in the 
global south. This can be provided via historical materialism. 
 
A historical materialist explanation of U.S. intervention in the global south  
 
In the final section of this chapter, I outline the historical materialist understanding 
of the goals of, and continuity in, U.S. intervention in the global south. From here, I 
                                                          




then move onto examining some of the major cleavages within contemporary 
historical materialist scholarship. This allows me to clearly position myself within the 
canon. I conclude this discussion by theorising military assistance as a remedy for one 
of the innate tensions within American imperialism: how to defend, deepen and 
when possible extend open-doors and closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy 
of the American state and capitalist market relations) without imposing direct control 
over territory within the global south. 
 
Explaining the animators and continuity of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south 
 
Historical materialism is a rich theoretical tradition with a lineage in the writings of 
Karl Marx.294 At its broadest extent, it can be understood as a politi al e o o  
approach in that it sees the political and economic as mutually constitutive rather 
tha  sphe es that a  e a al sed sepa atel .295 Historical materialism, as its name 
captures, has both a histo i al  a d a ate ialist  di e sio . Whilst the fo e  
speaks to the indispensability of the empirical  a d a  e phasis o  the diffe e t 
p a ti es a d epo hs of o ld histo , the latte  speaks to histo i al ate ialis s 
non-reductionist stress on the role of class and production in social relations.296 
Central to historical materialist scholarship is examining the practices of capitalism 
as the prevailing mode of production, and their relationship to social power relations 
within and between states and classes.  
 
Within the historical materialist literature, the exercise of U.S. coercive power is 
taken to have been key for stabilising, and in turn integrating, the global south into a 
global capitalist order which reinforces American primacy.297 More specifically, U.S. 
ilita  i te e tio  is a gued to ha e ee  ke  to ai tai i g ope  doo s 
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apitalist a kets  a d losed f o tie s te ito iall  so e eig  states . 298  When 
either of these two pillars of American imperialism have been threatened, the U.S. 
has intervened to preserve them. Instead of dissolving borders and absorbing 
territory into the American imperium however, historical materialist scholars argue 
that the U.“. has p o oted a plu i e se  of politi all  so e eig  states o figu ed to 
be open to the transnational flow of capital.299 As a consequence, the stability of 
American primacy is understood as being contingent on stability within states in the 
global south, and their conformity to particular political economies. Put differently, 
the use of fo e has ot ee  a out dest o i g these auto o ous politi al u its , 
as was the case with the European colonial powers between the sixteenth and 
t e tieth e tu ies, ut athe  as a p elude to e o stituti g states i te all  
organized to better realize the reproduction of global structures of American 
po e .300 Viewed through this prism, historical materialists hold that one of the 
principal targets of U.S. military intervention in the global south have been 
antithetical social forces from below, irrespective of their exact political beliefs 
(communist, nationalist or Islamist), that have sought to capture and/or govern 
territory.301  
 
Following from these theoretical precepts, one core aim of historical materialism 
scholarship has been to unravel the interplay of political, strategic and economic 
factors that explain the relationship between the U.S. and states in both the global 
north and global south. The policing of antithetical social forces in the latter cannot 
e e plai ed as a  a t of glo al e e ole e . As the  put it, ope  doo s, f ee 
markets, and level playing fields provide distinct advantages for the American 
economy over and above all others .302 In this respect, one aim of contemporary 
historical materialism scholarship has been to explain the underlying continuity in 
the goals, if not the means, of U.S. military intervention in the global south. A 
common assumption informing much of the contemporary debate on American 
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foreign policy is that the 9/11 attacks changed everything. This assumption has 
coloured the existing debate on the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism policy after 
9/11, including the constructivism and neoclassical realism accounts examined 
ea lie . B oadl  speaki g, as “tokes a d ‘aphael ha e a gued, [p]u li  dis ou se i  
the post- /  e a  ui kl  settled o  a  u de sta di g of o te po a  ti es as 
strikingly new, where old orders and established truths were rapidly crumbling in the 
fa e of a e  a d deadl  th eat .303 
 
Historical materialists reject this discontinuity thesis.304 As noted above, they argue 
that there are deeper logics at play in U.S. military intervention in the global south 
which predate the War against al-Qaeda, a d arise from structural processes at work 
in the post- a  glo al politi al a d e o o i  s ste .305 The goals of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south have remained constant since the Second World War. 
These are, as noted above, the reproduction of open doors and closed frontiers, and 
thus the primacy of the American state and capitalist-market relations. There is, 
nonetheless, elasticity here. Historical materialists postulate that how the American 
state has pursued these goals has been subject to some tactical readjustments over 
time.306  One significant distinction that can be drawn here is between historical 
materialist scholarship written during the Cold War which emphasized the largely 
coercive character of U.S. intervention in the global south, and later neo-Gramscian 
informed scholarship which has shone light on the U.S. efforts to penetrate global 
civil society and secure the spontaneous consent of subordinate classes. 
Furthermore, historical materialists also acknowledge that the pretexts that 
American policymakers have relied on to justify military intervention in the global 
south have also evolved over time. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
pretext of communism as a threat to U.S. national security gave way to an emphasis 
on counterterrorism.307  
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To conclude this discussion, historical materialist scholars are sensitive to the 
elasticity of both the character of, and justification given for, military intervention in 
the global south. Nevertheless, they understand the goals of such interventions as 
ha i g ee  shaped  a deep a d a idi g o ti uit  i  elatio  to its o e i te ests 
a d the efo e g a d st ateg .308 These predate the 9/11 attacks and reach back to 
the end of the Second World War. This explanation for this continuity in U.S. 
American foreign policy differs from the neoclassical realist and constructivist 
perspectives in that it privileges the structural logic of global capitalism, and not the 
international distribution of power or cultural factors, as its explanation. 
Nevertheless, as I now examine in greater detail, historical materialism is not a 
homogenous body of IR scholarship. Differences exist within the canon regarding 
both how the character of U.S. intervention in the global south has been understood, 
and what actors it is principally understood to have benefited. Before proceeding, it 
is therefore important to clearly position myself within these debates. This gives a 
clear indication of how this thesis fits into some of the major contemporary debates 
within the historical materialist canon. 
 
The neo-Gramscian school and the Dual Logic  of American power 
 
Neo-Gramscianism is perhaps the most well-known body of historical materialist 
scholarship.309 Its proponents drew philosophical insight from the writing of Antonio 
Gramsci to advance an alternative, systemic account of world politics which takes 
aim at its ahistorical and state-centric theorisation by neorealists.310 Expanding the 
                                                          
308 Stokes and Raphael, p. 10. 
309 The te  Italia  “ hool  as fi st oi ed  a  a o ous e ie e , a d does ot speaks to the 
nationality of its contributors. “tephe  Gill, G a s i a d Glo al Politi s: To a ds a Post-Hegemonic 
‘esea h Age da , i  G a s i, Histo i al Mate ialis  a d I ternational Relations, ed. by Stephen Gill 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 1–18 (p. 1). 
310 Although now more than an decade old, for an excellent 'state-of-the-discipline' overview of neo-
Gramscian perspectives in IR, see A d eas Biele  a d Ada  Da id Mo to , A C iti al Theo  ‘oute to 
Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International 
‘elatio s , Capital & Class, 28.1 (2004), 85–113. Fo  a iti ue of the Italia  “ hool s adoptio  of 
Gramsci philosophy and its limitations, see ‘a dall D Ge ai  a d Mi hael Ke , E gagi g G a s i: 





concept of production to include the social construction and reproductions of ideas, 
cultural practices and institutions was key, with it being argued that they were 
al a s ou d togethe , utuall  i flue i g o e a othe , a d ot edu i le o e to 
the othe .311 The focus on international civil society as the key vehicle for the global 
transmission of social practices and ideas has been held up as the neo-Gramscian 
s hool s ost i o ati e o t i utio  to I‘ s hola ship.312 It is therefore worth 
unpacking further.  
 
Robert Cox, it has ightl  ee  a gued, a  e f uitfull  ead as a  i t odu tio  to 
the appli atio  of G a s ia  o epts at the i te atio al le el .313 O e of Co s ke  
contributions to the discipline was to broaden the conceptualisation of hegemony 
both vertically, to capture dominant social classes (not just states), and horizontally, 
to encompass the prevailing social relation of production (not simply the possession 
of overlapping material capabilities).314  As an interlocking series of asymmetrical 
relationships between social classes which takes expression both within and between 
states, Co  o eptualised hege o  as a e essa  o i atio  of o se t a d 
oe io .315 The practice was centred on the reproduction of social forces exercised 
through the vehicle of international civil society and reinforced by international 
institutions and material resources. Conceptualised in this way, hegemony required 
a do i a t so ial lass to o st u t a  o de  hi h ost other states (or at least 
those ithi  ea h of the hege o  ould fi d o pati le ith thei  i te ests .316 
Only in situations where it is not possible to secure the consent of the subordinate 
group, is coercion applied. During the Cold War, this led to the imposition of 
oppressive state-formations throughout the global south in order to police 
alternative modes of social and material production. As Cox explained: 
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[a] world hegemony is thus in its beginnings an outward expansion of the 
internal (national) hegemony established by a dominant social class. The 
economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with 
this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad. Such an 
expansive hegemony impinges on the more peripheral countries as a passive 
revolution [a condition of non-hege o ]… While pe iphe al ou t ies a  
adopt some economic and cultural aspects of the hegemonic core, they are 
less well able to adopt its political models. Just as fascism became the form 
of passive revolution in the Italy of the inter-war period, so various forms of 
military-bureaucratic regime supervise passive revolution in today's 
peripheries.317 
 
Beyond this, Cox had little to directly say about the processes of U.S. intervention in 
the global south. His reading of hegemony has, nevertheless, heavily influenced 
su se ue t histo i al ate ialist s hola ship o  the su je t. D a i g f o  the path-
eaki g o ks  of Robert Cox and Stephen Gill, William Robinson traced what he 
perceived as the recalibration of U.S. intervention in the global south.318 In keeping 
with earlier historical materialist informed scholarship - most notably the work of 
Gabriel Kolko - Robinson agreed that successive U.S. administrations had provided 
material and political support to authoritarian regimes in order to advance its 
material interests.319 Where Robinson advanced on the existing historical materialist 
literature, ho e e , as i  appi g Co s eo-Gramscian conception of hegemony 
to this process.  
 
In keeping with the core tenets of historical materialist scholarship outlined earlier, 
Robinson argued that the goals of U.S. intervention in the global south had remained 
constant: maintaining the stability and openness of pro-U.S. state formations 
conducive to the penetration of transnational capital. What had changed, however, 
as the loose i g of the odes of coercive domination  pu sued du i g ost of the 
Cold War.320 Intertwined with the deepening processes of globalisation, beginning in 
the 1980s, the U.S. had pivoted toward attempting to secure the consent of 
transnationally oriented elites who are favourably disposed to open up their 
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countries to free trade and transnational corporate investment .321 This mode of 
politi al i te e tio , hi h ‘o i so  la elled pol a h , sought to fund and 
guide more moderate organizations attuned to the United States and transnational 
elite agenda, or to create such organizations from scratch if they did not already 
exist . 322  According to Robinson, U.S. policymakers hoped that polyarchy would 
provide a more stable mode of social control than the traditional reliance on 
authoritarian regimes.323 The principal target of these interventions, in keeping with 
Co s o eptio  of hegemony, was civil society. 324  I  this ega d, ‘o i so s 
contribution to the historical materialist canon was, building on the neo-Gramscian 
reading of hegemony, to begin opening up the debate on the means of intervention 
in the global south beyond the exercise of U.S. coercive power. As he noted, the 
American state combined: 
 
coercion (straight power concepts), such as direct colonial control, an invasion, 
or a CIA orchestrated coup d'etat, and more characteristically, through the 




[…] foreign-policy undertakings intended to bring about spontaneous consent 
through the political and ideological incorporation of subordinate groups.325 
 
Whilst I am sympathetic to broadening the debate on the character of U.S. 
intervention in the global south to include the penetration of civil society, as I argued 
earlier in this chapter, I am cautious about dismissing the concept of imperialism. The 
U.S. pu suit of legiti atio  st ategies , a d the sea h fo  the popula  
endorsement for the political and economic systems which Northern liberal 
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democracies seek to impose in the states in which they intervene ,326 may indeed 
have been key at certain junctures and in certain states after the Second World 
War.327 These efforts have continued after 9/11 as Robinson himself has traced.328 
Ne e theless, as Blakele  has a gued d a i g f o  oth ‘o i so s a d Co s eo-
Gramscian informed understanding of hegemony, whilst strategies of coercion and 
consent are pursued simultaneously by the American state, the foreign policy of 
powerful liberal democratic states from the North, and the US in particular, has been 
dominated by one or other of these strategies at different ti es .329 Having served 
as the catalyst for the (re)militarisation of American foreign policy across the global 
south however, I argue that coercive practices of U.S. intervention have generally 
dominated in the global south during the War against al-Qaeda. As I will argue in 
chapter 4, in part because both military assistance programmes and drone launched 
targeted killings remain contingent on at least the passive acquiescence of host-
nation governments, securing the consent of local elites in the South has remained a 
core aim of U.S. statecraft. Nevertheless, what is most telling about the roll out of 
d o e st ikes du i g O a a s p eside  he  thi ki g a out the e ol i g 
relationship between consent and coercion in U.S. intervention is the direct attempt 
to discipline antithetical social groups such as AQAP and al-Shabaab. I  Blakele s 
reading, this recourse to direct military intervention speaks to the failure of 
legitimisation strategies in securing U.S. interests in the global south.330  
 
‘o i so s esea h o  the glo alisatio  of apitalis  has also ee  ightl  iti ued 
as to who is privileged as the primary benefactor of U.S. military intervention in the 
global south. This debate on the relationship between the national and transnational 
logics of U.S. imperialism remains a significant fissure within historical materialism 
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scholarship.331 According to Robinson, the U.S. has underwritten the processes of 
globalisation on behalf of a deterritorialized transnational capitalist class. 332  This 
transnational capitalist class, which consists of the managers and owners of 
multinational corporations and financial institutions, is understood as forming a 
o stitue t pa t of a la ge  t a s atio al state: those i stitutio s a d p a ti es i  
global society that maintain, defend, and advance the emergent hegemony of a 
global bourgeoisie and its project of constructing a new global capitalist historical 
lo . 333  Glo alisatio  has ee  the e gi e of this t a s atio al states  g o th, 
Robinson has argued, subsuming the national circuits of capitalist production 
(including the American state) within larger, transnational assemblages. Whilst 
Robinson accepts that the U.S. remains the key hegemonic player in international 
politics, he maintains that it has policed the global south on behalf of transnational 
apitalist i te ests. O  this asis, he has alled fo  a paradigm shift in our study of 
o ld apitalis  a d the glo al uli g lass  in order to better capture the class 
(rather than state) centric logic of contemporary international politics.334 
 
Whilst praising Ro i so  fo  ad a i g the ost oge t od  of histo i al 
ate ialist theo isatio  o  t a s atio al t e ds u de  glo alisatio ,335 Doug Stokes 
(amongst others) has critiqued his theorization of the transnational capital class.336 
As “tokes a gues, ‘o i so  loses sight of the i te atio al d a i s  hi h ha e 
continued to shape the processes and practices of globalisation. 337  Whilst the 
American state has indeed policed antithetical social forces to deepen the processes 
of glo alisatio , i  doi g so, it has sho ed up the U.“.  st u tu all  do i a t positio  
                                                          
331 See Willia  I ‘o i so , De ate o  the Ne  Glo al Capitalis : T a s atio al Capitalist Class, 
T a s atio al “tate Appa atuses, a d Glo al C isis , International Critical Thought, 7.2 (2017), 171–89. 
332 See Willia  I ‘o i so , Capitalist Glo alizatio  a d the T a s atio alizatio  of the “tate , i  
Historical Materialism and Globalization (New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 210–29; William I Robinson, 
G a s i a d Glo alisatio : F o  Natio ‐“tate to T a s atio al Hege o , Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy, 8.4 (2005), 559– ; ‘o i so , De ate o  the Ne  Glo al 
Capitalis : T a s atio al Capitalist Class, T a s atio al “tate Appa atuses, a d Glo al C isis . 
333 ‘o i so , Capitalist Glo alizatio  a d the T a s atio alizatio  of the “tate , p. . 
334 ‘o i so , De ate o  the Ne  Glo al Capitalis : T a s atio al Capitalist Class, T a s atio al “tate 
Appa atuses, a d Glo al C isis , p. 171. 
335 “tokes, The Hea t of E pi e? Theo isi g U“ E pi e i  a  E a of T a s atio al Capitalis , p. . 
336 See also Biegon, pp. 34–35. 




as the fi st state a o g apitalist e uals . 338  In other words, the policing of 
antithetical social forces in the global south speaks directly to the dual logic of 
American power. When broken down into its two component parts, Stokes agrees 
with Robinson in the first instance that there has been a clear transnational logic to 
American imperialism, namely one which advances the generic interests of global 
capital. The ke  poi t of depa tu e, ho e e , is that “tokes  theo isi g etai s a 
clearly defined national logic which acknowledges that U.S. intervention in the global 
south has also worked to advance the interests of American based capital. The 
system-maintenance role within the global economy that the U.S. has provided since 
the Second World War, has been conducive to the interests of other core capitalist 
states because of the provision of international public goods which, amongst others, 
have included maintaining the stability of the global south for the penetration of 
transnational capital.339 These ha e, i  tu , a ted as a a ot  i du i g the othe  
core capitalist states to subordinate themselves to American leadership. Taken 
together, Stokes has thus a gued that this dual logi  thesis ad a es:  
  
[a] more structurally grounded theory of the state [...] thus avoids denuding 
the American state of political autonomy and allows for the fact that the 
American state has historically acted not just for specific sectors of American 
capital but for global capitalism as a whole.340 
 
The dual logic of American imperialism can be seen in practice, Stokes and Sam 
Raphael have argued, in U.S. global energy security policy. Control over the oil-rich 
regions of the global south (Africa, the Caspian region, the Middle East and South 
America) has been a key strategic objective of American imperialism. 341  By 
maintaining the stable supply of oil onto global markets, the American state has 
acted to not only advance its own national economic interests but to gain leverage 
over the other core capitalist powers.342 Taking aim at the Blood for Oil thesis which 
maintains that the U.S. has intervened to monopolise control of energy supplies for 
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the benefit of its own national interests, the provision of this international public 
good has also benefited the generic interests of global capitalism. In return, the 
American state has been able to exercise a significant structural power over its 
potential rivals.343 This logic can be seen, in practice, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As 
Stokes explains in length: 
 
Rather than interpreting US intervention in, for example, Iraq as a case of US 
imperialism using its military might to exclude oil corporations from 
competing nations (for example, France or Russia) it is far more accurate to 
view US intervention as part of the generic role that the US state has long 
pe fo ed i  sta ilisi g  a ket-orientated political economies throughout 
the Middle East for the generic interests of global capitalism as a whole.  
 
As he continues: 
[…] by underwriting transnationally-orientated political economies in the 
Middle East the US has (by default) guaranteed security of oil supply to world 
markets. As such, US intervention has benefited other core capitalist states 
as much as it has the US through guaranteeing a relatively cheap supply of 
crucial energy to their respective national economies and through the 
ordering of states and political economies along lines that are conducive for 
the liberal international order as a whole (which in turn benefits all core 
regions).344 
 
This custodianship of global energy supplies, which has been a key source of U.S. 
st u tu al po e , has ee  defe ded  the sti k  of U.“. oe i e po e . Fo  “tokes 
and Raphael, this has often taken the form of bilateral military assistance 
programmes intended to insulate the rule of transnationally oriented state 
formations from antithetical social forces (such as al-Qaeda) which threatened global 
oil production and supply.345 To clarify my position, I fall down on the side of Stokes 
a d ‘aphael s u de sta di g of the dual logic of American power. As they have 
a gued, [j]ust as t aditio al i te state i al  theo ists pa  i suffi ie t atte tio  to 
the positive-sum, transnational logic of US power, global capitalist theorists such as 
Robinson fail to take sufficient a ou t of Washi gto s atio al age da to e su e 
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that no other power has the means to dictate or significantly influence the terms of 
the u e t s ste . 346  “tokes a d ‘aphael s o eptualizatio  of the e e g  
se u it  e us , it is i po ta t to iefl  ote, pla s a  i po ta t pa t i   e pi i al 
a al sis of the goals of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to a d al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  the second half of this thesis.347 
 
Why train-and-equip? Theorising the relationship between military assistance 
programmes and the spatial arrangement of American power 
 
One of the primary aims of this thesis is to challenge the prevailing understanding of 
how the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south were 
retooled by the Obama administration. Key here, as I traced in the introduction, is 
broadening the debate beyond drone launched targeted killings to capture the role 
of military assistance programmes. It would not be possible - nor would it be 
necessary - to offer a granular history of how successive administrations sought to 
build the capacity of foreign security forces throughout the twentieth century and 
beyond. What is important to briefly discuss in order to preface my theorisation of 
the relationship between the use of military assistance programmes and the spatial 
arrangement of American power, however, is the weight the latter is given within the 
historical materialist canon.  
 
Over the course of the Cold War, the U.S. is estimated to have spent $240 billion 
training, equipping and advising 2.3 million foreign security personnel.348 One key 
site of U.S. military assistance during the Cold War was the School of the Americas, 
where over 40,000 soldiers were trained from militaries across Latin America.349 
Within this context, military assistance is recognised to have been a key tool for 
                                                          
346 No emphasis added. Stokes and Raphael, p. 34. 
347 Stokes and Raphael, p. 43. 
348 Parenti, p. 20. 
349 Stokes and Raphael, p. 60. For a more detailed discussion of the School of the Americas and its role 
in the coercive practices of U.S. statecraft in the global south see ‘uth Blakele , “till T ai i g to 





insulating the rule of authoritarian regimes which, in turn, policed antithetical social 
forces within their borders.350 As Stokes puts it: 
 
[t]hird world militaries, trained and funded by the USA, became central 
conduits through which US power extended to underwrite and police the 
burgeoning US Empire in the Third World. These forces provided a bulwark 
against varying forms of internal reformism, with a wide range of oppositional 
social forces refracted through the lens of cold war anti-communism.351 
 
In a similar vein, Gabriel Kolko has argued that it is esse tial  to t a e U.“. ilita  
assistance programmes, covert operations and support for authoritarian regimes in 
the global south, from the Second World War onward.352 They were key to shaping 
the internal political orders of states of economic and strategic significance without 
the deployment of U.S. ground forces.353 William Robinson has also recognised the 
centrality of military assistance programmes in exerting U.S. control over political 
outcomes during the Cold War. Along with economic aid programmes, Robinson has 
oted ho  ilita  assista e e e used e te si el  to reshape the global order 
and to thrust the US into the affai s of a ajo it  of atio s a ou d the glo e .354 As 
Ruth Blakeley has also documented, military assistance programmes remained a key 
tool of U.S. military intervention in the global south in the early years of the War 
against al-Qaeda.355  
 
Within contemporary historical materialist scholarship however, it is Stokes and 
Raphael who have written the most comprehensive account of the role of military 
assistance in defending the processes of globalization. They have argued that military 
assistance programmes have been key to defending and stabilizing preferred state 
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formations in energy rich areas of the global south from antithetical social forces 
from below.356 As they explain in length speaking to both the importance and logic 
informing the use of military assistance programmes in the maintenance of American 
primacy: 
 
In supporting pro-US state formations throughout the South, Washington has 
ofte  elied hea il  upo  host atio  se u it  fo es to i sulate f ie dl  
elites from counterhegemonic forces. Militaries throughout the South that 
have been trained, funded, and equipped by the United States have long been 
the key institution for guaranteeing the necessary stability and have in many 
instances been the central conduits through which Washington exercises its 
power. These forces have provided both a bulwark against varying forms of 
internal reformism and - on occasion - a tool for (counter)revolution should 
incumbent regimes prove resistant to US-led reforms.357 
 
Key for Stokes and Raphael has been building the capacity of indigenous security 
forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations. This assistance functions to not only 
build up the military capacity of forces loyal to the central government but shifts their 
focus from the external, to the internal defense of their borders. Counterinsurgency 
training and aid, in turn, acts as a catalyst for the militarization of state-society 
relations and the active targeting of civil society groups.358  
 
Consistent with the larger practices of American imperialism carved out in the first 
section of this chapter, Stokes and Raphael recognise that U.S. coercive power has 
historically been exercised through, rather than over, theoretically sovereign states. 
As the  poi t out, American control is predominately exercised through pre-existing 
elite structures in key regions, in order to ensure the stability and friendly orientation 
of i po ta t states . 359  When they have proven amenable to U.S. interests, 
authoritarian regimes have been employed as key agents of U.S. imperialism in this 
capacity, acting as surrogates through which the American state have been able to 
police antithetical social forces. 360  “i ila l , the  also a ept Colás  a d “aull s 
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defi itio  of e pi e as a hie a hi al a d e ploitati e [fo ] of ule over diverse 
te ito ies a d peoples f o  a d fo  a et opolita  e t e .361 Crucially however, 
what is missing from Stokes a d ‘aphael s e pla atio  fo  why the American state 
has been so reliant on the use military assistance programmes is their relationship to 
the spatial organisation of American power.362 On the flip-side of this coin, whilst 
Colás and Saull have theorised how the character of American imperialism has set 
limits to how all administrations have been able to project U.S. coercive power 
throughout the global south, they themselves have failed to meaningfully connect 
this to the use of military assistance programmes. 363  Combining these two 
perspectives, I argue, advances on the existing historical materialist canon in two 
ways which is key for my subsequent analysis: first, it provides us with a richer 
understanding of why military assistance programmes were used so heavily as part 
of the military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates; se o d, it sheds g eate  light 
on the relationship between the means and goals of U.S. military intervention in the 
global south.  
  
As traced in the first section of this chapter, Colás and Saull argue that the mode of 
imperialism practiced by the American state following the Second World War can be 
distinguished on the basis of its unique spatial organisation. It has been exercised 
through a system of sovereign states rather than the imposition of territorial control. 
Herein lies one of the greatest vulnerabilities of American primacy:  
 
Organizing its imperial power through the sovereign states system and the 
way in which this permits varying—but significant—degrees of internal 
political autonomy for those states associated with the American imperium 
highlights the requirement of local intermediaries in the sustaining of these 
arrangements.364 
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As Colás poi ts out, the disti ti el  eak li k  i  U.“. i pe ialis  is the i a ilit  of 
the A e i a  state to di e tl  o t ol so io-politi al out o es ithi  states .365 
A e i a  po e  is o se ue tl  always vulnerable to radical socio-political 
transformations within existing states and the accompanying possibility of such 
states o  e olutio a  o e e ts eje ti g Washi gto s fo eig  poli  diktats .366 
Put in another way, the essentially deterritorialized character of American 
i pe ialis  has eated a pe e ial halle ge fo  U.“. poli ake s: ho  to o up  
the da ge ous oid of ope  o  u defi ed f o tie s  without recourse to direct, boots 
on the ground intervention? 367  
 
As Colás has argued, the exercise of U.S. power through, rather than over, politically 
sovereign states configured to be open to the transnational flow of capital has set 
soft limits to how all administrations are able to project U.S. coercive power. 
Throughout the Cold War, successive administrations provided extensive military and 
political support to unstable and oppressive regimes throughout the global south. In 
Kolko s assess e t, this lead to A e i a  po e  ei g o st o ge  tha  the e  
a d egi es upo  ho  it depe ded .368 As Stokes and Waterman have traced, 
these practices have continued throughout the post-Cold War period. Intra (not 
inter) state war has remained the primary mode of military intervention in the global 
south.369 To be clear, I am not arguing that the spatial organization of American 
power has ruled out boots on the ground military intervention in the global south, 
and in turn occupation, of states in the global south. This principle can, and has, been 
violated. Rather, the point I am making here is that the sheer cost of these protracted 
military occupations exerts a significant penalty which encourages, if not determines, 
their correction.  
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The Iraq War is a prime example of this dynamic. According to Jeffery Record, the 
Iraq War reiterated that A e i a s o e tio al sup e a  a d app oa h to a —
especially its paramount reliance on firepower and technology—are often 
ou te p odu ti e .370 The capacity of the American state to coerce changes in the 
behaviour of other actors is, he argued, contingent on how these adversaries chose 
to fight, and more specifically, whether they were in a position to exploit the U.S.' 
cultural aversion to counterinsurgency operations.371 In a similar vein, James Lebovic 
has argued that one of big lessons of the Iraq War was, like the Vietnam War before 
it, that the leverage provided by U.S. coercive power was limited when employed in 
asymmetrical conflicts overseas. The size, st e gth, fle i ilit , a d adapta ilit  of 
the US military do not ensure victory in asymmetric o fli ts , Lebovic concluded, 
si e i flue e— and success— depend on conditions that the United States cannot 
easil  a ipulate .372 Within the literature more broadly, the immense financial and 
military cost of the Iraq War and their relationship to the O a a ad i ist atio s 
approach military intervention in the global south has also been discussed in 
detail.373 What is crucial to note, however, is that Iraq War speaks to more than just 
the limits of U.S. coercive power when exercised in counterinsurgency operations in 
the global south. These, as Colás argue, are a symptom (rather than a cause) of a 
more systemic constraint on the means of military intervention in the global south 
which run far deeper than just a cultural aversion to counterinsurgency and, in the 
spe ifi  ase of I a , a la k of suffi ie t ilita  pla i g. What is ke  is the fact that 
A e i a  i pe ial po e  does ot issue f o  di e t te ito ial o t ol .374 As he has 
explained: 
 
[the] American economy and society have little to gain from conquering lands 
and subjecting whole populations to their rule. (If anything, such exercises in 
direct rule tend to cost the metropolitan taxpayer dearly –– as both the British 
and now the American experience in Iraq indicates.) To be sure, military bases 
and favourable access to Iraqi oil resources may in the distant future 
contribute to a continued US hegemony. But only if there is a correspondingly 
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legitimate, territorially sovereign and market-friendly regime in Baghdad 
capable of managing such resources on behalf of the American empire.375 
 
I deed, etu i g a k to “tokes a d ‘aphael s ide tifi atio  of ilita  assista e 
programmes as a key instrument for resolving these tensions, it is worth pointing out 
that both the Bush a d O a a ad i ist atio s solutio  to e t a ti g U.“. o at 
troops from Iraq was through the use of military assistance programmes to build the 
counterinsurgency capacity of indigenous security forces.376 
   
Broached through this lens, I argue that military assistance programmes can be 
theorised as a key tool for resolving one of the tensions inherent within American 
imperialism: how to defend, deepen and wherever possible extend open-doors and 
closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy of the American state and capitalist-
market relations) without imposing territorial control. Put in another way, military 
assistance can be understood as a central breaker that successive administrations 
have attempted to plug into states in the global south where cracks in the circuits of 
global capitalism are perceived to have developed. The use of military assistance 
programmes can thus be understood, in part, as a symptom of the broader limits of 
American imperialism. The American state is far from omnipotent, either in terms of 
the outcomes which it is capable of securing nor the tools of coercive power which 
can generally be adopted to pursue them.377  The reliance on military assistance 
programmes is in many ways a reflection of these limits and, somewhat 
paradoxically, a tool which is widely used to try and resolve them. Nonetheless, these 
limits should not be read as determining the use of military assistance programmes 
in situations where the primacy of the American state and capitalist-market relations 
are perceived to have been threatened. As is discussed in chapter 4, in the context 
of O a a s p eside , d o e st ikes ha e also ee  used to fa ilitate the 
o upatio  of the da ge ous oid of ope  o  u defi ed f o tie s  he e 
te ito iall  sealed politi al autho it  has failed to deli e  se u it  fo  apitalis  a d 
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fo  U“ p i a .378 Similarly, in making these arguments, I am also sensitive to the 
othe  push fa to s  hi h a  e a gued to e plai  the use of ilita  assista e 
programmes.379 From a domestic perspective, this can include the genuine security 
concerns of U.S. defence officials and their apprehension about appearing not to be 
doi g so ethi g .380 Rather, my argument is that the reality that sovereign states - 
not territorial dependencies - have been the primary conduits for reproducing the 
primacy of the American state, has created a perennial challenge for U.S. 
policymakers which predates the recent concerns about the durability of American 
power. When it comes to explaining the central place of military assistance 
programmes i  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates later in this thesis, two pressures are thus understood as being at play: the 
more immediate constraints on the use of military force generated by the GFC and 
the Iraq War; and, as examined above, the more structural logics on the use of 





The primary aim of this chapter has been to unpack my historical materialist 
informed theoretical framework and the gap for it within the existing literature on 
the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11. As a precursor 
to this analysis, I set out this thesis  eta-theoretical commitments. I then unpacked 
two of the core concepts which animate my critical re-examination of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates: oe i e po e  a d 
imperialism.  
 
                                                          
378 Blakele , D o es, “tate Te o is  a d I te atio al La , p. . 
379 These are discussed in more detail in chapter four. 
380 I am grateful for Dr Paul Ashby for pointing this out in these terms. 
381 I would also argue that the hierarchical logic of American power helps shed alternative light on the 
empirical puzzle which has gained considerable traction within the extant literature on post-9/11 U.S. 
military assistance programmes: why, despite repeated concerns about their efficacy, have American 




From here, my focus shifted toward outlining contributions made by my historical 
materialism theoretical lens. Three alternative theoretically informed explanations 
for the continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11 were 
outlined and critiqued: neorealism, neoclassical realism and constructivism. I argued 
that the state centrism of neorealism means that those working with the tradition 
are unable to capture what al-Qaeda wants, nor the strategy it adopted to pursue its 
goals. The neoclassical realist- and constructivist- informed explanations for the 
continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policy after 9/11 were then critiqued. 
Both were shown to blend out the role of material interests in animating U.S. 
counterterrorism operations and, whether intentionally or not, reify the 
misconception that the War against al-Qaeda marked a fundamental discontinuity in 
U.S. military intervention in the global south. One implication of this temporal 
parochialism, I argued, was that much of the existing debate on the continuity in U.S. 
counterterrorism and foreign policy after 9/11 has focused on how such operations 
were fought, not what they were for.  
 
In the last section of this chapter, I argued that there has been an underlying 
continuity in the goals (if not the means nor pretexts) of U.S. military intervention in 
the global south, and that these reach back beyond the onset of the War against al-
Qaeda. These have been to maintain open-doors and closed frontiers, thus 
reproducing the primacy of the American state and capitalist-market relations. After 
positioning myself within the historical materialist canon, military assistance 
programmes were theorised as a remedy for one of the innate tensions within 
American imperialism: how to defend, deepen and whether possible extend open-
doors and closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy of the American state and 
capitalist-market relations) without imposing direct territorial control.  
 
Taken as a whole, this chapter has laid out the research design and theoretical 
framework which directly informs my structured-focused comparison of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates. Ha i g laid this fou datio , 
the next chapter now shifts its focus to contextualising the evolution of the War 




Qaeda s affiliates ithi  it. “i ila l , it also ope s up the la k- o  of al-Qaeda as 
an antithetical social force, unpacking its organisational structure, its ideology, and 
its strategy. In doing so, I am able to theorise al-Qaeda as an antithetical social force 







Situating the Obama administration’s military response to al-Qaeda’s 




The primary aim of this chapter is to determine the place of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  oth the p eside t s 
overarching foreign and security doctrine and the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in the global south after 9/11. Weaving through my historical materialist 
theoretical framework, it theorises al-Qaeda as an antithetical social force which 
challenged the practices of U.S. imperialism from below, traces the shift in the 
predominate target of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the global south after 
/ , a d efle ts o  Af i a s e e ge e as a  i easi gl  ke  site of A e i a  
imperialism. Taken as a whole, this chapter has three specific goals. First, to 
overcome the dualism which has decoupled much of the existing study of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations from the ideology and strategic goals of al-Qaeda. 
Second, to map how the military response to al-Qaeda evolved from the 9/11 attacks 
to the e d of O a a s p eside . A d third, in order to provide key empirical 
context to my later structured-focused comparison, to reflect on some of the larger 





Consistent with the aims listed above, in the first section of this chapter, I outline the 
elatio ship et ee  O a a s ou te te o is  poli  a d his o e a hi g fo eig  
policy doctrine.382 I argue that the existing U.S. foreign policy literature has rightly 
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identified burden-sharing, retrenchment and constraint as being three of the key 
pilla s of the O a a ad i ist atio s espo se to the state-based security challenges 
which he inherited during his presidency. The core tenets of the Obama Doctrine, I 
o ti ue to a gue, sit u easil  agai st the p eside t s agg essi e ou te te o is  
poli . This te sio , I ai tai , speaks di e tl  to the O a a ad i ist atio s Janus-
faced approach to military intervention in the global south: its penchant for leading 
from behind and pursuing a constrained, multilateral response to the state-based 
security challenges that emerged during his presidency on the one hand, but the 
aggressive exercise of U.S. coercive power and willingness to lead from the front 
against non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, on the other. This seeming contradiction 
is o siste t, I the  a gue, ith histo i al ate ialis s e phasis o  a titheti al 
social forces as a principal target of U.S. military intervention in the global south.  
 
In the second section of this chapter, I open up the black-box of al-Qaeda s ideolog  
and strategic goals. Al-Qaeda is theorised as an antithetical social force which posed 
a direct challenge to the practices of U.S. imperialism from below. This is 
a o plished  t a i g the o e e t s o it e t to:  o du ti g di e t 
attacks against targets of economic significance within the continental U.S.; (2) 
exploiting the spatial organisation of American power by tying down American 
ground forces in military campaigns across the global south; and (3) taking aim at two 
of the key practices of American imperialism, namely the reproduction of open-doors 
and closed frontiers. By theorising al-Qaeda in this way, I pierce the dualism which 
has separated much of the existing study of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the 
global south from al-Qaeda s age  a d st ategi  goals. This a al sis hea il  i fo s 
my empirical analysis of the political economy animators of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  hapte s ,  
and 7. 
 
In the final section of this chapter, I construct a six-stage periodization of the War 
against al-Qaeda i  the glo al south f o  the /  atta ks to the e d of O a a s 
presidency. I argue that whilst it has yet to be subject to the same degree of scholarly 




O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates a  e 
understood as a distinct and significant phase of this conflict. During the three-year 
period between the drawdown of combat operations against al-Qaeda s o e i  
Pakistan in the autumn of 2011 until the beginning of combat operations against the 
Islamic State in September 2014, the military response to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates was the principal front of the War against al-Qaeda. I then reflect on what 
my periodization reveals about Af i a s e e ge e as a  i easi gl  ke  site of U.“. 
military intervention in the global south, and the place of United States Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) and military assistance therein. This analysis provides key 
context for my later structured focused comparison.   
 
The Janus-Faced President: Distinguishing Obama’s foreign and 
counterterrorism policies 
 
Although its study has gained little traction amongst historical materialist scholars, 
the Obama Doctrine has been the subject of immense debate within the American 
foreign policy subfield. Whilst the Bush Doctrine is generally understood to have 
combined a muscular exercise of U.S. military power with a Wilsonian belief in the 
universalism of the American values, the central tenets of the Obama Doctrine are 
generally perceived to have been more amorphous.383 Speaking to this elasticity, the 
Obama Doctrine has ee  edu ed to a se ies of diffe e t oile  plates . These have 
included: (1) drone warfare; 384  (2) retrenchment and accommodation; 385  (3) 
shado - o i g ; 386   leadi g f o  ehi d ; 387  (5) restoring liberal hegemonic 
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leadership; 388 a d  ot doi g stupid shit .389 When synthesised, American foreign 
policy scholars have generally singled out three defining tenets of the Obama 
Doctrine: (1) burden-sharing; (2) restraint; and (3) retrenchment. Whilst I have 
separated my discussion of each of these tenets in order to provide a clearer 
structure to my analysis, it is important to note that this is a purely analytical 
distinction. Burden sharing, constraint and retrenchment were in practice mutually 
reinforcing and difficult to untangle. 
 
The Obama Doctrine: burden-sharing, constraint and retrenchment 
 
Burden sharing, the first of the three widely accepted tenets of the Obama Doctrine, 
speaks to the ad i ist atio s atte pt to t a sfe  a g eate  p opo tio  of the 
financial and military costs of American global leadership to partners across the 
globe. As it pertains to military intervention in the global south, although it has been 
idel  held up as e ide e of the ad i ist atio 's o it e t to leadi g f o  
ehi d , u de -sharing was not restricted to the 2011 intervention in Libya.390 The 
administration also provided unique military assets and logistical support to partners 
elsewhere in the global south including the French and Saudi Arabian interventions 
into the Malian and Yemeni civil wars respectively.391 On this reading, Obama is 
argued to have pursued a strategy of di ested hege o  i  hi h pa t e s e e 
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asked to assume greater responsibility for regional security.392 In situations where 
U.S. national interests were marginal, David Sanger has similarly argued, Obama 
i sisted that lo al allies ith o e ski  i  the ga e  assu ed the greatest costs and 
risks of military intervention.393 According to Andres Krieg, externalising the financial 
and human costs of U.S. intervention in the Middle East was the core feature of the 
Obama Doctrine.394 Burden-sharing is also argued to have been a key pillar of the 
administration's wider approach to international security.395 
 
Burden-sharing has also been understood as having run parallel to a second pillar of 
the Obama Doctrine: constraint. Obama is argued to have exercised considerable 
caution in his dealings abroad, favouring diplomatic and multilateral solutions to 
state-based security problems where possible. Evidence of this constraint can be 
fou d i  the ad i ist atio s o alisatio  of diplo ati  elatio s ith Cuba, in the 
diplomatic (not ilita  esolutio  to I a s u lea  eapo s programme, and the 
indirect response to the Russian annexation of Crimea. Bentley and Holland, co-
editors of two prominent edited collections on the Obama Doctrine, ranked the 
p eside t a o gst o e of the ost reluctantly interventionist US presidents in 
histo .396 I  a si ila  ei , Qui  has a gued that the fundamental character" of 
Obama's foreign policy was "defined by caution, self-restraint and consciousness of 
li its . 397  According to Clarke and Ricketts, a core operating assumption" of 
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O a a s p eside  as that the "g eatest th eat to o ti ued A e i a  p i a  
[ as] g eate  a ti is  o  e te sio  athe  tha  est ai t .398 This tendency toward 
under (rather than over) reach was perceived to have informed the decision not to 
i te e e i  the “ ia  Ci il Wa  follo i g the Assad egi e s ossi g of the ' ed-
line' on the use of chemical weapons in 2013.399 
 
A third pillar of the Obama Doctrine, which dovetailed strongly with burden sharing 
and constraint, was retrenchment. Pursued after periods of perceived geostrategic 
overstretch, retrenchment aims to reduce the financial costs of American global 
leadership by ending costly overseas military operations, scaling back the U.S. global 
ilita  footp i t , a d edu i g defe e spe di g. 400  In an influential account 
written early in Obama's presidency, Daniel Drezner contended that the 
administration was pursuing a three pillared strategy of multilateral retrenchment 
which aimed to transfer some of the financial burdens of global leadership to regional 
pa t e s, s iftl  e d the o upatio s of Afgha ista  a d I a , a d epai  the U.“.  
damaged global image.401 The strategic merits of retrenchment were, nonetheless, a 
subject of fierce debate. Whilst its proponents argued that the reduction of the U.S. 
global military presence could help dampen global anti-Americanism and free up 
more resources to reinforce the liberal institutional order, 402  those opposed to 
retrenchment argued that its strategic benefits were overstated and difficult to 
accurately gauge.403 For Colin Dueck, a critic of the Obama Doctrine as a whole, the 
p eside t s pu suit of et e h e t a oa d as a ehi le for pursuing 
transformative social change at home.404  
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Taken as a whole, the existing literature on the Obama Doctrine gets much right. 
Burden-sharing, prudence, retrenchment were all indeed consistent themes of the 
president's approach to the state-based security challenges he confronted during his 
tenure. When pushed late in his presidency, Obama explained his foreign policy 
do t i e as [ ]e ill e gage, ut e p ese e all ou  apa ilities .405 Pe haps the 
lea est o po e t of O a a fo eig  poli , it has ee  a gued, as the desi e to 
end wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to avoid any new large-scale military 
i te e tio s .406 The number of American combat troops in both states fell from 
180,000 in 2009 to 9,500 in 2014, a significant retrenchment.407  Similarly, in its 
original form, the bi-partisan 2011 Budget Control Act introduced spending limits 
that, if surpassed, automatically triggered cuts in defence spending. This 
se uest atio  as i te ded to t i  $  illio  f o  the DOD s pla ed ase udget 
between Fiscal Years (FY) 2012 and 2021. Whilst the bulk of these cuts were avoided, 
the BCA nevertheless dampened defe e spe di g du i g O a a s p eside .408 
 
Retrenchment, burden-sha i g a d o st ai t also i fo ed the ad i ist atio s 
military response to the security challenges which emerged after 2009. The demi 
interventions in the Libyan civil war speak directly to these three dynamics. During 
his March 2011 address on combat operations in Libya - an intervention which has 
been interpreted as a testing ground for the Obama Doctrine writ large -409  the 
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p eside t e t to g eat le gths to st ess ho  A e i a s ole ould e li ited .410 
In contrast to the Iraq War, partners would assume the greatest burden of military 
i te e tio  a d his ad i ist atio  ould ot put g ou d t oops i to Li a .411 
Thus, not only would European and Arab League partners be expected to contribute 
proportionally more to maintaining security in the Middle East (reflecting the 
ad i ist atio s o it e t to u de -sharing), but constraint had been 
exercised to ensure that U.S. ground forces would not be returning en masse back 
to the egio  also efle ti g the ad i ist atio s o it e t to et e h e t .412  
 
I  this espe t, leadi g f o  ehi d  a d ot doi g stupid shit  e e s o ous 
with the sa e goals: et e hi g the size of the U.“.  o e tio al ilita  footp i t 
in the global south; getting partners to assume a greater share of the costs of 
military intervention in situations when American interests were not perceived to 
be directly threatened; and exercising a constrained approach to the use of military 
force which avoided the deployment of American ground forces. As it pertains to 
the major state-based security challenges which the administration confronted, 
Obama was indeed a president disciplined by an acute awareness of the limits of 
American military and economic power.413 This being said, the three central tenets 
of the Obama Doctrine sit uneasily within the debate on his counterterrorism policy 
and military response to the non-state security challenges in the global south.  
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Obama is argued by some to have been weak on terrorism.414 Such critiques are 
fundamentally misplaced. During his two terms in office, the president fought a 
utal o e t a  agai st Al-Qaeda and other Islamist net o ks .415 The restraint 
and retrenchment which characterised the response to the state-based security 
challenges he confronted was at odds with the military response to transnational-
terrorist organisations. As Lasher and Rineart have argued, when it came to 
ou te te o is , the h pe - autious O a a … a ted ith g eat de isi e ess .416 
The Obama administration did not pursue a global strategy of retrenchment or 
constraint. Both the geographical scope and the intensity of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq grew markedly after 2009. By 2016, U.S. 
Special Operation Forces (SOF) were deployed in 138 states globally, up from around 
 i  O a a s fi st ea  i  offi e.417 Similarly, while the US military presence was 
reduced in the Middle East and South Asia during this period, as is discussed in 
greater detail at the end of this chapter, Africa emerged as an increasingly key site of 
U.S. military intervention in the global south (and of American imperialism more 
broadly). This was reflected in the expansion of SOF activity and the DOD s asi g 
architecture across the continent.418  It can also be seen in the expansion of the 
Ce t al I tellige e Age s CIA s  a d Joi t “pe ial Ope atio s Co a d J“OC s  
drone programmes du i g O a a s p eside . The Bush ad i ist atio  had 
conducted drone strikes in two a s i  ou t ies the [U.“.] is ot at a  during his 
presidency (Pakistan and Yemen). Obama not only intensified the campaign of 
targeted killings in both of these theatres, but also expanded them to Libya, Somalia 
and Syria. To put the scale of this expansion into some perspective, in Pakistan alone, 
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o e d o e st ikes e e epo ted i  O a a s fi st ea  i  offi e  tha  had ee  
launched over the entire course of Bush s p eside  .419   
 
I  su a , the defi i g ha a te isti s of the O a a ad i ist atio s app oa h 
military intervention in the global south was not unchecked retrenchment and 
constraint. What is essentially being discussed in the debates around retrenchment 
and constraint was the drive to reduce the number of uniformed ground forces in the 
battlefield theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with the commitment to 
avoiding their large-scale deployment elsewhere in the global south. Crucially, these 
processes should not be conflated with a global strategy of constraint and 
retrenchment. As I have documented, both the scale and intensity of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations increased throughout the global south after 2009. To 
this extent, whilst the Obama administration did indeed lead from behind in response 
to the state-based security challenges which it confronted over the course of its 
presidency, as far as counterterrorism was concerned, the Obama administration 
was far more aggressive, and can be understood to have led from the front. What 
this tension between the Obama Doctrine on the one hand and his counterterrorism 
poli  o  the othe  speaks to is the ad i ist atio s essentially Janus-faced approach 
to military intervention in the global south.  
 
Historical materialism sheds key new light on this apparent tension. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the theory holds that antithetical social forces from below have been a 
primary ta get of U.“. ilita  i te e tio  i  the glo al south. Whether armed or 
unarmed, these [groups] have posed a major threat to political and economic 
stability, to continued investment by global capital, and to the sustained projection 
of American power  as “tokes a d ‘aphael ha e a gued.420 The U.S. has consistently 
intervened in the global south in order to contain the challenge which these groups 
have presented to the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers in (and by 
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extension the primacy of the American state and capitalist-market relations). Intra- 
not inter- state war has been the primary mode of contemporary U.S. intervention in 
the global south. According to Stokes a d Wate a s esti ates, i  the post-Cold 
War period, there have been just three U.S. military deployments overseas which can 
be classified as examples of interstate conflict (Operation Desert Storm, Operation 
Iraqi Freedom and the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom).421 Of the other 94 
instances they catalogued, over a third centred on building the capacity of foreign 
security forces to maintain stability within their borders. 422  As with the Obama 
ad i ist atio s app oa h to U.“. ilita  i te e tio  i  the glo al south more 
broadly, this asymmetry is consistent with Colás s asse tio  that he e e  state 
sovereignty of an allied state was imperilled or democratic social forces challenged 
the e te sio  of apitalist a kets  U.“. oe i e po e  has ee  agg essi el  
exercised to reinforce them.423 Tying these threads together then, whilst historical 
materialists have been conspicuously absent from much of the existing literature on 
the O a a Do t i e, it a  e e theless help us e plai  the p eside t s Ja us-faced 
approach to military intervention in the global south. To further substantiate this 
argument, our attention must now turn toward theorising al-Qaeda as an antithetical 
non-state actor which challenged the practices of U.S. imperialism from below.  
 
Theorising al-Qaeda as an antithetical social force: strategic aims and approach 
to economic warfare 
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, whilst neorealism may be a useful lens for 
understanding the pretexts which successive administrations have used to justify 
military intervention in the global south, its state centrism means that it is unable to 
capture what al-Qaeda has wanted or the strategy it has adopted in pursuit of these 
goals. This dualism, which has decoupled the study of the goals of U.S. military 
intervention from those of the movement that it has been at war against, is not 
confined to neorealism. Both the neoclassical realist and constructivist informed 
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explanations for the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism and foreign policy after 9/11 
which were also examined in chapter 2 have said little about the means or goals 
animating al-Qaeda s military response to the U.S. A similar shortcoming has 
characterised historical materialist scholarship. Stokes and Raphael have argued, for 
example, that al-Qaeda surely did (and still does) pose a threat to the core interests 
of the A e i a  state .424 Yet, e o d e tio i g that the o e e t ep ese t[ed] 
a s oli  halle ge to U“ glo al hege o , the  do ot u pa k e a tl  ho  this 
was the case.425 A similar omissio  pu tuates Blakele s o e e e t o k i  hi h 
she argues that al-Qaeda has the pote tial to u de i e the o te po a  o de , 
espe iall  i  the Middle East, hi h is ke  to the U“  glo al hege o . 426 
Nevertheless, as with Stokes and Raphael, exactly how al-Qaeda has challenged 
American primacy is left open. 
 
This is a pa ti ula l  p o le ati  o issio . Neithe  the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates o  the e olutio  of U.“. ou te te o is  
operations in the global south after 9/11 unfolded in a vacuum devoid of al-Qaeda s 
age . Whilst it is o e t to a gue, fo  e a ple, that [ ]itti gl  a d u itti gl , 
U.S. policy shapes the political terrain on which the jihadi-salafist network, including 
AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq), is uilt , the i e se also holds. 427  Al-Qaeda s ilita  
response to the U.S. (and the ideology and the strategic goals which informed this 
agency) influenced how the U.S. responded to the group. Drawing insight from my 
le ded  u de sta di g of st u tu e a d agency, I maintain that the behaviour of 
the primary parties in the War against al-Qaeda (the U.S. on the one hand and the al-
Qaeda o e e t o  the othe  should e u de stood as utuall  i pli ated .428 
By this, I understand the U.S. military response to al-Qaeda and its affiliates as being 
dialectically shaped, and in turn co-constituted, by the actions and goals of al-Qaeda. 
The logic underpinning the analysis that follows is that a richer understanding of the 
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O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates a  e ad a ed 
by understanding the strategic goals of the al-Qaeda movement, and the means 
through which it pursued these. To fill these gaps within the existing U.S. foreign 
policy and historical materialist scholarship already outlined, the black-box of al-
Qaeda s ideolog  a d st ategi  goals is ope ed up elo .  
 
Al-Qaeda s ideology and strategic aims  
 
Al-Qaeda s se io  leade ship ha e ha pio ed the o e e t as the a gua d of a  
existential struggle between Dar ul-Islam (the religiously faithful) and the Dar ul-Harb 
(the non-faithful).429 On this basis, al-Qaeda s ideolog  has li eage i  the Salafist 
strain of Sunni Islam which calls for the reordering of Islamic society in line with the 
political and economic system laid out in the Quran and the Hadith (Prophetic 
tradition). The deepening Jahiliya (corruption) of Islamic society, it is maintained, can 
only be reversed through lesser Jihad.430 One of the core strategic aims which follows 
from these ideological precepts is the need to expel all Western influence (economic, 
political and cultural) from the Ummah (Islamic world). Such an expulsion is 
understood as a necessary step for overthrowing the apostate regimes which 
currently claim sovereignty across the Ummah and whose survival is perceived to be 
contingent upon their continued sponsorship from the U.S.431 
 
To advance this goal, al-Qaeda has targeted both the near enemy (apostate regimes) 
a d the fa  e e  p i ipall  the U.“., ut also othe  usade  states su h as F ance 
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a d the U ited Ki gdo . A la ge pa t of this st ateg  has i luded te o ist  atta ks 
intended to generate political pressure to bring about changes in their policies. 432 
Begi i g du i g Bush s p eside , al-Qaeda s se io  leade ship also atte pted to 
socially reconstruct Islamic identity as being locked in an irreconcilable conflict with 
the West. One implication of al-Qaeda s o st u ti ist tu , as Ma  L h has 
framed it, is that al-Qaeda sought to e gi ee  a a  of ideas  agai st the West i  
which norms, identities and narratives were also central fields of contestation.433 
These two modes of opposition - the first, coercive; the second, ideational - have 
been employed to advance al-Qaeda s ultimate, long-term strategic goal: the 
creation of an Islamic caliphate governed under Sharia law.434 
 
According to interviews conducted by the Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein, al-
Qaeda has pursued a seven-stage, twenty-year strategic plan to this end.435 I have 
summarised each of these seven stages, and the timetable for their implementation, 
in figure 3.1. What is particularly important to note about al-Qaeda s st ategi  pla  
is that from the third (The Rising Up and Standing on the Feet Stage) and fourth (The 
Expansion Stage) phases onwards, the movement broadened its focus beyond just 
conducting terrorist attacks against the near and far enemies. Al-Qaeda and its 
affiliates also sought to lay the political conditions for the eventual establishment of 
an Islamic caliphate. Key to this process was winning the political support of 
marginalised tribal communities in weak and fragile states across the global south.436 
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433  Ma  L h, Al-Qaeda s Co st u ti ist Tu , Praeger Security International, 2006 
<http://www.marclynch.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Al-Qaedas-Constructivism.pdf> 
[accessed 11 December 2017]. 
434 Ba ak Me delso , o ki g ithi  the E glish “ hool, has also sought to outli e the t o-level 
halle ge  hi h al-Qaeda presented to the U.S. Through its contestation of several of its core pillars 
(the prevailing principles of international sovereignty, the United Nations, and International Law), 
Mendelson argued that al-Qaeda threatened more than the territorial integrity of fragile states across 
the global south. It also took aim at the core principles of international society. Barak Mendelsohn, 
“o e eig t  u de  Atta k: The I te atio al “o iet  Meets the Al Qaeda Net o k , Review of 
International Studies, 31.1 (2005), 45–68. 
435 Rudner. 
436 In this respect, al-Qaeda s strategic aims can be distinguished from that of its principal offshoot, 




On this basis, not only should the al-Qaeda o e e t e u de stood as an 
international terrorist organisation that ha asses the West a d the A a  egi es , 
ut o e hi h also fu tio ed as a so ial a d politi al age t i  ou t ies e du i g 
o fli t .437 
  
                                                          
has positioned itself as the vanguard of the struggle between Dar ul-Islam (the religiously faithful) and 
the Dar ul-Harb (the non-faithful). Central to its victory in this conflict has been i i g the hea ts 
a d i ds  of the Musli  people ith the lo g-term goal of overthrowing the apostate regimes which 
currently govern the Middle East. The Islamic State, on the other hand, has rejected this incremental, 
bottom up approach to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. It has instead relied on coercion to 
force the immediate construction of an Islamic state at the heart of the Middle East. For a more 
detailed discussion of this, see Tu e , “t ategi  Diffe e es: Al Qaeda s “plit ith the Islamic State of 
Iraq and Al-“ha .   




Figure 3: Al-Qaeda s seven-stage strategic plan, 2001-2020.438 
 
Stage Name Time Period Summary of Goals 
The Awakening 
Stage 
2001–2002 Following the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda aimed 
to a ake  the o s ious ess of Musli s 
worldwide to the oppression of both the near 
and far enemies. The U.S. would be provoked 




2002–2006 Al-Qaeda then aimed to transform itself into 
a transnational movement. American ground 
forces would continue to be tied down in 
series of bloody, protracted conflicts 
throughout the global south. 
The Rising Up 
and Standing on 
the Feet Stage 
2007–2010 With U.S. forces tied down in bloody ground 
conflicts in the global south, al-Qaeda would 
expand its reach across the global south 
including attacks in Syria, Israel and Turkey. 
The Expansion 
Stage 
2010–2013 The focus of this phase of al-Qaeda s se e  
stage strategic plan was on beginning to 
topple apostate  egi es, hilst also 
attacking oil production sites and the 
American economy via cyber terrorism. 
The Declaration 
of the Caliphate 
Stage 
2013–2016 Having weakened U.S. and Israeli influence 
across the Ummah, the focus of this stage 
ould, ha i g toppled apostate  egi es, e 





2016–2020 With an Islamic caliphate established, al-
Qaeda s atte tio  ould the  shift to a d 
total o f o tatio  et ee  itself a d the 




2020 In this phase, al-Qaeda s e e ies ould ha e 
been defeated and the Caliphate secured. 
  
  
                                                          
438  Yassi  Musha ash, What Al-Qaida ‘eall  Wa ts , Spiegel Online, 2005 
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Unpacking al-Qaeda s approach to economic warfare 
 
Whilst recognised by some, what has been absent from much of the existing debate 
on al-Qaeda s g a d st ateg  is its pu suit of a sophisti ated st ateg  of e o o i  
warfare.439 In their public statements, both of al-Qaeda s t o e i s tied the U.“. 
capacity to intervene in the global south to the productive strength of the American 
e o o . E uati g its a paig  agai st the U.“. to the Mujahedee s ea lie  
resistance to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden stressed that al-
Qaeda ould e o ti ui g this poli  i  leedi g A e i a to the poi t of 
a k upt .440 Ayman al-Zawahiri, who succeeded Osama bin Laden as al-Qaeda s 
emir in 2011, remained wedded to this approach of economic warfare. Speaking on 
the twelfth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, he reaffirmed al-Qaeda s i te tio  to: 
 
bleed America economically by provoking it to continue in its massive 
expenditure on its security, for the weak point of America is its economy, 
which has already begun to stagger due to the military and security 
expenditure.441 
 
The political economy challenge which al-Qaeda has presented to American primacy 
was also recognised within the Obama administration. As the 2011 National Strategy 
for Counterterrorism Strategy oted, [a]l-Qa ida elie es that it a  ause the 
United States to change course in its foreign and national security policies by 
inflicting economic a d ps hologi al da age th ough te o ist atta ks .442 In the 
same year, then Homeland Security Advisor John Brennan similarly noted that the 
ad i ist atio  as pu sui g a o ust ou te te o is  postu e thereby denying al-
Qa ida the economic damage a d dis uptio  it seeks . 443  Mapping the different 
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440  Full T a s ipt of Bi  Ladi s “pee h , Al-Jazeera, 2004 
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avenues through which al-Qaeda sought to leed  the U.“. to a k upt  thus 
provides a workable foundation for theorising al-Qaeda as an antithetical social force 
which challenged the practices of U.S. imperialism from below. 
 
(1) Direct attacks against targets of economic significance within the continental 
U.S. 
 
The most direct (but rarest) form of economic warfare pursued by al-Qaeda was 
strikes against targets of economic significance within the continental U.S. As al-
Zawahiri stressed in 2006, al-Qaeda had to i fli t losses o  the western crusader, 
especially to its economic infrastructure with strikes that would make it bleed for 
ea s . 444  “u h ope atio s e e ot o l  i te ded to e ode the U.“.  e o o i  
strength by destroying key pieces of infrastructure and killing American workers, they 
were also intended to cause broader economic disruption through, amongst other 
means, undermining stock-market performance and consumer confidence. Beyond 
their difficult to quantify indirect financial costs (which range from a loss of consumer 
confidence through to higher insurance premiums), al-Qaeda s atta ks o  the 
continental U.S. were also intended to erode the economic foundation of American 
power by increasing the costs of counterterrorism.445  
 
The 9/11 attacks are the most prominent example of this dimension of al-Qaeda s 
approach to economic warfare. Bin Laden hailed the financial disruption these 
attacks produced. Factoring in stock market disruption and construction losses, he 
estimated these at over $1 trillion.446 Whilst the disruption produced by the 9/11 
attacks was relatively small as an overall proportion of the American economy, they 
nevertheless had a significant effect on the commercial aviation sector in 
                                                          
office/2011/06/29/remarks-john-o-brennan-assistant-president-homeland-security-and-counter> 
[accessed 11 February 2018]. 
444 Quoted in Geltzer, p. 77. 
445 The direct and indirect elements of al-Qaeda s app oa h to e o o i  a fa e should thus e 
understood as co-constitutive. Direct attacks on the American economy were also intended to 
increase the indirect costs of counterterrorism. In short, they can be understood as different sides of 
the same coin.  
446 Daveed Gartenstein-‘oss, Bi  Lade s Wa  of a Thousa d Cuts  Will Li e O , The Atlantic, 2011 
<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/05/bin-ladens-war-of-a-thousand-cuts-




particular.447 Speaking on the eve of the 2004 presidential election, bin Laden also 
celebrated the large asymmetry in financial outlay between how much the 9/11 
attacks had cost al-Qaeda to o du t a d the U.“. s u foldi g ilita  espo se to 
them.448 At a cost of just $500,000, al-Qaeda had forced the U.S. into spending over 
$500 billion, [ ]ea i g that e e  dolla  of al-Qaida defeated a million dollars by 
the pe issio  of Allah, esides the loss of a huge u e  of jo s .449  
 
On the twelfth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Al-Zawahiri reiterated al-Qaeda s 
o it e t to leed[i g] America economically by provoking it to continue in its 
assi e e pe ditu e o  its se u it . 450  What disti guished i  Lade s a d Al-
)a ahi i s odel of di e tl  st iki g at the A e i a  e o o  as the latte s pi ot 
toward smaller-scale, but more frequent, attacks. 451  Al-)a ahi i s strategy of a 
thousa d uts , as it as popula l  k o , was quickly adopted by AQAP. In the 
2010 edition of Inspire (its English language propaganda magazine), it emphasised 
that [t]o i g do  A e i a e do ot eed to st ike ig . 452  Rather, as it 
o ti ued, it is o e feasi le to stage s alle  atta ks that i ol e less pla e s a d 
less time to launch and thus we may circumvent the security barriers America worked 
so ha d to e e t .453 As dis ussed i  hapte  , this logi  di e tl  i fo ed Operation 
He o hage : the 2010 attempt to blow up cargo aircraft operated by FedEx and UPS 
en route to the U.S. 
 
(2) Tying down American ground forces in military campaigns across the global 
south 
 
Al-Qaeda also attempted to tie American ground forces down in multiple conflicts 
across the global south. Not only would these asymmetrical conflicts drain the U.S. 
militarily, but they would also extract a significant economic cost, thus weakening 
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the material foundations of American imperialism.454 According to Bin-Laden, the 
U.S. could be easily baited:  
 
[a]ll that we have to do is to send two mujahidin to the furthest point east to 
raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaida, in order to make the 
generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political 
losses without their achieving for it anything of note other than some benefits 
for their private companies.455 
 
Perhaps alluding to the cost of the Iraq War which is estimated to have run into the 
trillions of dollars, this danger was acknowledged by American policymakers. 456 
Speaking in May 2012 for example, John Brennan remarked that la ge, i t usi e 
military deployments risk playing into al-Qa'ida's strategy of trying to draw us into 
long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-American resentment and 
inspire the next gene atio  of te o ists .457  This suggests that al-Qaeda s se io  
leadership was sensitive to one of the greatest vulnerabilities of American power: its 
informal exercise through a system of sovereign states rather than the imposition of 
territorial control in the global south. The establishment of regional affiliates in the 
Arabian Peninsula, Horn of Africa and the Sahel (to say nothing of Iraq and Syria) 
speaks di e tl  to the o e e t s atte pts to i g a out A e i a  imperial 
overstretch in this way.458 In f a hisi g  the al-Qaeda name, the traditional core of 
the al-Qaeda movement was able to expand its reach beyond its traditional centre of 
gravity in South Asia thus precipitating U.S. military intervention elsewhere across 
the global south. 
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(3) Disrupting U.S. access to the markets, resources, and labour of the global south 
 
As part of its overarching approach to economic warfare, al-Qaeda can also be 
theorised to have threatened the reproduction of open-markets and closed frontiers 
in the global south. In the case of the former, al-Qaeda placed consistent weight on 
disrupting global energy security. As noted in one 2007 Congressional Research 
Service report: 
 
[a]l Qaeda leade s  state e ts e eal sophisti ated o side atio  of the 
economic and military vulnerabilities of the United States and its allies, 
pa ti ula l  ith ega d to the ole of Middle Easte  oil as the asis of 
i dust  i  the glo al e o o .459  
 
Although al-Qaeda s se io  leade ship autio ed agai st atta ki g e e g  ta gets i  
the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks, this stance began to weaken 
around 2004/2005. 460  In September 2005, Ayman al-)a ahi i all[ed] upo  the 
ujahidee  to fo us thei  atta ks o  the stole  oil of the Musli  … to sa e this 
resource for the sake of the Musli  atio . 461  Al-Qaeda s ta geti g of e e g  
se u it  took se e al fo s. As apped  Tukáš Ti h  a d Ja  Ei hle , these 
included: (1) attacks against oil production, transportation, and storage sites; (2) 
raids to kill, or take hostage, the Western employees of oil companies; (3) gaining 
control over oil production, transportation, and storage sites, in order to fund its own 
operations; and (4) targeting oil tankers during their transit in maritime choke-
points.462 This disruption of global energy supplies remained a key component of al-
Qaeda s app oa h to a k upti g the U.“. i to O a a s p eside . ‘eleased i  
October 2014, al-Qaeda s E glish-language propaganda magazine Resurgence, 
reiterated al-Qaeda s o it e t to atta ki g glo al oil t a sit outes, which was 
the A hilles heel ot just of the e e g  a ket, ut also of este  e o o ies 
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depe da t o  oil f o  the Musli  o ld . 463  This was consistent with the 
o e e t s la ge  goal of: 
 
[…] weakening this stranglehold of the enemy to the point that it is no longer 
able to effectively meddle in the Muslim world. This requires a multi-pronged 
strategy that focuses not only on attacking American military presence in the 
Muslim world, but also targeting the super-extended energy supply line that 
fuels their economies and helps to sustain their military strength.464 
 
Al-Qaeda thus threatened a key pillar of American primacy: global energy security. 
The A e i a  states  o t ol o e  glo al e e g  ese es, as “tokes a d ‘aphael ha e 
argued, has been a key source of its structural power within the international political 
economy. 465  This o ti ued e o d the “hale Gas e olutio  a d A e i a s 
transformation into one of the o ld s la gest oil a d atu al gas p odu e s.466 Whilst 
U.S. global oil imports may have falle  sig ifi a tl  i  the latte  ea s of O a a s 
p eside , the sla k  i  oil p odu tio  as pi ked up  pa t e s pa ti ula l  those 
in European states) reinforcing the dual logic of American power.467 As the 2015 
National Security Strategy stressed, increasing global access to reliable and 
affordable energy is one of the most powerful ways to support social and economic 
de elop e t  a d to also help uild e  a kets fo  U.“. te h olog  a d 
i est e t .468 
 
The challenge which the al-Qaeda movement presented to the practices of American 
imperialism was greater, however, than just threatening global energy security. 
Co siste t ith The E pa sio  “tage  phase of its t e t  ea s st ategi  pla  
summarised in figure 3.1, al-Qaeda also took aim at the reproduction of closed 
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frontiers throughout the global south. Al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates e e ke  ehi les 
for this. The ultimate, long-term goals of AQAP, al-Shabaab, and AQIM was to 
o e th o  the apostate  go ernments which exercised political sovereignty within 
their regions, unifying this territory under a single Islamic caliphate. As glo al  
organisations which sought to balance their local political ambitions with their global 
commitment to advancing the cause of al-Qaeda s o e, al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates 
thus retained distinctly local aims.469 Within the security and governance vacuums 
created by the weakness of governmental authority, they sought to win the loyalty 
of tribal populations through the provision of social services and public goods. As 
spelt out i  a Ma   lette   AQAP s e i  Nasi  al-Wuha shi to his AQIM s 
counterpart, Abdelmalek Droukdel: 
 
You have to be kind to [the local population] and make room for compassion 
and for leniency. Try to win them over through the conveniences of life and 
by taking care of their daily needs like food, electricity and water. Providing 
these necessities will have a great effect on people, and will make them 
sympathize with us and feel that their fate is tied to ours.470 
 
Whilst the capture and governing of territory was not directly intended to weaken 
the material foundations of U.S. imperialism, it nevertheless worked indirectly to this 
effect. As I argued in chapter 2, the stability of American primacy is contingent on 
preserving the stability within states in the global south, and the preservation of 
particular political economies. Thus, by contesting the territorial integrity of the Mali, 
Somalia and Yemen state s (amongst others), al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates put these 
practices at risk. 
 
Taken as a whole, this discussion of al-Qaeda s ideolog , st ategi  goals a d app oa h 
to economic warfare makes a vital contribution to this thesis. Building on the gaps 
within the extant U.S. foreign policy and historical materialism literature, I have 
theorised al-Qaeda as an antithetical social force which directly threatened the 
practices of American imperialism. In doing so, I have documented that there was 
more to its pursuit of its strategic aims than simply threatening U.S. security as 
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oftentimes implied by American policymakers. Al-Qaeda also pursued a sophisticated 
st ateg  of e o o i  a fa e hi h ai ed to leed  the U.“. to the poi t of 
bankruptcy by: 
 
(1) conducting direct attacks against targets of economic significance within the 
continental U.S.;  
 
(2) exploiting the spatial organisation of American power by tying down 
American ground forces in military campaigns throughout the global south;  
 
(3) and disrupting the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers 
throughout the global south, with a particular emphasis on disrupting global 
energy security and governing territory in weak and fragile states in the global 
south. 
 
Having now explored al-Qaeda s st ategi  goals a d app oa h to e o o i  a fa e, 
my attention now shifts toward situating the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response toward al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates ithi  the e ol i g ea s a d 
geography of American counterterrorism operations in the global south after 9/11. 
 
Mapping the evolution of the U.S. war against al-Qaeda from 9/11 through Trump 
 
Speaking in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, George Bush stated that 
the War against al-Qaeda ould not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
ha[d] ee  fou d, stopped a d defeated .471 Twelves year later, State Department 
Legal Adviser Harold Koh remarked that the military response to the 9/11 attacks had, 
i  a  a s, o e to feel like a Fo e e  Wa .472 The argument that the U.S. has 
been fighting a Fo e e  Wa  i  hi h a pe petual state of e eptio alis  has 
functioned to normalise previously tabooed practices of coercive state-craft has 
gained widespread traction.473 The expansive geography of the War against al-Qaeda 
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has also been subject to considerable debate. According to one author, the U.S. has 
fought a t ul  glo al, o de less a  agai st a stateless e e .474 Paralleling the 
de ate o  the Fo e e  Wa , the idea that the U.“. has ee  fighti g a  E e he e 
Wa  has also ee  ad a ed.475 
 
Conscious of these debates on the expansive geography and temporality of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations, the aim of my analysis in the third and final section of 
this chapter is to situate the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
affiliates within the overarching War against al-Qaeda. This is accomplished by 
constructing a loose six-stage periodization of the conflict from the 9/11 attacks to 
the e d of O a a s p eside .476 There are some caveats to this analysis. First, each 
of the six proposed phases of the conflict are not temporally siloed. I am not arguing, 
in other words, that combat operations against al-Qaeda s affiliates e e est i ted 
to the period between 2011 and 2014. Similarly, each of the proposed phases of the 
War against al-Qaeda is loose and should be read as more indicative rather than 
definitive. And third, it was not my intention to offer an exhaustive analysis of the 
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entire War against al-Qaeda across the entirety of the global south.477 Rather, to 
qualify, what my periodization has been intended to capture is the predominate focus 
of U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. 
 
This all being said, as Colás and Saull have rightly noted, historical periodization is 
ot a  i o e t h o ologi al o  a ati e e e ise: it o ple e ts, st e gthe s 
and legitimises particular interpretatio s a d o eptio s of po e . 478  By 
conceptualising the evolution of the War against al-Qaeda in loose phases rather 
than across administrations as is common within the literature, I am able to more 
accurately trace the shifts in the means and geography of U.S. military intervention 
in the global south after 9/11. It also provides multiple points of entry through which 
to weave through my historical materialist theoretical framework. This enables me 
to begin empirically substantiating my earlier argument that a key goal of U.S. 
military intervention in the global south since 9/11 has been the defence of preferred 
political economies in the global south.  
 
To preface this discussion, it is important to note that whilst it is difficult to envision 
the invasions of either Afghanistan or Iraq (to say nothing of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of these states) without the casus belli of the 9/11 attacks, these 
interventions were nonetheless conditioned by the structural framework of capitalist 
relations. As Colás a d “aull ha e a gued, o ti ge  al a s assu es, i deed is 
a gua l  o stituted  st u tu es .479 Striking a similar cord, Stokes and Raphael 
have argued that the principal goal of the War against al-Qaeda was not to defend 
the U“ f o  the th eat of Isla ist te o is  a d te o ist suppo ti g  states the so 
alled a is of e il .  ‘athe , as the  o ti ue: 
 
                                                          
477  Counterterrorism operations in a number of states on the War on Terror on the periphery - 
Colombia, the Caucasus and the Philippines (to name just three examples) - have fallen beyond the 
scope of my analysis of U.S. counterterrorism operations. For a more detailed empirical discussion of 
hat has ee  du ed the Wa  o  Te o  o  the pe iphe , see ‘ a , Wa  i  Cou t ies We A e Not 
at Wa  ith : The Wa  o  Te o o  the Pe iphe  f o  Bush to O a a ; ‘ a , The Wa  o  Te o  
a d the Ne  Pe iphe . 
478 Colás and Saull, p. 2. 




[…] secondary and subsidiary objectives aside, it was designed to expand and 
entrench America  glo al hege o  i  li e ith Washi gto s lo gsta di g 
strategic objectives. And to the extent that terrorist groups with a global 
reach were considered to post a significant threat to core US interests, of 
concern was the threat they posed to Washington s a ilit  to esta lish a d 
maintain its hegemony within the present order.480 
 
In other words, whilst a key goal of the War against al-Qaeda has indeed been 
containing the threat which al-Qaeda has presented to the practices of American 
imperialism, the conflict has also provided a pretext for the American state to 
attempt to lock in its primacy.481 As I will show, such efforts continued beyond the 
Bush administration and the 2003 invasion of Iraq - the focus of the extant literature 
- a d th oughout O a a s p eside . 
                                                          
480 Stokes and Raphael, p. 25. 




Figure 3: Mapping the evolution of the War against al-Qaeda, from 9/11 to Trump 
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The /  atta ks ep ese ted a  aff o t  to A e i a  p i a .482 In contrast to how 
antithetical social forces were policed during the Cold War, the Bush administration 
could not work through repressive state formations to police the group. 483  Al-
Qaeda s o e had ee  shelte ed  the Tali a  egi e i  Afgha ista  fo  almost a 
decade and was thus implicated in the 9/11 attacks.484 Fa ed ith this halle ge to 
the U“  o  u de sta di g of o ld o de  … the US response was to deploy its 
o e hel i g g ou d, ai , a d a i e fo e i  Afgha ista  a d the  I a .485 The 
first loose phase of the War against al-Qaeda lasted from September 2001 until the 
summer of 2002. During this period, the Bush administration adopted a twin-track 
approach to the exercise of U.S. coercive power. Both the perpetrators of the 9/11 
attacks (al-Qaeda s o e  a d thei  state spo so s the Tali a  e e ta geted.486 
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the first salvo of the War against al-Qaeda, 
began in late September 2001 when a small team of CIA case-officers were 
clandestinely air-lifted into Afghanista . OEF s minimal cost in American blood and 
treasure was widely celebrated, and the Afghan model of military intervention which 
combined U.S. SOF and airpower with indigenous surrogates was held up as a 
testa e t to Do ald ‘u sfeld s ‘e olutio  i  Military Affairs (RMA).487 Whilst both 
al-Qaeda s o e a d the Tali a  e e de i ated, eithe  as dest o ed.488 From 
                                                          
482 Blakele , D o es, “tate Te o is  a d I te atio al La , pp. –7. 
483  For a more detailed discussed of the central role of unconventional warfare and support for 
authoritarian regimes in the practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south during the Cold 
War, see Kolko; McClintock. 
484 B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al Capitalist O de , p. . 
485 Blakele , D o es, “tate Te o is  a d I te atio al La , p. . 
486 This positio  as ade lea   the p eside t i  ea l  O to e   he  he oted that [i]n this 
conflict, there is no neutral ground. If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocence, 
they have become outlaws and murderers themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own 
pe il . Geo ge W Bush, P eside t Bush “a s Tali a  Pa i g a P i e , CNN, 2001 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/10/07/ret.bush.transcript/> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
487 At the core of this defence planning concept was the belief that rapid developments in information 
technology and precision guided munitions could, when coupled with a change in operational thinking, 
transform the American military. This transformation in the American way of war, it was championed, 
would minimise the financial, military and human costs of military intervention. Donald H Rumsfeld, 
T a sfo i g the Milita , Foreign Affairs, 81.3 (2002), 20–32. For a more detailed discussion of what 
was dubbed the Afghan Model see Richard B A d es, C aig Wills, a d Tho as E G iffith J , Wi i g 
ith Allies: The “t ategi  Value of the Afgha  Model , International Security, 30.3 (2006), 124–60. 
488 During the course of the crucial Battle of Tora Bora in December 2001, Osama bin Laden (amongst 




safe-havens in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, al-
Qaeda s o e would subsequently regroup and go on to exploit the vast security 
a uu s p odu ed i  Afgha ista   the Bush ad i ist atio s initial aversion to 
nation-building.489 As Colás and Saull have argued:  
 
[f]o  all the a ado of Full “pe t u  Do i a e  a d the atte da t 
‘e olutio  i  Milita  Affai s  hi h su ounded Operation Enduring 
Freedom, US airpower and special forces required the engagement of local 
Afghani warlords and their militias in old-fashioned, ground combat in order 
to secure the defeat of what was, in any event, a militarily insignificant enemy.  
 
As they put it:  
 
[t]he continued fragmentation of political authority in Afghanistan and the 
current absence of a monopoly over the means of violence over that territory 
demonstrates that the US war machine may be able to defeat any enemy, but 





The second phase of the War against al-Qaeda began in the summer of 2002 and 
centred on toppling the Baathist regime in Iraq. 491  With ideological roots in the 
                                                          
489 As Bush o eded i  his p eside tial e oi s, the ad i ist atio s rapid success with low troop 
levels created false comfort, and our desire to maintain a light military footprint left us short of the 
esou es e eeded [i  Afgha ista ] . George W Bush, Decision Points (New York: Crown/Archetype, 
2010), p. 207.To put the scale of the initial financial commitment to Afghanistan into some historical 
perspective, aid per capita in the first two years after the invasion was thirty times less than that 
allo ated fo  Bos ia i  the s. The U.“.  fi a ial o t i utio  to e o st u tio  a d hu a ita ia  
projects in the country averaged $1.75 billion between 2002 and 2009. This worked out at about $60 
per annum for each Afghani. The 6,000 or so U.S. troops deployed to Afghanistan after the invasion 
also ranked as the smallest per capita peacekeeping force of any post conflict force since the Second 
World War. Bergen, pp. 179–81. 
490 Colás and Saull, p. 19. 
491 This was when the decision to invade Iraq was likely made. In the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, key elements within the Bush administration had advocated for military action to be rolled-
out beyond al-Qaeda s o e and the Taliban. Hours after the 9/11 attacks for example, Rumsfeld had 
called for the Best i fo fast. Judge hethe  good e ough to hit “[adda ] H[ussei ] at sa e ti e. Not 
only O[sama] B[in] L[aden] [...] Go massive. Sweep it all up. Thi gs elated a d ot.  Douglas Feith, 
who served as u de se eta  of defe se fo  poli  i  Bush s fi st ad i ist atio , has also epo ted 
that t o da s afte  the /  atta ks the P eside t, ‘i e a d ‘u sfeld e e al ead  dis ussi g the 
a  as a  effo t agai st ot o l  al Qaida ut the te o ists  etwork broadly conceived, including 
state spo so s of te o is . Quoted i  Maria Ryan, Neoconservatism and the New American Century 




neoconservative intellectual movement which first emerged during the 1970s, the 
core of what popularly became known as the Bush Doctrine was outlined i  the  
Natio al “e urit  “trateg .492 B oadl  defi ed, this o i ed a u ilate al a d p e‐
e pti e e e ise of the U.“. ilita  po e  ith a Wilso ia ‐like elief i  the 
u i e salis  of A e i a  alues.493 This reordering of U.S. foreign and security policy 
was sold to the American public on the pretext of an alleged nexus between rogue 
states, transnational terrorist groups and Weapons of Mass Destruction.494 Whilst 
Joh  Ike e  has a gued that the Bush Do t i e ep ese ted the most ambitious 
ethi ki g of A e i a s g a d st ateg  si e the ea l  ea s of the Cold Wa , su h 
claims should be qualified.495 The invasion of Iraq did indeed mark a departure in the 
means of U.S. military intervention in the global south. For the first time in a 
generation, an administration (if only temporarily) had attempted to circumvent the 
spatial organisation of American power by directly invading and in turn controlling 
                                                          
492  Neoconservatives sought to overturn containment and deterrence as organising principles of 
American grand strategy. During the 1990s, neoconservatives coalesced around the Project for a New 
American Century think-tank where they called for a renewed build-up of U.S. coercive power in order 
to a ou  a Ne  A e i a  Ce tu . T o of the o e e t s ost p opo e t a ke s - Donald 
Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney - e e ised o side a le i flue e du i g Bush s fi st te  in office, being 
appointed Secretary of Defence and Vice-President respectively. For a more in-depth discussion of 
neo-conservatism and its evolution over time, see Ryan, Neoconservatism and the New American 
Century. 
493 ‘o e t Je is, U de sta di g the Bush Do t i e , Political Science Quarterly, 118.3 (2003), 365–88. 
For a more detailed discussion of the Bush Doctrine and its legacy, see  Je is; Jeff e  ‘e o d, The 
Bush Doctrine and War with Ira , Parameters, 33.1 (2003), 4– ; Jo atha  Mo te , The ‘oots of the 
Bush Do t i e: Po e , Natio alis , a d De o a  P o otio  i  U“ “t ateg , International Security, 
29.4 (2005), 112–56; Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, A eri a U ou d : The Bush ‘e olution in 
Foreign Policy, ed. by James M Lindsay, Revised ed (Hoboken, N.J.: Hoboken: John Wiley, 2005); Hal 
B a ds a d Pete  Fea e , The Case fo  Bush ‘e isio is : ‘ee aluati g the Lega  of A e i a s d 
P eside t , Journal of Strategic Studies, 41.1–2 (2018), 234– ; ‘ a , Bush the T a s atio alist: A 
Reappraisal of the Unilateralist Impulse in US Foreign Policy, 2001– . 
494 Although Bush was successfully able to sell regime change in Iraq as an extension of the War against 
al-Qaeda, no substantial evidence has been produced of any meaningful relationship between the 
Baathist regime and al-Qaeda prior to the 2003 invasion. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that, 
despite a possible meeting between Iraqi officials and Osama bin Laden and/or his aids in 1999, it 
ould fi d … o e ide e that these o  ea lie  o ta ts e e  de eloped i to a olla o ati e 
operational relationship. Nor [did it see] evidence indicating that Iraq cooperated with al Qaeda in 
developing or carrying out any attacks against the U ited “tates . Tho as Kea , The /  
Co issio  ‘epo t , , p.  <https:// -11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> [accessed 3 
March 2017]. 
495 This was because it had derailed the commitment to multilateralism and international institutions 
hi h e e pe ei ed to e ke  to the ai te a e of the U.“.  li e al hege o  si e , hilst 
also being the catalyst for a global wave of anti-Americanism and opposition to American global 
leadership. See Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American 




territory in the global south. The goals of the invasion of Iraq, nevertheless, were 
consistent with the historical practices of American imperialism in the region. In 
toppling the Baathist regime, the Bush administration sought to impose a 
government more amicable to its imperial order, enforce its own vision of order 
ithi  I a s o de s, a d ope  up its a kets a d e e g  ese es to the flo  of 
transnational capital.496 As Simon Bromley has argued, the reconstitution of the Iraqi 
state so that it ould ope ate su essfull  ithi , athe  tha  agai st, the p e aili g 





The third phase of the War against al-Qaeda lasted f o  ea l   u til O a a s 
inauguration in January 2009. It followed from the failure to reconstruct the internal 
legitimacy of the Iraqi state. The initial invasion of Iraq was hailed by one 
o e tato  as o e of the sig al a hie e e ts i  ilita  histo  and further 
testa e t to the su ess of ‘u sfeld s ‘MA.498 Nonetheless, as in Afghanistan, the 
lightness of the American footprint, (less than 100,000 U.S. combat troops were 
involved in the initial invasion), coupled with the failure to adequately prepare for 
the occupation, led to wide-spread instability throughout the country. This was 
worsened  the Coalitio  P o isio al Autho it s CPA  poli  of de-Ba athifi atio  
which pushed thousands of former members of the Baathist party (including 
substantial parts of the Iraqi military) into the arms of insurgent groups.499 Principal 
amongst these groups was the al-Qaeda affiliate al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which, headed 
by Ayman al-Zawahiri, formally pledged bayat to Osama bin Laden in 2004. 500 
                                                          
496 Colás, p. 637. 
497 B o le , The Logi  of A e i a  Po e  i  the I te atio al Capitalist O de , p. . 
498 Ma  Boot, The Ne  A e i a  Wa  of Wa , Foreign Affairs, 82.4 (2003), 41–58. 
499 To  Dodge, The Causes of U“ Failu e i  I a , Survival, 49.1 (2007), 85–106 (p. 88). 
500 The relationship between al-Qaeda in Iraq and al-Qaeda s o e as o ple , a d fo eshado ed 
the later al-Qaeda/Islamic State split. The marriage between the two was very much one of 
convenience, as al-Qaeda s o e o je ted to A a  al-)a ahi i s o e i dis i i ate ta ti s. In 
contrast to al-Qaeda s o e, AQI pu sued a  agg essi e ilita  st ateg  of e ploiti g se ta ia  
divisions within Iraq. Whilst it was committed to conducting strikes against American troops, it 




Follo i g AQI s Fe ua   atta k o  the al-Askariyya Mosque in Samarra, 
sectarian violence throughout the country soared.  
 
I a s des e t i to iole e, a d the g o i g st ai  this pla ed o  the A e i a  
military, speaks directly to one of the greatest vulnerabilities of U.S. imperialism: its 
elia e o  territorially bounded sovereign states  to ep odu e its o  p i a .501 
Despite exercising near complete control over the air, sea and space surrounding Iraq, 
the American military was unable to dictate political or military outcomes on the 
ground.502 This fuelled the I a  Wa s u geo i g ost i  A e i a  lood a d fi a e. 
By the end of 2005, 2,181 U.S. military personnel had died of combat injuries 
sustained in the country.503 Whilst minimal in historical terms (58,220 U.S. military 
personnel had died in the Vietnam War for example)504, the relatively high number 
of U.S. combat fatalities sustained in Iraq was at odds with the elite casualty phobia 
that has shaped the practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south since 
the 1970s.505 As American soldiers began returning home in caskets, domestic public 
opinion soured against any further regime change in the Middle East. The collapse in 
public support for the Iraq War was so precipitous in fact that some began writing of 
an Iraq Syndrome comparable to the Vietnam Syndrome which had crystallised as a 
barrier to U.S. military intervention in the global south during the late twentieth 
century.506  
 
The failures of the Iraq War exercised a transformation effect on how the DOD 
planned to fight the War against al-Qaeda both within and outside of Iraq. Taking 
the toughest a d ost u popula  de isio  of [his] p eside ,507 within Iraq, Bush 
                                                          
501 Colás and Saull, p. 20. 
502 Colás and Saull, p. 20. 
503 Over the entire course of the Iraq War, 4,412 U.S. military personnel were killed, and a further 
31,949 service personnel were wounded. Nese DeB u e a d A e Lela d, A e i a  Wa  a d 
Milita  Ope atio s Casualties: Lists a d “tatisti s , The Congressional Research Service, 2015, p. 17 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32492.pdf> [accessed 3 March 2017].  
504 DeBruyne and Leland, p. 3. 
505 See Jeff e  ‘e o d, Collapsed Cou t ies, Casualt  D ead, a d the Ne  A e i a  Wa  of Wa , 
Parameters, 32.2 (2002), 4–24. 
506 Joh  Muelle , The I a  “ d o e . See also, Joh  Muelle , The I a  “ d o e ‘e isited: U“ 
I te e tio , F o  Koso o to Li a . For an critique of this concept of a  I a  “ d o e  see, Steel. 




ordered an additional 30,000 American combat troops to the country in January 
2007.508 U.S. soldiers decamped from their fortified Forward Operating Bases and 
mounted patrols alongside Iraqi security forces. Financial and material support was 
also given to the Anbar Awakening of over 100,000 Sunni fighters seeking to expel 
AQI s p ese e f o  thei  o u ities. 509  The repressive practices of 
unconventional warfare which had been rolled out across the country in the 
immediate aftermath of the invasion were also continued during this period.510 This 
turn to counterinsurgency (COIN) marked a radical departure not only from the first 
two phases of the War against al-Qaeda, but U.S. military intervention in the global 
south following the Vietnam War more broadly.511 Rather than relying on foreign 
security forces to police antithetical social force from below, for the first time in a 
generation, American armed forces attempted to do so directly with its own boots 
being deployed on the ground.512  
 
Outside of Iraq, the 2006 QDR, laid out significant step-changes in not only how but 
where the Pentagon planned to fight the War against al-Qaeda. This seminal defence 
pla i g do u e t s e t al o lusio  as that although the U.“. etai ed a  
unassailable conventional military superiority, it had been unprepared to tackle the 
asymmetrical security threats presented by antithetical social forces such as al-
Qaeda.513 I  o de  to ai tai  t ul  full-spe t u  do i a e , shifts e e e ui ed: 
 
                                                          
508 Sestanovich, pp. 294–96. 
509 For more on General Pet aeus  app oa h to ou te i su ge  a d his efle tio s o  it, see David 
H Pet aeus, ‘efle tio s o  the Cou te -I su ge  E a , The RUSI Journal, 158.4 (2013), 82–87; James 
A ‘ussell, Cou te i su ge  A e i a  “t le: Co side i g Da id Pet aeus a d T e t -First Century 
I egula  Wa , Small Wars & Insurgencies, 25.1 (2014), 69–90. 
510 See Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, pp. 134–45. 
511 In the wake of the Vietnam War, it was relegated to a peripheral place in U.S. Army doctrine 
pla i g, ha i g e o e a peculiar obsession of special operations forces . Paul Co ish, The U ited 
“tates a d Cou te i su ge : Politi al Fi st, Politi al Last, Politi al Al a s , International Affairs, 
85.1 (2009), 61–79 (p. 62).  COIN, so the popula  a ati e holds, as edis o e ed  du i g the Iraq 
War and the publication of Field Manual FM 3-24 by the US Army and Marine Corps in December 
2006- the first full COIN manual published since 1966. See also Ja es “ Co u , ‘ethi ki g U“ A  
Counter-I su ge  Do t i e , Contemporary Security Policy, 28.1 (2007), 127–42. 
512 For more on the place of COIN warfare in U.S. grand strategy during the Cold War and beyond, see 
Stokes and Raphael, pp. 64–72. 
513 The Quadrennial Defence Review is a defence planning document which the DOD publishes once 
e e  fou  ea s. It is a o p ehe si e defe e e ie  hi h la s out the DOD s p oposed t oop 




1. f o  espo di g afte  a isis sta ts ea ti e – to preventive actions so 
p o le s do ot e o e ises p oa ti e ; 
 
2. f o  ajo  o e tio al o at ope atio s – to multiple irregular, 
asymmetric operations ; 
 
3. and f o  o du ti g a  agai st atio s- to conducting war in countries we 
are not at war with (safe havens) .514 
 
These shifts, hi h e phasized the i po ta e of ei g a le to o k ith a d 
through partners to operate clandestinely and to sustain a persistent but low-
visibility presence , pla ed ke  eight o  ilita  assista e programmes.515 As one 
commentator noted, [ ]uilding the capacity of partner countries emerged as a key 
the e i  the  QD‘ . 516  The commitment to building the indigenous 
counterterrorism capacity of states, whose internal security was threatened by al-
Qaeda, was contingent on bilateral and multilateral cooperation with often 
repressive regimes across the global south.517 Such practices, it is argued in chapter 
, ould e i stitutio alised du i g O a a s p eside  as a e t al o po e t of 
the ad i ist atio s s all-footprint approach to counterterrorism. 
 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2009-2012 
 
B  O a a s i augu atio , as a o se ue e of oth the I a  Wa  a d the Glo al 
Financial Crisis (GFC), the U.S. was widely argued to be locked into a period of 
inexorable decline.518 Whether this was in fact the case has been the subject of 
immense scholarly debate.519 What is important to note about this development is 
                                                          
514 Emphasis added. DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , p. . 
515 DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , p. . 
516 Mi hele A Flou o , Did the Pe tago  Get the Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘ight? , Washington 
Quarterly, 29.2 (2006), 67–84 (p. 78). 
517 Burton, p. 47. 
518 See Rach a ; Qui , The A t of De li i g Politel : O a a s P ude t P eside  a d the Wa i g 
of A e i a  Po e ; La e, This Ti e It s ‘eal: The E d of U ipola it  a d the Pa  A e i a a ; “tokes, 
A hilles  Deal: Dolla  De li e a d U“ G a d “t ateg  afte  the C isis . 
519  Challenging declinist perspectives, some have pointed to the resilience of the monetary, 
institutional and material pillars of American primacy. “tokes, A hilles  Deal: Dolla  De li e a d U“ 
Grand Strategy after the C isis . Josef Joffe, The Default Po e : The False P ophe  of A e i a s 
De li e , Foreign Affairs, 2009, 21–35. Joseph “ N e J , The Futu es of A e i a  Po e -Dominance 
a d De li e i  Pe spe ti e , Foreign Affairs, 89.6 (2010), 2–12. See also, Brooks and Wohlforth, 




not the reality of American decline. Rather, it is the perception of, and reaction to it, 
which was key. For Obama and his inner circle, American decline appears to have 
been understood as a journey, not an immediate destination. The administration 
appears to have believed that it exercised considerable agency to the degree that it 
could slow the pace of American decline. According to Benjamin Rhodes, a key 
O a a ad ise , o e of the ad i ist atio s p i ipal ai s as to help ensure another 
fifty years of U.S. global leadership.520 As the president himself noted in the preamble 
to the 2010 National Security Strategy, ha i g ee  ha de ed  a s, 
a d…dis ipli ed  a de astati g e o o i  isis , his ad i ist atio  as o itted 
to "pursu[ing] a strategy of national renewal and global leadership- a strategy that 
rebuilds the foundation of American strength and influence".521 This suggests that, 
whilst the Obama administration accepted the reality of U.S. relative decline, it 
nevertheless believed that its momentum could be slowed if corrective actions were 
put i  pla e. This goal shaped the ad i ist atio s app oa h to ilita  i te e tio  
in the global south in two major ways: the first, through a commitment to avoiding 
any further largescale COIN operations in the global south; the second, through a 
renewed emphasis on extending open-door access to overseas markets, resources, 
and labour of the global south.  
 
A central aim of the means of O a a s ou te te o is  poli  was to put the 
military response against al-Qaeda onto a surer footing. This required not only 
i di g do  the costly, large-s ale g ou d a s i  I a  a d Afgha ista  ut 
avoiding fighting any further COIN campaigns in the global south.522 This goal was 
i teg ated i to the DOD s defe e pla i g o ept du i g O a a s p eside . The 
 QD‘ ade lea , fo  e a ple, that [e]fforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. 
forces and emphasize host-nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale 
ou te i su ge  a paig s . 523  As it o ti ued, [ ]  e phasizi g host-nation 
leadership and employing modest numbers of U.S. forces, the United States can 
                                                          
520 Sestanovich, p. 322. 
521 Emphasis added. The White House, The Natio al “e u it  “t ateg  of the U ited “tates , p. i. 
522 The White House, The  Natio al “e u it  “t ateg , p. . 
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sometimes obviate the need for larger-scale counterinsurgency campaigns . 524 
Capitalising on the i fle tio  poi t  i  defe e pla i g ought by the draw-down 
of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance 
sig alled the DOD s i te t to p io itise the ualitati e supe io it , ot ua titati e 
size, of the American military.525 U.S. ground forces would o se ue tl  o lo ge  
be sized to conduct large-s ale, p olo ged sta ilit  ope atio s .526 
 
Speaking to the Oba a ad i ist atio s renewed emphasis on extending open-door 
access to overseas markets, resources, and labour of the global south, the need to 
o e the e o o  f o  atast ophi  e essio  to lasti g e o e  as ited as a 
major goal of the 2010 National Security Strategy.527 To this end, a o it e t to 
e e  ou  e o o , hi h se es as the ellsp i g of A e i a  po e  as pla ed 
at the e t e of its d i e to e e  the U.“.  glo al leade ship.528 This e ui ed [a] 
strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic 
system that p o otes oppo tu it  a d p ospe it 529 since, the document continued, 
a g o i g a d ope  glo al e o o  se es as a sou e of oppo tu it  fo  the 
American people and a source of strength for the United States 530. The later 2014 
QDR reiterated the relationship between the strength of the American economy - the 
foundation of American imperialism - a d a sta le i te atio al o de , u de itte  
by the U.“. ilita s ole a d that of ou  allies a d pa t e s i  e su i g f eedo  of 
a ess a d the f ee flo  of o e e glo all . 531  The 2015 National Security 
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<http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
526 DOD, “ustai i g Glo al Leade ship: P io ities Fo  st Ce tu  Defe e , p. . The 2010 QDR had 
similarly noted how the o upatio s of Afgha ista  a d I a  had stressed the ground forces 
dispropo tio atel  du i g p eside . DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , p. i. To this 
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p. ix. Ji  Ti e, A  “h i ks to “ allest Le el si e efo e Wo ld Wa  II , Army Times, 2016 
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before-world-war-ii/> [accessed 10 November 2017]. 
527 The White House, The Natio al “e u it  “t ateg  of the U ited “tates , p. . 
528 Quoted in Va  Apeldoo  a d De G aaff, O a a s E o o i  ‘e o e  “t ateg  Ope  Ma kets a d 
Elite Po e : Busi ess as Usual? , p. . See also The White House, The Natio al “e u it  “t ateg  of 
the U ited “tates , p. . 
529 The White House, The Natio al “e u it  “t ateg  of the U ited “tates , p. . 
530 The White House, The Natio al “e u it  “t ateg  of the U ited “tates , p. . 




Strategy similarly noted how, during an era of perceived economic decline, 
[s]ustai i g ou  leade ship depends on shaping an emerging global economic order 
that o ti ues to efle t ou  i te ests a d alues . 532  As Van Apeldoorn and De 
G aaff ha e e plo ed i  g eate  e pi i al depth, ke  to the O a a ad i ist atio s 
attempt to repair American primacy in the aftermath of the GFC was restoring 
o fide e i  A e i a s fi a ial a kets, i  pa t  p oppi g up ope -door access 
to markets across the global south.533  
 
Situated against this backdrop, the Obama administration pivoted the geographical 
focus of the War against al-Qaeda from Iraq to South Asia. This was consistent with 
O a a s ea lie  iti is s that the I a  Wa  had ee  a  u e essa  a d ostl  
diversion from what should have been the primary target of U.S. military intervention 
in the global south: al-Qaeda.534 Prior to the end of U.S. combat operations in Iraq in 
August 2010, following a three-month policy review, Obama elected to send an 
additional 33,000 additional combat troops to Afghanistan. 535  This surge, which 
i o ed Bush s i  I a , took the u e  of U.“. soldie s o e  ,  a d ai ed to 
dis upt, dis a tle, a d defeat al Qaeda i  Pakista  a d Afgha ista …p e e t[i g] 
thei  etu  to eithe  ou t  i  the futu e . 536  Nevertheless, whilst Obama was 
willing to commit to a COIN campaign in Afghanistan in order to attempt to preserve 
the state s te ito ial i teg it , its du atio  as apped f o  its o set.537 As Obama 
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537 The additional 33,000 U.S. combat troops sent to Afghanistan would begin drawing down from 
June 2011. Combat operations in Afghanistan formally ended on the 28th December 2014. 
‘espo si ilit  fo  Afgha ista s se u it  as the  t a sfe ed f o  the NATO oalitio  to the Afgha i 
government. Although U.S. military commanders initially claimed that the 9,800 American combat 




i fo ed his i e  i le, he as ot doi g a lo g te  atio  uildi g effo t. [He 
as] ot spe di g a t illio  dolla s…That s not in the national interest .538 
 
I  eigh ou i g Pakista , to hi h Afgha ista s i te al se u it  as i e o a l  tied, 
legal and political obstacles precluded the deployment of uniformed ground forces. 
Consistent with the shift f o  o du ti g a  agai st atio s- to conducting war in 
ou t ies e a e ot at a  ith  fi st i stitutio alised i  the  QD‘, the O a a 
administration instead adopted a revised approach to military intervention which 
combined new technological innovations, most notably drone launched targeted 
killings, with more traditional tools of U.S. imperialism, principally military assistance 
programmes.539 Consistent with another central tenet of the 2006 QDR - the need to 
shift from conducting activities ourselves to enabling partners to do more for 
the sel es  - efforts were also made to build the capacity of Pakistani security forces 
to disrupt and dislodge al-Qaeda s o e in the FATA.540 To this end, the Pakistan 
Counterinsurgency Fund, later designated the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability 
Fund, was authorised in the FY 2009 Supplemental Appropriations Act. It provided 
U.S. military training, equipment and funds to build the counterinsurgency capacity 
of the Pakistani military and Frontier Corps.541 Before its cancellation in 2013, this 
programme was obligated funding of over $2 billion.542  
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538 Emphasis added. Quoted in Sestanovich, p. 307. 
539 DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , p. i. 
540 The Coalition Support Fund accounted for $14.6 billion of the $22.6 billion military aid given to 
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Research Service (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2013), pp. 17–23 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41856.pdf> [accessed 11 October 2017]. 
541  A  T so , Gates Pushes Co g ess To Boost Pakista  Aid , The Washington Post, 2009 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artic> [accessed 7 July 2017]. 




On the back of these efforts, a succession of administration officials lined up to 
trumpet the success of the military response against al-Qaeda s core in the run up to 
the 2012 presidential election. Speaking in June 2010, then CIA director Leon E. 
Pa etta i sisted that the ad i ist atio  as ithi  ea h of st ategi all  defeati g 
Al Qaeda .543 On the campaign trail, Obama repeatedly stressed that al-Qaeda s o e 
had ee  de i ated  a d that it as o  the path to defeat .544 The degradation of 
al-Qaeda s o e, coupled with al-Qaeda s pe ei ed a gi alisatio  afte  the A a  
Spring, lead some scholars to also argue that the entire movement was on the path 
to defeat.545 When thinking about the larger evolution of the War against al-Qaeda 
however, what is important to note here is that the repeated claims of al-Qaeda s 
impending defeat during this period were based on the (perceived) efficacy of 
counterterrorism operations against one particular branch of the transnational 
movement: al-Qaeda s o e. At the same time that this was being championed, 
Obama administration officials were beginning to emphasise the growing threat 
posed by al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates.546 These two connected trends - the relative 
decline of al-Qaeda s o e within the al-Qaeda movement and thus the growing 
importance of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates - were not contradictory. As Obama 
remarked in 2013:  
 
it s [si ] e ti el  o siste t to sa  that this tightl  o ga ised a d elati el  
centralized al-Qaeda that attacked us on 9/11 has been broken apart and is 
very weak and does not have a lot of operational capacity and to say we still 
have these regional organizations, like AQAP, that can pose a threat, that can 
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545 See Fawaz A Gerges, The Rise and Fall of Al-Qaeda (New York: OUP USA, 2011). 
546 Speaking in June 2010 for example, the principal Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism stated 
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drive potentially a truck bomb into an embassy wall and can kill some 
people.547 
 
As the intensity of the military campaign against al-Qaeda s o e in South Asia 
receded after peaking in 2010/2011, the predominate focus of the War against Al-
Qaeda shifted toward al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates.548  
 
Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, 2011-2014 
 
The fifth phase of the War against al-Qaeda lasted from late 2011 through the 
beginning of combat operations against Islamic State in autumn 2014. Following 
several high-profile (unsuccessful) attacks on the continental U.S. (including the 
failed u de ea  o i g  of No th est Ai li es Flight , the defeat of AQAP  
as si gled out as the ad i ist atio s CT [ ou te te o is ] p io it  i  the 
egio .549 Speaking in June 2012, Defence Secretary Leon Panetta reiterated the 
administrations:  
 
commitment that we are going to track these guys [Al-Qaeda] wherever they 
go and make sure they have no place to hide, a d that s hat the effo t he e 
[in Djibouti] is all about – to make sure that they have no place to hide, 
hethe  it s Ye e  o  it s “o alia o  a pla e else.550 
 
Panetta not only diagnosed the growing threat posed by al-Qaeda s affiliates elati e 
to al-Qaeda s o e, ut p es i ed the ad i ist atio s espo se to this e  
di e tio  i  the Wa  agai st al-Qaeda.551 As he noted:  
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We have slowed a primary cancer, but we know that the cancer has also 
metastasized to other parts of the global body. Two examples of that 
spreading al-Qaeda p ese e, a e Ye e  a d “o alia…But still ou  halle ge 
is far from over. Yes, we have decimated core al-Qaeda. And yes, we have 
ade ota le p og ess agai st its asso iated fo es i  Ye e  a d “o alia… 
But the al-Qaeda cancer, has also adapted to this pressure by becoming even 
more widely distributed, loosely knit, and geographically dispersed.552  
 
A year later, Obama acknowledged that, after more than a decade of military 
intervention across the global south, the War against al-Qaeda as at a oss oads . 
Toda , the o e of al Qaeda i  Afgha ista  a d Pakista  is o  the path to defeat , 
the president noted during a May 2013 national security speech. 553  The 
e e ge e of a ious al Qaeda affiliates  p ese ted a se ies of e  security 
halle ges: [f] o  Ye e  to I a , f o  “o alia to No th Af i a, the th eat toda  
is o e diffuse, ith Al Qaeda s affiliates i  the A a ia  Pe i sula - AQAP - the most 
a ti e i  plotti g agai st ou  ho ela d .554 Al-Qaeda s geog aphi al diffusio  to 
hat had p e iousl  ee  the pe iphe  of U.“. ou te te o is  effo ts oupled 
with the wind-down of combat operations in the battlefield theatres in Afghanistan 
and Iraq were two major trends which intersected during this period. At this crucial 
juncture in May 2014, Obama stressed that: 
 
toda s p i ipal th eat o lo ge  o es f o  a e t alized al Qaeda 
leadership. Instead, it comes from decentralized al Qaeda affiliates and 
extremists, many with agendas focused in countries where they operate.555 
 
The ea s a d goals of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates are the empirical focus of chapters 5, 6 and 7. What is important to 
ote he e is that these effo ts o ti ued th oughout the e ai de  of O a a s 
presidency. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper made clear in early 
2016, al-Qaeda s affiliates ha[d] p o e  esilie t a d a e positio ed to ake gai s 
i  , despite ou te te o is  p essu e that has la gel  deg aded the et o k s 
leade ship i  Afgha ista  a d Pakista .556 This being said, the military response 
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against al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates as displa ed as the e t al f o t of the Wa  
against al-Qaeda by the sudden rise of the Islamic State from 2014 onward. 
 
Iraq and Syria, 2014-2017 
 
In the early years of the Syrian Civil War, the al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Nusra Front made 
significant inroads throughout the country.557 By early 2016, it was reported to have 
had between 6,000 to 9,000 fighters and a stronghold in the western Syrian province 
of Idlib. 558  The Obama administration had nevertheless refrained from directly 
intervening against the group (or in the Syrian conflict more broadly) for the first 
years of the conflict. It instead limited itself to an abortive effort to train and equip 
vetted members of the Syrian opposition.559 This approach was only altered by the 
sweeping territorial gains which the Islamic State was able to make in both Syria and 
neighbouring Iraq from late 2013 onward.560 This had the effect of affixing the Syrian 
Civil War into the larger War against al-Qaeda. Speaking in August 2014, Defence 
“e eta  Chu k Hagel lai ed that the Isla i  “tate as e o d just a te o ist 
group" emphasising that "the sophistication of terrorism and ideology married with 
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resources now poses a whole new dynamic and a new paradigm of threats to this 
country".561 Indeed, such claims are consistent with my earlier theorisation of al-
Qaeda as an antithetical social force which took aim at the material practices of 
American imperialism. 562  Whilst ot a  e a t fit gi e  the Isla i  “tate s o e 
aggressive approach to global jihad, on a (temporarily) larger scale than al-Qaeda, it 
also aimed to overturn the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers 
throughout the global south. Beyond its traditional centre of gravity in Iraq and Syria, 
the Islamic State established Wila at s (overseas territories) in Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan Nigeria, and the Caucasus.563 As 
Kilcullen has argued, in contrast to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates, these Wilayat s 
e e o e like o e seas p o i es of a  e pi e, o  olo ial possessio s of a atio  
state, pu sui g the pa e t state s i te est e e  at the e pe se of thei  o  
age da .564 The Isla i  “tate s de la ation of a caliphate in the heart of the Middle 
East, and its pursuit of Wilayat s elsewhere, directly challenged the reproduction of 
closed frontiers in multiple states across the Middle East and Africa. Given its capture 
of key oilfields in both Iraq and Syria, it also threatened to dislocate the flow of 
Middle Eastern oil onto global markets.565  
 
Addressing the nation at the beginning of Operation Inherent Resolve in September 
2014, Obama was quick to point out that the military response against the Islamic 
State was to e diffe e t f o  the a s i  I a  a d Afgha ista .566 U.S. ground 
forces would not be returning to Iraq nor would they be deployed to Syria. The focus 
of the military response to the Islamic State would instead be on working by, with, 
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and through regional and local partners. Running parallel to a sustained coalition 
bombing campaign, the administration committed itself to a large scale train-and-
equip programme intended to provide material, logistical, training and other forms 
of support to Iraqi Security Forces, the Kurdish Peshmerga and pro-government Shia 
militias.567 “peaki g to the ilita  su ess of hat has ee  f a ed as the ediu  
footp i t  app oa h to ilita  i te e tio ,  the e d of O a a s p eside , 
Islamic State had lost control over the majority of the territory it had once held, 
including the key strongholds of Fallujah, Jarabulus and Ramadi.568  
 
Into Africa: the War against al-Qaeda’s latest frointer  
 
As I have shown, U.S. counterterrorism operations in the global south were far wider 
than military operations in just the battlefield theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq.569 
From late 2011 through the beginning of combat operations against Islamic State in 
September 2014 (phase 5), al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates e e held up as the most 
active and threatening branch of the entire movement. Obama made this position 
lea  hi self i  Ma   he  he ide tified the p i ipal  ou te te o is  
halle ge fa ed  the ad i ist atio  as o i g f o  de e t alized al Qaeda 
affiliates .570 Whilst yet to be subject to the same degree of  scholarly attention as 
U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda s o e, al-Qaeda in Iraq or the Islamic State, 
the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates thus 
qualifies as a distinct and significant phase of this conflict. It sat at the intersection 
of three interconnected trends in the contemporary practices of U.S. military 
i te e tio  i  the glo al south:  the i fle tio  poi t  in the War against al-Qaeda 
brought by the end of the COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq; 571  (2) the 
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retooling of the means of U.S. counterterrorism following the 2006 QDR; and (3) 
Af i a s e e ge e as a  i easi gl  ke  site of U.“. ou te te o is  ope atio s. 
Providing key context for my structured-focused comparison in chapters 5, 6 and 7, 
this chapter concludes by briefly reflecting on the latter two of these trends.  
 
My six-stage periodization of the War against al-Qaeda speaks to the continuity in 
the means of U.S. military intervention in the global south across the Bush and 
Obama presidencies. The greatest step-change in the means of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south did not unfold between the Bush and Obama 
presidencies. Rather, they occurred within Bush s t o te s i  offi e. Prompted by 
the growing fiscal, military and electoral costs of the Iraq War, the 2006 QDR planned 
for a recalibration of both the where and how the War against al-Qaeda would be 
fought. This accompanied the larger shifts away from o du ti g a  agai st 
nations- to conducting war in countries we are not at wa  ith safe hea e s  on 
the o e ha d a d f o  o du ti g a ti ities ou sel es to e a li g pa t e s to do 
o e fo  the sel es  o  the othe .572 As T e o  M C iske  has thus a gued, Bush[ s] 
st ateg  as uietl  odified i  the last th ee ea s efo e O a a s a essio .573 
This is important for my analysis moving forward because the claim made by some 
that O a a s a e sio  to ajo  o e seas a tio , a d the easo s fo  it- concerns 
o e  effi a  a d ost  as the ke  shift  in security policy between the two 
presidents, must be qualified.574 Yes, Obama attempted to curtail many of the most 
eg egious aspe ts of Bush s i itial app oa h to the Wa  agai st al-Qaeda. Yet, this 
p o ess had al ead  ega  i  the last ea s of Bush s p eside . O  this asis, 
Obama adopted an evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach to U.S. military 
intervention in the global south which institutionalised the revised counterterrorism 
playbook which he inherited. Precisely how the Obama administration 
institutionalised the retooling of the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention 
in the global south is the principal focus of the next chapter. 
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The rise of al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates as the e t al fo us of the War against al-
Qaeda ei fo ed Af i a s e e ge e as a  i easi gl  ke  site of U.“. ilita  
intervention in the global south. Historically, sub-Saharan Africa was perceived to be 
of limited strategic importance to American defence planners.575 In the wake of the 
“o iet U io s ollapse, the DOD s Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa published 
in 1995 ulti atel  [sa ] e  little t aditio al st ategi  i te est i  Af i a .576 This 
approach was radically altered by the onset of the War against al-Qaeda. To put the 
g o th of the U.“.  ilita  p ese e o  the o ti e t i to so e pe spe ti e, i  the 
decade after 2006, the percentage of American SOF operatives deployed overseas 
and in Africa rose from one to seventeen per cent.577 This paralleled a comparable 
g o th i  the DOD s asi g a hite tu e a oss the o ti e t. Whilst Camp 
Lemonnier remained the only permanent military base in Africa it likely served as the 
tributary for a constellation of smaller bases elsewhere in East Africa.578 In the West 
of Af i a, a st i g of lil -pad  Fo a d Ope ati g Bases a e also epo ted to ha e ee  
esta lished i  the latte  ea s of O a a s p eside .579  The growth of the U.“  
military presence across the continent was directly tied to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates. As AFRICOM commander General Ham told the Senate Armed Services 
Committee in March 2012, [c]ountering the threats posed by al-Qaida affiliates in 
East a d No th est Af i a e ai [ed] [the] No.  p io it .580 As he reiterated to the 
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same committee a year later, the eed to put p essu e o  al-Qa'ida affiliates and 
adhe e ts i  East, No th, a d West Af i a has e e  ee  g eate .581 
 
Key to U.S. military operations in Africa was AFRICOM: the Unified Combatant 
Command responsible for managi g a d e e uti g the Pe tago s a ti ities a oss 
the continent (with the exception of Egypt). 582  Whilst I am not suggesting that 
AF‘ICOM s eatio  i   ele ated the o ti e t to the sa e i po ta e as 
Western Europe, the Persian Gulf or East Asia in the maintenance of American 
p i a , it e e theless di e tl  spoke to the o ti e t s growing strategic 
importance to the U.S.583  Whilst AFRICOM worked to promote regional security 
cooperation and build long term partnerships, its highest priority was 
counterterrorism.584 Consistent with my historical materialist theoretical framework, 
AFRICOM played a key managerial role in the defence of open-markets and closed 
frontiers from antithetical social forces such as al-Qaeda. 
 
Africa has wrongly been argued to ha e ee  asi all  i sig ifi a t  i  e o o i  
terms to the U.S.585 As poi ted out i  the White House s  fa tsheet o  U.“.-Africa 
Coope atio  o  T ade a d I est e t U de  the O a a Ad i ist atio , Af i a s 
immense economic potential, increasing integration into global markets, expanding 
infrastructure, and demographic boom provide[d] a remarkable opportunity to 
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e ha e U.“. t ade a d i est e t ties a oss the o ti e t .586 Speaking directly to 
the dual logic of American power, the African continent holds significant oil and gas 
reserves. A core goal of U.S. energy security policy after the 1990s was to open-up oil 
production in the Gulf of Guinea as a hedge against instability in the Middle East.587 
Whilst states in the Gulf of Guinea accounted for only a small percentage of global 
oil production (around six per cent in 2010), 96% of its production was exported onto 
the glo al a ket thus e a li g it to se e as a ke  s i g p odu e .588 Beyond oil, 
Africa is also home to approximately a third of all rare earth minerals including 
platinum, iridium, tantalum, tourmaline and uranium which are key to the global 
manufacturing sector.589 Fu the o e, as poi ted out i  the White House s 2012 
Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, [t]he e o o ies of su -Saharan Africa are 
a o g the o ld s ost apidl  g o i g .590 Indeed, at 4.4 per cent, real annual GDP 
growth on the continent between 2010 and 2015 outpaced the global average.591 
The economic importance of Africa is only forecast to grow. By 2050, the continent 
is predicted to hold a ua te  of the o ld s populatio , a apidl  g o i g iddle 
class, and a burgeoning labour force.592 Speaking to this economic potential, in the 
years between 2008 and 2015, U.S. direct investment in the continent jumped from 
$37 billion to $64 billion.593  
 
AFRICOM has also worked to maintain territorial stability within weak and fragile 
states across the continent. This was a core goal of American foreign and security 
policy during the War against al-Qaeda. The 2002 National Security Strategy noted 
                                                          
586  The White House, FACT “HEET: U.“.-Africa Cooperation on Trade and Investment Under the 
O a a Ad i ist atio ,  <https://o a a hitehouse.a hi es.go /the-press-
office/2016/09/21/fact-sheet-us-africa-cooperation-trade-and-investment-under-obama> [accessed 
11 April 2018]. 
587 See Stokes and Raphael, pp. 148–55. 
588 Stokes and Raphael, pp. 146–47. 
589 G a t Ha is, Wh  Af i a Matte s to U“ Natio al “e u it , Atlantic Council: Africa Centre, 2017, p. 
17 <http://www.css.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-
studies/resources/docs/Atlantic Council-Why_Africa_Matters_to_US_National_Security.pdf> 
[accessed 11 April 2018]. 
590  The White House, U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-“aha a  Af i a , , p.  <https:// -
2017.state.gov/documents/organization/209377.pdf> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
591 Harris, p. 15. 
592 Harris, p. 15. 
593  The White House, FACT “HEET: U.S.-Africa Cooperation on Trade and Investment Under the 




that eak states, like Afgha ista , a  pose as g eat a da ge  to ou  atio al 
i te ests as st o g states .594 The 2006 National Security Strategy reiterated this 
o it e t, di e tl  t i g A e i a  se u it  to pa t e i g ith Af i a s to 
strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the control of 
effe ti e de o a ies .595 As it continued, speaking to the importance of building 
partner capacity in states across the continent:  
 
U.S. security is inextricably tied to the effectiveness of our efforts to help 
pa t e s a d allies uild thei  o  se u it  apa it  … Although se u it  
assistance is not new, what has fundamentally changed is the role that such 
assista e a  pla  i  p o idi g se u it  i  toda s e i o e t. Th eats to 
our security in the decades to come are more likely to emanate from state 
weakness than from state strength.596 
 
Consistent with this reading, as I theorised in chapter 2, military assistance can be 
understood as a eake  hi h A e i a  poli ake s ha e atte pted to plug i to 
states were the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers was perceived to be 
th eate ed  a titheti al so ial fo es. This logi  lea l  i fo ed AF‘ICOM s 
military engagement across the continent. Working with and through existing state 
formations, with a particular focus on preventative engagement, was key to 
AF‘ICOM s app oa h to poli i g the o ti e t.597 It was, as AF‘ICOM s o a de  
Ge e al Ca te  F. Ha  put it, the ead a d utter of what we do at U.S. 
AFRICOM".598 A core aim of these military assistance programmes was to pre-empt 
the deplo e t of U.“. oots o  the g ou d  to the o ti e t. “peaki g i  , 
deputy assistant secretary of defence for African affairs Theresa Whelan remarked 
that U.S. security is enhanced when African nations themselves endeavour 
successfully to address and resolve emerging security issues before they become so 
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serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to 
resol e .599 The central importance of military assistance in the campaigns against 
AQIM and al-Shabaab (and other militant groups across the continent including Boko 
Haram and Ansar al-Sharia) as sig alled i  the o p ehe si e app oa h  to 
counterterrorism in Africa published by the administration in August 2014. As it 
noted, in addition to strengthening law enforcement capacity of partner states and 
ta geti g the oot auses of adi alisatio  a oss the o ti e t, U.S. military 
personnel work hand-in-hand with their African counterparts to increase military 
apa it  i  ou t ies th eate ed  te o is .600 As General Ham put it, whilst his 
command would "preserve the capability to conduct whatever military operations 
ight e e essa  it as ulti atel  far better if we can focus our efforts on 
preventative measures by, with and through our African partners".601 The DOD s 
security cooperation efforts across the continent, which worked in tandem with the 
“tate Depa t e t s se u it  assista e programmes, had a clear political economy 
logic. By working to maintain internal stability within key states across the continent, 
these programmes functioned to smooth their integration into the global economy 
and secure privileged American access to its energy resources.602 In West Africa in 
particular, both the Bush and Obama administrations funnelled millions of dollars in 
military hardware and training to oil-rich states. This was with the aim of maintaining 
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Coming full circle, the primary goal of this chapter was to determine the place of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  oth the 
p eside t s o e a hi g fo eig  a d se u it  do t i e and the evolution of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in the global south after 9/11. In the first section of this 
chapter, I began by e plo i g the elatio ship et ee  O a a s ou te te o is  
policy and his overarching foreign policy doctrine. Whilst the existing U.S. foreign 
policy literature was rightly shown to have correctly identified burden-sharing, 
retrenchment and constraint as being three of the key pillars of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s espo se to the ajo  state-based security challenges which he 
inherited during his presidency, I argued that these tenets were at odds with the 
p eside t s agg essi e app oa h to ou te te o is . I then demonstrated how what 
I oi ed the O a a ad i ist atio s Ja us-faced approach to military intervention in 
the global south as o siste t ith histo i al ate ialis s e phasis o  a titheti al 
social forces as a primary target of U.S. military intervention in the global south.  
 
My aim in the second section of this chapter was to overcome the dualism which has 
decoupled the study of the goals of U.S. military intervention from those of the 
movement it has been at war against. This required opening the black-box of al-
Qaeda s ideolog  a d st ategi  goals. I  doi g so, I theorised al-Qaeda as an 
antithetical social force which posed a three-pronged challenge to the practices of 
American imperialism. Within the context of my structured-focused comparison, 
particular attention will consequently be given to al-Qaeda s affiliates  atte pt to:  
conduct direct attacks against targets of economic significance within the continental 
U.S.; (2) exploit the spatial organisation of American power by tying down American 
ground forces in military campaigns throughout the global south;  and (3) disrupt the 
reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers throughout the global south, with a 
particular emphasis on disrupting global energy security and governing territory in 





In the third and final section of this chapter, I constructed a loose six-staged 
chronology of the War against al-Qaeda f o  the /  atta ks to the e d of O a a s 
presidency. This enabled me to situate the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se 
to al-Qaeda s affiliates ithi  the o e a hi g Wa  agai st al-Qaeda. As I argued, 
during the three-year period between the drawdown of combat operations against 
al-Qaeda s o e i  Pakista  i  the autu  of  u til the egi i g of o at 
operations against Islamic State in September 2014, the military response to al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates was the primary focus of the War against al-Qaeda. 
 
My periodization of the War against al-Qaeda also enabled me to engage with the 
shifts in the means and geographical focus of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the 
global south after 9/11. Pa ti ula  atte tio  as paid to Af i a s e e ge e as a ke  
site of American imperialism, and the role of AFRICOM and military assistance in 
reproducing open-doors and closed frontiers throughout the continent. Building on 
this foundation, the principal aim of the following chapter is to narrow the scope of 
my empirical analysis of the means of the Obama administratio s ilita  espo se 












This hapte s p i ipal ai  is to halle ge the p e aili g u de sta di g of ho  the 
coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south were retooled 
du i g O a a s p eside . This is i  o de  to o st u t a i he  a al ti al f a e o k 
to inform my empirical analysis of the means of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  hapte s ,  a d . Mu h of the extant 
IR and American foreign policy literature has essentialized a single technological 
development (drones) and a single practice of U.S. statecraft (targeted killings). One 
inadvertent consequence of this drone-centrism, as I coin it, has been to ignore the 
parallel rise of security force assistance (SFA) as a disciplinary mode of state violence 
employed to police antithetical social forces (such as al-Qaeda) which threatened 
American primacy. This chapter is therefore structured to broaden the debate on the 
means of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq beyond 
its ki eti  fa e  to pla e g eate  eight o  i di e t effo ts to t ai , e uip, ad ise a d 
assist foreign security forces. As I will argue, drone-launched targeted killings were 
indeed a central and distinctive component of U.S. counterterrorism operations in 
some theatres of the War against al-Qaeda. Nevertheless, alongside security force 
assistance (SFA) and the auxiliary tools of U.S. coercive power (Special Operations 
Forces [SOF] and Private Military and Security Contractors [PMSC]) which enabled 
their use, they are better conceived as having formed constituent parts of a 




This chapter begins by defining two concepts which are key to setting some limits to 
my later analysis: counterterrorism and SFA. Counterterrorism is first distinguished 




of my analysis. From here, I then explore the detail of U.S. military assistance 
programmes. My understanding of SFA, and their relationship to security assistance, 
security cooperation and building partner capacity is then briefly untangled. 
Thereafter, I contextualise the history, goals and major recipients of three of the 
largest SFA programmes used outside of Afghanistan and Iraq: the (1) Section 1206 
Global Train and Equip authority; (2) the Global Counterterrorism Partnership Fund; 
(3) and the Section 1207(n) Transitional Authority. This analysis provides key context 
for my later empirical analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
The second section of this chapter then continues to outline the prevailing 
understanding of how the Obama administration retooled the coercive practices of 
U.S. military intervention in the global south. I begin this critique by briefly 
contextualising the rise of drone warfare during the War against al-Qaeda. With this 
foundation laid, I then continue to demonstrate the theoretical limitations of the 
existing explanations of the goals of drone-launched targeted killings. Shifting to the 
place of the drones in the current literature on the means of U.S. military intervention 
in the global south, the two faces of what I coin the drone-centrism of the extant IR 
and U.S. foreign policy literature are then discussed. Having critiqued the privileging 
of drone strikes as the primary mode of military intervention in the global south, I 
then examine the place of SFA programmes i  the DOD s defe e pla i g o ept 
du i g the ke  ea l  ea s of O a a s p eside . 604  My close reading of these 
documents advances my argument that, alongside drone launched targeted killings, 
SFA programmes e e ke  to the etooli g of U.“. oe i e po e  du i g O a a s 
presidency. 
 
The final section of this chapter works to reconcile the drone centrism of the existing 
IR and U.S. foreign policy literatures with the parallel rise of SFA. I conceptualise both 
drone strikes and SFA as having formed constituent parts of an overarching small-
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footprint approach to counterterrorism. This variegated approach to military 
intervention, which I distinguish from alternative models of military intervention 
advanced within the existing literature, is also shown to have made auxiliary use of 
“OF a d P“MC. This detailed e a i atio  of O a a s s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism makes a key contribution to this thesis. It is used as the template 
to structure my critical re-e a i atio  of the ea s of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to AQAP, al-Shabaab and AQIM in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Key definitions: Counterterrorism and Security Force Assistance 
 
This chapter begins by defining two concepts which are key for narrowing my 
subsequent empirical examination of how the Obama administration responded 
militarily to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates: counterterrorism and SFA. Both 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency are recognised by historical materialist 
informed scholars (alongside other forms of unconventional warfare) as having been 
key modes of U.S. military intervention in the global south. 605  Nevertheless, as 
Michael Boyle has noted, the two practices have been conflated by UK and U.S. 
policymakers since 9/11. 606  This conflation presents a significant obstacle to my 
a al sis. Fo  e to dete i e the elatio ship et ee  O a a s counterterrorism 
poli  a d his o e a hi g fo eig  poli  do t i e, a d the  late  u pa k O a a s 
small footprint approach to counterterrorism, it is crucial to be clear about what I 
understand the practice to be. To do so requires me to distinguish the practice from 
counterinsurgency. A similar analytical challenge exists for SFA. As one Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) resea he  has oted, [t]he discussion of U.S. assistance to 
foreign military and other security forces is complicated by the lack of a standard and 
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ade uate te i olog .607 In short, the relationship between, and the definition of, 
the different channels of U.S. military assistance remains imprecise.  
 
Counterterrorism and counterinsurgency 
 
The DOD has defi ed ou te te o is  as the [a] ti ities and operations taken to 
neutralize terrorists and their organizations and networks in order to render them 
incapable of using violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to 
a hie e thei  goals .608  On this reading, the immediate goal of counterterrorism 
ope atio s hi h as ‘i ehea t poi ts out, a  e disti guished f o  the U.“. s 
overarching counterterrorism policy)609 can broadly be understood to be preventing 
militant groups from advancing their political aims through the use, or threat, of 
violence. Two broad paradigms of counterterrorism have traditionally been 
acknowledged: a criminal justice model which criminalises acts of terrorism and aims 
to tackle them through the judicial system; and a war model which militarises the 
response to te o ist o ga isatio s a d tasks a state s se u it  se i es ith thei  
destruction.610  
 
Since 9/11, the war model of counterterrorism has been institutionalised as its 
dominant expression. 611  U.S. counterterrorism policy, it has been argued, has 
evolved through a succession of crises that have led to the institutionalisation of 
robust counterterrorism practices. 612  In any discussion of the war model of 
counterterrorism however, a crucial distinction needs to be made between direct 
actions, such as airborne targeted killings and SOF kill/capture raids in which U.S. 
forces conduct direct strikes against al-Qaeda members on the one hand, and indirect 
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operations which seek to deny al-Qaeda safe-haven by working with and through 
partners.613 I draw from both of these different dimensions of counterterrorism in 
my empirical analysis and, as is explored in greater detail later in this chapter, 
o eptualise the  as pa t of O a a s s all-footprint approach to counterterrorism.  
 
COIN, on the other hand, has been defined by the DOD as the o p ehe si e i ilia  
and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and 
add ess its oot auses .614 In contrast to the war model of counterterrorism whose 
principal focus is on tackling the symptoms of militancy through direct and indirect 
military actions, COIN operations are instead focused on addressing their underlying 
political causes. As Scott Moore has argued, the:  
 
[…] ultimate objective of counterinsurgency strategy is lasting stability, but 
not one that is imposed and maintained by force or repression. Stability must 
provide the structures necessary to peacefully address issues that may 
continue to arise; those structures must be understood, institutionalized, and 
fully accepted by the population, who now feel they benefit from them.615   
 
Following from this, whilst COIN includes a place for targeted strikes and train and 
equip efforts, their principal target is not the militant group themselves. This is 
instead the populations amongst which they operate.616 This, in other words, is a 
difference between enemy vs population centrism, between denying al-Qaeda a 
safe-haven from which to operate by directly attacking the group rather than 
undermining its support within the local population. Whilst there is a kinetic 
component to COIN, this is given less weight than in the war model of 
counterterrorism. 617  Furthermore, in order to secure the loyalty of the local 
                                                          
613 The DOD defines direct actions, which are often co flated ith ki eti  st ikes, as [s]ho t-duration 
strikes and other small-scale offensive actions conducted as a special operation in hostile, denied, or 
diplomatically sensitive environments and which employ specialized military capabilities to seize, 
dest o , aptu e, e ploit, e o e , o  da age desig ated ta gets . DOD, DOD Di tio a  of Milita  
a d Asso iated Te s , p. . For a more detailed discussion of the indirect approach to 
counterterrorism, see Burton. 
614 DOD, DOD Di tio a  of Milita  a d Asso iated Te s , p. . 
615  ‘ “ ott Moo e, The Basi s of Cou te i su ge , Small Wars Journal, 2007, p. 17 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265742953_The_Basics_of_Counterinsurgency>. 
616 For more on the targeting of civil society as part of COIN operations, see Stokes and Raphael, pp.71-
72. 




population, COIN operations require a comparatively greater military presence on 
the ground. To this end, as I discussed in chapter 3, the U.S. sent tens of thousands 
of ground troops to Afghanistan and Iraq during the surges in both countries. The 
size of the U.“.  ilita  footp i t  i  the a  odel of ou te te o is , o e sel , 
aims to minimise the u e  of A e i a  oots o  the g ou d  o e seas.618 On 
these points of departure- (1) their different principal targets; (2) their uneven 
approach to the use of military force; and (3) the different size of their footprints- I 
distinguish COIN from counterterrorism.  
 
In making these distinctions, I am not suggesting that counterterrorism and COIN 
campaigns are somehow mutually exclusive, and that the former cannot be 
conducted in support of the latter.619 Similarly, I am also not implying that the U.S. 
cannot provide material support to local forces to fight COIN operations whilst 
restricting its own intervention to counterterrorism. As Stokes and Raphael have 
sho , su h assista e has ee  ke  to ho  the A e i a  state has o ked to 
armour processes of transnationalization and globalisation through the use of 
oe i e state aft .620 Rather, the point I am making here is that my subsequent 
empirical analysis is predominately focused on the counterterrorism element of 
these interventions (particularly the military assistance component) not the COIN 
campaigns fought by local forces against al-Qaeda s affiliates o  the g ou d. 
Consistent with this focus, some elements of the o p ehe si e hole-of-
go e e t  app oa h to ou te te o is  hi h the O a a ad i ist atio  lai ed 
to be pursuing against al-Qaeda also falls beyond the scope of my later structured-
focused comparison. 621  This includes U.S. efforts to tackle al-Qaeda's affiliates 
through non-military channels such as tackling the ideological causes of radicalisation, 
                                                          
618 The Pe tago s Milita  Di tio a  defi es footp i t as the su  of personnel, spares, resources, 
and capabilities physically p ese t a d o up i g spa e at a deplo ed lo atio . DOD, DOD Di tio a  
of Milita  a d Asso iated Te s , p. . 
619 During the occupation of Iraq, to provide just one example, the Joint Special Operations Command 
aged a  i dust ial s ale a paig  of kill/ aptu e  ou te te o is  ope atio s pa allel to the 
o e tio al ilita s COIN campaign in the country. Niva, pp. 192–95. 
620 Stokes and Raphael, pp. 2–3. 
621 See Ji  Ga a o e, ‘i e Details U.“. Whole-of-Go e e t App oa h to Defeati g I“IL , DOD News, 
2016 <https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/722259/rice-details-us-whole-of-government-




disrupting terrorist financing, promoting good governance, and stimulating economic 
development.  
 




Security assistance refers to the group of military aid programmes authorised under 
Title 22 of the U.S. code (as amended). Whilst some programmes are administrated 
 the DOD s Defe se “e u it  Coope atio  Age , the  a e fo  the ost pa t  
managed and funded by the DOS.622 Security assistance can take many forms, two of 
the most direct being the sale (or gifting) of military equipment on the one hand, and 
the training of foreign security forces on the other.623 The largest of the security 
assistance programmes intended to train foreign security forces is the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) programme which provides grants for foreign 
military personnel to attend American training courses and military colleges.624 The 
largest security assistance programmes used to provide military equipment to 
foreign security forces is the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) account. 625  This 
programme enables partners to purchase U.S. defence articles and services via U.S. 
government backed grants.626 Beyond their intuitive military purposes (training and 
equipping foreign security forces and improving their interoperability with American 
forces) security assistance programmes are also recognised to have a clear political 
                                                          
622 Ta lo  P White, “e u it  Coope atio : Ho  It All Fits , Joint Forces Quarterly, 72, 106–8 (p. 106). 
623 Shapiro, p. 26. 
624 In Fiscal Year (FY) 2017, this programme was funded to the tune of $110 million, with Pakistan ($4.8 
million), Jordan ($4 million) and Turkey ($3.2 million) the largest of its 127 recipients. Security 
Assista e Mo ito , Data: I te atio al Milita  Edu atio  a d T ai i g , Security Assistance Monitor, 
2017 <https://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/International Military Education and 
Training/2009/2017/all/Global//> [accessed 10 October 2017].  
625 $6.16 billion was allocated for the FMF programme in FY 2017. The bulk of this assistance went to 
just two states: Israel ($3.175 billion) and Egypt ($1.3 billion). “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: 
Foreign Milita  Fi a i g , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<https://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Foreign Military 
Financing/2009/2017/all/Global//> [accessed 10 October 2017].  
626 Other notable security assistance programmes include the International Counternarcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related Programme (NADR) 




logic. As former Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Andrew 
Shapiro has poi ted out, [ ]he  the U.“. t a sfe s a eapo  s ste , it is not just 
providing a country with military hardware, it is both reinforcing diplomatic relations 
and establishing a long-te  se u it  pa t e ship .627 Over time, he argues, security 
assista e thus fu tio s to thi ke  ilate al se u it  a d politi al partnerships 




Security cooperation, on the other hand, refers to the programmes authorised under 
Title 10 of the U.S. code and the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 
which are primarily managed, funded and executed by the DOD. Distinct from DOS 
run security assistance programmes, security cooperation has been broadly defined 
by the Pentagon as all: 
 
interactions, programmes, and activities with foreign security forces (FSF) and 
their institutions to build relationships that help promote US interests; enable 
partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access to territory, infrastructure, 
information, and resources; and/or to build and apply their capacity and 
capabilities consistent with US defense objectives.629 
 
In contrast to DOS run security assistance programmes, security cooperation is more 
narrowly focused on bilateral defence engagement and security objectives. These 
include, amongst others, developing military-to-military relationships with foreign 
military personnel and their respective institutions and helping secure access to 
overseas military bases, airspace and intelligence.630  
                                                          
627 Shapiro, p. 29. This also has the effect of tying the recipient state into the American centred military 
industrial complex. After the transfer or sale of military equipment, U.S. arm manufactures then 
generally become the sole source of weapons upgrades, ammunition and repairs.  
628 For these reasons, Shapiro argues, other states increasingly want to partner with the U.S., and be 
the recipients of American security assistance. Shapiro, p. 27. 
629 The Joi t Cheifs of “taff, “e u it  Coope atio : Joi t Pu li atio  - , , p.  
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_20_20172305.pdf> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
630 This is not to say, however, that security cooperation has not also been employed in pursuit of a 
se ies of oad politi al i pe ati es , e ou agi g politi al eha iou s and outcomes that are 
pe ei ed  A e i a  poli ake s to e fa ou a le to U.“. i te ests . The poi t that I a  aki g 
here is that, generally speaking, security cooperation programmes tend to be more narrowly focused 
on defence engagement. See, Ross, p. 93. Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, Buildi g Pa t e  





Security Force Assistance and Building Partner Capacity 
 
A third avenue of military assistance which has risen to prominence during the War 
against al-Qaeda, and falls under the umbrella of security cooperation, is SFA. 
According to the Joint Doctrine Note 1-13 hi h p o ides the ge e all  ag eed to 
fu da e tal guida e fo  joi t fo es o du ti g “FA , the p a ti e ualifies as a 
sub-set of security cooperation.631 It is broadly defined as: 
 
the set of Department of Defense (DOD) activities that contribute to unified 
action by the United States Government (USG) to support the development 
of capability and capacity of foreign security forces (FSF) and supporting 
institutions.632  
 
The 2010 QDR offers a more workable definition for the purpose of my analysis. SFA 
is defined as the: 
 
ha ds o  effo ts, conducted primarily in host countries, to train, equip, 
ad ise, a d assist those ou t ies  fo es i  e o i g o e p ofi ie t at 
providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and 
territories.633 
 
Biddle, Macdonald and Baker, the authors of the most comprehensive academic 
study on the practice, have more broadly defined “FA as the Pe tago s effo ts to 
train, equip and advise foreign security forces to defend themselves against internal 
threats without a large-scale, long term U.S. military commitment.634 Following from 
                                                          
Assista e Effo ts , Goverment Accountability Office, 2017, p. 11 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/690/683682.pdf> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
631  Joi t Chiefs of “taff, Joi t Do t i e Note -  “e u it  Fo e Assista e , , p. i 
<http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/notes/jdn1_13.pdf> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
632 Joi t Chiefs of “taff, Joi t Do t i e Note -  “e u it  Fo e Assista e , p. ii. 
633 DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , p. . 
634 To this end, Biddle, Macdonald and Baker have identified two distinct models of security force 
assistance. These differ in terms of both the size of the U.S. military footprint in the recipient state 
and the volume of the assistance given. The first is the El-Salvador model, pioneered in the country of 
the same name between 1979 and 1992 through the combined the use of small-teams of SOF trainers 
and military assistance. The second, what they label the FM 3-24 model which was pioneered during 
the occupation of Iraq, relied on thousands of U.S. Army and Marine Corps trainers with a considerable 
oots o  the g ou d ilita  p ese e  to t ai , ad ise a d e ed ith i dige ous se u it  fo es.  




these definitions, at their most intuitive, I understand SFA programmes to have had 
a lea  tea hi g a pe so  to fish  logi :  t ai i g a d e uippi g fo eig  se u it  
forces to perform certain military activities, they are intended to minimise (if not 
always eliminate) the need for U.S. forces to conduct these military operations 
themselves.  
 
Before proceeding, it is important to briefly clarify the relationship between SFA and 
Building Partner Capacity (BPC). This is a challenge because, as pointed out by the 
C‘“, ot o l  like many other terms of art, BPC means different things to different 
people , 635  but the DOD see ed to e phasize BPC as a o ept distinct from 
traditional securit  assista e a d se u it  oope atio .636 The term BPC appears to 
have first been coined in the 2006 QDR. Against the backdrop of the Iraq Surge, it 
emerged as a buzzword amongst defence officials, commentators and scholars.637 
BPC has ee  defi ed as the road set of missions, programmes, activities, and 
authorities intended to improve the ability of other nations to achieve security-
o ie ted goals the  sha e ith the U ited “tates .638 Recognising this, I accept BCP 
as the destination which the DOD wants to arrive at through the use of SFA: foreign 
security forces capable of performing certain military tasks with reduced (if not 
completely eliminated) direct U.S. military intervention. When used later in my 
analysis, I am understanding BCP as the desired outcome of training, equipping, 
advising and assigning foreign security forces, and SFA, a subset of security 
cooperation, as the means of getting there.  
 
                                                          
to a d a se ies of g oss hu a  ights iolatio s ei g o du ted  the ou t s se u it  fo es 
against their own population. For a more detailed discussion of practices, which included state-
sponsored torture, see Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, pp. 97–
98. See also T uth Co issio : El “al ado , F o  Mad ess to Hope: The -Year War in El Salvador: 
‘epo t of the Co issio  o  the T uth fo  El “al ado , United States Institute of Peace, 1993 
<https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/file/ElSalvador-Report.pdf> [accessed 11 February 2018]. 
635 Kathlee  J M i is a d Natha  J Lu as, What Is Buildi g Pa t e  Capa it ?  Issues fo  Co g ess , 
Congressional Research Service, 2015, p. 5 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf> [accessed 3 
September 2017]. 
636 Emphasis added. Mcinnis and Lucas, p. 7. 
637 Mcinnis and Lucas, p. 1.  




To conclude, despite the confusion which has surrounded there definition, I maintain 
that it is possible to loosely untangle security assistance, security cooperation, and 
SFA as distinct types of military assistance. In terms of there respective bureaucracies, 
whilst security assistance programmes are managed and funded by the State 
Department, security cooperation programmes are managed, funded and executed 
by the Pentagon. Beyond this, whilst both security assistance and security 
cooperation programmes can work to train and equip foreign security forces, they 
do so to different temporal rhythms. Security cooperation programmes tilt toward 
pre-empting the need for direct U.S. military intervention. Security assistance 
programmes, on the other hand, are more focused on managing existing political 
and security challenges. 639  In comparison to security cooperation, SFA is more 
narrowly focused on the training, equipping and advising of foreign security forces 
rather than larger defence engagement goals. Understood in this way, SFA can be 
distinguished from BPC on the basis of the former being a means to accomplish the 
latte . I  te s of  su se ue t e pi i al a al sis of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates, hilst atte tio  ill e gi e  to 
the security cooperation and security assistance programmes used to build the 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity of foreign security forces involved, 
the focus of my analysis will be on those programmes used to train, equip, advise, 
a d assist  foreign security forces.  
 
Key SFA authorities: Section 1206, Section 1207(n), and Global Counterterrorism 
Partnership Fund  
 
U.S. policymakers perceived the patchwork of largely Cold-War era security 
assistance and security cooperation programmes available in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks as being inadequate for fighting the War against al-Qaeda.640 Thereafter, 
Congress authorised a spate of new security cooperation programmes to correct this 
perceived imbalance, engendering concerns in some quarters that the DOD has been 
                                                          
639 Reveron, p. 105. 
640 “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e a d Coope atio : “ha ed Responsibility of the Departments of State 




institutionalised as a leading (if not lead) agency for U.S. military assistance. 641 
Several major points of departure can be identified in terms of these programmes, 
with differences in:  
 
(1) scale, with some programmes being used to train a handful of special force 
operatives in the host nation and others, in the more exceptional 
circumstances of Afghanistan and Iraq, tens of thousands of conventional 
troops;  
 
(2) purpose, with different military assistance programmes working to build 
different capacities relevant for counterterrorism and COIN operations (e.g. 
border security, cyber, demining, law enforcement, reconstruction, maritime 
security and peacekeeping);  
 
and (3) scope, with some military assistance programmes being used to 
augment direct strikes against branches of the al-Qaeda movement (e.g. the 
military response to al-Qaeda s o e i  Pakista  a d al-Qaeda s affiliates i  
the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa), and in other cases substituting 
for them entirely (e.g. in the military response against AQIM).  
 
During the course of the War against al-Qaeda, military assistance programmes were 
used within and beyond Afghanistan and Iraq to:  
 
(1) build the capacity of indigenous security forces to hasten the end of COIN 
operations in the battlefield theatres of Afghanistan and Iraq;  
 
(2) build the capacity of partners to fight alongside American and allied 
ground forces in overseas COIN operations as seen in the European 
contributions to the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan;  
 
(3) build the capacity of indigenous security forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations against non-state actors including AQAP and 
AQIM;  
 
                                                          
641 According to POLITICO, the DOD s udget fo  o e seas ilita  aid o e tha  t ipled et ee   
a d . The DO“  udget, o  the othe  ha d, g e   o l   pe  e t. This asymmetry is argued to 
have contributed toward the militarisation of American foreign assistance. To this end, the DOS and 
the DOD are said to have feuded on which was the lead government agency responsible for military 
aid. Andrew Shapiro, former assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs, has claimed that 
the seeds of this conflict e e pla ted ea l  i  O a a s p eside , g o i g f o  hat the DOD 
perceived as the inflexibility of DOS security assistance programmes. See B a  Be de , Pe tago  
Mus les out “tate Dept. o  Fo eig  Aid , Politico, 2016 
<http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/general-diplomats-tussle-over-pentagons-growing-




(4) and build the capacity of regional security forces to conduct peacekeeping 
operations in states threatened by non-state actors including al-Shabaab in 
the Horn of Africa.642 
 
As Maria Ryan has argued, bilateral and multilateral train and equip efforts were a 
ke  o po e t  of the Wa  agai st al-Qaeda.643 This is borne out empirically in the 
volume of ilita  aid allo atio s du i g O a a s p eside . A o di g to the 
figures compiled by the Security Assistance Monitor, $20.5 billion was obligated for 
security aid annually in Fiscal Year (FY) 2017.644 This was more than double the $8.1 
billion spent on similar activities in FY 2002, the first full fiscal year of the War against 
al-Qaeda.645 Between FY 2002 and FY 2017, a total of $285.3 billion was allocated for 
security aid. Of this, $162.5 billion was spent du i g O a a s p eside  FY  - 
FY 2016). The bulk of this increase was driven by the combat operations in the central 
battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq where U.S. forces learned valuable lessons 
about how to train, advice, and assist partner natio  fo es o e effe ti el .646 As 
catalogued in figure 4.1, annual security aid allocations peaked at the height of the 
surges in both Iraq (2007, $24.4 billion) and Afghanistan (2011, $24.3 billion) 
respectively.647  
  
                                                          
642 Watts and Biegon, p. 5. 
643 ‘ a , The Wa  o  Te o  a d the Ne  Pe iphe , p. . 
644 These figures are taken from the Security Assistance Monitor hi h p o ides use s ith details o  
U.S. funds allocated primarily to foreign militaries and police through various U.S. security aid or 
cooperation programmes (also known as funds or accounts) to over 160 countries or regional 
a ou ts . It i ludes oth DOD a d DO“ fu ded se u it  oope atio  a d se u it  assista e 
programmes. See Use s Guide . 
645  Security Assistance Mo ito , Data: - , Security Assistance Monitor, 2018 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2009/2019/all/Global//> [accessed 11 
April 2018]. 
646 DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  , p. . 
647 Just to put this into some perspective, the fall in security aid allocations from $24.4 billion in FY 
2007 to $16.5 billion in FY 2008, for example, was largely explained by the fall in assistance to 




Figure 4: Annual military assistance obligations, FY 2002-2017.648 
 
 
FY Obligation (in 
billions $) 
FY Obligation (in 
billions $) 
2002 $8.1 2010 $23.7 
2003 $10.8 2011 $24.3 
2004 $10.7 2012 $21.8 
2005 $17.5 2013 $18.3 
2006 $14.5 2014 $17.1 
2007 $24.4 2015 $19.6 
2008 $16.5 2016 $19.0 
2009 $18.6 2017 $20.5 
 
 
                                                          




















Two of the three largest recipients of U.S. security aid during the War against al-
Qaeda were Afghanistan ($80.4 billion) and Iraq ($28.8 billion).649 The majority of this 
assistance was allocated via the Afghanistan Security Forces Funds ($68.6 billion)650 
and the Iraq Security Force Fund ($20.2 billion)651. In support of combat operations 
in Afghanistan, an additional $21.2 billion was also allocated for the Coalition Support 
Fund between FY 2002 to FY 2017. These funds were largely used to reimburse 
Pakista s logisti al a d ilita  suppo t fo  U.“. o at ope atio s i  Afgha ista .  
  
                                                          
649 The second and fourth largest recipients of security aid during the War against al-Qaeda were, as 
listed in figure 4.2, Israel ($48.7 billion) and Egypt ($20.8 billion). The majority of this assistance was 
allocated via the FMF programme, the single largest security assistance programme during this period 
($85.6 billion).  
650 The Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) financed the, training, equipping, supply, construction, 
and the sustainment of Afghanistan National Defence and Security Forces. The Afghan National Army 
and the Afghan National Police (ANP) were the two major recipients of this assistance, and the focus 
of the ASFF was building their respective capacity to conduct both counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism operations. By FY 2017, the ANDSF was authorised a total strength of 352,000: 
195,000 ANA personnel and 157,000 ANP personnel. Defe se Offi e of the “e eta  of, Justifi atio  
fo  FY  O e seas Co ti ge  Ope atio s OCO  Afgha ista  “e u it  Fo es Fu d A“FF , , 
p. 3 <http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY17_J-Book-
ASFF.pdf> [accessed 3 March 2017].  
651 The Iraqi Security Forces Fund was authorised in FY2005 as part of the Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriations for Defence, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief. Prior to its authorisation, 
the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces had been financed through the Iraq Relief and 
‘e o st u tio  Fu d. The Natio al “e u it  Cou il s  st ateg  fo  i to  i  I a , itte  agai st 
the backdrop of es alati g se ta ia  iole e th oughout the ou t , had eite ated that the t ai i g, 
equipping, and mentoring of Iraqi Security Forces will produce an army and police force capable of 
independently providing security and maintaining public order in I a .  N“C, Natio al “t ateg  fo  
Victory in Iraq, p. 18. According to one estimate produced by the DOD and the Special Inspector 
General for Iraq Reconstruction, an estimated 950,000 Iraqi security personnel were trained over the 
course of U.S. combat operations in the country. Iraqi Security Forces received military equipment of 
all types ranging from small-arms and ammunition on one hand to armoured vehicles and warplanes 




Figure 5: Military assistance obligations by recipient, FY 2002-2017.652  
 
NB: aste isk i di ates ele a e to the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates.  
 
 
 Recipient Obligation  
(in billions 
$) 
 Recipient  Obligation 
(in billions 
$) 
1 Afghanistan $80.5 9 Mexico $3.0 
2 Israel $48.7 10 Russia $2.5 
3 Iraq $28.9 *11 Somalia $2.0 
4 Pakistan $23.0 *22 Yemen $0.8 
5 Global $22.1 *27 East Africa 
regional 
$0.6 
6 Egypt $20.8 *29 Kenya $0.6 
7 Colombia $8.4 *54 Niger $0.2 
8 Jordan $7.6 *62 Mali $0.2 
 
                                                          














As Maria Ryan has also demonstrated, security aid was also key to U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in the War on Terror on the periphery.653 Within the 
Pe tago s g o i g pat h o k of se u it  oope atio  autho ities, th ee “FA 
programmes were widely used to build partner capacity. These were: (1) the Section 
1206 Global Train and Equip authority; (2) the Global Counterterrorism Partnership 
Fund; (3) and the Section 1207(n) Transitional authority. The history, goals and 
principal recipients of each of these three programmes is outlined below. This 
provides key context for my structured-focused comparison in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Section 1206 Global Train and Equip Authority 
 
The Section 1206 Global Train and Equip authority (hereafter referred to as Section 
1206) was authorised in the FY 2006 NDAA. 654  The programme s autho isatio  
marked a watershed in U.S. military assistance. It broke with the division of labour 
institutionalised in the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act by placing the DOD, not the DOS, 
as the lead agency on a global train and equip programme.655 The Section 1206 
authority was principally intended to build partner counterterrorism capacity. It also 
aimed to build the capacity of European states such as Poland and Romania to fight 
                                                          
653 See ‘ a , Wa  i  Cou t ies We A e Not at Wa  ith : The Wa  o  Te o o  the Pe iphe  f o  
Bush to O a a . 
654 The FY 2006 NDAA also authorised the Section 1207 Security and Stabilization Assistance fund 
(henceforth shorted to the Section 1207 authority). The authority authorised the DOD to transfer up 
to $100 million to the DOS to conduct reconstruction, stabilization and security activities. This would 
allow the DOD to plug i  the DO“ s Offi e of the Coo di ato  fo  ‘e o st u tio  a d “ta ilizatio  
expertise in these areas. ‘ a , Full “pe t u  Do i a e : Do ald ‘u sfeld, the Depa t e t of 
Defense, and US Irregular Warfare Strategy, 2001– , p. . The Section 1207 authority was not, 
however, a permanent authority, and expired at the end of the FY2010 having funded $445.2 million 
worth of programmes in 28 partner states. Nina Serafino, Depa t e t of Defe se “e tio   
Security and Stabilization Assistance: Background and Congressional Concerns, FY2006-FY , 
Congressional Research Service, 2011, p. i <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22871.pdf> [accessed 16 
September 2017]. Geo gia $  illio  as the “e tio   autho it s la gest e ipie t, follo ed 
by the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and the Philippines ($25 million each). Of greater 
relevance for my analysis here, smaller Section 1207 funded projects were allocated for 
counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  the A a ia  Pe i sula, the “ahel 
and the Horn of Africa. “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: “e tio  , Security Assistance Monitor, 
2017 <https://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Section 1207 Security and 
Stabilization Assistance/2006/2012/all/Global//> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
655 Ni a “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , 





alongside U.S. troops in stability operations in Afghanistan.656 To both ends, Section 
1206 funds were used to purchase foreign security forces equipment ranging from 
night-vision googles and small arms through to transport and ISR aircraft.657 In the 
context of counterterrorism operations in a  i  ou t ies e a e ot at a , one 
major focus of Section 1206 assistance was on building the capacity of partnered 
states to police their own territorial waters and strengthen their border security.658 
This was with the intention of denying al-Qaeda sanctuary in weak and fragile states 
across the global south. In this regard, the Section 1206 authority was consistent with 
the reliance on military assistance to resolve the tension inherent within American 
imperialism concerning how to defend, deepen and wherever possible extend open-
doors and closed frontiers (and by extension the primacy of the American state and 
capitalist-market relations) without imposing territorial control. 
 
Following its authorisation, the Section 1206 authority quickly emerged as a favoured 
i st u e t i  the DOD s se u it  oope atio  tool o . A o di g to the DOD, the 
Section 1206 authority enabled foreign security forces to be trained and equipped 
i  espo se to u ge t a d e e ge t th eats a d oppo tu ities .659 In testimony to 
the House Armed Service Committee, Defence Secretary Robert Gates held up the 
programme i   as a u ial tool fo  o f o t[i g] e t e ists a d othe  pote tial 
sources of global instability withi  thei  o de s  before feste i g p o le s a d 
th eats e o e ises e ui i g U.“. ilita  i te e tio . 660  U.S. Combat 
Co a de s si ila l  p aised the “e tio   autho it  as the si gle ost 
important tool for the [DOD] to shape the environment and ou te  te o is .661 
The veracity of these claims are borne out in the volume of Section 1206 funding. 
Between FY 2006 and FY 2016, the programme was allocated $4 billion.662 74 states 
                                                          
656 Serafino, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
657 “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
658 “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
659  Defe se “e u it  Coope atio  Age , Fis al Yea   Budget Esti ates Defe se “e u it  
Coope atio  Age  D“CA , , p.  <http://se u it assista e.o g/sites/default/files/DSCA.pdf> 
[accessed 16 September 2017]. 
660 “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
661 Se afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
662 “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: “e tio   T ai  a d E uip , Security Assistance Monitor, 
2017 <https://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Section 1206 Train and Equip 




in total received this assistance.663 Of these, Jordan was the largest single recipient 
($472.6 million, of which $445.8 was allocated in FY 2016 alone) followed by Yemen 
($405.8 million). States in East Africa were also allocated considerable sums of 
Section 1206 assistance to support their military response against al-Shabaab (Kenya 
[$250.9 million], Somalia [$80.1 million] and Ethiopia [$67.4 million]).  
 
Figure 6: Section 1206 obligations by recipient, FY 2006-2017.664  
 
 Recipient Obligation (in millions $) 
1 Jordan $472.6 
*2 Yemen $405.8 
3 Lebanon $372.3 
4 Pakistan $307.1 
*5 Kenya $250.9 
*6 Niger $161.5 
*8 Tunisia $122.1 
*11 Mauritania $92.4 
*14 Somalia $80.1 
*18 Ethiopia $67.4 
 
Global Counterterrorism Partnership Fund 
 
Obama first requested Congressional authorisation for the Counterterrorism 
Partnership Fund (CTPF) during a national security speech at West Point in May 2014. 
The need for this new security cooperation authority was tied directly to the ongoing 
military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. As he oted, the CTPF would better 
positio  the ad i ist atio  to train, build capacity, and facilitate partner countries 
o  the f o t li es  i ludi g i  the A a ia  Pe i sula, the Ho  of Af i a a d the 
Sahel.665 The CTPF would also provide a new avenue of military assistance to support 
U.S. backed groups in Syria whilst better enabling the DOD to respond to 
                                                          
663 Inspector Ge e al, E aluatio  of Depa t e t of Defe se Effo ts to Build Cou te te o is  a d 
“ta ilit  Ope atio s Capa it  of Fo eig  Milita  Fo es ith “e tio  /  Fu di g , DOD, 2017, 
p. 4 <http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2017-099.pdf> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
664 “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: “e tio   T ai  a d E uip . 
665 Ba a k O a a, ‘e a ks  the P eside t at the U ited “tates Milita  A ade  Co e e e t 
Ce e o , Office of the Press Secretary, 2014 <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2014/05/28/remarks-president-united-states-military-academy-commencement-ceremony> 




u e pe ted ises .666  CTFP funds were allocated to build partner capacity in a 
number of areas which are consistent with my theorization of military assistance as 
a key tool for policing antithetical social forces in the global south including border 
security, SOF capability, ISR, airlift, and intelligence.667 
 
Measured against its initial budget request of up to $5 billion the FY2015 NDAA, the 
CTPF was an order of magnitude larger than either the Section 1206 or Section 
 autho ities. O e  the ou se of the autho ities  histo , hi h e ded i  FY 
2017 NDAA when the CTFP was rolled into a broader security cooperation 
programme,668  its funding was consistently cut. 669  Security forces in Syria ($500 
million) and Jordan ($350 million) were its two largest bilateral recipients, followed 
by Somalia ($50 million), Lebanon ($48.3 million), and Kenya ($31.4 million). CTFP 
assistance was also allocated to partners across East Africa ($275.9 million), the Lake 
Chad region ($238 million), and West and North Africa ($221.0 million).670 By the end 
of O a a s p eside , the CTPF had e e ged as a ke  ehi le of U.“. 
ou te te o is  ope atio s i  Af i a. As AF‘ICOM s hief General Thomas D. 
Waldhause  oted i  his  postu e state e t, the CTPF had been essential to 
our success in enabling African partners and enhancing their capability to counter 
                                                          
666 Offi e of the U de  “e eta  of Defe se, Cou te te o is  Pa t e ships Fu d: Department of 
Defe se Budget Fis al Yea  FY  , DOD, 2016, p. 2 
<http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/FY2017_CTPF_J-
Book.pdf> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
667 Offi e of the U de  “e eta  of Defe se, Cou te te o is  Pa t e ships Fu d: Depa t e t of 
Defe se Budget Fis al Yea  FY  , pp. –14. 
668  L  Willia s a d Pat To ell, FY  Defe se Budget ‘e uest: The Basi s , Congressional 
Research Service, 2017, p. 18 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44866.pdf> [accessed 16 September 
2017]. 
669 It fell from $1.3 billion in FY 2015 to $750 million in FY 2016 alone. K isti a Wo g, Defe se Poli  
Bill Cuts Would “lash Cou te te o is  Fu d , The Hill, 2015 
<http://thehill.com/policy/defense/258924-defense-policy-bill-cuts-of-5b-would-slash-obama-
counterterrorism-fund> [accessed 3 March 2017]. This move was strongly criticised by some security 
analysts. See, E M Ki e , Co g ess “hould t Ha e Defu ded the Cou te te o is  Pa t e ships 
Fu d , The Hill, 2017 <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/267088-congress-
shouldnt-have-defunded-the-counterterrorism#bottom-story-socials> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
670  “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Cou te te o is  Pa t e ship Fu d ,  
<http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Counterterrorism Partnerships 




extremist organization within their borders and in support of collective regional 
effo ts .671 
 
Figure 7: CTPF obligations by recipient, FY 2006-2017.672 
 
 Recipient Obligation (in 
millions $) 
1 Syrian Opposition $500  
2 Jordan $350 
*3 East Africa Regional $275.9 
4 Levant Regional $253.7 
5 Lake Chad Regional $238 
*6 West and North Africa Regional $221 
*7 Somalia  $50 
*9 Arabian Peninsula Regional $48.3 
*10 Kenya $40 
*11 Ethiopia  $18.7 
 
Section 1207(n) Transitional Authority 
 
The Section 1207(n) Transitional Authority was a three-year transnational authority, 
attached to the Global Security Contingency Fund in the FY2012 NDAA, which 
financed U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of 
Africa. 673  Between FY2012 and FY2013, $224.3 million was allocated for this 
                                                          
671  Tho as D. Waldhause , U ited “tates Af i a Co a d  Postu e “tate e t ,  
<https://www.africom.mil/media-room/document/28720/africom-2017-posture-satement> 
[accessed 11 April 2018]. 
672 “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Cou te te o is  Pa t e ship Fu d . 
673 Although the G“CF as pla ed u de  the DO“  udget, the autho it  as joi tl  ad i istered by 
the DOD and the DOS. One of the primary aims of this four-year pilot programme as to e ha e 
the capabilities of military forces and other security forces responsible for conducting border and 
maritime security, internal security, and counterterrorism operations, as well as the government 
age ies espo si le fo  su h fo es . Ni a “e afi o, Glo al “e u it  Co ti ge  Fu d: “u a  a d 
Issue O e ie , Congressional Research Service, 2014, p. 4 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42641.pdf> 
[accessed 3 March 2017]. The G“CF as also i te ded to e a le pa t e s to pa ti ipate i  o  suppo t 
military, stability, or peace support operations consistent with United States foreign policy and 
atio al se u it  i te ests . “e afi o, Glo al “e u it  Co ti ge  Fu d: “u a  a d Issue 
O e ie , p. . Bangladesh, Libya, Hungary, Nigeria, the Philippines, Romania, and Slovakia were all 
designated as being eligible for GSCF assistance, and $70.3 million in funding was allocated for them 
between FY 2012 and FY 2016. The $70.8 million figure has been reached by combining the two 
separate Security Assistance Monitor entries for the GSCF authority, bringing together DOS ($26.8 
million) and DOD ($44 million) contributions. “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Glo al “e u it  




programme. These funds were split equally between Yemen and the Horn of 
Africa.674  The Section 1207(n) authority was used to train and equip partners to 
conduct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations against AQAP and al-
Shabaab. It had t o spe ifi  goals: e ha e the apa it  of the atio al ilita  
forces, security agencies serving a similar defence function, and border security 
forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to conduct counterterrorism operations 
against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates, a d al “ha aa  o  the o e ha d, a d [t]o 
enhance the ability of the Yemen Ministry of Interior Counter Terrorism Forces to 
conduct counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and 
its affiliates" on the other.675  
 
Figure 8: Section 1207(n) obligations by recipient, FY 2006-2017.676 
 
 Recipient Obligation (in millions $) 
(1)* East Africa Regional $112.2 
(1)* Yemen $112.2 
 
The only game in town ? The drone-centrism of the existing literature on Obama’s counterterrorism policy 
 
Within much of the extant IR and U.S. foreign policy literature, the Obama 
administration's retooling of the means of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south has been reduced to a single technological development: drones.677 Prior to 
                                                          
<https://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Global Security Contingency 
Fund %28DOS%29/2006/2018/all/Global//> [accessed 10 October 2017]; Security Assistance Monitor, 
Data: Glo al “e u it  Co ti ge  Fu d DOD , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Global Security Contingency 
Fund %28DOS%29/2006/2018/all/Global//> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
674  “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: “e tio   T a sitio al Autho it ,  
<http://www.securityassistance.org/data/country/military/Section 1207%28n%29 Transitional 
Authority/2010/2018/all/Global//> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
675 Foot ote “e afi o, Glo al “e u it  Co ti ge  Fu d: “u a  a d Issue O e ie , p. . 
676 “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: “e tio   T a sitio al Autho it . 
677 The DOD ha e defi ed a  u a ed ai aft as o e that does ot a  a hu a  ope ato  a d is 
apa le of flight u de  e ote o t ol o  auto o ous p og a i g . Quoted in Under Secretary of 
Defe se A uisitio , U a ed “ ste s I teg ated ‘oad ap. FY - , , p.  
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a592015.pdf> [accessed 11 November 2017]. This definition 
is useful for distinguishing drones from other concei a l  u a ed  ae ial s ste s. U like uise 
and ballistic missiles for example, unmanned aircraft are designed to be remotely flown like any 




arguing why greater weight should be given to the parallel rise of SFA programmes 
in these debates, it is important to contextualise the contemporary rise of drone 
warfare. 
 
As part of the War against al-Qaeda, medium-altitude long-endurance drones 
(principally the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper) played a key role 
in the COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq.678 The first reported drone strike 
outside of either of these two states occurred in 2002 when a CIA operated Predator 
killed Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi (an alleged architect of the 2000 attack on the USS 
Cole) in Yemen. Although no further drone strikes would be conducted in Yemen for 
ea l  a de ade, u de  the CIA s o a d, a se et d o e a  i  the FATA began 
in 2004.679 During this time, the Bush administration is also reported to have signed 
off on the more controversial practice of signature strikes (also known as TADS 
[Terror Attack Disruption Strikes]). These freed the CIA to conduct strikes on the basis 
of epo tedl  suspi ious  patte s of eha iou  athe  tha  the k o  ide tit  of 
the target.680  
 
The ole of d o e st ikes i  O a a s ou te te o ism policy marked a departure 
both in terms of their scale a d the deg ee of the p eside t s personal involvement. 
Wo ki g alo gside Joh  B e a , ho is a gued to ha e t a sfo ed the a  the 
U ited “tates hu ted te o ists ,681  Obama played a lead role in the Pe tago s 
drone operations as part of a weekly meeting of his national security staff dubbed 
                                                          
operating from within its airframe, it is also important to stress that the current generation of drones 
remain dependent on, rather than autonomous from, their human operators.  
678  The MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper were deployed in a variety of reconnaissance and 
surveillance roles to improve situational awareness, improve signal intelligence, target designation, 
data relay and mine detection. As the scale and sophistication of the IED threat in these theatres grew 
du i g the o upatio , the pe siste t sta e  offered by the craft was increasingly demanded by US 
commanders. Indeed, according to the 2009 Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap published by 
the DOD, UAS adaptability, versatility, and dependability ha[d] become indispensable to successful 
joint combat ope atio s . DOD, FY –  U a ed “ ste s I teg ated ‘oad ap , , p.  
<https://www.uvsr.org/Documentatie UVS/Publicatii-
internationale/UnmannedSystemIntegratedRoadmap-2009.pdf> [accessed 11 November 2017].  
679 For a more detailed discussion on the history of CIA drone operations in Pakistan, see Brian Glyn 
Willia s, The CIA s Co e t P edato  D o e Wa  i  Pakista , 2004–2010: The History of an 
Assassi atio  Ca paig . 
680 Bo le, The Costs a d Co se ue es of D o e Wa fa e , p. . 




Terror Tuesday.682  He positio ed hi self at the head of the Dispositio  Mat i  
which generated an interagency kill-list of thousands of alleged militants.683 Central 
to the ad i ist atio s elated  pu li  defe e of the d o e st ikes outside the 
battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq was their (supposedly) greater effectiveness vis-
à-vis alternative tools of U.S. coercive power.684 Advocates of the craft argued that 
they had played a key role in decimating al-Qaeda s e t al leade ship, dis upti g 
their operational planning and helping deny the movement (including its affiliates in 
Somalia and Yemen) safe haven.685 As then CIA director Leon Panetta put it in 2009, 
drone strikes were the o l  ga e i  to  i  te s of o f o ti g o  t i g to dis upt 
the al Qaeda leade ship .686 
 
The sharp rise in fi d, fi  a d fi ish  d o e st ikes i  a  i  ou t ies e a e ot at 
a  during O a a s p eside  has ee  su je t to i ense scholarly debate. The 
empirical focus of much of this literature has been on the transformative effect that 
the aircraft have had on the role of targeted killings in the practices of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south.687 Throughout this immense literature, the rise of 
                                                          
682 Jo Be ke  a d “ ott “ha e, “e et Kill List  P o es a Test of O a a s P i iples a d Will , The New 
York Times, 2012 <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-
qaeda.html> [accessed 14 April 2018]. 
683  Ka e  DeYou g, CIA Vete a  Joh  B e a  Has T a sfo ed U.“. Cou te te o is  Poli , 
Washington Post, 2012 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/cia-veteran-
john-brennan-has-transformed-us-counterterrorism-policy/2012/10/24/318b8eec-1c7c-11e2-ad90-
ba5920e56eb3_story.html> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
684 Speaking during a landmark counterterrorism speech in May 2013, President Obama stressed that 
drone strikes- which he maintained were only used when foreign governments were unable or 
unwilling to deal with terrorists who posed a continuing and imminent threat to American security - 
not only helped protect the lives of U.S. military personnel but minimised civilian casualties. Barack 
O a a, O a a s “pee h o  D o e Poli , New York Times, 2013 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-
policy.html> [accessed 16 April 2018]. 
685 B a , Wh  D o es Wo k: The Case fo  Washi gto s Weapo  of Choi e . 
686  Leo  E Pa etta, Di e to s ‘e a ks at the Pa ifi  Cou il o  I te atio al Poli ,  
<https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/directors-remarks-at-pacific-
council.html> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
687 As has ee  a gued, the means and methods of wide-area reconnaissance and precision attack 
from a distance have made it much easier to execute persistent campaigns of targeted killings across 




drone warfare has been explained as an interplay of economic, 688 political,689 and 
military factors.690 What has been largely ignored in this debate, however, is the 
relationship between the rise of drone warfare and the historical practices of U.S. 
unconventional warfare in the global south. There has been a general dearth of 
historical materialist informed scholarship on the practice. This is a problematic 
omission. The assumption underpinning much of the existing academic debate on 
drone warfare is that, as U.S. policymakers have claimed, they have been intended 
to disrupt, degrade, dismantle and ultimately defeat those who attacked America 
on 9/11, al-Qaeda .691 The goals of drone warfare have often been reduced solely to 
protecting U.S. national security. Whilst these concerns animated their use, they do 
not give us the complete picture. As Obama pointed out during a landmark speech 
o  the use of the aft i  , this new technology raises profound questions about 
who is targeted and why . 692  The latter question, however, has only been 
unsatisfactorily answered within the nascent field of drone studies.  
 
As Blakele  has a gued, the O a a ad i ist atio s use of the aft is o siste t ith 
the practices of dis ipli a  state iole e f o  a o e  hi h ha e lo g-defined 
British and American imperialism.693 Whilst the drone programme a  appea  o e 
                                                          
688 In lieu of the heighted fiscal pressures brought about by the GFC and Iraq War, drones have been 
argued to have been the pe fe t tools fo  a  age of auste it —far cheaper than landing troops in 
e ote dese ts a d ou tai s, a d ofte  o e p e ise . Sanger, p. 243.  
689 Sauer and Schörnig, to provide just one example, have a ked d o es a o gst the ost important 
o te po a  de elop e t i  o e tio al ilita  a a e ts . Fo  Weste  poli ake s, the  
a gue that the aft ha e p o ided a sil e - ullet  fo  o e seas ilita  i te e tio   i i isi g 
their cost in both blood and treasure, whilst seemingly conforming to the laws of armed conflict. Frank 
“aue  a d Niklas “ hö ig, Kille  D o es: The “il e  Bullet of De o ati  Wa fa e? , Security 
Dialogue, 43.4 (2012), 363–80 (p. 363). In the context of U.S. counterterrorism operations, drone 
strikes are also argued to have been valued because of the increased secrecy they are perceived to 
offer vis-à-vis alternative tools of American power, and the perception that they can be used to 
circumvent domestic political opposition to the use of military force. Mayer, p. 767.  
690 From a military perspective, drones are argued to have lowered the threshold for the use of military 
force by eliminating the risk to U.S. military personnel. In comparison to manned aircraft, they also 
have a greater capacity to loiter over a battlefield far in excess of manned aircraft and divert their 
payload once fired (thus, in theory if not necessarily practice, minimising civilian casualties). Jacqueline 
L Hazelto , D o e “t ikes a d G a d “t ateg : To a d a Politi al Understanding of the Uses of 
U a ed Ae ial Vehi le Atta ks i  U“ “e u it  Poli , Journal of Strategic Studies, 40.1–2 (2017), 
68–91 (pp. 82–84). 
691 Pa etta, The Fight Agai st Al Qaeda: Toda  a d To o o . 
692 Emphasis added. O a a, ‘e a ks  the P eside t at the Natio al Defe se U i e sit . 




sophisti ated i  so e espe ts, tha ks to ad a es i  te h olog , it is i po ta t to 
note, the u de l i g assu ptio s a d p i iples ould suggest o ti uit . 694 
Drones, like manned airpower at the beginning of the twentieth century, have been 
used to police antithetical social forces from below: non-state actors which have 
threatened open-doors and closed frontiers. As Blakeley a gues, d a i g f o  Colas  
conceptualisation of imperialism,695 [t]he ta geted killi gs p og a e is si pl  the 
latest tool deplo ed  the U“ to fa ilitate the o upatio  of the da ge ous oid of 
open or undefined frontiers  he e te ito iall  sealed politi al autho it  has failed 
to deli e  se u it  fo  apitalis  a d fo  U“ p i a .696 
 
Advancing on Blakele s a al sis, it should also e poi ted out that the MQ-1 
Predators and the MQ-9 Reapers used to conduct armed strikes are only to operate 
in non-contested airspace given their limited payload and survivability.697 According 
to Ai  Co at Ge e al Mike Hostage, oth aft a e useless in a contested 
environment".698 Speaking directly to how their use conforms with the historical 
exercise of U.S. coercive power through favourable state formations rather than the 
imposition of territorial control, the practices of drone warfare are contingent on at 
least the tacit consent of the host government. As General Mike Hostage puts it, the 
eakest ou t  ith the most minimal air force- can deal with a Predator".699 
Pakista , the site of the ost d o e st ikes du i g O a a s p eside , speaks 
directly to this dynamic. At the same time that Pakistani politicians were calling for 
an immediate end to CIA drone operations in the FATA,700 the ou t s ai  fo e s 
existing fleet of F-16A/B combat aircraft were being upgraded via the FMF 
                                                          
694 Blakele , D o es, “tate Te o is  a d I te atio al La , p. . 
695 Colás, p. 621. 
696 Blakele , D o es, “tate Te o is  a d I te atio al La , p. . 
697 Evidence of this can be clearly seen in the design of the craft. As Mayer has argued, the current 
ge e atio  of d o es e e desig ed fo  e du a e, ith ge e ous i gspa s fo  a i u  lift a d 
small, fuel-efficient motors that sacrifice speed and agility for extra time on-statio . Mayer, p. 773. 
See also Haas and Fischer, p. 284. 
698 Joh  ‘eed, P edato  D o es Useless  i  Most Wa s, Top Ai  Fo e Ge e al “a s , Foreign Policy, 
2013 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/19/predator-drones-useless-in-most-wars-top-air-force-
general-says/> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
699 Reed. 
700 J. “tuste , Pakista  De a ds E d to U.“. D o e “t ikes — fo  the Ni th Ti e , Foreign Policy, 2013 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/05/pakistan-demands-end-to-u-s-drone-strikes-for-the-ninth-




programme. 701  More tellingly, the Pakistani Air Force was also completing the 
purchase of 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles. 702 Pakistan did not therefore lack the 
military means to prevent U.S. drone strikes. What was absent was the political will 
to do so. Indeed, the then Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani told the 
American Ambassador in 2010 that he was willing to turn a blind-eye to drone strikes 
as lo g as the  [got] the ight people  which included not only al-Qaeda s o e 
leadership but members of associated forces such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban and the 
Haqqani network. 703  Thus, like SFA programmes, the use of drones remained 
contingent upon working through (rather than over) existing states in the global 
south. What was most novel about drone warfare is that it provided the Obama 
administration a direct means of projecting U.S. coercive power against al-Qaeda 
which circumvented some of the agency loss involved with building partner 
capacity.704  
 
As it pertains to the debate on the means of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south, the predominate focus of this chapter, the wider IR and U.S. foreign policy 
literatures have been characterised by a sensitivity to new technological 
developments. This drone-centrism, as I coin it, has often times reduced the 
empirical study of U.S. counterterrorism operations to a single tool of coercive power 
(drones) and a single practice of U.S. statecraft (targeted killings). This process has 
been uneven, and has manifested itself in different degrees across the academic 
literature. Nevertheless, what has connected the two faces of the drone-centrism 
literature, as I outline below, is that drone strikes (and other forms of kinetic warfare) 
are privileged as the primary mode of military intervention in the global south.  
 
Some scholars have explicitly framed drone-launched targeted killings as the centre 
pie e of O a a s ou te te o is  poli . This is the fi st a d ost o spi uous  
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face of the drone-centrism which has characterised much of the existing IR and U.S. 
foreign policy existing literatures. It has been argued, for example, that:  
 
(1) Gi e  se u it  o e s a d the politi al u a epta ilit  of oots o  the 
g ou d   the use of fo e has ee  a ied out primarily through a policy of 
targeted killi g ia st ikes f o  u a ed ae ial ehi les ;705 
 
(2) High-tech air power, especially unmanned drones but also piloted aircraft 
and cruise missiles, has been the most salient tool of the light-footprint way 
of a ;706 
 
(3) This tool [d o es] a gua l  e a e a ke  weapon of choice  i  the 
ad i ist atio s p ose utio  of the a  o  te o , pe itti g the P eside t 
to demonstrate his resolve to combat the terrorist threat while avoiding the 
isk of e o i g e oiled i  ou te i su ge  a fa e ;707 
 
(4) O a a passes o  a ou te te o is  lega  he e the d o e st ike is o 
longer a tool for counterterrorism strategy, but is counterterrorism 
st ateg .708 
 
These claims are consistent with the criticism that O a a adopted a ha k-a- ole  
approach to counterte o is  he e  his ad i ist atio  a e to el  upo  the 
high-tech, low-risk quick fix to threats, with too little consideration for the long-term 
o se ue es of this espo se .709 They are also consistent with what Jordan, Kosal 
and Rubin have (problemati all  f a ed as the oade  st ategi  illogi  of 
contemporary U.S. counterterrorism policy, namely the suggestion that precision 
kinetic operations, whether taking the form of drone strikes or special force raids, 
have calcified as the default policy response to transnational terrorist groups, despite 
their questionable military effectiveness.710 
 
The second face of drone centrism is less conspicuous than the first outlined above. 
In such accounts, drone-launched targeted killings are essentialized by the 
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disproportionate weight which is given to their discussion at the expense of most (if 
not all) other instruments of U.S. coercive power. Whilst such perspectives advance 
a i he  u de sta di g of the O a a ad i ist atio s etooli g of U.“. oe i e 
power, like the first face of drone centrism, they nevertheless privilege a single 
technological development (drones) and a single practice of U.S. statecraft (targeted 
killings) at the heart of this process. It has been argued, for example, that:   
 
(1)  hile O a a has eje ted the idea of a glo al Wa  o  Te o , he pu sues a 
more focused and targeted counterterrorism strategy that mainly relies on 
drone attacks and special operation forces designed to target local networks 
of e t e ists ho th eate  the U“ a d its allies ;711 
 
(2) Ne  heto i al e phasis has ee  a o pa ied i  p a ti e  o es 
toward greater reliance on airpower and local military forces, remote 
warfare, particularly the use of drones, and the use of special forces- move 
a a  f o  oots o  the g ou d poli  to a d e ote a fa e ;712 
 
(3) O a a has o e see  a  app oa h that elies o  a o i atio  of ta geted 
killing, security assistance to military and intelligence forces in partner and 
allied ou t ies, a d i te si e ele t o i  su eilla e 713  ut [f]irst and 
foremost a o gst these a e a ed d o es .714 
 
(4) P e isio  st ikes th ough the use of ai st ikes, aids, a d u a ed ae ial 
vehicles have thus formed the basis of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
ou te te o is  poli .715 
 
 
Whilst speaki g to o e of the ajo  di e sio s of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
retooling of U.S. coercive power during a (perceived) era of U.S. decline, I maintain 
that this drone-centrism has effectively put the cart before the horse. Targeted and 
sig atu e st ikes e e i deed a e t al o po e t of O a a s ou te te o is  
policy. 353 drone strikes are estimated to have been conducted in Pakistan alone 
du i g O a a s p eside .716 I  hat has ee  si gled out as the ost ote o th  
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e pa sio  of the d o e et o k u de  O a a , 717  164 drone strikes are also 
reported in Yemen during the same period, with a further 21 in Somalia.718 These 
figures do not speak to the dozens of other drone strikes conducted elsewhere in the 
glo al south du i g O a a s p eside , hethe  i  the attlefield theat es of 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya (during the 2011 NATO intervention) or in the 
interventions in Syria and Libya (after the 2011 NATO intervention).719 Furthermore, 
they also do not speak to the use of drones to perform ISR operations in countless 
other countries across the global south including, as chapter 7 will examine, in the 
military response against AQIM. 
 
Beyond this, as I can now show, whilst drone-launched targeted killings were indeed 
a key element of U.S. counterterrorism operations in some a  i  ou t ies [the U.“.] 
a e ot at a , their institutionalisation as a leading practice of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south was paralleled by programmes to train, equip and 
advise foreign security forces. As Secretary of State John Kerry rightly pointed out 
during his 2013 confirmation hearing, A e i a  fo eig  poli  [ as] ot defined by 
d o es a d deplo e ts alo e .720 Put simply whilst much of the existing IR and 
American foreign policy literature has done a good job of capturing (if not necessarily 
theorising) the contemporary rise of drone warfare, it has generally spoken to only 
one dimension of how the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south e e etooled du i g O a a s p eside . As I can now demonstrate through 
a detailed empirical analysis, claims such as [i]  a  ases, e otel  piloted 
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systems have provided a counterterrorism policy option where the only alternative 
is ofte  i a tio 721 a d that la ge-scale ground wars [were] being eclipsed by fleets 
of eapo ised d o es apa le of ta geted killi gs a oss the pla et 722 need to be 
qualified and situated within their proper context.  
 
“ituati g “e u it  Fo e Assista e i  the O a a ad i ist atio s etooli g of U.“. 
coercive power  
 
Coercive power, as I outlined in chapter two, can be conceptualised as the deliberate 
deployment of material resources to elicit a certain response, change a given 
eha iou , ealise a spe ifi  out o e a d/o  gai  le e age o e  a othe  a to .723 It 
can be exercised in situations where there is a misalignment between the interests 
of the U.S. and an actor to intentionally compel changes in behaviour which would 
otherwise not have happened. Broached through this lens, SFA programmes must be 
understood as an indirect tool of U.S. coercive power. Put differently, they worked 
to compel al-Qaeda affiliates to end their challenge to open-doors and closed 
frontiers in the global south through the intermediary of foreign security forces.  
 
SFA has an intuitive military logic. In theory if not necessarily practice, the training, 
equipping, and advising of foreign security forces functions to minimise the military 
(and by extension financial and political) costs of policing antithetical social forces 
throughout the global south.724  Through SFA, American policymakers attempt to 
build the capacity of foreign security services to conduct military actions that they 
otherwise could not (or at least not to the scale/quality perceived to be required). 
SFA thus functions to reduce (if not eliminate) the need for the U.S. to militarily 
intervene directly.725 As Tommy Ross who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defence for Security Cooperation between 2014-2017 put it, [c]apable partners can 
reduce burdens on U.S. forces not just by participating alongside us in coalition 
operations, but by effectively confronting regional security challenges in ways that 
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di i ish de a ds o  U.“. fo es .726 The intuitive burden-sharing logic of SFA can 
thus be understood to work on two levels: it enables partners to contribute 
proportionally more toward maintaining security within their own borders on the one 
hand and enables other partners to contribute proportionally more toward 
maintaining security within their immediate regions on the other.727 As an instrument 
of U.S. coercive power then, SFA is contingent on working with and through security 
forces in the global south. 
 
Indeed, one core assumption animating the use of SFA programmes is that American 
forces are effective at building partner capacity. 728  A second assumption 
underpinning the use of SFA is that local forces, which in the eyes of the local 
population enjoy far greater political legitimacy than American troops, are better 
placed to conduct combat operations against militant groups on the ground.729 Both 
of these assumptions speak directly to the inherently political character of SFA. As 
Biddle, Macdonald and Baker have argued, the training, equipping, advising and 
assisting of these forces does not play out in a political vacuum.730 They can only be 
effective, measured in the narrow sense of building partner capacity, if the recipient 
state modifies their behaviour in a way amicable to the American counterterrorism 
policy. 731  Mo e spe ifi all , host atio s a e e pe ted to seek to e te d thei  
sovereignty throughout their territories and combat terrorists and insurgents on 
thei  soil .732 In other words, the intuitive military and political logics of SFA runs 
parallel to their ability to manage one of the tensions inherent within American 
imperialism: reproducing open-doors and closed frontiers in the global south without 
imposing direct territorial control. 
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This logic continued into the War against al-Qaeda. The DOD definition of SFA, it is 
worth emphasising, directly equates the means of building partner capacity to the 
goal of providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and 
territories .733 Similarly, the 2013 factsheet on U.S. Security Sector Assistance Policy 
singled out building partner capacity as a means of ot o l  disrupt[ing] and 
defeat[i g] t a s atio al th eats  ut ai tai [i g] o t ol of thei  te ito  a d 
ju isdi tio  ate s i ludi g ai , la d, a d sea o de s . 734  As Maria Ryan has 
o e ted, [ ]lite al a d ultilate al t ai  a d e uip programmes designed to 
bolster internal security in allied states that were allegedly vulnerable to terrorist 
pe et atio  e e a ke  o po e t of the a  o  te o . 735  Such programmes, 
which were rolled out across Africa and elsewhere in the global south, were intended 
to defend U.S. economic and material interests against transnational threats. 736 
During the War against al-Qaeda, oth the Bush a d O a a ad i ist atio s worked 
to armour the rule of preferred state formations in Latin America, West Africa, the 
Persian Gulf and the Caspian Basin via military assistance programmes.737 A iti al 
fo eig  poli  tool i  the p o otio  of U.“. glo al i te ests 738, building the COIN 
capacity of foreign security forces in areas of key geostrategic importance to 
A e i a  poli ake s has histo i all  p o ided oth a ul a k agai st a i g 
forms of internal reformism and- on occasion- a tool for (counter)revolution should 
incumbent regimes prove resistance to US-led refor s .739 These practices, as Stokes 
a d Wate a  ha e o e e e tl  a gued, o ti ued to the e d of O a a s 
presidency.740 Consistent with the historical use of security cooperation and security 
assistance to manage intrastate conflicts, the programmes were used across Latin 
America, the Middle East, South Asia and Africa to build the capacity of regional 
security forces to help maintain stability within preferred state formations. In the 
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case of Iraq, whilst being unable to contain the Islamic State, U.S. trained-and-
equipped security forces were nevertheless effective in underwriting the 
li e alisatio  of the ou t s oil se to .741  
 
Like drone warfare, the institutionalisation of SFA as a key tool of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south predated Obama s p eside . As I de o st ated i  
chapter three, he  easu ed agai st the last ea s of Bush s p eside , there was 
an underlying continuity in the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the 
global south. Key here, as I argued, was the 2006 QDR. This defence planning 
do u e t pla ed e e ed e phasis o  [w]orking indirectly with and through 
othe s, a d the e  de i g popula  suppo t to the e e .742 It also laid out a shift 
from o du ti g a ti ities ou sel es to e a li g pa t e s to do o e fo  
the sel es .743 Paralleling the rise of drone-launched targeted killings outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, which had also began gaining momentum in the last years of 
Bush s p eside , “FA as i stitutio alised as a  i easi gl  ke  i st u e t i  the 
U.S. counterterrorism toolbox. This is reflected in both the statements of key Obama 
ad i ist atio  offi ials a d the DOD s defe e pla i g o ept i  the u ial ea l  
ea s of O a a s p eside .  
 
Robert Gates, who served as Defence Secretary from 2006 to 2011, stressed that the 
DOD needed to continue get[ti g] ette  at hat is alled uildi g pa t e  apa it : 
helping other countries defend themselves or, if necessary, fight alongside U.S. forces 
by providing them with equipment, training, or other forms of security assista e .744 
Whe e e  possi le, he o ti ued, the ad i ist atio  ould look to e plo  i di e t 
approaches — primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and 
their security forces — to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that 
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e ui e ostl  a d o t o e sial di e t ilita  i te e tio . 745  In this respect, 
pa t e  apa it  ould e as important as its own, and building their capacity is 
arguably as important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does 
itself .746 The  QD‘ si ila l  held that uildi g pa t e  apa it  had e e  ee  
o e i po ta t  i  U.“. defe e pla i g.747 As it st essed, [w]orking in conjunction 
with other U.S. government agencies and allied military forces to strengthen the 
security institutions of partner nations will be a crucial part of U.S. and allied efforts 
to defeat te o ist g oups a ou d the o ld .748 
 
Leon Panetta, who succeeded Gates as Defence Secretary, was also a lead proponent 
of SFA. Whilst acknowledging that the U.S. remai ed the o ld s do i a t ilita  
power, during a June 2012 speech on building partnerships in the twentieth first 
century, he emphasized how American global leadership would increasingly come to 
depe d o  apa le allies a d pa t e s illi g to help shoulder the burden of global 
se u it .749 As he poi ted out, the  QD‘ had ide tified the critical importance  
of building partner capacity and the practice was thereafter rolled out to both 
Afghanistan and Iraq and the War on Terror on the periphery (the Horn of Africa, the 
Philippines, Yemen) theatres. 750  For Panetta, enabling partners to do more, 
particularly during this era of (perceived) U.S. decline, was crucial. Whilst the U.S. 
had p e iousl  assu ed the p i a  ole of defe di g othe s … [o]ur new strategy 
e og izes that this is ot the o ld e li e i  a o e .751 SFA would consequently 
e e t al to the o goi g ilita  a paig  to disrupt, degrade, dismantle and 
ulti atel  defeat  al-Qaeda, a subject which Panetta spoke about in greater detail at 
the Centre for a New American Security in November 2012.752 As Panetta stressed, 
[ ]he e e  possi le, e ill o k th ough, a d ith lo al pa t e s, suppo ti g the  
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with the intelligence and resources they need in order to deter these common 
th eats .753 According to the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance in fact, the U.S. would 
look to e o e the glo al se u it  pa t e  of hoi e .754 For both Gates and Panetta 
then, SFA was a key (if by no means the only) component in the retooling of U.S. 
coercive power during an era of (perceived) American decline.  
 
Speaking directly to the relationship between drone strikes and SFA efforts, 
th oughout O a a s p eside , the DOD s defe se pla ning concept elevated 
direct actions alongside partner building efforts at the center of the military response 
to al-Qaeda s affiliates. A o di g to the  QD‘, a highl  apa le et o k of 
special operations and intelligence capabilities designed to seek out, identify, and 
eli i ate Al Qaeda s leade ship, dis a tle its et o ks, a d e ode its effe ti e ess  
ould e o i ed ith a  e du i g effo t to uild the se u it  apa it  of ke  
partners around the world, where improved local and regional capability and 
apa it  a  edu e the size a d u e  of Al Qaeda s safe ha e s a d p e e t thei  
ege e atio .755 The 2012 Defence Strategic Review reiterated this goal. SFA were 
again placed on a twin-t a k alo gside ki eti  st ikes at the e t e of O a a s 
cou te te o is  poli . U.“. glo al ou te  te o is  effo ts ill e o e , it oted, 
o e idel  dist i uted a d ill e ha a te ized  a i  of di e t a tio  and 
security force assistance . 756  This logi  also i fo ed the  QD‘. The DOD s 
remained co itted to e ala e[i g] ou  ou te te o is  effo ts to a d g eate  
emphasis on building partnership capacity, especially in fragile states, while retaining 
robust capability for direct action, including intelligence, persistent surveillance, 
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Unpacking Obama’s small-footprint approach to counterterrorism: a framework 
for analysis 
 
As I have shown, much of the existing IR and American foreign policy literature has 
edu ed the p a ti es of U.“. ilita  i te e tio  i  the glo al south du i g O a a s 
presidency to a single practice (drone-launched targeted killings). This drone-
centrism downplays the parallel rise of SFA as an increasingly key instrument of U.S. 
oe i e po e  du i g O a a s p eside . Ho  the  a  these t o de elop e ts 
be reconciled for my structured-focused comparison in chapters 5, 6 and 7 ? The aim 
of my discussion in the remainder of this chapter is to outline and defend the 
framework which will be used to shape my empirical analysis of the means of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP, AQIM a d al-Shabaab.  
 
Whilst acknowledging that they were indeed a distinct and central component of 
some U.S. counterterrorism operations, I conceive of drone-launched targeted 
killings and SFA programmes as having formed a consistent part of a variegated small-
footprint approach to counterterrorism. My use of the small-footprint label is 
deliberate. The 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance directly spelt out the Obama 
ad i ist atio s o it e t to de elop[i g] i o ati e, lo -cost, and small-
footprint app oa hes to a hie e [its] se u it  o je ti es . 758  Speaking in 2012, 
Defence Secretary Leon Panetta directly tied this the small-footprint moniker to the 
military response to al-Qaeda. As he noted:  
 
This campaign against al-Qaeda will largely take place outside declared 
combat zones, using a small footprint approach, that includes precision 
operations, partnered activities with foreign Special Forces operations, and 
capacity building so that partner countries can be more effective in 
combating terrorism on their own.759 
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AFRICOM's director of strategy Army Major General Charles Hooper also used the 
label to explain the centrality of the approach to counterterrorism operations across 
the continent:  
 
If ou look at the st ategi  guida e, it talks a out a s all footp i t… [a] d I 
would say that Africa Command is the quintessential small footprint, 
providing the maximum return and the maximum impact for our national 
policies with limited resources. We have become masters at providing the 
maximum return on investment.760 
 
As the label conveys, the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism aimed to 
minimise, but did not eliminate, the size of the U.S. military footprint on the ground. 
SFA programmes were key in this regard. As Biddle, Macdonald and Baker have 
a gued, “FA s hole pu pose is to li it the U“ footp i t .761 An operation cannot 
constitute a small-footprint operation, I maintain, if uniformed U.S. combat troops 
were deployed on combat operations. Instead, the bulk of the military presence is 
provided by either indigenous security forces or, if these are unavailable as was the 
case in Somalia, by regional security forces who received U.S. military assistance. 
American SOF and PSMC, as discussed below, may also be active on the ground 
performing a range of different tasks centred on, for the most part, enabling drone 
and SFA efforts (these are catalogued at the end of this section). Furthermore, as was 
the case with the French in the Sahel, the small-footprint approach may also be run 
parallel to the provision of logistical support to other states who conduct their own 
direct counterterrorism operations. Such assistance can include, but is not restricted 
to: (1) Foreign Military Sales; (2) Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance; and 
(3) aerial refuelling and strategic airlift.762   
 
As captured in the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance, a t polog  of s all-footprint 
approaches  athe  tha  a si gula  s all-footprint approach should be 
conceptualised.763  Its exact composition could be tailored to reflect the political 
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sensitivities of the host nation, the availability of partners within the region and the 
policy considerations within the Obama administration. Not all of four of its 
component parts were necessarily deployed, with drone strikes being conspicuously 
absent from U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel for example. As part of 
the small-footprint approach, the U.S. could nevertheless attempt to directly police 
antithetical social forces such as al-Qaeda through drone strikes and, more rarely, 
SOF kill-capture raids. These direct actions, it is crucial to qualify, did not directly 
substitute for the deployment of uniformed ground troops. As Michael Boyle has 
noted, in states such as Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen, large-scale conventional 
ope atio s e e ot a plausi le alte ati e  to d o e st ikes.764 Moreover, drone 
strikes and kill-capture raids worked to different temporal rhythms than SFA 
programmes. As e plai ed  “OCOM Chief Ad i al E i  T. Olso  i  , [ ]hile 
the di e t app oa h ill al a s e e ui ed, its o e all effe ts a e ot de isi e .765 
Di e t a tio s e e e plo ed as a holdi g a tio  to eate the politi al a d ilita  
space for indirect approaches (including SFA) to take effect.766 On this basis, drone 
strikes can be understood as supporting SFA efforts by helping provide the 
prerequisite level of security needed for train, equip and advise efforts to take 
effect.767 
 
My understanding of the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism departs from 
the alternative models of military intervention advanced within the existing IR and 
U.S. foreign policy literatures in a number of ways. These are worth clarifying in order 
to fu the  efi e  e pi i al a al sis of the ea s of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  hapte s ,  a d . The Obama 
administration, it is widely argued, adopted a light-footp i t  app oa h to 
counterterrorism.768 According to David Sanger, who was amongst the first to write 
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substantially about the su je t, O a a s tu  to a d d o e st ikes a d e a fa e 
to a oid the deplo e t of U.“. g ou d fo es o e seas as his sig atu e fo eig  
poli  i o atio  du i g his fi st te .769 I  o t ast to “a ge s o eptualisatio  
of light-footp i t  arfare, my conceptualisation of the small-footprint approach 
places no weight on the role of cyberwarfare and expands its conceptualisation 
beyond drone strikes to include a variegated use of SFA, SOF and PMSC. My 
understanding of the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism also departs from 
the surrogate warfare model advanced by A d es K ieg. Ce t al to O a a s 
overarching approach to military intervention in the Middle East, he argued, was 
externalising their financial and human costs to both other actors and technologies 
such as drones.770 Whilst the e is o e lap ith K ieg s su ogate a fa e odel,  
understanding of the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism departs in two 
significant ways: first, the central weight which is given to SFA in my analysis, a 
p a ti e hi h hilst dis ussed i  K ieg s f a e o k is eithe  full  u pa ked o  
theorised; and second, the geographical focus of my analysis on the practices of U.S. 
military intervention in Africa not the Middle East. Finally, the small-footprint 
approach to counterterrorism can also be distinguished from what Hal Brands and 
Pete  Fea e  ha e f a ed as the ediu  footp i t  odel of ilita  i te e tio  
which the Obama administration adopted to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria.771 Addressing the nation at the beginning of Operation Inherent Resolve in 
September 2014, Obama lai ed that the strategy of taking out terrorists who 
threaten us, while supporting partners on the front lines  ould e e plo ed. This 
model, Obama continued, had been successfully pursued in Yemen and Somalia for 
ea s .772  Whilst retaining the basic template of the small-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism in the sense that drones, military assistance programmes, SOF and 
PM“C e e all used as pa t of this a paig ; the ediu  footp i t  app oa h to 
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769 Sanger, p. xviv. 
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fighting the Islamic State was distinguished by its far greater scale. At the head of a 
multilateral military coalition of more than thirty states, the DOD estimated that after 
August 2014 it had killed over 45,000 Islamic State fighters.773 An estimated 5,000 
American SOF were also sent to Iraq and Syria, tasked with not only building partner 
capacity but conducting kill/capture raids against Islamic State targets and collecting 
intelligence. 774  In comparison, the number of American SOF involved in small-
footprint operations was of an order of magnitude smaller, running at maximum into 
the hundreds rather than thousands. 
  
To round off this discussion, the remainder of this chapter outlines the role of SOF 
and PMSC i   o eptualisatio  of O a a s s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism. As I will argue, these auxiliary tools of U.S. coercive power played 
a key enabling role in U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and 
Iraq. Both are consequently studied as part of my structured-focused comparison of 
the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates i  
chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
 
Special Operations Forces 
 
American SOF, the preserve of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM), are 
spe ifi all  t ai ed to o du t ti e se siti e, la desti e, lo  isi ilit  [ope atio s], 
conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional expertise, 
a d/o  a high deg ee of isk . 775  They are often deployed to states where their 
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presence is either contested, denied or politically sensitive.776 This attribute is valued 
by both American policymakers and host-governments. 
 
Used in this capacity, SOF had played a key role in U.S. military operations throughout 
the War against al-Qaeda. The 2004 Unified Command Plan desig ated “OCOM s 
commander as the lead combatant commander for planning, synchronizing, and as 
directed, executing global operations against terrorist networks in coordination with 
othe  o ata t o a de s .777 The 2004 al-Qaeda Network Execute Order, also 
issued by Donald Rumsfeld, streamlined the approval process for kill-capture 
operations against al-Qaeda leaders in states such as Pakistan, Somalia and Syria.778 
“OCOM s g o th o ti ued i to O a a s p eside . Retiring as head of SOCOM in 
, Ad i al Willia  M ‘a e  e a ked o  the golde  age fo  spe ial 
ope atio s .779 I  the de ade up to FY  alo e, “OCOM s a ual udget e uest 
had nearly tripled to $10.5 billion.780 Driven, in part, by the military response to al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates, the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) reportedly 
e e ged as a fa ou ite a h of the ilita  du i g O a a s p eside .781 On 
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779  Quoted in Da  La othe, ‘eti i g Top Na  “EAL: We A e i  the Golde  Age of “pe ial 
Ope atio s , The Washington Post, 2014 
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one estimate, JSOC is estimated to have killed or captured more suspected al-Qaeda 
members than all other branches of the American military combined.782  
 
“OF pe fo ed a ke  idgi g ole i  the O a a ad i ist atio s s all-footprint 
approach to counterterrorism. Alongside PMSC, they provided the figurative small-
footprint in the global south: the conduit through which host-nation security forces 
could be trained, equipped, advised and assisted to fight against al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates. More sparingly, they also conducted kill-capture raids and drone strikes 
against high value al-Qaeda targets. When conceptualising the role which JSOC and 
othe  “OF u its pla ed i  the O a a ad i ist atio s s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism, a key disti tio  eeds to e ade et ee  la k  a d hite  
ope atio s. Bla k  “OF ope atio s o sisted of di e t ilita  a tio s su h as kill-
capture raids and airborne targeted killings. Whilst exact figures are not possible to 
o e , e o d the hot  attlefields of Afgha ista  a d I a  a d Pakista  a d “ ria 
which they adjoined, JSOC is reported to have conducted kill-or-capture raids in a 
number of states. These included, as I discuss later in this thesis, Somalia and 
Yemen.783 White  ope atio s, o  the othe  ha d, e t ed a ou d uildi g pa t e  
capacity, civil affairs operations and the provision of mission planning, support and 
intelligence to host nation forces.784 American SOF were deployed throughout the 
global south in order to train, advise and occasionally accompany foreign security 
forces. Used in this capacity, they have been a key instrument of foreign internal 
defence. 785  “u h ope atio s ould e fu ded ia the Pe tago s “e tio   
account which paid for U.S. SOF to train and equip foreign forces and irregular forces 
(including paramilitary forces), including for counterterrorism purposes. 786  They 
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often take the form of Joint Combined Exchange Training which SOF used to build 
counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and counternarcotic capacity in foreign 
security forces.787  
 
Private Military and Security Contractors 
 
PMSC, like SOF, were also key enablers of U.S. counterterrorism operations 
th oughout the glo al south. PM“C a  e oadl  defi ed as p i ate fi s that sell 
as commodities professional security services directly or indirectly linked to 
a fa e .788 Drilling down further, a loose three part typology of different PMSC can 
be drawn. This is between: (1) military combat companies, the least common type of 
PMSC, which provide state and non-state soldie s  fo  hi e apa le of o du ti g 
combat operations; (2) military consulting firms, which provide military personnel 
capable of training and advising foreign security forces, personal security details, 
hostage negotiators, security escorts and site-protection; and (3) military support 
firms, the most commonly used type of PMSC, which provide technical, logistical and 
operational support services such as weapons maintenance, intelligence analysis, 
procurement support and catering. 789  PMSC have been valued by American 
policymakers because they have enabled U.S. coercive power to be projected into 
the global south with a greater degree of political deniability.790 Like SOF, they are 
also valued by the host-government because they provide a less conspicuous U.S. 
military presence on the ground.791 As Stokes and Raphael have argued, PMSC have 
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traditionally been used by both the American state and private companies to insulate 
privileged access to oil resources across the global south.792 
 
PMSC are integral to the contemporary practices of U.S. military intervention.793 
Throughout the War against al-Qaeda, they played a key role in the COIN campaigns 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.794 At times, the number of contractors in both theatres was 
greater than the overall number of uniformed American combat troops deployed.795 
Military consulting and support firms were at the heart of the American effort to train 
indigenous security forces and provide essential logistical support services to their 
own forces.796 PMSC were also key to counterterrorism operations outside of these 
states.797 Co t a to s a e suspe ted to ha e pla ed a  i po ta t ole i  the CIA s a d 
J“OC s d o e ope atio s. This is epo ted to ha e i luded p o idi g maintenance, 
intelligence and data analysis, whilst also piloting the craft outside of active combat 
missions. 798  Similarly, PMSC are also understood to have conducted manned 
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Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance operations in Africa.799 In addition to 
supporting drone and aerial operations, PSMC were also employed to train, advise 
and sometimes accompany foreign security forces on counterterrorism operations 
across the global south.800 Military consulting firms such as Bancroft Global were 
oftentimes perceived as being more flexible and responsive than uniformed military 
trainers in performing such tasks. 801  Beyond this, PSMC also provided essential 
logistical support functions to U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq. These practices were particularly pronounced in Africa. Given 
the o ti e t s ast size, AFRICOM relied heavily on military support firms for a range 
of services including:  
 
public safety (security operations, emergency management, and 
fire/emergency services), air operations, ordnance, supply operations, 
laundry services, morale welfare and recreation, galley (food services), 
housing (bachelor quarters), facility support (facilities investment, janitorial 
services, grounds maintenance, pest control, refuse collection, and roads), 
utilities (electrical generation, wastewater treatment, and water operations), 
base support vehicles equipment, and environmental services.802 
 
As with drones, military assistance programmes and SOF, PMSC thus formed an 
i po ta t pa t of the O a a ad i ist atio s s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism. To help the reader contextualise my subsequent empirical analysis 
of the ea s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates in chapters 5, 6 and 7, a sample of the specific military functions which SOF 
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Figure 9: Sample of tasks performed by SOF and PMSC in support of U.S. 























































The principal aim of this chapter was to challenge the prevailing understanding of 
how the Obama administration retooled the coercive practices of U.S. military 
intervention during a perceived era of American decline. It began by defining two of 
the o epts hi h a e ke  to  a al sis of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates: ou te te o is  a d SFA. I then 
continued to outline the history, goals and principal recipients of three of the 
principal SFA programmes employed to build partner capacity in the global south.  
 
The second section of this chapter began by contextualising the evolution of U.S. 
drone operations during the War against al-Qaeda, and bringing together several of 
the largest bodies of literature from within the interdisciplinary field of drone studies. 
I then continued to outline the theoretical limitations of the prevailing explanations 
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for the goals of drone launched targeted and signature strikes, and the need to shed 
greater light on the historically contingent processes which can be understood to 
have informed U.S. military intervention in the global south. I then continued to 
outline the two faces of what I coined the drone-centrism of the extant IR and U.S. 
foreign policy literature. After broadening the current debate on the use of SFA 
during the War against al-Qaeda beyond their initiative military logic to discuss how 
they have been used to armour favoured political economies in the global south, I 
demonstrated the importance of programmes to train, equip, advise and accompany 
fo eig  se u it  fo es i  the DOD s defe e pla i g st ateg  a d the olu e of 
military aid allocations during the key early years of the Obama presidency.  
 
In the third and final section of this chapter, I attempted to reconcile the drone 
centrism of the existing IR and U.S. foreign policy literatures with the parallel rise of 
SFA. I conceptualised both as having formed constituent parts of O a a s a iegated 
small-footprint approach to counterterrorism which also included the use of SOF and 
PMSC. I then continued to distinguish my understanding of this approach from the 
alte ati e odels hi h ha e ee  ad a ed to o eptualise O a a s atte pts 
to minimise the size of its footprint in the global south. Using this framework to 
structure my analysis, I can now move onto my structured-focused comparison of 
the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP hapte  , al-Shabaab 







Re-examining the means and drivers of the Obama administration’s 
military response to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
 
The first section of this thesis outlined the theoretical and analytical framework 
which informs my critical study of the means, goals and continuity of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Building on this 
foundation, the second section of this thesis takes the form of a structured-focused 
o pa iso  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP (chapter 5), al-
Shabaab (chapter 6), and AQIM (chapter 7). As noted in the introduction, this 
methodology is structured in the sense that same questions are asked of each case. 
It is focused in that only certain dimensions of each of case are examined. By ordering 
my analysis in this way, I am able to draw richer inferences about the means and 
drivers of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq during 
O a a s p eside . Fu the o e, the use of this method enables me to circumvent 
the well-documented limitations of single-case analysis, whilst also providing a clear 
framework of analysis through which to weave my historical materialist theoretical 
framework.804  
 
The first three questions of this structured-focused comparison explore the political 
economy animators of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates. They are informed by - but are not directly mapped to - my 
theorisation of al-Qaeda s sophisti ated st ateg  of e o o i  a fa e outli ed i  
chapter 3. The establishment of egio al affiliates speaks to the o e e t s atte pt 
to exploit the particular spatial organisation of American power by tying American 
ground forces down in military campaigns across the global south. Given that only 
AQAP attempted to conduct transnational terrorist attacks against the continental 
U.S., I maintain that it would be similarly redundant to narrow my empirical analysis 
to just whether al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates atte pted to atta k targets of economic 
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significance within the continental U.S.805 Sensitive to these observations, the second 
and third questions of my structured-focused comparison explore the third pillar of 
al-Qaeda s app oa h to e o o i  a fa e: disrupting the reproduction of open-
doors and closed frontiers throughout the global south (with a particular emphasis 
on disrupting global energy security and attempting to capture and govern territory).  
 
1. Did AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM attempt to conduct terrorist strikes against the 
continental U.S. or the U.S. military presence overseas? 
 
2. To what extent did AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM attempt to disrupt the 
reproduction of open-doors access to the markets, resources and labour of 
the global south?  
 
3. To what extent did AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM attempt to disrupt the 
reproduction of closed frontiers throughout the global south? 
 
The second set of my three structured-focused comparison questions address the 
means of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to ea h of al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates. They are directly informed by the small-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism outlined at the end of chapter 4. They ask: 
 
1. What was the role of drone-launched targeted killings in the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM? 
 
2. What was the role of special operations forces and private military security 
contractors in the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP/al-
Shabaab/AQIM? 
 
3. What was the role of security force assistance programmes in the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP/al-Shabaab/AQIM? 
 
Taken as a whole, my detailed empirical response to each of these six questions 
e a les e to fu the  su sta tiate this thesis  t o p i a  o t i utio s to the 
existing IR and U.S. foreign policy literatures. The first, that the essentialization of a 
single technological development (drones) and a single practice of U.S. statecraft 
(targeted killings) has washed out the parallel rise of security force assistance 
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programmes as a disciplinary mode of state violence employed alongside (and at 
other times in place of) drone strikes to police al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. The 
second, that there was more animating the military response to al-Qaeda's regional 
affiliates than just counterterrorism. They were also partially driven by the goal of 
armouring the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers (and by extension 
the primacy of the American state and capitalist-market relations) in and around 
Africa. Beyond this, my structured-focused comparison also provides the space to 
fu the  ela o ate upo  th ee of this thesis  narrower contributions to the existing IR 
and U.S. foreign policy literatures. These are my arguments that: 
 
1. military assistance programmes can be theorised as a key tool for defending 
the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers within the soft limits set 
on the exercise of U.S. coercive power in the global south by the spatial 
organisation of American power; 
 
2. the al-Qaeda movement - through its affiliates - threatened more than just 
American national security, they can also be theorised as having contested 
the practices of U.S. imperialism from below; 
 
3. And, like military assistance programmes, the O a a ad i ist atio s use of 
drone strikes remained contingent upon working through (rather than over) 
governments in the global south. 
 
Underpinning my structured-focused comparison, it is important to qualify, are three 
assumptions worth briefly reiterating to help the reader navigate the remainder of 
this thesis.  
 
The first, as outlined in chapter 4, is that I understand military assistance programmes 
to be an indirect tool of U.S. coercive power employed by American policymakers to 
build the capacity of surrogates to conduct military actions that they otherwise could 
not (or at least not to the scale/quality perceived to be required). Whilst remaining 
sensitive to the challenge (if not impossibility) of untangling how exactly the 
structures of global capitalism have animated American foreign policy, because they 
are mediated through the American state, I maintain that they can be indirectly 
observed through the exercise of U.S. coercive power in the global south. Following 




training and advice obligated for foreign security forces via security force assistance 
programmes can shed light on the alternative animators of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. This is because, as Stokes and Raphael 
have argued, [a]ssista e programmes are a critical foreign policy tool in the 
promotion of US global interests, by ensuring that allied militaries are equipped and 
trained to operate in missions defined as relevant and important by US planners .806  
 
The second assumption underpinning my structured-focused comparison is that 
historical materialism allows for a richer understanding of the continuity in, and 
d i e s of, the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al 
affiliates. As outlined in chapter 2, I maintain that the theory is well equipped to 
problematize what U.S. military intervention in the global south have been for, 
capture their relationship to the historical practices of U.S. statecraft and explain 
their relationship to the particular spatial arrangement of American power which has 
prevailed since 1945. Given al-Qaeda s o it e t to dis upti g Middle Easte  oil 
production (see chapter 3), particular weight is given throughout my structured-
focused comparison to “tokes a d ‘aphael s dual logic thesis, namely the argument 
that the defence of global energy security has been a key mechanism through which 
the American state has not only advanced its own national economic interests but 
maintained its dominance over the other core capitalist powers. Also key to my 
su se ue t e pi i al a al sis is histo i al ate ialis s e phasis o  antithetical 
social forces and movements from below as one of the principal targets of U.S. 
military intervention in the global south. On this basis, it is assumed that the 
u de l i g ai  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates was not to conquer and directly control territory. Rather, as Saull 
has poi ted out, it as as a prelude to reconstituting states internally organized to 
ette  ealize the ep odu tio  of glo al st u tu es of A e i a  po e .807 As was 
argued in chapter 2, the primary conduits for reproducing the primacy of the 
American state and capitalist- a ket elatio s si e  ha e ee  a plu i e se  of 
sovereign states, not direct territorial dependencies. This has represented one of the 
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greater vulnerabilities of American power, providing multiple access points across 
the global south for the practices of American imperialism to be challenged from 
below.  
 
The third major assumption worth reiterating here is that, throughout this 
structured-focused comparison, I remain sensitive to the charge of economic 
determinism. To reiterate, the argument advanced here is not that defence of closed 
frontiers and open-doors in the global south was the only goal animating the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates. ‘athe , as outli ed i  
chapter 2, it is that they formed part of a larger mix of observable and unobservable 
strategic, security and ideational factors which, when taken together, can help 
explain American military intervention in the global south. On this basis, whilst I am 
critical of the role which national security concerns played in animating the military 
response to al-Qaeda s egional affiliates, their importance is not entirely dismissed. 
Weaving through my historical materialist theoretical framework, my analysis 
reaches beyond these concerns to draw out the political economy animators of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP (chapter 5), al-Shabaab (chapter 
6) and AQIM (chapter 7). In doing so, it speaks to the continuity between the 
historical practices and goals of U.S. military intervention in the global south and U.S. 





The first chapter of this structured-focused comparison examines the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. This ase holds a pa ti ula  sig ifi a e 
within the larger study of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan 
a d I a . At poi ts du i g O a a s p eside , AQAP as held up as the most 
threatening branch of the entire al-Qaeda movement. The goals of counterterrorism 
operations in Yemen were thereafter explained in terms of preventing and deterring 
terrorist attacks. As it pertains to the debate on the means of American 




la o ato , a pla e he e the U ited “tates a  test e  a s to fight al Qaeda .808 
On multiple occasions during his presidency, Obama praised the model of military 
intervention pioneered in the country as a successful template which could be 
replicated elsewhere in the global south.809 To put such claims into perspective, more 
d o e st ikes e e epo ted i  Ye e  du i g O a a s p eside  tha  i  a  othe  
war in countries we are not at war ith  other than Pakistan. This hapte s detailed 
re-e a i atio  of the d i e s a d ea s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to AQAP thus provides a strong test of my arguments that there was more 
to the military response to al-Qaeda's regional affiliates than just counterterrorism 




The first section of this chapter provides a chronological roadmap of the major 
developments in the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen during 
the War against al-Qaeda. This process, which George and Bennett have labelled 
soaki g a d poki g , p o ides ke  o te t fo   a al sis of the ea s a d d i e s 
of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to the affiliate.810 Throughout this 
discussion, particular attention is given to changes in the bilateral relationship 
et ee  Washi gto  a d the “aleh a d Hadi go e e ts i  “a a'a. AQAP s 
advances in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the Yemeni Civil War are also 
discussed in detail.  
 
The second section of this chapter builds on this foundation in order to open up the 
politi al e o o  a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
AQAP. By broadening the study of U.S. counterterrorism in Yemen to incorporate 
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AQAP s strategic goals and intentions, alternate light is shed on its attempts to 
conduct transnational terrorist attacks against continental America. To this end, 
AQAP s o it e t to al-)a ahi i s st ateg  of a thousa d uts  is fi st outli ed a d 
discussed in relation to Ope atio  He o hage, the affiliate s  atte pt to 
destroy cargo aircraft en route to America. My focus then turns to answering the 
second and third questions of my structured-focused comparison. To this end, 
AQAP s halle ge to the ep odu tio  of closed frontiers and open-doors in the 
A a ia  Pe i sula is outli ed. Fi st, AQAP s e pe i e ts i  aptu i g a d go e i g 
territory within Yemen are examined in greater detail. The  AQAP s halle ge to 
global energy security is discussed in relation to its efforts to disrupt both Saudi oil 
production and traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb maritime straight. 
 
Tying the two previous threads together, the third and final section of this chapter 
re-examines the means of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  esponse to AQAP. It 
oade s its stud  e o d the ki eti  fa e  of U.“. ou te te o is  ope atio s i  
order to better capture and theorise the central role of security force assistance (SFA) 
programmes therein. There are two components to this analysis, both of which are 
bridged by my theorisation of military assistance programmes in chapter 2 as a 
o duit plugged i  to states i  the glo al south i  o de  to fill pe ei ed gaps i  the 
currents of global capitalism. The first is to argue that whilst drone strikes were an 
important and distinctive component of the military response to AQAP, they 
nevertheless formed part of a small-footprint approach to military intervention 
centred on the use of security force assistance (SFA) programmes. The second is to 
argue there was more driving the use of these programmes than just 
counterterrorism. By drilling down into some of the specific programmes obligated 
under the two largest sources of military assistance for the state- the Section 1206 
and Section 1207(n) authorities- I document how they also worked to defend the 
p a ti es of A e i a  i pe ialis  f o  AQAP s halle ge to the  f o  elo . 
 Situating the Obama administration’s military response to AQAP: the evolution 





Yemen was, for the most part, a peripheral U.S. foreign policy concern during the 
twentieth century. At certain intervals however, it exercised a considerable hold on 
the attention of American policymakers.811 This interest was not shaped by the goal 
of maintaining open-door access to markets, resources and labour within Yemen.812 
Rather, it was driven by the goal of preventing instability within the country from 
spilling out into the wider region, thus threatening the American state s key imperial 
interests elsewhere in the Gulf. 813  In the decade prior to the 9/11 attacks, Ali 
Abdullah Saleh, the Yemeni president, allowed thousands of Mujahedeen fighters to 
repatriate back to Yemen following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. 814 
Around this time, Osama bin Laden is also suspected to have provided financial 
support to jihadi groups operating in the country, perceiving his ancestral home as 
being a fertile area for future expansion.815 By the close of the decade, Yemen had 
been used as a staging area for both al-Qaeda s  atta ks o  the A e i a  
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the U.S. naval destroyer the 
USS Cole. Whilst this process gained considerably more momentum after 9/11, 
Yemen had thus emerged as a growing counterterrorism concern prior to the 
outbreak of the War against al-Qaeda.  
 
Withi  t o o ths of the /  atta ks, Ye e s President Saleh had flown to 
Washington in order to pledge his support to the Bush administration.816 Within a 
year, U.S. Special Operation Forces (SOF) were reportedly active in a training and 
advisory capacity in the country as part of a $400 million bilateral package of military 
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812 Although the Hunt Oil Company had prospected oil in the then Yemen Arab Republic during the 
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in the Gulf region. Peterson, pp. 505–6. 
813 Peterson, p. 502. 
814 This was in exchange for their support in the military campaign against elements within the former 
PDRY who were unhappy with the terms of reunification. Saleh had overseen the Yemen Arab 
‘epu li s YA‘  u ifi atio  ith People's De o ati  ‘epu li  of Yemen (PDRY) in 1990. 
815  The Mappi g Milita ts P oje t, Al Qaeda i  the A a ia  Pe i sula ,  
<http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/19?highlight=aqap> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 




support.817 In a pretext which was also used to justify the rollout of counterterrorism 
operations across the Horn of Africa and the Sahel around this time, the goals of 
these efforts were stated by one State Department official in the following terms: 
[w]e are trying to make sure Yemen is not the new base for [al-Qaeda s o e 
leade ship] .818 Despite this initial cooperation, U.S. counterterrorism operations in 
Yemen suffered a significant blow in November 2002. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul 
Wolfowitz publicly acknowledged the U.S. involvement in the CIA drone strike (the 
first outside of Afghanistan and Iraq) that killed Ali Qaed Senyan al-Harthi, the alleged 
mastermind of the attack on the USS Cole. Giving further weight to my earlier 
argument that the drone campaign was contingent upon working through (rather 
than over) governments in the global south, Yemeni consent for any further U.S. 
drone strike in the state was thereafter withheld  until 2010. 
 
Despite this barrier to direct U.S. military actions against AQAP, the Saleh 
go e e t e e theless logged so e ajo  [ ou te te o is ] gai s and 
sig ifi a tl  i p o ed se u it  i  Ye e  i  the ea s hi h follo ed.819 With much 
of al-Qaeda s leade ship i  the ou t  eithe  killed o  detai ed, the U.“. a assado  
Ed u d Hull ote i   that the al Qaeda et o k i  Ye e  had eased to 
functio .820 In return for these successes, Saleh expected to be rewarded with a 
further increase in U.S. military assistance to help contain the latest Houthi rebellion 
waging in the north east of the country. 821  During his November 2005 visit to 
                                                          
817 See The Bu eau of I estigati e Jou alis , Ye e : ‘epo ted U“ Co e t A tio s - , The 
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819  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a. Ye e  G ot Assess e t .  Ap il .  
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820 Amb Edmund J Hull, High-Value Target: Countering Al Qaeda in Yemen (New York: Potomac Books, 
Inc., 2011), p. 111. 
821 Follo i g the killi g of the o e e t s fou de  Hussei  Al-Houthi by Yemeni security forces in 
2004, the Houthi had taken up arms against the Saleh government a total of six occasions prior to the 
Yemeni Civil War. Saleh perceived the Houthi, not AQAP, to pose the greatest challenge to his rule. To 
this end, military assistance which had been intended to be used against AQAP was suspected to have 
been misappropriated in order to conduct counterinsurgency operations in the north-east of the 
country. The Ye e i go e e t s o it e t to defeat[i g] the Houthis at a  ost  as 
acknowledged in one diplomatic cable sent in December 2009 alongside their dismal of American 




Washington, he was instead informed that U.S. economic assistance was going to be 
cut. 822  Whilst Saleh had always been a mercurial counterterrorism partner, this 
reversal appears to have pushed the President into pursuing an essentially 
transactional approach to counterterrorism in which he aimed to extract the greatest 
volume of U.S. economic and military largesse in exchange for any assistance he may 
offer.823 It also coincided with what is widely recognised to have been the catalyst for 
al-Qaeda s e i al i  the ou t : the escape of twenty-three al-Qaeda members 
from a maximum-security prison in 2006.824 In January 2009, one of these escapees, 
Nasir al-Wuhayshi, announced the merger of al-Qaeda s p e iousl  sepa ate Ye e i 
and Saudi franchises to form AQAP.825  
 
Shortly after taking office, Obama tasked the National Security Council (NSC) with 
conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterterrorism policy in Yemen. The 
N“C is epo ted to ha e e o e ded fo usi g o  o ati g AQAP i  the sho t 
term, increasing development assistance to meet long-term challenges, and 
a shalli g suppo t fo  glo al effo ts to sta ilize Ye e .826 This recalibration of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in Yemen was given further impetuses by the failed 
U de ea  Bo i g  of No th est Ai li es Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009. 
                                                          
military operations against the Houthi. As it continued, "[t]he CTU has been unable to go after genuine 
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822 Saleh was informed during a meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that Yemen was, on 
the basis of governmental corruption, being suspended from the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
at a cost of $20 million in bilateral assistance. Saleh was informed the following day at the World Bank 
that their development assistance would be drastically cut from $420 million to $280 million for a 
similar reason. Johnsen. 
823  Throughout his presidency, Saleh repeatedly expressed his displeasure with the level of U.S. 
military assistance his country was receiving. Complaining about the delayed delivery of replacement 
pa ts fo  the Ye e i  Ai  Fo e s F- s fighte  jets a d C s t a spo t ai aft i  “epte e  , fo  
e a ple, he la e ted "[h]o  a  e e a pa t e  i  CT [ ou te te o is ]…if ou do 't gi e us the 
equipment we ask for?" Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a. “aleh Coope ati e O  Ct, Looks 
Fo  E o o i  ‘e a ds .  “epte e  .  
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05SANAA2507_a.html> [accessed 10 October 2017].  
824 Hull, pp. 116–17. 
825 Abdel Karim al-Wuha shi e ai ed AQAP s e i  u til he as killed i  a Ju e  d o e st ike. He 
was succeeded by Qassim al-Raimi who had also been part of this prison escape.   
826 Je e  “ha p, Ye e : Ba kg ou d a d U.“. ‘elatio s , Congressional Research Service, 2015, p. 




A o di g to the DO“ s Coo di ato  fo  Cou te te o is  Da iel Be ja i , this 
attack marked a watershed in the War against al-Qaeda. As he put it, the U.S. could 
o lo ge  ou t o  [al-Qaeda s] affiliates to e fo used e lusively on the near 
enemy – the governments in their own countries – or American facilities in their 
i ediate su ou di gs .827  
 
The next broad phase of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen was set in 
motion by the Arab Spring. Inspired by the popular protests sweeping the Arab 
World, youth demonstrations took place th oughout Ye e  alli g fo  “aleh s 
abdication as president. As violence broke out in the capital Saana, military units loyal 
to the regime were recalled from their postings throughout the rest of the country. 
These actions produced large security vacuums which the AQAP affiliated group 
Ansar al-Sharia exploited to proclaim Islamic emirates within the southern 
governorates of Abyan and Shabwa.828 In May 2012, a combined Yemeni Army and 
militia offensive successfully pushed Ansaw al-Sharia out of these territories. 
Nevertheless, at this key juncture in the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in Yemen, Saleh abdicated his position as president as part of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) transitionary arrangement. In the single candidate 
election which followed, the former vice-president Abed Rabbo Mansour al Hadi was 
elected president. To international audiences, Hadi was quick to position himself as 
a less mercurial counterterrorism partner. He claimed to personally sign off on the 
increasing number of U.S. drone strikes in the country (more on this in the final 
section of this chapter).829 The modicum of stability which Hadi initially brought to 
Yemen was shattered by the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War in early 2014.  
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Following the collapse of the National Dialogue Conference - a condition of the GCC 
transitionary arrangement - the Houthis, allied with forces loyal to former President 
Saleh, wrested control of Saana in September 2014. Claiming to fear Iranian 
encroachment on its southern border, Saudi Arabia mobilised a coalition of Sunni 
po e s i ludi g the U ited A a  E i ates UAE  a d Bah ai  to ei stall Hadi s 
rule.830 Operation Decisive Storm - which within three weeks had rolled over into 
Operation Restoring Hope - began in March 2015. Much to the chagrin of human 
rights groups, the Obama administration provided extensive operational and 
logistical support to this operation. Hundreds of aerial refuelling sorties were flown 
to support coalition aircraft; Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and 
search and rescue operations were conducted; and the sale of billions of dollars in 
military hardware such as precision guided munitions, tanks and small arms was 
authorised.831 Whilst the Saudi-led coalition made some advances in the country 
du i g the e ai de  of O a a s p eside , it as u a le to full  dislodge the 
Houthis from Saana, let alone their tribal heartlands in north-eastern Yemen.832  
 
As Zimmerman has a gued, Ye e s i il a  has se u ed ea l  all of AQAP s 
immediate military o je ti es . 833  The Houthi and forces loyal to the former 
president Saleh, not AQAP, were the primary targets of Saudi military intervention. 
The lack of a recognised government through which to work with and through also 
impeded U.S. SFA efforts and drone operations in the country, the latter of which 
had resumed in 2011. 834  As the security situation in Yemen deteriorated, the 
American embassy in Sana'a was also closed and SOF personnel temporarily 
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evacuated. 835  The counterterrorism units which successive administrations had 
spent more than a decade training, equipping and advising were either diverted from 
fighting AQAP or disintegrated. Within this vacuum, much as how they had during 
the Arab Spring, AQAP made sweeping territorial gains throughout southern Yemen 
i ludi g the aptu e of the ou t s thi d la gest po t, Mukalla.836  
 
Bringing this brief chronological narrative of the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in Yemen to a close, three concluding points are worth making here to 
help contextualise my subsequent analysis of the means and goals of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. Fi st, the ollout of U.“. ou te te o is  
operations in Yemen was uneven, being largely driven by the deterioration of the 
security situation within the state. Two events were particularly significant in this 
regard: the 2011 Arab Spring and the 2015 Yemeni Civil War. AQAP exploited the 
instability which both events produced so as to exercise a loose suzerainty over large 
s athes of southe  Ye e . “e o d, o e so i  the de ade p io  to “aleh s 
abdication, the rollout of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the country was a 
highly negotiated process. As one 2005 diplomatic cable put it, Saleh was a high-
maintenance and highl  oppo tu isti  ope ato , o e ho sought to ala e 
domestic political equities while ensuring that he extract[ed] maximum benefit from 
the U.“. ead: aid  fo  his oope atio .837 Whilst Hadi would temporarily prove a 
more amenable counterterrorism partner, the military response to AQAP was again 
disrupted by the beginning of the Saudi led Operation Restoring Hope in March 2015. 
And third, whilst not discussed here, al-Qaeda also maintained an active presence in 
neighbouring Saudi Arabia during the early years of the War against al-Qaeda.838 Al-
Qaeda s e pulsio  f o  the ki gdo  follo i g a sustai ed ou te te o is  
a paig  as a sig ifi a t o t i uti g fa to  to AQAP s fou di g i  Ja ua  .  
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Re-examining the drivers of the Obama administration’s military response to 
AQAP 
 
Having outlined the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen during 
the War against AQAP, this chapter now turns its attention to exploring some of the 
alte ati e a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to the affiliate. 
As I can now document by addressing the first three questions of my structured-
focused comparison, AQAP did indeed directly threaten American national security. 
Nevertheless, there was more behind its attempts to conduct transnational terrorist 
attacks against the continental U.S. than just killing the greatest possible number of 
American citizens. Consistent with al-)a ahi i s st ateg  of a thousa d uts  outli ed 
in chapter 3, they were also intended to weaken the material foundation of American 
imperialism. Furthermore, as is also discussed, AQAP took deliberate aim at the 
reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors in the Arabian Peninsula, a key site 
of global energy security. 
 
AQAP s challenge to American and regional security 
 
AQAP as f a ed du i g O a a s p eside  as a  i ediate a d di e t th eat to 
American national security. During the three year period separating the claimed 
destruction of al-Qaeda s o e i  ea l   a d the egi i g of o at ope atio s 
against the Islamic State in late 2014, AQAP was singled out as the most threatening 
branch of the entire al-Qaeda movement. Speaking in 2011, director of the National 
Cou te te o is  Ce t e Mi hael E. Leite  i sisted that AQAP as p o a l  the 
most significant risk to the U.“. ho ela d . 839  The 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism similarly elevated AQAP to the ad i ist atio s ou te te o is  
p io it  i  the Gulf.840 Late i  O a a s p eside , the Department of Homeland 
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Security continued to stress that AQAP as the g oup ost likel  to atte pt 
t a s atio al atta ks agai st the U ited “tates .841 
 
Giving weight to these claims, AQAP made repeated attempts to conduct 
t a s atio al te o ist atta ks agai st the o ti e tal U.“. du i g O a a s 
presidency. The most well-documented of these efforts was Umar Farouk 
A dul utalla s failed Ch ist as Da  U de ea  Bo i g  of No th est Ai li es 
Flight 253 in 2009. Under the stewardship of the explosive expert Ibrahim Hassan al 
Asiri, the affiliate later targeted cargo planes flying to the U.S. in 2010 and 2012 (more 
on this below). In addition to these direct attacks against continental America, Anwar 
al Awlaki was also charged by U.S. defence officials with having liaised with Nidal 
Hasan, the U.S. Army Medical Corps psychiatrist responsible for the November 2009 
Fort Hood shootings which killed thirteen.842 On the basis of these attacks, Obama 
administration officials explained the goals of the military response to AQAP in terms 
of protecting U.S. national security. As one spokesman for the National Security 
Cou il lu tl  put it i  , the ad i ist atio  as pu sui g a fo used 
counterterrorism campaign in Yemen designed to prevent and deter terrorist plots 
that directly threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad . 843  From AQAP s 
perspective however, there was more animating its attacks against the continental 
U.S. than just terrorism. They were also informed by the al-Qaedas o e e t s 
larger strategy of economic warfare, the core tenets of which were outlined in 
chapter 3. 
 
Speaking on the twelfth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, Al-Zawahiri reiterated al-
Qaeda s o it e t to leed[i g] A e i a e o o i all   p o oki g it to 
o ti ue i  its assi e e pe ditu e o  its se u it .844 Rather than trying to replicate 
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the 9/11 attacks, al-Zawahiri alternatively proposed accomplishing this goal through 
a st ateg  of a thousa d uts : i  esse e, s alle  s ale - but more frequent - attacks 
intended to increase the financial costs of counterterrorism. The merits of this 
strategy were quickly adopted by AQAP. To i g do  A e i a , a  editio  of 
the affiliate s E glish la guage p opaga da agazi e Inspire e phasized, e do ot 
eed to st ike ig .845 ‘athe , the do u e t o ti ued, it is o e feasi le to stage 
smaller attacks that involve less players and less time to launch and thus we may 
i u e t the se u it  a ie s A e i a o ked so ha d to e e t . 846  AQAP s 
practical commitment to al-)a ahi i s st ateg  of a thousa d uts  is see  i  
Operation Hemorrhage, the 2010 attempt to blow up cargo aircraft operated by 
FedEx and UPS en route to the U.S.847 This attack had been deliberately planned to 
fo e the West to i stall st i ge t se u it  easu es suffi ie t e ough to stop ou  
explosive devices would add a heavy economic burden to an already faltering 
e o o .848 Put differently, the primary purpose of Operation Hemorrhage was not 
to kill the greatest possible number of American citizens in order to communicate 
the affiliate s politi al essage to a g oup e o d those directly attacked (the 
traditional understanding of terrorism). Rather, it was primarily intended to weaken 
the material foundations of American imperialism by increasing the financial costs of 
counterterrorism. As made clear in Inspire, [ ]e k e  that argo planes are staffed 
by only a pilot and a co-pilot so our objective was not to cause maximum casualties 
ut to ause a i u  losses to the A eri a  e o o .849 Beyond this commitment 
to al-)a ahi i s st ateg  of a thousa d uts , as I can now examine, AQAP actively 
contested the practices of American imperialism in other ways. It took aim at both 
the territorial integrity of the Yemeni state and the flow of Middle Eastern oil onto 
global markets. 
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AQAP s challenge to closed frontiers in the Arabian Peninsula 
 
AQAP s ulti ate lo g-term goal was to establish an Islamic caliphate covering the 
entire Arabian Peninsula. This required the affiliate to expel all American influence 
from the region as a precursor for overthrowing its principal ea  e e ies: the 
apostate  egi es i  ‘i adh, Mus at a d “a a'a.850 Prior to his abdication in late 
, “aleh s go e e t as si gled out ithi  AQAP s p opaga da ate ial fo  
particular criticism: 
 
[i]t is very difficult to imagine the level of degradation reached by the 
government of Yemen. It has no religion and no magnanimity or sense of 
honor; [it is] a state which has sold the lives of its sons to be harvested by the 
e e s issiles so that [“aleh] a  etai  po e . It has ea hed the lo est 
level of corruption.851 
 
To a o plish its st ategi  goals, AQAP pu sued a dual age da  th ough hi h it 
attempted to reconcile its global commitment to advancing al-Qaeda s o e st ategi  
aims with a local focus o  e eddi g itself ithi  Ye e s politi al a hite tu e.852 
To this end, the affiliate combined elements of a terrorist organisation that 
conducted transnational attacks against the continental U.S. with elements of an 
armed insurgency which captured and governed territory within Yemen. To this end, 
as Christopher Swift has argued, AQAP has p o e  e a ka l  adept at e o ili g 
the ideological dictates of global jihad with the practical realities of local 
i su ge .853  
 
Prior to the civil war, Yemen was widely discussed as a failing (if not as yet failed) 
state. Its cohesion was widely recognised to have been undermined by a series of 
socio-economic challenges. These included: (1) rapid population growth; (2) water 
scarcity; (3) economic recession and (4) a terminal decline in oil production, the 
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ou t s t aditio all  la gest sou e of e e ue.854 On a deeper level, the authority 
of the e t al go e e t as also u de i ed  the esse tiall  t i -t a k  ualit  
of politics within the country. Beyond Sana'a, the reach of the central government 
ran parallel to, and was often challenged by, more immediate tribal allegiances. In 
order to project its authority beyond major urban areas, the Saleh government 
o ple e ted its oe i e po e   o-opting, dividing, rewarding, or punishing 
t i al elites, a d ofte  pla i g oth e ds agai st the iddle .855 Indeed, as one 2007 
U.S. diplomatic cable put it, [f]o  e tu ies, Ye e 's e t al go e e ts ha e kept 
control over various regions through a complex system of tribal balancing, pay-outs, 
tu i g a li d e e to illi it a ti ities, a d o  o asio  ilita  fo e .856 Whilst the 
central government was theoretically capable of exercising its authority over the 
entire country, in practice, this required the co-option and support of key tribal 
figures.  
 
Consistent with its ultimate ambition of establishing an Islamic caliphate on the 
Arabian Peninsula, AQAP exploited the fragility of the Yemeni state in order to 
capture and in turn govern territory. In doing so, it actively contested the closed 
frontiers of the Yemeni state. Central to these efforts were Ansar al-Sharia (Partisans 
of Islamic Law). The purpose of this subsidiary was, speaking to the affiliate s dual 
age da , to e a le AQAP to pla e a lo al fa e  o  its ope atio s.857 These principles 
were put into practice in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. In May 2011, as 
government forces were withdrawn to Sana'a to contain the popular protests which 
had sprung up in the capital, Ansar al-Sharia declared Islamic emirates within the 
southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa. With an eye on winning the consent of 
the populations which it now came to govern, AQAP proceeded to provide basic 
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social services in the towns of Jaar, Shaqwa and Zanjibar.858 Wells were dug, pensions 
were created for the widowed families of its fighters and “ha i a courts were 
established to provide an efficient, if nevertheless brutal, judicial system.859 AQAP is 
also reported to have paid compensation to those killed by U.S. drone strikes, and 
provided food, water and electricity in areas which it controlled.860  
 
Whilst AQAP was forced out of this territory in May 2012, it resumed this experiment 
in governance on a larger scale during the Yemeni Civil War. Having made 
considerable headway in the Abyan, Shabwa and Hadramawt governorates, AQAP is 
estimated to have controlled around  kilo et es of the ou t s southe  
coastline by April 2016.861 Learning from its previous experiences in Abyan in 2011 
where its strict enforcement of “ha i a law had alienated much of the population, 
neither AQAP nor Ansar al-Sharia attempted to directly govern this territory. Instead, 
in the port city of Mukalla which it seized in April 2015, the Hadramawt National 
Council were installed to serve as their proxy. To this end, the affiliate is reported to 
have given the Hadramawt National Council $3.7 million in funding to provide for the 
i ediate eeds of the it s 500,000 population and pay for public salaries.862 In 
June 2017, the Sons of Hadramawt were designated as a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization by the DOS, one which AQAP was recognised to use in order help 
govern the territories it controls, and to manage issues such as administration, 
e o o i s, se u it , a d uildi g elatio ships ith itize s .863 After holding power 
in the city for almost a year, AQAP was squeezed out of Mukalla in April 2016 as 
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Yemeni and Emirati troops advanced on their position.864 According to one local 
eside t, speaki g to the su ess of the g oup s halle ge to the te ito ial i teg it  
of the Yemeni state, the Sons of Hadramawt a d AQAP s presence was missed:  
 
We view the [Hadramout National] Council positively, because it has 
a aged to o ti ue to pa  go e e t sala ies …. It has kept pu li  se i es 
at a u h ette  le el tha  hat is a aila le i  the est of the ou t  …. The 
AQAP judicial system is fair and swift and therefore preferred over the 
go e e t s o upt s ste . Ma  p o i e t ases that had li ge ed fo  
years were resolved in a single day.865 
  
AQAP s challenge to open-doors access in the Arabian Peninsula 
 
Yemen is the poorest state in the wider Gulf region. Its geographical location at the 
southern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, however, has meant that maintaining the 
state s sta ilit  has ee  a  i po ta t goal of A e i a  poli ake s. This o e  
can largely be explained in terms of global energy security. Yemen shares a porous 
land border with both Saudi Arabia and the Bab al Mandab maritime strait.866 As 
A tho  Co des a  has oted, hilst Ye e  has failed to match the strategic 
i po ta e of the Gulf  it is e e theless of g eat st ategi  i po ta e to the 
sta ilit  of “audi A a ia a d the A a ia  Pe i sula .867  
 
The strait of Bab al Mandab is the eighteen-mile-long waterway which separates 
Yemen from Djibouti on the Horn of Africa. This chokepoint connects the 
Mediterranean Sea (and thus Europe) with the Indian Ocean via the Suez canal.868 
According to the Energy Information Administration (EIA), more than 4.8 million of 
barrels of oil and refined petroleum travelled through the Bab al Mandab daily in 
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2016. 869  Whilst its closure would neither eliminate this entire trade nor be as 
disruptive to the global economy as the closure of the nearby Strait of Hormuz,870 it 
would nevertheless exert a strong inflationary pressure on global oil prices. As 
explained by the EIA, the [c]losure of the Bab el-Mandeb could keep tankers from 
the Persian Gulf from reaching the Suez Canal or SUMED [Suez-Mediterranean] 
Pipeline, diverting them around the southern tip of Africa, adding to transit time and 
ost .871  
 
The importance of maintaining unfettered access to Saudi oil for both the stability of 
the global economy and American primacy has been well documented.872 Holding 
approximately 16% of global oil reserves, Saudi Arabia has historically served as the 
producer of last resort, picking up the slack in global energy supply when production 
has been disrupted elsewhere.873 Whilst the Shale Gas revolution led to a significant 
fall i  the ki gdo s oil e po ts to the U.“., as of , “audi A a ia e ai ed the 
largest exporter of crude oil and petroleum products globally.874 With 69 per cent of 
these exports destined for Asia, the kingdom has remained a key prop of the dual 
logic of American power.875 
 
As I discussed in chapter three, disrupting Middle Eastern oil production emerged as 
a component of al-Qaeda s st ateg  i  the ea s afte  / . “peaki g i  September 
2005, Ayman al-)a ahi i all[ed] upo  the Mujahideen to focus their attacks on the 
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stole  oil of the Musli  … to sa e this esou e fo  the sake of the Musli  atio .876 
As atalogued  Tukáš Ti h  a d Ja  Ei hle , al-Qaeda pursued four different 
avenues for accomplishing this goal: (1) attacking oil production, transportation, and 
storage sites; (2) killing, or take hostage, the employees of oil companies; (3) gaining 
control over oil production, transportation, and storage sites to fund its own 
operations; and (4) targeting oil tankers during their transit in maritime choke-
points.877 Over the course of the War against al-Qaeda, AQAP and its immediate 
predecessors (al-Qaeda in Yemen and al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia) pursued several of 
these channels to contest the material foundations of American imperialism.  
 
Al-Qaeda s fi st a d to date o l  ajo  atta k agai st oil p odu tio , t a spo tatio  
and storage sites within Saudi Arabia came in February 2006. This took the form of 
an attempted suicide bomb attack against the Abqaiq oil facility which is responsible 
fo  half of the ki gdo s e ti e oil e po ts. 878  Whilst this attack was ultimately 
unsuccessful, it nevertheless led to a $1.20 a barrel jump in the global cost of oil. 879 
A successful attack against either the Abqaiq Oil Processing centre or the Ras Tanura 
Oil exporting terminal would cause an immediate spike in global oil prices, speaking 
to the importance of maintaining the internal stability of the Saudi state to global 
energy security.880 Within Yemen, where oil production is of an order of magnitude 
lower than in Saudi Arabia, AQAP wrestled control over oil production, 
transportation and storage sites during the Civil War. The affiliate went as far as to 
unsuccessfully negotiate a profit-sharing agreement with the Yemeni government to 
export oil in 2016.881 AQAP proposed to pocket 25 per cent of the profits of oil 
exports, with the remaining 75 per cent going to the government.882 
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In its public statements, al-Qaeda also displayed a sophisticated understanding of the 
importance of maintaining the openness of key maritime chokepoints to the stability 
of the global economy. As was noted in a 2014 edition of al-Qaeda s E glish-language 
propaganda magazine Resurgence: 
 
[a]pp o i atel  % of the o ld s t aded a go is t a spo ted  sea; hile 
% of the o ld s oil is transported by a few thousand slow-moving tankers 
that are cumbersome to navigate and difficult to protect. Transporting oil 
from refineries to the service station depends on a complex system involving 
oil terminals, pipelines, oil tankers and trucks. The energy umbilical cord 
which sustains western economies stretches across hundreds of miles of 
pipelines and sea lanes. It represents the Achilles heel not just of the energy 
market, but also of western economies dependant on oil from the Muslim 
world.883 
 
Disrupting the flow of petrol onto global markets, they maintained, would destabilise 
the global economy by increasing the insurance premiums of tankers. Such an action 
ould, i  tu , ake the theft of ou  pet oleu  esou es a  e pe si e e tu e fo  
the West .884 Whilst the i e se st ategi  i po ta e  of the “t ait of Ho uz as 
discussed in detail throughout this document, attention was also given to the strait 
of Bab al Mandab.885  Al-Qaeda militants had attacked the French oil tanker MV 
Limburg whilst it was in transit in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002. As al-Qaeda 
predicted, this led to a temporary increase in global oil prices and insurance 
premiums.886 The possibility that AQAP would resume such activities as it expanded 
alo g Ye e s southe  oastline during the Civil War was openly acknowledged by 
DOD officials. Speaking in 2016, Captain William Nault who was the Chief of Staff with 
the multinational Combined Maritime Forces, tasked with maintaining stability in 
International Waters, noted that the th eat ould e agai st a soft ta get ea i g 
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an industry ship passing or going in and out of [...] the Red Sea towards the eastern 
e d of Ye e .887  
 
In summary, whilst AQAP did indeed attempt to conduct large-scale attacks against 
the o ti e tal U.“. e.g. the  U de ea  o i g , it also took deli e ate ai  
at the material pillar and practices of U.S. imperialism. Consistent with al-)a ahi i s 
strategy of a 'thousand cuts' outlined in chapter 3, this logic clearly informed 
Ope atio  He o hage . Coupled ith the halle ge AQAP p ese ted to the 
reproduction of closed frontiers and open doors in the Arabian Peninsula, the 
ad i ist atio s lai  to only e pu sui g a fo used ou te te o is  a paig  i  
Yemen designed to prevent and deter terrorist plots that directly threaten U.S. 
i te ests at ho e a d a oad  should thus e ualified.888 When situated within a 
ide  stud  of oth AQAP s o  st ategy and the historical practices of U.S. 
imperialism in the global south, political economy considerations can also be 
theo ised to ha e at least pa tiall  a i ated the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to the affiliate.  
 
Re-examining the means of the Obama administration’s military response to 
AQAP 
 
The first section of this chapter examined the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations against AQAP over the War against al-Qaeda. Building on this foundation, 
I then continued to outline the political economy animators of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to the affiliate. T i g these th eads togethe , the 
third and final section of this chapter turns its attention to the means of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. The nascent literature on U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in Yemen has been punctuated by the drone-centrism 
hi h I a gued i  hapte   has ha a te ised u h of the la ge  stud  of O a a s 
counterterrorism policy: the essentialization of a single technological development 
                                                          
887 Jonatha  “aul, Al Qaeda i  Ye e  Poses G o i g Th eat to “hippi g: Na al Fo e , Reuters, 2016 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-qaeda-idUSKCN0XV1WV> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 




(drones) and a single practice of U.S. statecraft (targeted killings).889 My aim in the 
remainder of this chapter is to outline and theorise the central role of SFA 
programmes ithi  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  response to AQAP. I begin 
this analysis by addressing the fourth question of my structured-focused comparison: 
what was the role of drone-lau hed ta geted killi gs i  the O a a ad i ist atio s 




During a September 2009 meeting with then Deputy National Security Advisor John 
Brennan, President Saleh offered the Obama administration unfettered access to 
Ye e 's atio al te ito  fo  U.“. ou te te o is  ope atio s .890 JSOC is reported 
to have begun a limited campaign of airstrikes against AQAP shortly thereafter. This 
included the abortive December 2009 Tomahawk cruise missile strike at al-Majalah, 
which Human Rights Watch estimated killed at least 41 civilians. 891  Despite the 
opposition that the al-Majalah strike generated throughout Yemeni civil society, 
Saleh did not withdraw his consent for future airstrikes.892 He instead pledged to 
o ti ue sa i g the o s a e ou s, ot ou s , a d did ot o je t to Ge e al 
Pet aeus  late  p oposal to ha e fi ed wing U.S. aircraft, not cruise missiles, conduct 
future strikes against AQAP.893 J“OC s fi st drone strike in the country reportedly 
came in May 2010.894 The o a d s la k of esou es fo  this a paig , oupled 
                                                          
889 See Terrill; Hudson, Owens, and Callen. 
890  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a, B e a -“aleh Meeti g  
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SANAA1669_a.html> [accessed 12 November 2017]. 
891 Hu a  ‘ights Wat h, Bet ee  A D o e A d Al-Qaeda : The Ci ilia  Cost of US Targeted Killings 
i  Ye e , Human Rights Watch, 2013 
<https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/yemen1013_ForUpload_1.pdf> [accessed 10 
October 2017]. 
892 Du i g a Ja ua   eeti g ith Ge e al Da id Pet aeus, “aleh p aised  the st ike at al-
Majalah. Whilst he acknowledged that "mistakes were made" and that civilians had been killed, he 
i sisted that it had al ead  aused al-Qaeda operatives to turn themselves in to authorities and 
residents in affected areas to deny refuge to al-Qaeda . Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a. 
Ge e al Pet aeus  Meeti g With “aleh O  “e u it  Assista e, AQAP “t ikes ,  Ja ua  .  
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10SANAA4_a.html> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
893  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a. Ge e al Pet aeus  Meeti g With “aleh O  “e u it  
Assista e, AQAP “t ikes ,  Ja ua  .  
894 This st ike at Wadi A ida is suspe ted to ha e killed fi e i ilia s i ludi g the p o i e s deput  
governor, Jaber al-Shabwani, who had been attempting to mediate between the Yemeni government 




with the failure to kill the American cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki, reportedly led Obama to 
authorise the CIA to run a parallel drone campaign against AQAP based around the 
model of operations that it had pioneered in Pakistan from June 2011 onward.895 
Thereafter, both the CIA and JSOC are reported to have ran parallel drone operations 
in the country, sharing intelligence but maintaining separate kill lists.896 According to 
later reporting, all JSOC drone strikes would be temporarily suspended in 2014 
following a succession of botched operations that had killed an unacceptably high 
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distrust-of-government-and-u-s-idUSTRE69Q36520101027?pageNumber=1> [accessed 10 October 
2017]. 
895 Scott Shane, Objective Troy: A Terrorist, a President, and the Rise of the Drone (London: Bantam 
Books Inc, 2015), p. 285. See also G eg Mille , CIA to Ope ate D o es o e  Ye e , Washington Post, 
2011 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/cia-to-operate-drones-over-
yemen/2011/06/13/AG7VyyTH_story.html?utm_term=.c67f4d429d8f> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
896 G eg Mille , U de  O a a, a  E e gi g Glo al Appa atus fo  D o e Killi g , The Washington Post, 
2011 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/under-obama-an-emerging-
global-apparatus-for-drone-killing/2011/12/13/gIQANPdILP_story.html?utm_term=.1865b75e61c0> 
[accessed 11 April 2018]. 
897 Ma k Mazzetti, Dela s i  Effo t to ‘efo us CIA f o  D o e Wa , The New York Times, 2014 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/world/delays-in-effort-to-refocus-cia-from-drone-
war.html?mtrref=undefined&assetType=nyt_now&mtrref=www.nytimes.com&gwh=E21317703ACC
B227717D22FE9232B4C6&gwt=pay&assetType=nyt_now> [accessed 10 October 2017]. A 2013 
e ie  o du ted  the DOD s I tellige e, “u eilla e, a d ‘e o aissa e Task Fo e shed lights 
on the inner working on Task Force 48- s d o e ope atio s i  oth Ye e  a d “o alia du i g this 
period. This can help partially explain the high number of civilian casualties generated by drone strikes 
in both countries. Drone coverage in both countries was patchy, limiting the pace of drone strikes in 
both states. This was a consequence of both the general shortage of armed drones available to 
regional pa t e s a d the t a  of dista e  p odu ed  the  kilo et e dista e f o  J“OC s 
primary base at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti and southern Yemen on the other. Je e  “ ahill, The 
Assassi atio  Co ple , The Intercept, 2016 <https://theintercept.com/drone-papers/the-
assassination-comple /> [a essed  Ap il ]; “ all Footp i t Ope atio s / , The Intercept, 
2015 <https://theintercept.com/document/2015/10/15/small-footprint-operations-2-13/#page-1> 








O e  the ou se of O a a s p eside , a total of  d o e st ikes a e epo ted to 
have been conducted in Yemen. As illustrated in figure 5.1, this was in addition to 16 
other airstrikes. These strikes were concentrated in the southern Abyan, Shabwah, 
and the Al Ba da go e o ates. Coi idi g ith the Ye e i A s ou te  offe si e 
to push AQAP out of the Islamic emirates it had carved out in the south of the 
country, 2012 was the peak year of drone strikes in the country (47). The pace of 
drone strikes fell in the following years to 24 in 2013 and 15 in 2015, before rising 
sha pl  agai  i  the last ea  of O a a s p eside  as AQAP ade i oads agai st 
the backdrop of the Yemeni Civil War. To put the scale of their use into some 
perspective, over the cou se of O a a s e ti e p eside , a total of  d o e 
strikes are reported in Yemen, more than any other state outside Afghanistan and 
Iraq besides Pakistan (353).899 
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In total, three different types of drone strikes were reported in Yemen as part of the 
milita  espo se to AQAP. The fi st e e ta geted st ikes agai st high- alue  AQAP 
operatives. These operations, conducted by both the CIA and JSOC, sought to 
de apitate AQAP s leade ship, hilst also dis upti g the affiliate s ope atio al 
planning and cohesion.900  O e  the ou se of O a a s p eside , a u e  of 
prominent AQAP figures are suspected to have been killed in such operations. The 
most well documented of these were the two strikes in 2011 which killed Anwar Al-
Awlaki and his sixteen-year-old son Abdulrahman.901 These operations, criticised by 
some as extrajudicial killings,902 sparked considerable public debate about the limits 
of presidential power, forcing the administration to release a redacted version of the 
legal memo justifying the killing of American citizens abroad. 903  Speaking to the 
drone-centrism of the overarching de ate o  the ea s of O a a s 
counterterrorism policy, they were also held up as evidence of the president having 
de isi el  e a ed the d o e, alo g ith s all-scale lightning raids like the one 
that killed Osama bin Laden in May [2011], as the future of the fight against terrorist 
networks .904 Modelled on the template pioneered by the CIA in Pakistan, a second 
type of drone strike was also conducted as part of the military response to AQAP. 
These sig atu e st ikes  e e i te ded to dest o , allegedl , da ge ous  patte s of 
behaviour displayed by military aged males.905 I  doi g so, the  aimed at wiping out 
a layer of [AQAP] lower- a ki g ope ati es .906 Whilst heavily criticised by multiple 
Human Rights groups, they were justified by the administration on the basis that 
those targeted presented an imminent threat to the American military personnel, 
                                                          
900 Hudson, Owens, and Callen, p. 150. 
901 Beside Anwar al-Awlaki, these are reported to have included Fahd al-Quso (who was suspected of 
involvement in both the 2000 attack on the USS Cole), Said al-Shihri (AQAP Deputy Emir) and Nasser 
al-Wuhayshi (AQAP emir). See Shane. 
902  Mi hael ‘at e , A a  Al-A laki s E t ajudi ial Mu de , The Guardian, 2011 
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/sep/30/anwar-awlaki-
extrajudicial-murder> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
903  )eke Mille , He e s the “e et Me o That Justified Anwar Al-A laki Killi g , TIME, 2014 
<http://time.com/2912137/memo-anwar-al-awlaki-doj-drone/> [accessed 10 October 2017].  
904 Emphasis added. “ ott “ha e a d Tho  “ha ke , “t ike ‘efle ts U.“. “hift to D o es i  Te o  Fight , 
The New York Times, 2011 <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/world/awlaki-strike-shows-us-
shift-to-drones-in-terror-fight.html> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
905 Becker and Shane. 




intelligence officers and PMSC operating in the country. 907 The third, and least 
common use of drone strikes in the campaign against AQAP, was to provide close 
air support to Yemeni ground forces. This occurred in 2012 when the Yemeni Army 
attempted to dislodge AQAP from the territory it had come to control within the 
southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa.908  
 
In summary, drone strikes were indeed a distinctive and important component of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. The  e e used to ot o l  
de apitate AQAP s se io  leade ship, ut ta get the affiliates' id-to-low level 
operatives.909 Nevertheless, as I can now document by answering the fifth and sixth 
questions of my structured-focused comparison, they are best conceived as having 
formed a constituent part of a small-footprint approach to counterterrorism which, 




Consistent with the historical exercise of U.S. imperialism through, rather than 
above, states in the global south, Obama publicly ruled out the prospect of sending 
conventional American ground forces to the country early in his presidency. 910 
I stead, the U.“.  ilita  footp i t o  the g ou d i  Ye e  as li ited to a s all 
SOF presence. As was noted in the first section of this chapter, SOF were active in a 
train, advise and assist capacity from the early years of the War against al-Qaeda. 
Du i g O a a s p eside , se e al doze  J“OC ope ati es e e epo tedl  se t to 
Yemen in 2010 to help facilitate the expansion of counterterrorism operations 
agai st AQAP. A o di g to o e se io  O a a ad i ist atio  offi ial, U.S. military 
                                                          
907 According to a 2014 estimated produced by the human-rights group Reprieve, the targeting of 
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teams and intelligence agencies are deeply involved in secret joint operations with 
Yemeni troops who in the past six weeks have killed scores of people .911 Despite 
reported pressure from JSOC commander General McRaven for his unit to begin 
conducting unilateral kill/capture raids against AQAP, this request was denied.912 
J“OC ope ati es ould i stead e est i ted du i g the ajo it  of O a a s 
presidency to a training and advisory capacity. Here, they worked alongside, but not 
in front of, their Yemeni counterparts. Whilst they were reportedly authorised to 
accompany Yemeni SOF on raids against AQAP cells, their rules of engagement 
p ohi ited the  f o  e gagi g lose  tha  the last positio  of o e .913 Running 
parallel to these efforts, JSOC is also reported to have provided large amounts of 
intelligence and operational support to their Yemeni counterparts including, at one 
stage, from a Joint Special Operations Command Centre run from the outskirts of 
Saana.914 O  this asis, hilst the  e e la gel  est i ted to o du ti g hite  “OF 
operations for the majority of his presidency, JSOC nonetheless played an important 
au ilia  ole i  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP.  
 
Whilst Saudi coalition partners such as the UAE relied heavily on PMSC as part of their 
intervention in the Yemeni Civil War, the lack of media reporting on American PMSC 
activity within Yemen suggests that they were allocated a less direct role than in the 
military response to al-Shabaab (chapter 6) and AQIM (chapter 7).915 Consistent with 
the different uses of military consulting firms and military support firms outlined in 
chapter 4 however, they were likely used in a number of more indirect capacities to 
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912 Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA, a Secret Army, and a War at the Ends of the Earth, p. 86. 
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2014 <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/world/middleeast/hostage-luke-somers-is-killed-in-
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918 Greg Mille , U.“. D o e Ta gets i  Ye e  ‘aise Questio s . 
914 G eg Mille , U.“. D o e Ta gets i  Ye e  ‘aise Questio s . 
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Fight , The New York Times, 2015 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/26/world/middleeast/emirates-secretly-sends-colombian-




support combat operations in Yemen. These would have likely included providing 
logistical support and management services, intelligence analysis, and drone 
maintenance and operations.  
 
Military Assistance  
 
‘u i g pa allel to the CIA s a d J“OC s o e t d o e ope atio s i  Yemen was a 
larger, more persistent effort to train, equip and advise indigenous security forces to 
conduct counterterrorism operations. The 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy 
outli ed the O a a ad i ist atio s o it e t to uildi g the apa it  of 
Yemeni security services so they are able eventually to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat 
AQAP with only limited U.S. involvement .916 This sentiment was reiterated by then 
Defence Secretary Leon Panetta in 2012 when he emphasised that:   
 
[b]y training local security forces, we are building and training a 
counterterrorism force poised to be the most effective over the long term. 
And that force is the Yemenis themselves. And by participating in joint efforts 
against key leaders, and key operatives, we have put unprecedented pressure 
on AQAP, and given the Yemeni people an opportunity to free themselves 
from the grip of these terrorists.917 
 
The lo g-te  attle agai st AQAP i  Ye e  ust , Joh  B e a  si ila l  
e a ked a ou d this pe iod, e fought [si ] - fought and won by Yemenis .918 To 
this e d, the ad i ist atio  as o ki g to a d empowering the Yemenis [sic] with 
the tools they need to conduct precise intelligence-driven operations to locate 
ope ati es a d dis upt plots .919 
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In total, Yemen was obligated around $662 million in bilateral military assistance 
between FY2009 and FY2016. 920  This was despite almost all military assistance, 
a o di g to the “e u it  Assista e Mo ito s data ase, ei g suspe ded i  FY , 
FY 2015 and FY 2016 due to the political instability within the country. As pointed out 
by the GAO, the bulk of these funds were obligated via two SFA authorities - the 
Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) - and one security assistance programme, Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF).921 The bulk of the latter assistance ($94.3 million in total) 
as used to se i e agi g a d outdated e uip e t ,922 with some of it also being 
allocated to help maintain the newer military equipment transferred via the Section 
1206 and Section 1207 (n) authorities.923 
 
Figure 11: Military assistance obligations to Yemen, FY 2009-2016.924 
 
Authority Obligation (in millions $) 
Section 1206 $375.5  
Section 1207(n) $112.2  
FMF $94.3  
 
Provided below is a detailed breakdown of some of the specific military equipment 
and training programmes which were obligated Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 
fu di g du i g O a a s p eside . These shed light o  the politi al e o o  logi  
which partiall  a i ated the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. 
 
Section 1206 assistance  
 
Between FY 2009 and FY 2016 Yemen was obligated $375.5 million in Section 1206 
funding.925  As noted by the Congressional Research Service (CRS), this authority 
                                                          
920 “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Ye e , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
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922 Jeremy Sharp, p. 27. 
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e a e the ajo  sou e of o e t U.“. ilita  aid to Ye e . 926  The primary 
pu pose of “e tio   assista e as to uild the apa it  of Ye e s se u it  
forces to conduct counterterrorism operations throughout the country. 927  Funds 
were used to purchase a range of tactical military equipment. This included 
ammunition, Global Position Systems, radios, surveillance cameras, night vision 
goggles and small-arms. On a larger scale, Section 1206 funds were also obligated to 
purchase four Huey II helicopters, a CASA CN-235 transport aircraft, ISR aircraft and 
tactical reconnaissance drones.928 This equipment was intended to build the capacity 
of Ye e s se u it  fo es i  fou  ke  a eas:  ai lift;  o de / a iti e se u it ; 
(3) ISR and (4) SOF.929  
 
Airlift: The Yemeni Air Force (YAF) was a major recipient of Section 1206 
assista e. The si gle la gest “e tio   p oje t fu ded du i g O a a s 
presidency, the FY 2010 Rotary-Wing Medium Lift project ($82.8 million), 
ai ed to uild the apa it  of Ye e s atio al military forces to conduct 
counterterrorism operations by providing equipment and training to increase 
Ye e s ota - i g ediu  lift apa ilit .930 It funded the transfer of four 
Huey II transport helicopters. The Fixed Wing Tactical Heavy Lift programme, 
also authorised in FY 2010, allocated $38 million to strengthen the 
ope atio al ea h a d ea tio  ti e of ou te te o is  fo es . 931  It 
funded the purchase of a CASA CN-235 transport aircraft capable of carrying 
50 troops. The FY 2012 Fixed-Wing Capability ($23.4 million) project was 
i te ded to e ha e the ope atio al ea h of Ye e s ou te te o is  
forces, and funded the purchase of two short take-off and landing aircraft.932 
 
Border and maritime security: Two projects were authorised in FY2009 to 
build the apa it  of Ye e s se u it  fo es to ette  poli e thei  la d a d 
maritime borders: the Counterterrorism Initiative for Increased Border 
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Security ($25.4 million) and the Coast Guard Patrol Maritime Security 
Counterterrorism Initiative ($30.1 million).933 Building on these efforts, the 
$47.3 million Integrated Border and Maritime Security project was authorised 
in FY 2013. This programme ai ed to uild the apa it  of Ye e s atio al 
military forces and maritime security forces to conduct operations by 
providing training and equipment for integrated, real-time, air, ground, and 
a al ope atio s alo g thei  o de s .934 
 
ISR: In FY 2009, $5.9 million was allocated via the Aerial Surveillance 
Cou te te o is  I itiati e to p o ide the YAF s e isti g fleet of heli opte s 
with spare parts and surveillance cameras. Two follow up projects were 
authorised in FY 2014: the Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Capability ($17.5 
million) and the Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Aircraft ($46.5 
million). Taken together, these two programmes ai ed to uild Ye e s 
counterterrorism capability by enhancing their capacity to track and locate 
AQAP militants.935  
 
SOF: $34.5 million was appropriated in FY 2010 for the Special Operations 
Fo es Cou te te o is  E ha e e t p oje t i te ded to i p o e the 
ta ti al effe ti e ess of the Ye e i “OF .936 The u it s attlefield a a e ess, 
communication, survivability, and tactical proficiency was to be enhanced via 
the transfer of a range of military equipment including ammunition, night 
vision googles, vehicles and weapons.937 These efforts were supplemented in 
FY 2012 by a further $14 million in funding for the SOF Counterterrorism 
Enchantment project. This funded the purchase of more specialised 
equipment for the Yemeni SOF including radios, global positioning systems, 
rigid hull inflatable boats, clothing and individual solider equipment.938 
 
Section 1207(n) assistance 
 
Yemen was also obligated $112.2 million in Section 1207(n) assistance during 
O a a s p eside . These fu ds e e i te ded to help e ha e the a ilit  of 
Ye e s Mi ist  of I te io  Cou te  Te o is  Fo es to o du t ou te te orism 
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ope atio s  p o idi g e uip e t, i o  ilita  o st u tio , a d t ai i g .939 
The Ministry of Interior Counterterrorism Enhancement package, funded to the tune 
of $75 million in FY2012, was the largest single project funded via the Section 1207(n) 
authority. This project aimed to build the capacity of the Ministry of Interior 
Counterterrorism Forces to conduct military operations outside of the capital Sana'a. 
To this end, funds were obligated to purchase a range of military equipment including 
ammunition, night vision goggles, RAVEN drones, and vehicles.940  
 
Whilst these activities were disrupted by the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War, as 
noted earlier in this chapter, one of the core assumptions underpinning my empirical 
analysis is that studying some of the exact military equipment and training 
programmes obligated via SFA authorities can give us a richer understanding of the 
goals animating U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Working from this assumption, the SFA funds obligated to Yemeni security forces to 
AQAP can be theorised as having worked to accomplish more than just 
counterterrorism. They also helped build the capacity of indigenous security forces 
to armour the reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors within the Arabian 
Peninsula.  
 
The eed to de elop the apa it  of the ou t s se u it  fo es to fi d, fix and strike 
AQAP cells within Ye e  had ee  ide tified p io  to O a a s ele tio . As as spelt 
out in a May 2007 diplomatic cable sent by then U.S. ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski, 
Ye e  as u a le to deploy its forces quickly, securely, and reliably to all four 
corners of its territory to extend the rule of law over ungoverned spaces, and deter 
te o ist ope atio s .941 This as due i  la ge pa t, the a le o ti ued, to a lack of 
secure and reliable mobility, no aerial reconnaissance capability, and an MOD staff 
                                                          
939 Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, A tio s Needed to I p o e O e sight of E e ge  Food Aid 
a d Assess “e u it  Assista e , Goverment Accountability Office, 2013, p. 34 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/653163.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
940  Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, Ye en: DOD Should Improve Accuracy of Its Data on 
Co g essio al Clea a e of P oje ts as It ‘ee aluates Cou te te o is  Assista e , p. . 
941 Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a. ‘espo di g To Potus Di e ti e: T a spo t A d T ai i g: 




that has little a ilit  to ai tai  e uip e t a d ehi les that e do ate . 942 
Consistent with these recognised shortcomings, Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) 
programmes focused on improving the ai lift, I“‘ a d “OF apa it  of Ye e s 
security forces. Tellingly, these programmes worked to build the capacity of the 
ou t s se u it  fo es to st e gthe  the defe e of Ye e s la d a d a iti e 
borders from internal - not external - challengers. The FY 2009 Aerial Surveillance 
counterterrorism initiative funded to the tune of $5.9 million, for example, was 
spe ifi all  desig ed to uild the apa it  of the Ye e i Ai  Fo e to o du t 
counterterrorism operations by providing aerial surveillance capability for internal 
stability and combating terrorism within and at its borders .943  The Coast Guard 
Patrol Maritime Security Counterterrorism Initiative, which was also obligated $30.1 
illio  i  FY , si ila l  ai ed to e ha e the Ye e i Coast Gua d s apa it  to 
provide internal stability and counterterrorism within its territorial waters .944  In 
o tai i g AQAP s a ti ities ithi  a d at Ye e s o de s, these “FA programmes 
worked to bottle up instability within the state, thus preventing it from spilling out 
to threaten the American states' more significant imperial interests elsewhere in the 
Gulf. When theorised as a central mechanism through which American policymakers 
have attempted to stabilise preferred political economies in the global south, the 
programmes obligated via the Section 1206 and Section 1207(n) authorities can thus 
be understood to have had twin purposes. They worked to contain the threat which 
AQAP presented to both U.S. national security and the material foundation and 




The primary aim of this chapter was to open-up the existing debate on the means 
a d a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. Withi  the 
                                                          
942 Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: “ANAA _a. ‘espo di g To Potus Di e ti e: T a spo t A d T aining: 
Ho  To Help The Ye e is .  Ma  .  
943 Emphasis added. Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, Ye e : DOD “hould I p o e A u a  of Its 
Data on Congressional Clearance of Projects as It Reevaluates Cou te te o is  Assista e , p. . 
944 Emphasis added. Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, Ye e : DOD “hould Improve Accuracy of Its 




o te t of this thesis  structured-focused comparison of American counterterrorism 
ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s p eside , this ase 
holds a particular significance. Not only was the affiliate held up at points by Obama 
administration officials as the most threatening branch of the entire al-Qaeda 
movement, but more drone strikes were reported in Yemen than in any state where 
the U.S. was 'not at war', apart from Pakistan. As outlined in the first section of this 
chapter, the evolution of American counterterrorism operations in Yemen after 9/11 
was uneven. P io  to “aleh s a di atio  a d the Ye e i Ci il Wa , the t o p i a  
catalysts for their expansion, it was a largely negotiated process. As the security 
situation in the country deteriorated against the backdrop of the Saudi-led 
intervention, AQAP was able to make sweeping territorial gains as U.S. 
counterterrorism operations were dislocated. 
 
The second section of this chapter drew out the political economy animators of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. Th oughout O a a s p eside , 
the affiliate was consistently framed by American policymakers as directly 
threatening American national security. Nevertheless, as was documented by 
broadening the study of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen to include a 
g eate  fo us o  AQAP s a tio s a d i te tio s, the e as o e a i ati g the 
affiliate s attempts to conduct transnational terrorist attacks against the continental 
U.S. than just terrorism. Consistent with al-)a ahi i s st ateg  of a thousa d uts , 
Operation Hemorrhage - the 2010 attack on cargo aircraft flying to the U.S.- was 
explicitly intended to weaken the material foundations of American power by 
increasing the financial costs of counterterrorism. AQAP also actively contested the 
practices of American imperialism in and around the Arabian Peninsula through two 
channels: contesting the territorial integrity of the Yemeni state and attempting to 
disrupt open-doo  a ess to the egio s o side a le e e g  esou es. 
 
The third and final section of this chapter moved beyond the drone-centrism of the 
existing IR and U.S. foreign policy literatures to advance a richer understanding of the 
ea s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP. Whilst d o e 




operations in Yemen, they were shown to have formed a consistent part of the small-
footprint approach to counterterrorism which I outlined in chapter 4. The focus of 
the Obama administratio s ilita  espo se to AQAP as the use of “FA 
programmes to help Yemeni security forces better maintain internal order and 
strengthen border security. In doing so, this assistance can be read as having worked 
to armour the reproduction of closed frontiers and open doors in the Arabian 
Peninsula, an important site of American imperialism. Similar processes, as can now 
e e a i ed, also i fo ed the ea s a d a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s 








Re-examining the means and drivers of the Obama administration’s 




This chapter continues my structured-focused comparison of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates. My focus now 
turns to the Somali based Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (hereafter shortened to 
al-“ha aa . This ase holds a pa ti ula  sig ifi a e ithi  this thesis  itical re-
examination of the means and drivers of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afgha ista  a d I a . F o  its i eptio , the ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
“ha aa  suffe ed f o  a o e te sio : [ ]hile the U ited “tates has sig ificantly 
stepped up clandestine operations in Pakistan and Yemen, American officials 
[remained] deeply worried about Somalia but cannot agree on the risks versus the 
e a ds of es alati g ilita  st ikes he e .945 Speaking in September 2014, Obama 
would nevertheless hold up the model of counterterrorism pioneered in Somalia as 
a template which could be replicated in the fight against the Islamic State.946 This 
se ti e t has ee  eite ated  othe s ho ha e a gued that the a paig  as a 
blueprint for warfare that President Obama has embraced and will pass along to his 
su esso .947 In short, the military response to al-Shabaab has been recognised by 
both the president and commentators alike as an important counterterrorism 
campaign outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst it shared several similarities with 
the military response to AQAP, counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab were 
distinguished by both their context (the affiliate did not attempt to conduct a large 
scale transnational attack against the U.S.) and their execution (how the small-
                                                          
945 Jeffrey Gettleman, Mark Mazzetti, and E i  “ h itt, U.“. ‘elies o  Co t a to s i  “o alia Co fli t , 
The New York Times, 2011 <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/11/world/africa/11somalia.html> 
[accessed 11 May 2018]. 
946 O a a, T a s ipt: P eside t O a a s “pee h o  Co ati g I“I“ a d Te o is . 
947 Ma k Mazzetti, Jeff e  Gettle a , a d E i  “ h itt, I  “o alia, U.“. Es alates a “hado  Wa , The 
New York Times, 2016 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/16/world/africa/obama-somalia-secret-
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footprint approach to counterterrorism was configured).948 The inclusion of this case 
as part of my structured-focused comparison thus allows for a richer study of the 





The first section of this chapter provides key empirical context for my subsequent re-
e a i atio  of the ea s a d d i e s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Shabaab. This takes the form of a brief chronological narrative of the 
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia over the course of the War 
against al-Qaeda. A o e pa t of this soaki g a d poki g  is to outli e the ph si al 
and bureaucratic architecture put in place by the Bush administration to conduct 
counterterrorism operations within the state. This requires me to contextualise the 
creation of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa in 2002 and, more 
importantly, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in 2007. Al-“ha aa s 
rise to become the st o gest, est o ga ised, est fi a ed a d est a ed ilita  
g oup o t olli g the la gest st et h of te ito  i  southe  “o alia  afte  its 
breakaway from Al-Ittihad Al-Isla i is also t a ed, alo gside ho  the affiliate s 
strategy within and beyond the state evolved during this period.949 
 
The second section of this chapter draws out the political economy animators of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab. Unlike AQAP, al-Shabaab 
was not committed to conducting large-scale transnational terrorist attacks against 
the continental U.S. It instead focused on attacking AMISOM contributing states 
within its immediate neighbourhood. Weaving through my historical materialist 
                                                          
948 To provide one specific example, the predominate focus of American military efforts was not 
directed to bilaterally building the counterterrorism capacity of Somalia forces as was the case in 
Yemen, but rather multilaterally building the counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and peacekeeping 
capacity of states contributing to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). As I argued in 
chapter 4, the intuitive burden-sharing logic of military assistance programmes works on two levels: 
it enables partners to contribute proportionally more toward maintaining security within their own 
borders on the one hand and enables other partners to contribute proportionally more toward 
maintaining security within their immediate regions on the other. 




theoretical framework to answer the first three questions of my structured-focused 
comparison, al-Shabaab is then shown to have contested the reproduction of closed 
frontiers and open doors in the Horn of Africa. At different intervals during the War 
against al-Qaeda, it came to capture and govern territory within Somalia, performing 
many of the traditional functions of a state. Furthermore, as is also discussed, not 
only did al-“ha aa  o st u t the pote tial i teg atio  of “o alia s oil esources into 
global energy markets, but it indirectly contributed toward the piracy which 
disrupted maritime trade in the Gulf of Aden. 
 
The third and final section of this chapter ties my analysis together by re-examining 
the means of the Obama administratio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab. It gives 
eight to the se o d of this thesis  p i a  o t i utio s to the e isti g I‘ a d U.“. 
foreign policy literatures, namely its critique of the drone-centrism of the existing 
study of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Drone 
launched targeted and signature strikes are shown to have formed a constituent part 
of O a a s o e a hi g s all-footprint military approach to counterterrorism which 
instead centred around the use of military assistance programmes.950 As I then trace 
by drilling down into some of the specific programmes funded via the Section 1206, 
the Section 1207(n) and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) authorities, 
the O a a ad i ist atio s use of se u it  fo e assista e SFA) programmes 
worked to accomplish more than just counterterrorism. They also functioned to 
armour the reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors in the Horn of Africa 





                                                          
950 Within the existing literature, the variegated use of these tools of coercive power to minimise the 
size of the U.“.  ilita  footp i t has ee  studied u de  t o diffe e t o ike s: tailo ed 
e gage e t  a d shado  a fa e . See Seth Jones, Andrew Liepman, and Nathan Chandler, 
Cou te te o is  a d Cou te i su ge  i  “o alia , RAND Corporation, 2016 
<https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1539/RAND_RR1539.




Situating the Obama administration’s military response to al-Shabaab: the 
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia after 9/11  
 
In the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks, the Horn of Africa was held up 
as a f o t-li e egio  i  [the] glo al a  agai st te o is .951 Bush administration 
officials claimed that al-Qaeda s se io  leade ship ould atte pt to elo ate to the 
region following their eviction from Afghanistan.952 To counter this perceived threat, 
the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) was established in October 
2002. This joint task force served as the regional hub for U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in both Somalia and Yemen. 953  The CJTF-HOA s stated ai  as to 
enhance partner-nation capacity, promote regional stability, dissuade conflict, and 
fu the  U.“. a d Coalitio  i te ests i  East Af i a .954 Beyond this, CJTF-HOA was also 
committed to an i di e t, hole-of-government approach to foster partnerships 
with host nations and regional organizations, increase security capacities, encourage 
ette  go e a e a d uild t ust a d o fide e a o g host populatio .955 The 
2006 QDR held up the CJTF-HOA as a p i e e a ple of dist i uted ope atio s a d 
e o o  of fo e  a d it e ai ed a ke  o duit of the Obama ad i ist atio s 
military response to al-Shabaab.956 The CJTF-HOA s p i a  ase of ope atio s as 
at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.957 Speaking to its importance, by 2012, this base had 
                                                          
951 Pri eto  N L a  a d J “tephe  Mo iso , The Te o ist Th eat i  Af i a , Foreign Affairs, 83.1 
(2004), 75–86 (p. 75). 
952  ‘ a , Wa  i  Cou t ies We A e Not at Wa  ith : The Wa  o  Te o o  the Pe iphe  f o  
Bush to O a a , pp. –71. 
953 The CJTF-HOA s fo al a ea of ope atio s o e ed se e  Af i a  states: Dji outi, E it ea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia and Somali. Stretching down the Indian Ocean coastline, the CJTF-
HOA was also responsible for a further eleven states of interest: Burundi, Chad, Comoros, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen. 
Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa Task 
Fo e , Government Accountability Office, 2010, p. 5 <http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303408.pdf> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 
954   Thi gs a out CJTF-HOA , U.S. Africa Command Blog, 2012 
<https://africom.wordpress.com/2012/06/01/10-things-about-cjtf-hoa/> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
955 On the GAO estimates, sixty per cent of the CJTF-HOA s a ti ities fo used o  i il affairs projects 
such as building schools, orphanages and public utilities, and providing local people agricultural and 
industrial training. Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, DOD Needs to Dete i e the Futu e of Its Ho  
of Af i a Task Fo e , pp. –12. Consistent with the scope of my empirical analysis which I was careful 
to outline in chapter 4, these activities fall beyond the scope of my analysis in this chapter to explore.  
956 DOD, Quad e ial Defe se ‘e ie  ‘epo t , p. . 
957  Auxiliary airfields which were used to support drone operations against al-Shabaab have, at 
different times, been reported in Ethiopia, Kenya, the Seychelles, and even Somalia. See also, Whitlock, 
‘e ote U.“. Base at Co e of “e et Ope atio s ; T  M Co i k, E lusi e: U.“. Ope ates D o es F o  




grown to hold a sizeable fleet of both unmanned and manned aircraft which included 
10 MQ-1 Predator and 4 larger MQ-9 Reapers.958 In the assessment of AFRICOM 
o a de  Ge e al Ca te  Ha , [t]he e ui e e ts fo  Ca p Le onnier as a key 
lo atio  fo  atio al se u it  a d po e  p oje tio  a e e du i g .959 
 
The CJTF-HOA s g o th up to, a d du i g, O a a s p eside  as put i  otio   
al-“ha aa s e olutio  f o  a i o  fa tio  ithi  a pat h o k of “o alia ilita t 
groups to the egio s la gest ou te te o is  halle ge. Al-Shabaab traces its 
immediate roots to Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), an Islamist organisation founded in 
1983.960 A splinter faction of the AIAI would later join with the youth militia of the 
Islamic Court Union (ICU) which established control of the Somali capital Mogadishu 
in June 2006. On the behest of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was 
formed in exile i  O to e   f o  ep ese tati es of “o alia s la gest la s, the 
ICU s ad a es triggered an invasion by neighbouring Ethiopia in December 2006. 
Ethiopia s i asio  of “o alia, hi h as la desti el  suppo ted  the Bush 
administration, was the catalyst for al-“ha aa s de elop e t i to the do i a t 
militant faction within the count .961 It created the political space for al-Shabaab 
to positio  itself agai st the TFG as the t ue gua dia s  of the “o alia people, a d 
tap into the nationalist sentiment which this invasion had generated.962  
 
Speaking in the summer of 2006 Jendayi Fraser, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Africa, laid out the broad contours of U.S. policy toward Somalia. These were: 
ou te -terrorism efforts, [the] creation of an effective government, and 
responding to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people .963 Up until this point 
the Bush administration had relied principally on surrogate forces such as the Alliance 
                                                          
operates-drones-from-secret-bases-in-somalia-special-operations-jsoc-black-hawk-down/> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 
958 See Tu se, Ta get Af i a: The U.“. Milita s E pa di g Footp int In East Africa and the Arabian 
Pe i sula . 
959 Emphasis added. Quoted in Tu se, Ta get Af i a: The U.“. Milita s E pa di g Footp i t I  East 
Af i a a d the A a ia  Pe i sula . 
960 Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, p. 9. 
961 A de so  a d M K ight, U de sta di g Al-Shabaab: Clan, Islam a d I su ge  i  Ke a , p. . 
962 Mwangi, p. 521. 
963  Ted Dag e, “o alia: Cu e t Co ditio s a d P ospe ts fo  a Lasti g Pea e , Congressional 




for Restoration of Peace and Counterterrorism to combat Islamist elements within 
Somalia. As the security situation in the country continued to deteriorate, the first 
direct U.S. actions within Somalia were authorised. In January 7th 2007, a JSOC 
operated AC-130 gunship attacked a vehicle convoy suspected of carrying militants 
involved in the 1998 embassy bombing.964 2007 was also a key year in the evolution 
of U.S. counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab for a second reason: it saw 
the UN authorisation for, and subsequent standing up of, the African Union Mission 
to Somalia (AMISOM). This multilateral peacekeeping mission was intended to 
stabilize the security situation in Somalia, provide humanitarian support, and 
otherwise assist the TFG. Over the following decade, AMISOM grew significantly. This 
can be measured both in term of its size (from an initial deployment of 1,600 troops 
to over 22,000 troops) and military responsibility (from first being tasked with 
p ote ti g the TFG s ke  pe so el a d go e e t uildi gs to fighti g a full-scale 
COIN campaign in central and southern Somalia).965 As illustrated in Figure 6.1, just 









                                                          
964 Follow on AC-130 air strikes were conducted on January 9th and January 23rd. These targeted Fazul 
Abdullah Mohammed and Ahmed Madobe, who were other prominent al-Qaeda operatives in 
Somalia. In June 2007, the U.S. naval destroyer USS Chafee conducted a shore bombardment in Bargal, 
northern Somalia, to cover the withdrawal of a small team of U.S. SOF which had been attacked by a 
group of heavily armed militants. The Bush administration is also suspected to have conducted two 
separate cruise missile strikes in 2008, the second of which killed al-“ha aa s the  e i , Ade  Hashi 
Ayro. The Bu eau of I estigati e Jou alis , “o alia: ‘epo ted U“ Co e t A tio s - ,  
<https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/drone-war/data/somalia-reported-us-covert-actions-
2001-2017> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
965 Paul D Williams, AMI“OM u de  ‘e ie , The RUSI Journal, 161.1 (2016), 40–49 (p. 40). 
966 For a more detailed analysis of why these states contributed troops toward AMISOM, see Paul D 
Willia s, Joi i g AMI“OM: Wh  “i  Af i a  “tates Co t i uted T oops to the Af i a  U io  Missio  




Figure 12: AMISOM troop contributing states.967 
 




Burundi 2007 5,400 
Djibouti 2011 1,800 
Ethiopia 2014 4,400 
Kenya 2012 4,300 
Sierra Leone 2013 850 
Uganda 2007 6,200 
 
Despite this twin-track military response to the affiliate, al-Shabaab continued to 
make significant inroads within Somalia. Following the delayed withdrawal of 
Ethiopia  t oops f o  “o alia i  Ja ua  , the g oup aptu ed the TFG s i te i  
capital Baidoa and the key port cities of Haradere, Kismayo and Hizbul.968 These 
territorial advances coincided with the group formally becoming an al-Qaeda affiliate, 
a process which was completed in 2012 when Ayman al Zawahiri formally accepted 
al-Shabaab s a at.969  
 
The AMISOM counteroffensive against al-Shabaab began in April 2011. In October of 
that year, Kenya (which at this point had not joined AMISOM) sent troops into 
southern Somalia in support of Operation Linda Nchi. 970  By the end of 2011, 
Ethiopian forces had also re-entered Somalia, further increasing the military pressure 
on al-Shabaab. Within six months, the affiliate had been pushed out of Mogadishu 
before subsequently going on to lose its other key urban strongholds in Baido, 
Baraswe and Kismayo. Increasingly squeezed in its traditional centre of gravity, the 
affiliate began a series of large-scale terrorist attacks against AMISOM contributing 
states abroad. According to Anderson and McKnight, it was at this juncture that al-
                                                          
967 Figures taken from Paul D Willia s, Joi i g AMI“OM: Wh  “i  Af i a  “tates Co t i uted T oops 
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968 Jones, Liepman, and Chandler, p. 18. 
969 In a February 2010, al-“ha aa s leade s pledged to o e t the ho  of Af i a jihad to the o e 
led  al Qaeda a d its leade  “heikh Osa a i  Lade . ‘o e t Wise, Al “ha aa , Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, 2011, pp. 1–13 (p. 6) 
<http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4039~v~Al_Shabaab.pdf> [accessed 10 October 
2017]. 
970 For a more detailed discussion of Operation Linda Nchi and the blow back it produced, see David 
M A de so  a d Ja o  M K ight, Ke a at Wa : Al-“ha aa  a d Its E e ies i  Easte  Af i a , African 




“ha aa  t a sfo [ed] f o  a  overt, military and governmental force in southern 
“o alia to a o e t, i su ge t a d a a hi  fo e i  Ke a . 971  This change 
culminated in the September 2013 siege of the Westgate shopping centre, the 
affiliate s ost high-profile attack outside of the country to date. Within Somalia, as 
it et eated deepe  i to the ou t s hi te la d, al-Shabaab returned to the guerrilla 
tactics which it had initially pioneered in 2007/2008. These included IEDs; a ushes 
on convoys and patrols; hit-and-run attacks, including the throwing of grenades and 
targeted mortar fire on checkpoints; the use of snipers; and the assassination of 
individual officials or members of the SFG [Somalia Federal Government], AMISOM, 
o  thei  allied ilitias .972 These attacks formed part of a larger strategy intended to 
undermine the political viability of the AMISOM mission by increasing the military 
costs of participation to unacceptable levels. 
 
In response, the Obama administration continued to funnel large quantities of 
military assistance to AMISOM contributing states. According to a 2014 factsheet 
published by the White House, the U.S. had provided $512 million in direct financial 
suppo t fo  AMI“OM so as to build capacity to counter al-Shabaab in Somalia and 
provide space for political p og ess .973 This was in addition to the more than $455 
million in contributions to the UN Support Office for AMISOM, which were 
distributed separately.974 In January 2013, the Obama administration also officially 
recognised the Somali government, the first time the U.S. had done so since 1991.975 
This formal recognition of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), which had been 
established in August 2012 replacing the TFG, laid the groundwork for an increase in 
ilita  assista e to the state s fledgi g se u it  fo es the li itatio s of hi h a e 
discussed in greater detail in the last section of this chapter).976 
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Whilst the AMISOM offensive was successful in disrupting al-“ha aa s a ti ities a d 
killing several of its senior leaders, it nevertheless failed to fully dislodge it from its 
strongholds in central and southern Somalia. 977  Rather, as alluded above, the 
affiliates  d i dli g politi al fo tu es i  “omalia pushed it to conduct a war of 
destabilisation rather than attempt to build a genuine alternative form of 
go e e t to the fede al p o ess . 978  This ei g said,  the e d of O a a s 
presidency, the affiliate was argued to be poised to reverse many of its most recent 
territorial losses.979 Similarly, speaking to continued escalation of direct U.S. military 
intervention in the country, in one of his last major acts as president, Obama 
designated al-Shabaab as falling under the 2001 Authorisation for the Use of Military 
Force.980 This action strengthened the legal foundation for airstrikes and SOF kill-
capture raids against al-Shabaab.981 
 
All told, U.S. counterterrorism operations evolved steadily in Somalia up to and 
du i g O a a s p eside . The i stitutio al and physical infrastructure required to 
conduct counterterrorism operations across the Horn of Africa were put in place 
early in the War against al-Qaeda. This was seen in the creation of the CJTF-HOA and 
the securing of access of Camp Lemonnier in 2002. Unlike in Yemen, the rollout of 
U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia was not catapulted by a series of 
catalytic events within Somalia, but rather the more persistent condition of state 
collapse. Within this vacuum, al-Shabaab grew significantly after 2006. Following its 
breakaway from AIAI, not only did it emerge as the dominant militant group within 
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the country, but it came to govern large swathes of territory in central and southern 
Somalia. 2007 was a particularly significant year in the military response to al-
“ha aa  fo  t o easo s: it sa  oth the U.“. s fi st di e t ilita  i te e tio  
ithi  “o alia a d, o e i po ta tl , AMI“OM s esta lish e t. This t i  t a k 
military response to al-Shabaab, like many of the changes put in place in U.S. 
ou te te o is  poli  late i  Bush s p eside , as i stitutio alised  the O a a 
administration. Thereafter, the AMISOM counteroffensive which began in 2011 was 
the catalyst for al-Shabaab pursuing a more asymmetrical form of resistance. This 
strategy had two main pillars: a turn toward insurgent attacks within Somalia, and a 
campaign of terrorist attacks against AMISOM contributing states intended to 
undermine political support for the mission. Despite sustained military pressure 
however, by the end of O a a s p eside , the affiliate e ai ed esilie t.982  
 
Re-examining the drivers of the Obama administration’s military response to al-
Shabaab 
 
Having outlined the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia after 
9/11, my attention now turns to re-examining the drivers of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab. As I first discuss, al-Shabaab was 
generally framed by American policymakers as a threat to regional rather than 
A e i a  se u it . This poses the uestio  of hethe  the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to al-Shabaab can be explained only in terms of counterterrorism, 
or whether there were indeed other factors at play. Coming down in favour of the 
latter conclusion, I continue to outline al-“ha aa s halle ge to ep odu tio  of 
closed frontiers and open doors in the Horn of Africa. When situated within the wider 
historical practices of U.S. imperialism in the global south, al-Shabaab is theorised to 
ha e ot o l  o st u ted the pote tial i teg atio  of “o alia s oil esou es i to 
global energy markets, but indirectly contributed toward the piracy which disrupted 
maritime trade in the crucial Gulf of Aden. Whilst neither of these economic 
o side atio s a  e ti el  e plai  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
the affiliate, when coupled with the potential threat which the affiliate presented to 
                                                          




American security, they can give us a richer understanding of the drivers of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in Somalia.  
 
Al-Shabaab s challenge to American and regional security 
 
The 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism framed al-Shabaab as a threat to 
A e i a  people, [its] i te ests, a d [its] allies .983 During his last major national 
security speech delivered in December 2016, Obama similarity emphasized that 
[f]rom the territory it controls in Somalia, [al-Shabaab] continues to call for strikes 
agai st the U ited “tates .984 Despite su h lai s, fo  the ajo it  of O a a s 
presidency, al-Shabaab had generally been presented as a threat to regional rather 
homeland security. Speaking in February 2010 for example, Director of National 
Intelligence Dennis Blair commented that the affiliate ould likel  e ai  fo used 
on regional objectives in the near-te .985  Nicholas Rasmussen, director of the 
National Counterterrorism Centre, reiterated this sentiment in 2015. Al-Shabaab, he 
insisted, as a potential threat to the Homeland, as some al-Shabaab leaders in the 
past publicly called for transnational attacks, but its interest appears to still be 
p i a il  fo used o  ope atio s i  East Af i a .986  
 
Indeed, whilst al-Shabaab may have been successful in radicalizing a small group of 
Somali Americans, the affiliate is not reported to have attempted a large-scale 
terrorist attack against the continental America.987 Nor is it reported to have directly 
ta geted the U.“.  ilita  o  politi al p ese e i  the Ho  of Af i a. I stead, hilst 
the affiliate conducted several high- asualt  te o ist atta ks a oad du i g O a a s 
presidency, these were di e ted agai st the ea  e e : AMI“OM o t i uti g 
states in its immediate neighbourhood. At the height of the FIFA World Cup in July 
2010, al-Shabaab conducted multiple suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda, killing 
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76 and injuring a further 80.988 According to an al-Shabaab spokesman, this attack 
as i te ded as essage to e e  ou t  ho is illi g to se d t oops to “o alia 
that they will face atta ks o  thei  te ito .989 Three years later, in the affiliates' 
most well documented attack, al-Shabaab besieged the Westgate Shopping Mall in 
Nairobi killing 67.990 In February 2016, an al-Shabaab suicide bomber also attempted 
to destroy a Daallo Airlines flight from Mogadishu airport to Djibouti using an 
improvised explosive device disguised as a laptop. According to an al-Shabaab 
spokes a , this atta k as o du ted as a retribution for the crimes committed by 
the coalition of Western crusaders and their intelligence agencies against the 
Musli s of “o alia .991 To this extent, whilst there was an international dimension 
to al-Shabaab s a ti ities, this as p edo i atel  fo used agai st AMI“OM 
contributing states. Whilst al-Shabaab did call for terrorist attacks against shopping 
malls within America (and other western countries) in 2015, Homeland Security 
Secretary Officials were quick to point out that the affiliate lacked the capacity to pull 
off these attacks.992 
 
If al-Shabaab is accepted as having lacked the capacity to directly threaten American 
security, the question then becomes whether the affiliate's attacks against AMISOM 
o t i uti g states alo e a  e plai  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se 
against the affiliate? As I now argue, consistent with my overarching historical 
ate ialist f a e o k, the  e e also a i ated  the affiliate s halle ge to the 
reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors in the Horn of Africa. 
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Al-Shabaab s challenge to closed frontiers in the Horn of Africa 
 
Al-“ha aa  lai ed to e fighti g agai st all o -Somalia and non-Muslim forces, 
ideas a d i flue es i  the ou t  a d e o d .993 This put it in opposition against 
both the FGS and its principal military backers, the U.S and AMISOM. Al-“ha aa s 
ulti ate goal as the u ifi atio  of G eate  “o alia  u de  a  Isla i  aliphate.994 
The affiliate thus contested more than just the territorial integrity of the Somalia 
state. It also pursued irredentist claims over the ethnic Somalia populations in 
neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. 995  To this end, al-Shabaab combined 
elements of a terrorist organisation with that of a popular insurgency. The effectively 
dual challenge which the al-Qaeda affiliate presented to regional security has been 
explained in detail by Jones, Liepman, and Chandler. As they have noted: 
 
[s]ince its inception, al Shabaab has been an insurgent group dedicated to 
reuniting a greater Somalia. This goal requires controlling territory in Somalia 
and parts of neighboring countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia that have 
Somali populations. But al Shabaab uses terrorism to help achieve its 
o je ti es… al “ha aa  t a sfo ed f o  a  i su ge t g oup that sought to 
control territory and govern its inhabitants to one that controlled little 
territory and increasingly relied on terrorist attacks.996 
 
This has also been acknowledged by General Carter Ham, former AFRICOM 
o a de . As he e phasized du i g his  postu e state e t, al-Shabaab 
represents both a terrorist threat to U.S. and regional interests and an insurgent 
p o le  to the [TFG] as ell as “o ali egio al ad i ist atio s .997  
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Al-“ha aa  as aided i  these effo ts  “o alia s h o i  politi al i sta ilit . 
Following the overthrow of the Mohammed Siad Ba e s go e e t i  , 
Somalia lacked a functioning central government. This has led some to argue that 
“o alia has ee  the lo gest u i g i sta e of o plete state ollapse i  
o te po a  histo .998 By 2011, there were an estimated 4 million Somalians in 
need of humanitarian assistance and a further million Somalian refugees living in 
neighbouring countries.999 Although the TFG and later the FGS attempted to provide 
the public services needed to alleviate these pressures, it was for the most part 
ineffective in this regard. 1000  Withi  this go e a e a uu , [al-Shabaab] 
governed the territory it held and was an existential threat to the Mogadishu-based 
T a sitio al Fede al Go e e t .1001  
 
At different intervals during the War against al-Qaeda, al-Shabaab came to control 
large swathes of territory in central and southern Somalia. Here, the affiliate forbade 
u -Isla i  a ti ities a d uled u de  a st i t i te p etatio  of “ha i a la . 
Pa alleli g AQAP s a d Ansar al-Sharia activities in Yemen, al-Shabaab also 
attempted to win the consent of local populations it came to control by performing 
many of the traditional roles of a state.1002 Whilst it pursued these activities unevenly, 
several general practices of governance have been identified within the existing 
literature. Taking aim at the criminality and corruption which had flourished in 
Somalia since the 1990s, al-“ha aa  p o ided a judi ial s ste  ased o  “ha i a 
law.1003 Whilst delegating much of the responsibility for daily governance to local 
intermediates, the affiliate also assumed responsibility for major public work projects 
such as the construction of bridges and infrastructure maintenance.1004 Similarly, al-
Shabaab further undermined the legitimacy of the FGS by managing humanitarian 
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relief efforts within the territory it controlled. This process had two dimensions. The 
first, was the collection of a zayat to finance the distribution of aid to the most 
vulnerable communities. The second, was the establishment of an Office for the 
Supervision of Foreign Agencies in order to regulate international relief efforts.1005 
Al-Shabaab raised a series of taxes within the territory it controlled to finance these 
activities, further speaking to the strength of al-“ha aa s halle ge to the 
reproduction of closed frontiers in Somalia.1006  The (relative) stability which the 
affiliate was able to bring in the territory it controlled, it is also important to stress, 
was valued by both average Somalis and business leaders.1007 All told, al-Shabaab can 
thus be argued to have presented a significant challenge to the territorial integrity of 
the Somalia state. It worked to capture and govern territory, performing many of the 
traditional functions of a state. In doing so, it took aim at the reproduction of 
American primacy through a system of sovereign states rather than the direct control 
of territory in the global south. Beyond that, as I can now examine, it was also a major 
o sta le to the pote tial i teg atio  of “o alia s o side a le e e g  ese es i to 
global markets. 
 
Al-Shabaab s challenge to open-doors in the Horn of Africa 
 
At first glance, maintaining the territorial integrity of the Somalia state may appear 
to e of o l  pe iphe al i te est to the A e i a  state. The ou t  as the U.“.  
185th largest trading partner in 2016 with just $40 million in trade between the two 
countries. 1008  As Stokes and Raphael have argued however, a consistent aim of 
A e i a  fo eig  a d se u it  poli  si e  has ee  to ope  up ke  e o o ies 
in the global south in order to facilitate the smooth transmission and operation of 
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transnational capital for the benefit of a li e al o e .1009 Key to these practices has 
been containing the threat posed by antithetical social forces to the political and 
economic stability of states in the global south. Viewed through the prism of creating 
a stable investment climate, Somalia can be understood as a potentially important 
site of global energy security for two reasons. Not only did al-“ha aa s a ti ities 
stymie oil production within Somalia, it also contributed toward the piracy which spilt 
out into the wider Gulf of Aden. 
 
Impeded by the instability which has gripped the region, oil and gas production 
across the Horn of Africa is currently negligible. The region has, nevertheless, been 
identified as a key site of future oil production.1010 Fo  so e, “o alia is the latest 
f o tie  egio  of h d o a o  e plo atio  a d p odu tio  i  East Af i a .1011 The 
existence of large oil deposits has long been suspected in the country, with large 
American companies (Conoco, Amoco, Chevron and Phillips) having been allocated 
exploration licenses prior to the overthrow of Siad Barre's government in 1991.1012 
The majority of current oil exploitation within Somalia has been concentrated in 
Somaliland, which unilaterally proclaimed its independence in 1991. Here Production 
Sharing Agreements have been signed with a number of Western oil companies.1013 
Test drills have also been borne in the semi-autonomous Puntland region, which 
borders Somaliland in the north of the country.1014 Somalia is also suspected to hold 
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considerable offshore oil reserves.1015 All told, o  so e esti ates, the ou t s oil 
reserves have been put as high as 110 billion barrels – a figure comparable to those 
of Kuwait.1016 A ke  o sta le to “o alia s a d the Ho  of Af i a s o e oadl  
integration into the U.S. managed global oil economy has been al-“ha aa s 
contestation of the territorial integrity of the Somalia state. As has been pointed out, 
a e t al uestio  fo  the h d o a o  de elop e t se to  is hether Somalia will 
significantly and sustainably stabilize with regards to its security, political, and legal 
landscape in the short and medium term in order to allow for commercial oil 
p odu tio .1017 
 
Al-“ha aa s o testatio  of the te ito ial i teg it  of the Somalia state can also be 
argued to have indirectly contributed toward the rise of piracy in the strategically 
important waters around the Gulf of Aden.1018 The degree (if at all) of al-“ha aa s 
involvement in piracy has been the subject of considerable debate.1019 Furthermore, 
the rise of piracy around Somalia has been explained as an interplay of different 
factors, not just state collapse.1020 Whilst al-Shabaab may have generally refrained 
from attacking shipping itself, its activities nevertheless diverted the military focus of 
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the fledging FSG and its military backers.1021 As General Ward explained in his 2010 
AFRICOM posture statement: 
 
The lack of an effective central governing authority in Somalia for nearly two 
decades has created a multitude of de-stabilizing conditions. It has left the 
country vulnerable to terrorist exploitation, and fosters a permissive 
environment for piracy and other illicit activities.1022 
 
Indeed, Somalia is strategically located at the intersection of the Indian Ocean and 
the Gulf of Aden. The northern part of its 1,880-mile-long coastline commands the 
western entrance to the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb whilst its southern coastline abuts 
onto the busy shipping lane which connects Europe and Asia via the Cape of Good 
Hope passage. The na o ess of the Gulf of Ade  has ea t that all t affi  ust 
pass ithi  st iki g dista e of the “o ali oast .1023 This includes nearly twelve per 
cent of the annual global trade in oil.1024 Caluula, Eyl, Hobyo, and Haradheere were 
key ports in the Somali piracy nexus, with the majority of attacks being concentrated 
a ou d Pu tla d the auto o ous egio  of the ou t s o th  a d e t al 
Somalia.1025 
 
Du i g the fi st ea  of O a a s p eside ,  ships e e su essfull  hija ked i  
the Horn of Africa: a two hundred per cent increase from their 2007 levels.1026 In April 
, the p eside t o ed to halt the ise of pi a  follo i g the u h publicised 
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Causes , African Security, 8.3 (2015), 147–65 (p. 148). 
1025 Lau e  Plo h a d othe s, Pi a  off the Ho  of Af i a , Congressional Research Service, 2011, p. 
6 <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40528.pdf> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 




rescue of Captain Richard Phillips.1027 To put the scale of the economic disruption 
these attacks produced into some pe spe ti e, a o di g to the Wo ld Ba k s 
estimates, piracy around the Horn of Africa cost the global economy over $18 billion 
each year from 2005 and 2012.1028 Whilst piracy off the Somali coast fell sharply after 
2011 - in large part because of the establishment of a series of multinational counter-
pi a  pat ols i ludi g the U.“. Na s Coo di ated Co i ed Task Fo e  - 
attacks had again begun to rise in the latter years of the Obama presidency.1029 As 
the Natio al “e u it  Cou il s  Countering Piracy Off the Horn Of Africa: 
Partnership & Action Plan ade lea , it as ithi  the U.“.  atio al i te ests to 
work with all States to repress piracy off the Ho  of Af i a .1030 Such a position was 
consistent with the 2005 U.S. National Maritime Security Strategy that singled out 
the safet  a d economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use 
of the o ld s o ea s .1031  
 
Re-examining the means of the Obama administration’s military response to al-
Shabaab 
 
The first section of this chapter provided a brief chronological narrative of the 
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia over the course of the War 
against al-Qaeda. Building on this foundation, in the second section of this chapter, 
the political economy animators of the military response to al-Shabaab were drawn 
out. The remainder of this chapter has two aims: to capture, and in turn theorise, the 
role of SFA programmes in the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
Shabaab. This detailed empirical analysis makes two contributions toward this 
chapter: it enables me to further broaden the debate on the means of U.S. 
ou te te o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  e o d its ki eti  fa e  
                                                          
1027  Pete  Bake , O a a “ig als Mo e A ti e ‘espo se to Pi a , New York Times, 2009 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/14/world/africa/14pirates.html> [accessed 11 June 2018]. 
1028 Elmi and others, p. 148. 
1029 In October 2016, a Korean flagged chemical tanker was attacked 330 nautical miles east of Somalia, 
the first reported attack on a major ship sailing for the region in two and a half years. Jonathan Saul, 
“hips Mo e at ‘isk afte  Fi st “o ali Pi ate Atta k i  Yea s: Offi ials , Reuters, 2016 
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-shipping-piracy-somalia-idUSKBN1331UJ> [accessed 11 April 
2018]. 
1030 The National Security Council, p. 3. 




to place military assistance programmes more centrally into this debate, and it gives 
greater weight to my theorisation of SFA programmes as a tool plugged into states 





As I examined in chapter 4, the causes and consequences of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s i stitutio alisatio  of d o e a fa e ha e ee  the su je t of 
considerable interdisciplinary debate. Surprisingly little academic literature has, 
however, been published on drone operations within Somalia.1032 Turning to the 
work of several investigative journalists to fill this gap, drone strikes were coupled 
with the use of other direct actions including SOF kill-capture raids, manned aircraft 
strikes, cruise missile strikes and naval bombardments.1033 Managed by JSOC based 
at Camp Lemonnier, a total of 21 drone airstrikes are reported to have been 
o du ted i  “o alia o e  the ou se of O a a s p eside . The fi st of these 
operations was reported in June 2011, a full year after the resumption of such 
operations across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen. This strike, which is suspected to have 
wounded two senior al-Shabaab militants, was seen as marking a sharp escalation of 
U.S. counterterrorism operations in the country.1034 As illustrated in figure 6.2, the 
annual number of drone strikes in Somalia rose sharply from 3 in 2014 to 9 in 2016. 
This upti k i  d o e st ikes as e a led  the O al Offi e s loose i g of the 
targeting criteria for such operations, an action intended to better support AMISOM 
operations in the country.1035  
 
 
                                                          
1032 The focus of the empirical debate on U.S. drone operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq has 
largely centred on Pakistan and, to a lesser degree, Yemen. 
1033 For a more detailed discussion of these practices, see The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 
“o alia: ‘epo ted U“ Co e t A tio s - . 
1034 Ma k Mazzetti a d E i  “ h itt, U.“. E pa ds Its D o e Wa  I to “o alia , The New York Times, 
2011 <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/africa/02somalia.html> [accessed 10 October 
2017]. 









J“OC s d o e ope atio s i  “o alia e e pa tiall  i te ded to de apitate al-
Shabaab s se io  leade ship.1037  O e  the ou se of O a a s p eside , se e al 
prominent al-Shabaab operatives were reportedly killed in such operations, Ahmed 
Abdi Godane (al-Shabaab s e i  a d Ad a  Ga aa  the suspe ted head pla e  of 
the West Gate Mall attack) prominent amongst them.1038 As in Yemen, Obama is 
reported to have personally signed off on o i atio s to the DOD s kill-list as part of 
the process which was informally dubbed Te o  Tuesda s .1039 Later in Obama's 
presidency, JSOC is also reported to have begun targeting mid-to-low level al-
Shabaab operatives. 1040  One combined manned and unmanned air strike at a 
suspected training camp at Camp Raso in central Somalia killed an estimated 150 al-
                                                          
1036 Ne  A e i a, D o e “t ikes: “o alia . Ne  A e i a, D o e “t ikes: “o alia . 
1037 Becker and Shane. 
1038 The strike that killed Ahmed Abdi Godane in September 2014 was conducted by a mix of manned 
and unmanned aircraft. Hele e Coope , U.“. “t ikes i  “o alia Kill  “ha a  Fighte s , The New 
York Times, 2016 <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/08/world/africa/us-airstrikes-
somalia.html?mcubz=3> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
1039 Becker and Shane. 
1040 Zimmerman and others, p. 4. 
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Shabaab fighters in March 2016.1041 Speaking in the aftermath of this attack, White 
House p ess se eta  Josh Ea est i sisted that [t]he removal of those terrorist 
fighters degrades al-“ha aa s a ilit  to eet the g oup s o je ti es i  “o alia, 
including recruiting new members, establishing bases and planning attacks on the 
U.“. .1042  
 
This being said, drone strikes were used more sparingly as part of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab vis-à-vis its military response to 
AQAP. The  d o e st ikes epo ted i  “o alia du i g O a a s p eside  as of a 
magnitude lower than the 164 comparable operations reported in Yemen during the 
same period. On first reflection, this disparity was seemingly at odds with my earlier 
argument that drone strikes remained contingent upon working through (rather than 
over) governments in the global south. Indeed, as one Obama administration official 
e a ked, “omalia would be the easiest place to go in in an undiscriminating way 
a d do d o e st ikes e ause the e s o host go e e t to get .1043 According to 
Luke Hating, who served as Senior Director for Counterterrorism at the National 
Security Council during Oba a s p eside , the dispa it  i  the u e  of d o e 
st ikes et ee  “o alia a d Ye e  as a eal te sio  i  U.“. ou te te o is  
policy. 1044  As he e plai ed, [ ]e ask ou t ies to go i to the fight agai st ou  
counterterrorism adversaries, but we have a stated policy of not using force against 
g oups u less the  pose a o ti ui g a d i i e t th eat to A e i a s .1045 The 
disparity in the number of drone strikes between Somalia and Yemen has also been 
e plai ed i  te s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ish to not antagonise al-Shabaab 
into conducting attacks against the continental U.S.1046 Nevertheless, as with the 
Hadi government in Yemen, the FGS appears to have actively consented to drone 
strikes in their country. As President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud made clear in 2013, 
[ ]e suppo t it so fa , e ause so fa  the U.“. d o es ha e killed o l  fo eig  fighte s 
                                                          
1041 Cooper. 
1042 Cooper. 
1043 Quoted in G eg Mille , U de  O a a, a  E e gi g Glo al Appa atus fo  D o e Killi g . 
1044 Savage, Schmitt, and Mazzetti. 
1045 Savage, Schmitt, and Mazzetti. 




i  “o alia a d e app e iate it .1047 To this extent, whilst a variety of factors may 
have contributed toward the comparatively lower number of drone strikes 
conducted in Somalia vis-à-vis Yemen, the strikes which did occur also worked in 
principle through, rather than over, the fledging Somali state. 
 
SOF and PMSC 
 
The O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab was consistent with the 
soft limits that the spatial arrangement of American power has set on how all 
administrations have been capable of projecting U.S. coercive power into in the 
global south. A o e ai  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
Shabaab was to strike the affiliate without the return of conventional U.S. ground 
forces to Somalia, a concern given extra impetus by the legacy of the 1993 Black-
Hawk Down incident. 1048  As the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
Joh ie Ca so  ade lea  ea l  i  O a a s p eside , [ ]e do ot a t a  
A e i a  footp i t o  oot o  the g ou d [i  “o alia] .1049 
 
To this end, American SOF are reported to have been active within Somalia from at 
least 2007.1050 By 2014, this presence is reported to have grown as large as 120 
                                                          
1047  Josh ‘ogi , “o ali P eside t Asks fo  Mo e A e i a  Help , Foreign Policy, 2013 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/18/somali-president-asks-for-more-american-help/> [accessed 
11 August 2018]. 
1048 In support of the UN intervention in the Somalia Civil War, American combat troops had been sent 
to the ou t  du i g the ea l  s. This i te e tio  has ee  ead as a atal ti  e e t  fo  al-
Qaeda s e pa sio  i  the egio  as it p o ided the o e e t s se io  leade ship a  oppo tu it  to 
portray the U.S. as an imperial power intent on dominating the entire Muslim world. Jones, Liepman, 
and Chandler, p. 10. Following the 1993 Black-Hawk Down incident, in which 18 Army Rangers were 
killed in a fire-fight outside Mogadishu, all U.S. forces from the country were withdrawn, spelling the 
end of UN peacekeeping operations in the country. In the longer run, this intervention has also been 
a gued to ha e e ge de ed a la ge  “o alia “ d o e  i  hi h A e i a  poli ake s e e 
increasi gl  u illi g to deplo  U.“. oots o  the g ou d  i  humanitarian interventions. See Robert 
G Pat a , The ‘oots of “t ategi  Failu e: The “o alia “ d o e a d Al Qaeda s Path to / , 
International Politics, 52.1 (2015), 89–109. 
1049 Gettleman, Mazzetti, and Schmitt. 
1050  Pauli e Jeli ek, U.“. “pe ial Fo es i  “o alia , The Associated Press, 2007 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/AR2007011000438.html> 




operatives.1051 Returning to the typology of SOF operations which I outlined in the 
last se tio  of hapte  , these fo es p efo ed a i  of oth hite  and la k  
SOF missions. The former included: (1) the training and advising of AMISOM and 
Somalia troops; (2) the provision of mission planning, support and intelligence from 
a cell in Mogadishu; and (3) communication and medical expertise.1052 According to 
2015 reporting from Ty McCormick, a team of JSOC operatives was also based at 
Kismayo airport within Somalia conducting drone operations and other intelligence 
gathering operations.1053 Unlike in both Yemen and the Sahel however, JSOC is also 
reported to have coordinated a limited campaign of kill-capture raids against al-
Shabaab leade ship ta gets du i g O a a s p eside . I  o e “epte e   aid, 
codenamed Celestial Balance, members of the 160th Special Operations Aviation 
Regiment killed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan and five other militants. 1054  In another 
January 2012 raid, codenamed Octave Fusion, Navy Seals are reported to have 
parachuted into an al-Shahabad camp near the town of Adado Adow in order to free 
American and Danish hostages.1055  
 
PMSC were also a central conduit through which the Obama administration 
attempted to build the capacity of the regional surrogates tasked with combating al-
Shabaab on the ground. They were contracted to train, advise and assist two sets of 
security forces, namely AMISOM contributing states (Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti and 
Sierra Leone) and Somalia national forces (both SNA and the elite Danab SOF 
                                                          
1051 Phil “te a t, U.“. Dis loses “e et “o alia Milita  P ese e, up to  T oops , Reuters, 2014 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia/exclusive-u-s-discloses-secret-somalia-military-
presence-up-to-120-troops-idUSKBN0F72A820140703> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
1052 To provide just one specific example of these train, equip and advise elements, beginning in 2005, 
U.S. SOF established episodic engagement  ith ele e ts of Ke a s th Pa a hute Battalio  
known as the Ranger Strike Force which included basic infantry training. Wikileaks, ‘efe e e 
ID: NAI‘OBI _a. “e u it  “e to  Assista e I  Ke a, Pa t II: La d Bo de  “e u it  T ai i g .  
Ja ua  .  <https:// ikileaks.o g/plusd/ a les/ NAI‘OBI _a.ht l> [a essed  Ap il 2018]. 
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Post, 2014 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-has-deployed-military-
advisers-to-somalia-officials-say/2014/01/10/b19429f2-7a20-11e3-af7f-
13bf0e9965f6_story.html?utm_term=.2ae0dd771cf7> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
1054 The Bu eau of I estigati e Jou alis , “o alia: ‘epo ted U“ Co e t A tio s - . 




unit).1056 The Washington D.C. based PMSC Bancroft Global was heavily involved in 
the mentoring of both sets of forces.1057 According to one 2011 New York Times 
report, thei  advisers typically work[ed] from the front lines - showing the troops 
how to build sniper pits or smash holes in walls to move between houses [in the 
egio ] . 1058  U.S. SOF and Marines were limited to providing more specialised 
training in countering IEDs and performing medical evaluations.1059 Military support 
firms were also contracted to operate two drones - 1 MQ-1 Predator and 1 MQ-9 
Reaper - at a civilian airport in southern Ethiopia.1060 According to James Fisher, a 
spokesman for the 17th Air Force which was responsible for Air Force Operations 
a oss the o ti e t, the deplo e t of these aft as i te ded to p o ide 
operation and technical support for our security assistance programmes . 1061 
Contractors also performed vital base operation support services at Camp Lemonnier 
in Djibouti, with Kellogg Brown being awarded an $54 million contract to this end in 
2014.1062  Alongside SOF, PMSC can thus be argued to have played an important 
enabling role i  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab. Not 
only were they heavily involved with the training of AMISOM forces, but also in 
providing logistical and maintenance support to U.S. counterterrorism operations in 
the region more broadly. 
 
 
                                                          
1056  C aig Whitlo k, U.“. T ai s Af i a  “oldie s fo  “o alia Missio , Washington Post, 2012 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-trains-african-soldiers-for-somalia-
mission/2012/05/13/gIQAJhsPNU_story.html?utm_term=.16f480d4def3> [accessed 11 April 2018].  
1057 In a complex arrangement, the company was contracted by the Ugandan Government to provide 
military mentors  for the AMISOM mission. These contractors then trained Somalia national forces 
with the cost to the Ugandan government being reimbursed by the DOS. See Whitlo k, U.“. T ai s 
Af i a  “oldie s fo  “o alia Missio . In the two years between 2011 and 2011, Bancroft International 
was estimated to have received $7 million through this arrangement.  Gettleman, Mazzetti, and 
Schmitt. 
1058 Gettleman, Mazzetti, and Schmitt. 
1059 Whitlo k, U.“. T ai s Af i a  “oldie s fo  “o alia Missio . 
1060  Tu se, Ta get Af i a: The U.“. Milita s E pa di g Footp i t I  East Af i a a d the A a ia  
Pe i sula . 
1061  C aig Whitlo k, U.“. D o e Base i  Ethiopia Is Ope atio al , Washington Post, 2011 
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-drone-base-in-ethiopia-is-
operational/2011/10/27/gIQAznKwMM_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.4bc9cfebe173> 
[accessed 11 April 2018]. 




Military Assistance  
 
The thi d a d la gest pilla  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
Shabaab was the use of military assistance programmes to build the capacity of 
egio al a d “o alia fo es. The li ited di e t a tio  st ikes  e a ined earlier in 
this hapte  a e e og ised to ha e o l  hope[d] to dis upt se io  leade ship a d 
pla i g fo  e te al atta ks .1063 As these autho s put it, [the] A e i a  st ateg  
for containing and ultimately defeating al-Shabaab relie[d] on AMISOM and the 
Somali National Army .1064 The 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy laid out the 
O a a ad i ist atio s o it e t to pu sui g a st ateg  fo used o  dis a tli g 
al-Qa ida ele e ts [ ithi  “o alia] hile building the capacity of countries and local 
administrations to serve as countervailing forces to the supporters of al-Qa ida a d 
the purveyors of instability that enable the transnational terrorist threat to 
pe sist .1065 As Obama made clear during a 2015 visit to Ethiopia: 
 
[p]a t of the easo  that e e seen the shrinkage of al-“ha aa s a ti ities 
in East Africa is because we have our military teams in consultation with 
regional forces and local forces, and there are certain capacities that we 
have that some of these militaries may not, and I think the e s ee  
o ple e ta it  i  the o k that e e do e togethe . 
 
By building partner capacity in this way, the president continued: 
 
e do t eed to se d ou  o  Ma i es, fo  e a ple, i  to do the fighti g … 
[t]hat s h , i  the past, I e said, fo  e a ple, that the o k that e e 
doi g i  “o alia is a odel … a odel i  hi h e a e pa t e i g ith othe  
ou t ies a d the  a e p o idi g outsta di g t oops o  the g ou d…1066 
 
The O a a ad i ist atio s effo ts to uild the apa it  of “o alia s se u it  fo es 
focused on the Somalia National Army (SNA) and its elite SOF Gaashaan brigade. The 
                                                          
1063 Zimmerman and others, p. 4. 
1064 Emphasis added. Zimmerman and others, p. 4. 
1065 Emphasis added. DOD, Natio al “t ateg  Fo  Cou te te o is  , p. . 
1066  Ba a k O a a, ‘e a ks  P eside t O a a a d P i e Mi iste  Haile a iam Desalegn of 
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latter were trained by American SOF and the PSMC from Bancroft Global. 1067 
According to Zimmerman, Kantack and Lahiff however, efforts to train and equip the 
“NA e e less su essful. O  thei  esti ates, the “NA e ai ed u de a ed, 
poo l  e uipped, a d i effe ti e  a d, as the  o ti ued, ese led a olle tio  of 
regional militias more tha  a u ified atio al fo e .1068 The predominate focus of 
U.S. train, equip and advise efforts instead centred on AMISOM contributing states.  
 
According to the figures compiled by the Security Assistance Monitor, over the 
e ti et  of O a a s p eside , “o alia was obligated $1.48 billion in Peacekeeping 
Operations (PKO) funds, a DOS managed programme oste si l  i te ded to to 
support regional peace support operations for which international coalitions or 
eigh ou i g ou t ies take p i a  espo si ilit .1069 To be clear however, only a 
proportion of these funds were actually intended for Somali security forces, with the 
bulk instead being obligated for AMISOM contributing states.1070 To put the scale of 
this disparity into some perspective, according to a 2014 factsheet released by the 
White House, the U.S. had obligated $512 million in direct financial support to 
AMI“OM si e . I  o pa iso , over $171 million [had been obligated] to build 
a o e effe ti e a d p ofessio al “o ali Natio al A .1071 Some of these PKO 
obligations were channelled through the DOS-led Partnership for Regional East Africa 
Counterterrorism (PREACT). 1072  Launched in 2009 as a replacement for the East 
                                                          
1067 Zimmerman and others, p. 5; Mazzetti, Gettleman, and Schmitt.  
1068 Zimmerman and others, p. 5. “ee Willia s fo  a o e detailed dis ussio  of the “NA s ate ial 
and organisational, Paul D Willia s, AMI“OM u de  ‘e ie , p. . 
1069  Bureau of Political-Milita  Affai s, Pea ekeepi g Ope atio s , Department of State, 2006 
<https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/pm/65534.htm> [accessed 16 September 2017]. 
1070 As the “e u it  Assista e Mo ito  ha e oted, hilst the U.“. has histo i all  app op iated 
Peacekeeping Operations assistance to Somalia with the intent to support both the Somali National 
Fo es a d AMI“OM […] [the] U.“. go e e t epo ts do ot p o ide details about how PKO amounts 
a e di ided et ee  the t o se u it  p o ide s   The efo e, [i  the “e u it  Assista e Mo ito ] 
database PKO assistance to Somalia appears high, though only a portion of that amount actually is 
destined for the Somalia Natio al Fo es . Natalie Ch alisz, U ited “tates Pea ekeepi g 
Ope atio s PKO  Assista e i  “o alia , Security Assistance Monitor, 2014 
<http://www.securityassistance.org/blog/united-states-peacekeeping-operations-pko-
assistance-somalia> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
1071 The White House, FACT “HEET: U.“. “uppo t fo  Pea ekeepi g i  Af i a . 
1072 PREACT was funded through four DOS managed security assistance accounts including the PKO 
and the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. According to the data which 
is available between FY 2009 and FY 2013, PREACT was allocated $104 million in funding. This, 




Af i a Cou te te o is  I itiati e, P‘EACT is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-
year, multi-faceted programme designed to build the capacity and cooperation of 
military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism 
i  a o p ehe si e fashio . 1073  It was modelled on the Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership which, as will be discussed in chapter 7, aimed to build 
similar capacities as part of the military response to AQIM. 
 
Figure 14: Military assistance obligations for Somalia, FY 2009-2016.1074  
 
Authority Obligation (in millions $) 
PKO $1480 




Beyond PKO funding, as illustrated in figures 6.4 and 6.5, several AMISOM 
contributing states were also allocated significant sums of bilateral military 
assistance. Kenya ($463.0 million) and Uganda ($278.6 million) were the largest 
single recipients of such funds. These allocations were in large part intended to train, 
e uip a d ad ise elite ou te te o is  fo es i  oth states, i ludi g Ke a s th 
Ranger Strike Forces and Special Boat U it a d the Uga da  People s Defe e Fo e 
Special Forces Group. 1075  Ethiopia ($86.1 million), Burundi ($51.4 million) and 
Djibouti ($44.5 million) were also obligated substantial sums of U.S. military 
assistance. Furthermore, the Horn of Africa was also obligated $112.2 million in 
Section 1207(n) assistance and $276 million in CTFP assista e du i g O a a s 
presidency.  
 
                                                          
te o is  i  East Af i a  hi h totalled $  illio . Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, “tate 
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Department of State <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/programs/index.htm#PREACT> [accessed 11 April 
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Figure 15: Military assistance obligations for AMISOM contributing states (in 
millions $), FY 2009-2016.1076  
 
 Burundi Djibouti Ethiopia Kenya Uganda 
Section 1206 $34.7 $23.9 $43.4 $237.8 $156.4 
PKO - - $4.6 $16.4 $58.7 
CTFP - - $18.7 $31.4 $9 
FMF $1 $10.7 $4.7 $14.6 $1.8 
Total $51.4 $44.5 $86.1 $463.0 $278.6 
 
Drilling down deeper into some of the exact military assistance given to states in the 
Horn of Africa as part of the military response to al-Shabaab, three specific 
authorities are worth unpacking here: (1) the Section 1206; (2) the Section 1207(n); 
and (3) the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. 
 
Section 1206  
 
Consistent with the overarching goals of the authority which were examined in 
chapter 4, Section 1206 funds were obligated to build the counterterrorism capacity 
of AMISOM contributing states. Kenya ($237.8 million) was the largest recipient of 
this assista e. A o e goal of these fu ds as to defe d the states  o de s f o  
raids by al-“ha aa s fo es. 1077  Uganda ($156.4 million), Somalia ($80 million), 
Burundi ($34.7 million) and Djibouti ($23.9 million) were also significant recipients of 
Section 1206 assistance. The obligation of these funds centred on building regional 
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ISR and SOF capacity. A detailed breakdown of some of the specific programmes 
obligated to these ends has been provided below: 
 
ISR: Four major Section 1206 projects were allocated to develop Kenya ISR 
capability: the FY 2013 & FY 2014 Aircraft and ISR capability projects ($15.7 
million each year); the FY2015 Raven Unmanned Aerial System project ($4.3 
million); and the FY 2015 Scan Eagle project ($13.6 million).1078 The latter two 
programmes, which funded the purchase of tactical reconnaissance drones, 
aimed to improve the operational reach of the Kenyan National Defence 
Forces.1079 In FY 2013, Uganda would also be allocated $4.2 million to fund 
the purchase of a hand-launched Raven drone reconnaissance system.1080 
A o di g to o e edia epo t, [t]he si ple, a e a-equipped Ravens were 
ideal for short- a ge su eilla e flights du i g … u a  attles ai ed at 
li e ati g Mogadishu f o  ilita ts .1081 
 
SOF: $44.8 million was allocated for Uganda and Burundi in FY 2010 in support 
of their counterterrorism operations in Somalia.1082 This project consisted of 
two parts. On the one hand, U.S. Marines trained Ugandan and Burundian 
fo es o  ho  to o f o t u a  a fa e [ ou te te o is ] th eats like 
improved explosive devices, complex obstacle reduction, counter-fire, and 
ight ope atio s .1083On the other, they were equipped to conduct these 
ope atio s th ough the p o isio  of ilita -grade personal protective gear, 
combat lifesaver training, as well as static and mobile surveillance 
s ste s . 1084  A further $18.8 million was jointly obligated in FY 2012 to 
Uga da a d Bu u di fo  CT “uppo t fo  Deplo e t to “o alia . 1085  In 
FY2015 two projects - Ranger Regiment Support and Transport Company 
($20.5 million) and Ranger Regiment ($15.2 million) - were allocated for 
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Ke a s ‘a ge  “OF u it.1086 $12.7 million was also allocated in FY 2015 for 
uildi g apa it  i  Uga da s “pe ial Fo es Co a d.1087  
 
Section 1207(n)  
 
As a region, East Africa was also allocated $112.2 million in Section 1207(n) assistance 
between FY 2012 and FY 2014.1088 This programme had t o ajo  goals: e ha e 
the capacity of the national military forces, security agencies serving a similar 
defense function, and border security forces of Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya to 
conduct counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda affiliates, and al 
“ha aa  a d [t]o e ha e the apa it  of atio al ilita  fo es pa ti ipati g i  
the African Union Mission in Somalia to conduct the counterterrorism operations 
des i ed . 1089  A comprehensive programme break-down of Section 1207(n) 
spending is currently unavailable. Nevertheless, according to one Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) report, $8 million was allocated in FY 2012 to Kenya to 
support its participation in AMISOM, shedding a limited light on how these funds 
were spent.1090 
 
Global Counterterrorism Partnership Fund 
 
As a region, East Africa was allocated $276 million in CTFP assistance between FY 
2015 and FY 2016. Somalia ($50 million), Kenya ($31.4 million), Ethiopia ($18.7 
million), Uganda ($9 million) were also allocated bilateral CTFP funding. According to 
the DOD s FY  udget e uest, these fu ds e e i te ded to uild AMI“OM 
Troop Contributing Country (TCC) capacity, promote interoperability, generate 
Somali security forces capability of joint operations with AMISOM, and create 
multilateral engagement opportunities with the goal of diminishing al-Shabaab (AS) 
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effe ti e ess i  East Af i a . 1091  CTFP assistance focused on enhancing partner 
capacity in four overarching areas:  
 
(1) the collection and analysis of ISR, through both manned or unmanned aircraft, 
to p o ide o e  at h fo  g ou d fo es, lo ate VEOs [Viole t E t e ist 
O ga isatio ], a d i fo  g ou d fo es  espo se 1092;  
 
(2) counter-i p o ised e plosi e de i e apa ilities, i ludi g i e esista t 
vehicles, mine detection equipment, re-declaring equipment, body armour, 
bomb suits, EOD [Explosive Ordnance Disposal] o ots, a d t ai i g 1093;  
 
(3) counterterrorism mobility, via the transfer of trucks and specialised vehicles;  
 
(4) and counterterrorism interdiction, through the provision of small arms, 
mortars and artillery to combat al-Shabaab.1094  
 
I  this ega d, CTFP fu ds e e e uested to aid i  eut alizi g [al-Shabaab], 
interdicting [violent extremist organisations] in the region, and neutralizing threats 
to egio al pa t e s a d U.“. i te ests .1095 
 
The largest single avenue of military assistance for the regional surrogates fighting 
al-Shabaab on the ground in Somalia, as noted earlier, was the PKO. In total, $1.48 
illio  as o ligated fo  this autho it  du i g O a a s p eside , ith these fu ds 
being unevenly distributed amongst both AMISOM contributing states and Somali 
National Security Forces. This type of security assistance serves a dual function. The 
military training, equipment and advice transferred to conduct peacekeeping 
missions is fungible enough to also be used for counterinsurgency (COIN) 
operations.1096 As Stokes and Raphael have argued, this mode of warfare has been a 
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key mechanism through which Washington has policed the challenge of antithetical 
social forces from below and maintained stability in key areas of the global south.1097 
The need to build such capabilities as part of the military response to al-Shabaab was 
highlighted by the DOS in their Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification. 
As was pointed out: 
 
[s]upporting [Somali National Security Forces] is critical to the overall effort to 
stabilize Mogadishu and south-central Somalia, as AMISOM cannot conduct 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations under its current 
mandate.1098 
 
When situated within the historical practices of U.S. military intervention in the 
glo al south, PKO fu di g a  e theo ised as ha i g ad a ed the U.“.  i pe ial 
interests in East Africa by working to build the capacity of AMISOM and Somali 
National Security Forces to conduct COIN operations.  
 
A similar logic can be theorised as having informed the SFA obligated to AMISOM 
contributing states via the Section 1206, Section 1207(n) and CTPF authorities. As 
noted above, the immediate aim of this military assistance was to build the 
counterterrorism capacity of, and interoperability between, AMISOM contributing 
states. A number of core capabilities were prioritised to this end, ISR, SOF and 
mobility primary amongst them. In this regard, the use of SFA as a part of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab can also be theorised as having had 
a dual fu tio . It o ked ot just to o tai  the affiliate s i di e t th eat to 
A e i a  atio al se u it , ut also the A e i a  state s i pe ial i te ests in the 
egio . As the DOD s FY  CTPF fu di g e uest detailed, fu ds o ligated ia the 
programme e e i te ded to oth p o ote egio al sta ilit , a e essa  
p e u so  fo  e ou agi g i est e t i  “o alia s fledgi g oil se to  a d i i isi g 
pira , a d aid [ egio al] pa t e s [i ] suppo ti g the t a sitio  f o  se u it  led  
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[AMISOM] to a Somalia-led mission to secure its own territory .1099 In this regard, the 
use of SFA programmes helped the O a a ad i ist atio  to s ua e the i le  of 
how to contain al-“ha aa s halle ge to the ep odu tio  of losed f o tie s a d 
open-doors, within the soft limits set by the spatial organisation of American power 
on how all administrations can intervene in the global south. 
 
Beyond this, paralleling the use of the programmes in Yemen, SFA was also a key 
mechanism through which the Obama administration attempted to contain al-
Shabaab within “o alia s o de s. This logi  is lea l  see  i  the fu ds o ligated ia 
the “e tio   autho it  to olste  Ke a s land and maritime border security 
du i g O a a s p eside . As as poi ted out i  a t o pa t se ies of diplo ati  
cables sent in 2007 from the American embassy in Nairobi specifically on the subject, 
[d]ue to the th eat of spill o e  effe ts f o  fighti g in Somalia, the Government of 
Kenya views effective border control as its top national security concern .1100 Section 
1206 funds would thus be used alongside those of other programmes to suppo t 
the development of both land and sea border security forces to counter the threat 
of incursions from Somalia- ased ilitias .1101 Between FY 2009 and FY 2010, three 
“e tio   p oje ts e e autho ised to uild the apa it  of Ke a s a iti e a d 
border security forces. The Kenya Border Security Package ($8.5 million) was 
i te ded to eate a espo se fo e that a  ou te  [al-Shabaab] infiltration from 
“o alia .1102 The Border Counterterrorism Security Package ($8.5 million) expanded 
the scope of the above programme, and sought to build the capacity of the Kenya 
Army, Ranger Strike Force and Fifth Kenya Rifles to not only police the border, but 
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conduct cross-border strikes into Somalia.1103 The Maritime Security Initiative ($15.2 
illio , o  the othe  ha d, p o ided t ai i g a d e uip e t to e pa d o itoring 
a d o t ol of Ke a s oastli es, i teg ati g the ‘egio al Ma iti e A a e ess 
Capa ilit  ith e isti g apa ilit  i  a  effo t to i ease the Ke a  Na s a ti it  
i  oastal o de  se u it  a d [ ou te te o is ] Ope atio s . 1104  Through the 
Section 1206 programme, the Obama administration could thus be understood to 
ha e o ked to ei fo e Ke a s la d a d a iti e o de s, the e  o ki g to 




This chapte  has iti all  e a i ed the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
the Somalia based al-“ha aa . The i lusio  of this a paig  as pa t of this thesis  
structured-focused comparison has contributed toward the richness of its study of 
U.S. counterte o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s 
presidency. As the first section of this chapter examined, U.S. counterterrorism 
ope atio s e pa ded steadil  i  “o alia up to a d du i g O a a s p eside . A 
limited campaign of direct actions was coupled with support for the AMISOM forces 
who were tasked with fighting al-Shabaab on the ground. The persistent condition of 
state ollapse ithi  “o alia p o ided the o ditio s fo  the affiliate s e pa sio  
after 2006, although the AMISOM counteroffensive which began in 2011 pushed the 
affiliate into pursuing a more asymmetrical strategy of resistance during the latter 
ea s of O a a s p eside .  
 
The second section of this chapter reached beyond the challenge which al-Shabaab 
presented to regional security, to carve out some of the political considerations 
hi h a  e theo ised as ha i g also a i ated the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
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response to the affiliate. Although there was shown to have been an international 
dimension to al-Shabaa s a ti ities, u like AQAP, these e e o fi ed to its 
immediate neighbourhood. On this basis, there was argued to be more at play with 
the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab than just 
ou te te o is . The affiliate s o testatio  of the te ito ial i teg it  of the “o ali 
state hindered the potential integration of its energy resources onto global energy 
markets. Its activities also indirectly contributed toward the piracy around the Horn 
of Africa, a source of considerable economic dislocation during the early years of 
O a a s p eside . O  this asis, al-Shabaab also challenged, if in a more indirect 
way than AQAP in Yemen, the practices of American imperialism from below.  
 
Tying this analysis together, the third and final section of this chapter examined the 
means of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Shabaab. Drone 
launched targeted and signature strikes were shown to have formed a component 
part of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Somalia, with the caveat that they were 
used on a comparatively smaller scale than in Yemen. They did not, however, form 
the e ti et  o  e e  the p edo i ate fo us of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to the affiliate. Alongside SOF and PMSC, they formed a constituent part of 
a small-footprint approach to counterterrorism which centred on the use of military 
assistance programmes. In addition to PKO funding, a string of SFA authorities were 
used to build the counterterrorism capacity of both Somalia security forces and 
AMISOM contributing states. These programmes can be read as having worked to 
poli e the affiliate s halle ge to the p a ti es of A e i a  i pe ialis  f o  elo . 
With this analysis now complete, our focus can now turn toward critically re-
e a i i g the ea s a d a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se 






Re-examining the means and drivers of the Obama administration’s 




The thi d a d fi al hapte  of this thesis  structured-focused comparison critically re-
e a i es the ea s a d d i e s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to 
AQIM. Speaking in January 2013, Secretary of Defence Leon E. Panetta outlined the 
ad i ist atio s o it e t to o f o ti g al-Qaeda as a th eat to ou  se u it  … 
whether it's in Pakistan or Somalia or Yemen or Mali .1105 Pa etta s i lusio  of Mali 
alongside Somalia and Yemen as sites of al-Qaeda s e pa sio  is pa ti ula l  
noteworthy due to later omissions. Obama did not e tio  his ad i ist atio s 
military response to AQIM during his September 2014 national speech in which he 
held up the st ateg  of taki g out te o ists ho th eate  us, hile suppo ti g 
pa t e s o  the f o t li es  as hi h had ee  su essfull  pu sued i  Ye e  a d 
“o alia fo  ea s .1106 Despite the “ahel s e e ge e as a e  f o tie  i  the Wa  
against al-Qaeda during his presidency, no direct strikes - whether from drones, 
manned aircraft or SOF - were conducted against the affiliate.1107 Instead the direct 
military response to AQIM was channelled entirely through regional and extra-
regional partners. On this basis, the administration is recognised to have pioneered 
a e  odel fo  ou te te o is  i  the “ahel, o e hi h depa ted i  i portant 
ways from the military response to AQAP and al-Shabaab.1108 The inclusion of this 
i po ta t ase ithi  this thesis  structured-focused comparison thus sheds 
alternative light on the means (if not necessarily the drivers) of U.S. counterterrorism 
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operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. The absence of any direct actions against 
AQIM suggests that the affiliate was not perceived as directly threatening U.S. 
interests (however defined). As Obama made clear in September 2014, his 
administration was committed to us[i g] fo e agai st a o e ho th eate s 
A e i a s o e i te ests, ut to o ilize pa t e s he e e  possi le to add ess 
oade  halle ges to i te atio al o de .1109 The 2015 National Security Strategy 
similarly noted that:  
 
[t]he threshold for military action is higher when our interests are not directly 
threatened. In such cases, we will seek to mobilize allies and partners to share 
the burden and achieve lasting outcomes.1110 
 
The absence of any direct strikes as part of the military response to AQIM thus poses 
a  i po ta t poi t of depa tu e f o   a al sis of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to AQAP and al-Shabaab in chapters 5 and 6. On this basis, it 
contributes significantly to the empirical richness of my overarching study of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
 
Before proceeding with this analysis however, the geographical scope of this 
hapte s e pi i al a al sis eeds to e iefl  ualified. AQIM e pa ded e o d its 
traditional centre of gravity in northern Algeria on three axes after 9/11: eastward, 
toward Libya and Tunisia; southward, toward the ungoverned spaces in the Sahel; 
and westward, toward Morocco and the Western Sahara.1111 Of these three lines of 
advance, the affiliate made its greatest inroads in the Sahel.1112 In both academic and 
policymaking circles, this region has been inconsistently defined. As with Zoubir, I 
understand it as encompassing Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and 
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Niger.1113 Th oughout  a al sis, pa ti ula  atte tio  is gi e  to AQIM s a ti ities 
within northern Mali where the affiliate came to exercise a loose suzerainty in the 
immediate aftermath of the 2012 civil war. To be clear, the implication of this tight 
geographical focus is that AQIM and its associated forces elsewhere in the region fall 
beyond the empirical scope of my analysis.1114 Likewise, the rise and activities of the 
then al-Qaeda adherent Boko Haram in West Africa are also not included as part of 




The first section of this chapter provides a narrative overview of the major 
developments in U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel up to, and during, 
O a a s p eside . This p o ides ke  o text for my empirical analysis of the means 
and drivers of the military response to AQIM in the remainder of this chapter. The 
counterterrorism architecture put in place by the Bush administration to facilitate 
the U.“.  e pa ded ilita  p ese e th oughout the region, principally the Trans-
Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), is discussed. Thereafter, the central 
ole of the A a  “p i g a d the  Malia  Ci il Wa  i  d i i g AQIM s e pa sio , 
a d  e te sio  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  response to the affiliate, is 
reviewed. 
 
Building on this foundation, in the second section of this chapter, the political 
e o o  a i ato s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM a e 
drawn out. Much of the existing literature on AQIM has adopted a descriptive rather 
than theoretical approach to studying the affiliate and its activities.1115 Sensitive to 
these li itatio s, I situate  stud  of AQIM s halle ge to the o e p a ti es of 
American imperialism in the Sahel within my overarching historical materialist 
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theoretical framework. Viewed through this prism, AQIM is shown to have contested 
both the territorial integrity of the Malian state and transnational access to the 
Sahel s e e g  a d i e al esou es. 
 
The third and final section of this chapter sheds alternative light on the means of the 
U.“. ou te te o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s 
presidency. It has two specific goals. One the one hand, I trace in rich empirical detail 
how the Obama administration adopted a revised version of the small footprint 
approach to counterterrorism which used drones to conduct Intelligence Surveillance 
and Reconnaissance (ISR) operations, not targeted and signature strikes. On the 
other, weaving through my historical materialist framework, I outline how the funds 
obligated under two security force assistance (SFA) authorities - the Section 1206 and 
the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund (CTPF) authorities - indirectly worked to 
o tai  AQIM s halle ge to the ep odu tio  of closed frontiers and open doors in 
the Sahel.  
 Situating the Obama administration’s military response to AQIM: the evolution of 
U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel after 9/11  
 
For much of the twentieth century, the Sahel (as with North-West Africa as a whole) 
was a region of generally peripheral importance to American foreign policy 
makers.1116 This calculus was altered, somewhat, by the onset of the War against al-
Qaeda. In the years immediately following the 9/11 attacks, DOD officials expressed 
o e s that the egio s u de -governed spaces provided fertile ground for al-
Qaeda s e pa sio .1117 Such concerns were given impetus in 2003 when the Salafist 
Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) - the group which would later rebranded 
                                                          
1116 Yahia H )ou i , The U ited “tates a d Magh e –“ahel “e u it , International Affairs, 85.5 (2009), 
977–95 (p. 982). 
1117 “peaki g i  , the DOD s ou t  di e to  fo  West Af i a, Col Vi  Nelso  oted that [ ]e ha e 
said for a long time that if you squeeze terrorists in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and other places, they 
will find new places to operate and one of those is the Sahel-Magh e . As he o ti ued, [i]f ou 
drive them out of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and you drive them out of Iraq, where do they go? Large, 
ungoverned kinds of space, kind of Arabic, kind of Muslim- that ould e the e . “ee Lisa Burgess and 
Pat Di kso , “t ipes  Q&A o  DOD s Pa  “ahel I itiati e , Stars and Stripes, 2004 
<https://www.stripes.com/news/stripes-q-a-on-dod-s-pan-sahel-initiative-1.18537#.WduyT2hSyUl> 




itself as AQIM -1118 raised over $5 million in ransoms from the German government 
for the release of 32 kidnapped European tourists.1119 
 
The twin goals of deepening regional security cooperation and building partner 
ou te te o is  apa it  a i ated the Bush ad i ist atio s fi st ajo  
counterterrorism initiative in the region, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). Launched in 
November 2003, this multilateral security cooperation programme aimed to build 
the apa it  of egio al se u it  fo es to protect borders, track [the] movement of 
people, o at te o is , a d e ha e egio al oope atio  a d sta ilit .1120 It 
covered four states: Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. American SOF and Marine 
Corps units provided training in basic marksmanship, operational planning, patrolling 
and navigation to partner security forces as part of this programme.1121  As one 
EUCOM counterterrorism officer explained, alluding to limits which I have previously 
argued the spatial arrangement of American power has exerted on the projection of 
U.“. oe i e po e  i to the glo al south, the P“I as i te ded to e p e e tati e, 
so that e do t ha e to put oots on the ground here in North Africa as we did in 
Afgha ista .1122 
 
                                                          
1118 AQIM s i ediate oots a  e t a ed to Alge ia s u gled atte pt at de o ati  li e alisatio  
in the decade prior to 9/11. In 1991, as an Islamist coalition looked poised to win a majority within the 
ou t s pa liament, the Algerian military intervened to annul the election result. In response, the 
Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA) took up arms against the government. In the decade which 
followed, the GIA fought a brutal insurgency against the Algerian government, leading upwards to the 
deaths of 200,000. In protest to the growing bloodiness of this conflict, several generals broke away 
from the GIA in 1998 to fo  the i al G“PC. Whilst the G“PC s emir Abdelmalek Droukdel would go 
as far as to pledge allegiance to Osama Bin Laden in September 2003, this bayat would not formally 
be accepted until September 2006. Boeke, p. 919. 
1119 Lia e Boudali, The T a s-“aha a Cou te te o is  Pa t e ship , The Combating Terrorism Center, 
2007, p. 2 <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466542.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]. In an 
example of the regional security cooperation which subsequent U.S. military assistance efforts would 
promote, the leader of the GSPC cell responsible for this plot (a former Algerian paratrooper popularly 
k o  as El Pa a  as aptu ed afte  ha i g ee  pu sued a oss the Sahel by the security forces 
of Mali, Algeria, Niger and Chad. Boudali, p. 2. 
1120  Offi e of Cou te te o is , Pa  “ahel I itiati e ,  <https:// -
2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/14987.htm> [accessed 3 March 2017]. 
1121 Lia e Boudali, The T a s-“aha a Cou te te o is  Pa t e ship , The Combating Terrorism Center, 
2007, pp. 1–9 <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a466542.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]; p.4. 
1122  C aig “ ith, U.“. T ai i g Af i a  Fo es to Up oot Te o ists , The New York Times, 2004 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/11/world/us-training-african-forces-to-uproot-




Whilst the PSI was generally considered a success by both U.S. officials and 
participants, it was criticised by then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
African Affairs Theresa Whelan as a little it of a Ba d-Aid app oa h  to 
counterterrorism due to its limited size. 1123  In 2005, the PSI was subsequently 
absorbed into the larger Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCP). 
‘e og ised as ei g the p i a  U.“. ou te te o is  i itiative in northwest 
Af i a , this DO“ headed programme had a far more ambitious mandate.1124 This was 
to: 
 
build longterm capacity to defeat terrorist organizations and facilitation 
networks; disrupt efforts to recruit, train, and provision terrorists and 
extremists; counter efforts to establish safe havens for terrorist organizations; 
disrupt foreign fighter networks that may attempt to operate outside the 
region; address underlying causes of radicalization; and increase the capacity 
of moderate leaders to positively influence vulnerable populations.1125 
 
Ma ki g a sig ifi a t e pa sio 1126  of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the 
region, the number of participant states jumped from the four PSI members (Chad, 
Mali, Mauritania and Niger) to include new partners in the Maghreb (Algeria, 
Morocco and Tunisia), the Sahel (Burkina Faso) and West Africa (Cameroon, Nigeria 
a d “e egal . The DOD s o t i utio  to the T“CP - Operation Enduring Freedom-
Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) - began in June 2005. Paralleling the PSI, a core focus of the 
TSCP was to build partner infantry, special force, intelligence, communication and 
logistical capacity; to encourage regional counterterrorism cooperation through 
hosti g o fe e es a d o kshops; a d fa ilitate pa ti ipatio  i  AF‘ICOM s a ual 
                                                          
1123 Quoted in Lawrence Cli e, Cou te te o is  “t ateg  i  the “ahel , Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
30.10 (2007), 889–99 (p. 893). 
1124 Government Accou ta ilit  Offi e, U.“. Effo ts i  No th est Af i a Would Be “t e gthe ed  
E ha ed P og a  Ma age e t , Government Accountability Office, 2014, p. 1 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664337.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
1125  Da iel Be ja i , “e ate Co ittee o  Fo eig  ‘elatio s  Subcommittee on African Affairs 
E a i i g U.“. Cou te te o is  P io ities, “t ateg  A oss Af i a s “ahel ‘egio , Department of 
State, 2009 <https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/BenjaminTestimony091117a.pdf> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 




Flintlock training exercise.1127 Like the P“I, the T“CP o ked to effectively build up 
pro-A e i a  su ogates ho ould suppo t U“ egio al o je ti es .1128 
 
GSPC formally rebranded itself as AQIM in January 2007, becoming al-Qaeda s 
second regional affiliate after al-Qaeda in Iraq. 2007 was also a significant year in the 
evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel as it marked the height of 
AQIM s a ti it  ithi  Alge ia. I  De e e  of that ea , the g oup o du ted 
simultaneous suicide bombing against the UN regional headquarters and the 
Algerian Constitutional Court, both based in Algiers.1129 These attacks triggered a 
clampdown by Algerian security forces on the affiliate's activities within the state. 
Increasingly squeezed in its traditional centre of gravity, AQIM pivoted its focus 
southward toward the Sahel.1130 A key pilla  of this southe  st ateg  as to o k 
with, and at other times more indirectly through, other militant groups.1131 Whilst 
this as a egotiated p o ess i  hi h g oups ould ofte  peel a a  f o  AQIM s 
orbit, tactical alliances were a key engine of the affiliate s e pa sio  th oughout the 
“ahel du i g O a a s p eside .1132  
                                                          
1127 The principal aim of the annual Flintlock training exercise is to build regional counterterrorism 
capacity and interoperability of states in the Sahel through instruction from U.S. and European SOF. 
Lesle  Wa e , The T a s “aha a Cou te  Te o is  Pa t e ship: Buildi g Pa t e  Capa it  to Cou te  
Te o is  a d Viole t E t e is , Center for Complex Operations, 2014, pp. 36–38 
<https://lesleyannewarner.files.wordpress.com/2014/05/tsctp-building-partner-capacity-to-
counter-terrorism-and-violent-extremism2.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
1128 ‘ a , Wa  i  Cou t ies We A e Not at Wa  ith : The Wa  o  Te o o  the Pe iphe  f o  
Bush to O a a , p. . 
1129 A o di g to the A e i a  diplo ati  staff i  Algie s, these atta ks highlighted AQIM s adoption 
of the playbook of insurgent tactics employed by AQI: suicide bombings, kidnappings and IED attacks. 
Whilst AQIM as at this ti e e  fa  f o  ei g a le to i g do  the Alge ia  go e e t , it 
as oted that it [ ould] e tai l  ake it look eak a d foolish . Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: 
ALGIE‘“ _a. Afte  The Latest Algie s Bo i gs: This Will Be A Lo g Haul .  De e e  .  
<https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07ALGIERS1809_a.html> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
1130 To facilitate this expansion, two katibas attalio s  e e esta lished i  AQIM s southe  zo e  
of operations: the Tarik Ibn Ziad Brigade, commanded by Abdelhamid Abu Zeid and the Al Mulhatamin 
Brigade, commanded by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. A d e Le “age, The E ol i g Th eat of Al Qaeda i  the 
Isla i  Magh e , Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2011, pp. 1–16 
<http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratforum/SF-268.pdf> [accessed 10 October 
2017]; p.12. 
1131 Andrew Le o i h, AQIM s Fo alized Fle i ilit , How Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and 
the Islamic State, 2017, pp. 56–67 (p. 57) 
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 
1132  Following a st i g of disag ee e ts ith AQIM s emir Droukdal, Mokhtar Belmokhtar would 





The evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel entered a new phase 
following the Arab Spring.1133 The political and military dislocation produced in its 
wake provided AQIM with an opportunity to expand its regional footprint. The 
collapse of the Muammar Gaddafi regime in Libya was particularly noteworthy in this 
ega d. O  the o e ha d, AQIM s aptu e of a  of the eapo  sto kpiles that 
Gaddafi had hidden throughout the ou t  helped t a sfo  it i to o e of the est 
armed Al-Qaeda f a hises i  the o ld .1134 On the other, the collapse of Gaddafi 
government provided AQIM a new sanctuary in southern Libya from which to 
operate and coordinate its operations elsewhere.1135 As the DO“ s Coo di ato  fo  
Counterterrorism Daniel Benjami explained during this time, the overthrow of the 
Gaddafi regime p ofou dl  affe ted ou t ies i  the “ahel  e ause the su se ue t 
dispe sal of a s, efugees, a d the etu  of p e iousl  exiled fighters, [that] 
significantly changed the situation in Mali and also raised concerns in Algeria, Chad, 
Mau ita ia, a d Nige .1136  
 
The roll-out of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel was given further 
impetus by the Malian Civil War. Working closely with Ansar al-Dine and the 
Mo e e t fo  U it  a d Jihad i  West Af i a MUJWA , AQIM s southe  igades 
supported the Tuareg's rebellion against the Malian government. Following the coup 
d tat hi h ousted P eside t A adou Tou a i Tou  ea lier in the year, the 
National Liberation Movement for the Azawad (MNLA) declared the independence 
                                                          
Murabitun. Following the unconfirmed killing of Mokhtar Belmokhtar in late 2015, al-Murabitun was 
reabsorbed into AQIM.  
1133 Reeve and Pelter, p. 2. 
1134 Alta G o elaa  a d Hussei  “olo o , The O igi s, Ideolog  a d De elop e t of Al-Qaeda in the 
Isla i  Magh e , Africa Review, 7.2 (2015), 149–61; p.154. 
1135 Boeke, p. 924. 
1136 Da iel Be ja i , L‘A, Boko Ha a , Al-“ha aa , AQIM, a d Othe  “ou es of I sta ilit  i  Af i a , 
Department of State, 2012 <https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/rm/2012/188816.htm> [accessed 
10 October 2017]. Striking a similar cord in the aftermath of the September 2012 attack on the 
American Embassy in Benghazi, Hillary Clinton similarly emphasized that ith a la ge  safe ha e  a d 
increased freedom to manoeuvre, terrorists are seeking to extend their reach and their networks in 
ultiple di e tio s [i  the egio ] .  The ad i ist atio  as o se ue tl  o ki g to dis upt te o ist 
organisations in [Libya], whilst also stepping [its] counterterrorism efforts across the Maghreb and the 
“ahel . “te e s M e s, Cli to  “uggests Li k to Qaeda Offshoot i  Deadl  Li a Atta k , The New York 
Times, 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/world/africa/clinton-cites-clear-link-between-




of the Azawad peoples in April 2012.1137 After marginalising the MNLA, AQIM came 
to exercise a loose sovereignty over much of northern Mali including the key cities of 
Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. On the behest of the transitional Malian government, 
France and a coalition of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
e e s i te e ed to halt AQIM s ad a e i to southe  Mali.1138 Over the course 
of Operation Serval, which began in January 2013, AQIM is reported to have 
sustained significant losses. French forces, fighting alongside 2,000 Chadian troops, 
quickly recaptured much of northern Mali. Rather than trying to defend this territory, 
AQIM elected to melt back across the Malian border to their safe-havens in Algeria 
and Niger. Over the course of Operational Serval, the Obama administration provided 
significant logistical and intelligence support to French forces. This included ISR and 
aerial refuelling.1139 The spigot , as o e defe e offi ial put it, as ope ed all the 
a .1140 A o di g to Defe se “e eta  Leo  Pa etta, [t]he fu da e tal o je ti e 
[of U.S. military support was] to ensure that AQIM -al-Qaeda- never establishes a 
base of operations in Mali or an he e else .1141 
 
Unlike the later Saudi-led intervention into the Yemeni Civil War, Operation Serval 
as a ta ti al su ess. Not o l  as AQIM s ad a e to a d southe  Mali halted, 
but the affiliate was squeezed out of the safe-haven it had maintained in the north 
of the country. On the strategic level however, Operation Serval failed to resolve 
many of the underlying causes of the Malian Civil War, the Tuaregs political 
marginalization and economic underdevelopment principal amongst them. 1142 
Despite its substantial losses in both man and material, AQIM remained enmeshed 
i  the egio s politi al a d e o o i  fa i  - a reflection of both the strength of its 
ties to local militant groups and its flexible approach to advancing the cause of Salafi-
                                                          
1137 )ou i , The “aha a-“ahel Quag i e: ‘egio al a d I te atio al ‘a ifi atio s , pp. –55. 
1138 ECOWAS troop contributing states included Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ghana, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Togo. La e e Cli e, No ads, Isla ists, a d “oldie s: The “t uggles fo  No the  Mali , 
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 36.8 (2013), 617–34 (p. 630). 
1139 Reeve and Pelter, p. 10. 
1140 Quoted in Da id “a ge  a d E i  “ h itt, U.“. Weighi g Ho  Mu h Help to Gi e F a e s Milita  
Ope atio  i  Mali , The New York Times, 2013 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/world/africa/us-weighing-how-much-help-to-give-frances-
military-operation-in-mali.html?mcubz=3> [accessed 10 October 2017]. 
1141 Gearan, DeYoung, and Whitlock. 




jihadism in the region.1143  To support the Malian government in its post-conflict 
reconstruction efforts, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established in April 2013. This 6,000 strong 
peacekeeping force was tasked with suppo t[i g] the politi al p o ess a d a [i g] 
out a number of security-related stabilisation tasks with a focus on major population 
e t es a d li es of o u i atio .1144 Gi e  the issio s peace enforcement 
mandate, in northern Mali, the UN is argued to have gone to war against AQIM, with 
many Western European states contributing troops to this mission.1145 In addition to 
other avenues of logistical and material support, the Obama administration provided 
MINUSMA over $115 million in assessed contributions during its first eighteen 
months of operation. 1146  Continuing the pattern of bilateral support which 
underpinned Operation Serval, AFRICOM also provided logistical support to 
Operation Barkhane, F a e s se i-permanent deployment of 4,000 troops to 
Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mali and Mauritania in support of regional 
counterterrorism operations. The value of these defence services, which included 
troop transportation and aerial refuelling, was put at $95 million between 2013 and 
2015.1147  
 
In summary, the narrative of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel over the 
course of War against al-Qaeda was one of expansion. As was also the case in Yemen 
and Somalia, this was neither a linear nor deterministic process. Rather, it was one 
driven by the continued deterioration of the security situation in the region. Key in 
                                                          
1143 A d e  Le o i h, AQIM s Fo alized Fle i ilit , How Al-Qaeda Survived Drones, Uprisings,and 
the Islamic State, 2017, pp. 56–67 
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus153-Zelin.pdf> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]; 
1144  MINU“MA: U ited Natio s “ta ilizatio  Missio  i  Mali ,  
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/background.shtml> [accessed 10 October 
2017]. 
1145  For a more detailed discussion about these dynamics, see Joh  Ka ls ud, The UN at Wa : 
Examining the Consequences of Peace-Enforcement Mandates for the UN Peacekeeping Operations 
i  the CA‘, the D‘C a d Mali , Third World Quarterly, 36.1 (2015), 40–54. 
1146 Beyond this, the administration had also committed itself to providing up to $173 million in 
logisti al suppo t, t ai i g, a d iti al e uip e t, su h as ehi les a d o u i atio s, to Af i a  
peacekeepers deploying to MINUSMA and its predecessor, the African-led International Support 
Missio  i  Mali AFI“MA . The White House, FACT “HEET: U.“. “uppo t fo  Pea ekeepi g i  Af i a . 





this regard was the Arab Spring and the Malian Civil War, which were two major 
atal sts fo  AQIM s e pa sio  a d,  e te sio , the ollout of U.“. suppo t fo  
counterterrorism operatio s a oss the egio . As has ee  a gued, AQIM as an 
amorphous, resilient, and adaptive terrorist organization that has shown 
e t ao di a  sta i g po e  i  the fa e of ou te te o is  ope atio s . 1148  Its 
evolution both institutionally - as the GSPC gave way to AQIM - and geographically - 
as its focus of operations shifted away from its traditional centre of gravity in Algeria 
southward toward the Sahel - was mirrored by the formalisation of the U.S. 
counterterrorism architecture in the region. Founded in 2005, the TSCP remained an 
important part of these efforts and, as is examined in more detail in the last section 
of this chapter, was supported by the use of other SFA authorities. 
 
Re-examining the drivers of the Obama administration’s military response to 
AQIM 
 
The first section of this chapter outlined the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in the Sahel during the War against al-Qaeda. With this foundation in 
place, my attention now turns toward drawing out some of the alternative animators 
of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to the affiliate. Whilst the th eat 
which AQIM was framed by American policymakers as presenting to American 
p i a  as o tested at poi ts du i g O a a s p eside , it as ge e all  
understood as principally threatening regional stability rather than American security. 
Whilst AQIM may have lacked the ambition to launch transnational attacks against 
the continental U.S. it did take aim at both the territorial integrity of the Malian state 
a d t a s atio al a ess to the “ahel s ate ial esou es. B  itself, this halle ge to 
the practices of American imperialism does not entirely explain the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  esponse to the affiliate. What it does do, however, is to 
afford a richer understanding of the political economy animators of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in the region.    
 
                                                          




AQIM s challenge to American and regional security 
 
The exact challenge which AQIM p ese ted to A e i a  p i a  as hotl  de ated  
du i g O a a s p eside .1149 Within the academic literature, some argued that the 
threat which the affiliate presented to American security had been exaggerated.1150 
More controversially, others claimed that it had been entirely fabricated as a pretext 
to justify the rollout of U.S. and Algerian counterterrorism operations across the 
region.1151 Setting these debates to one side for the moment, the challenge which 
American policymakers themselves claimed AQIM presented to American primacy 
as o tested at poi ts du i g O a a s p eside . The p i a  poi t of o te tio  
he e as hethe , as AQIM s e i  A del alek D oukdel lai ed du i g a  
interview with the New York Times, the affiliate ould ge ui el  ot hesitate in 
ta geti g [the U.“] he e e  e a  a d he e e  it is o  this pla et .1152  
 
Prior to the Malian Civil War, AQIM was generally portrayed as a potential rather 
than immediate threat to American security. Whilst it may have aspired to attack the 
U.S., it was generally understood to lack the capacity to do so. Although 
a k o ledgi g that AQIM posed a persistent threat to western individuals in the 
Sahel, including our embassies and diplomats, as well as tourists, business-people, 
and humanitarian wo ke s , Daniel Benjamin insisted in November 2009 for example 
that the affiliate a ot se iousl  th eate  go e e ts o  egio al sta ilit , o  is 
it poised to gai  sig ifi a t suppo t a o g the egio s populatio .1153 The 2012 
Malian Civil War led some to o test this a ati e. AQIM aspi e[s] to o du t 
e e ts o e oadl  a oss the egio , a d e e tuall  to the U ited “tates  
AF‘ICOM s o a de  Ge e al Ca te  Ha  i sisted a ou d this ti e.1154 By the 
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1150 )ou i , The U ited “tates a d Magh e –“ahel “e u it . 
1151 See Kee a , Al Qaeda i  the West, fo  the West . 
1152  A  I te ie  With A del alek D oukdal , The New York Times, 2008 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/world/africa/01transcript-droukdal.html?mcubz=3> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. 
1153 Be ja i , “e ate Co ittee o  Fo eig  ‘elatio s  “u o ittee o  Af i a  Affai s E a i i g 
U.S. Counterterro is  P io ities, “t ateg  A oss Af i a s “ahel ‘egio . 
1154  Ale is A ieff, C isis i  Mali , Congressional Research Service, 2013, p. 13 




lose of O a a s p eside  ho e e , Ha s su esso  at AFRICOM - General 
Waldhauser - had walked back this assessment. Speaking in June 2016, he reiterated 
that AQIM etai ed the apa ilit  a d i te t to o du t atta ks o  este  ta gets 
and posed a significant threat to U.S./western interests and regional sta ilit . 
Ne e theless, as he o ti ued, it does not pose a th eat to the U.“. ho ela d .1155  
 
Ge e al Waldhause s assess e t that AQIM posed the g eate  th eat to regional 
(not American) security holds water. In contrast to AQAP, AQIM did not attempt to 
o du t a t a s atio al atta k agai st the o ti e tal U.“. du i g O a a s 
presidency. Intuitively, this may be explained by the greater weight which AQIM 
pla ed o  F a e a d to a lesse  deg ee “pai  as its p i ipal fa  e e .1156 Even 
here though, whilst the affiliate readily attacked the former colonial powers' 
commercial interests throughout the Sahel (more on this below), it was unable to 
conduct a successful strike against the European mainland.1157 Its operations were 
instead predominately focused o  the “ahel a d the ea  e e . To this e d, AQIM 
conducted large scale terrorist attacks on hotels in Bamako (November 2015) and 
Ouagadougou (January 2016), whilst also continuing to target Europeans working 
within the region. Beyond this, AQIM also conducted sophisticated raids against 
security forces throughout the region. To put the scale of these into some 
perspective, following its authorisation in 2013, the MINUMSA quickly became one 
of the loodiest UN pea ekeepi g issio s i  the o ga isatio s history.1158 AQIM, 
like al-Qaeda s affiliates i  the A a ia  Pe i sula a d the Ho  of Af i a, e a e 
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proficient users of Improvised Explosive Devices, killing dozens of MINUSMA and 
Malian security forces personnel in the process.1159 
 
AQIM s challenge to closed frontiers in the Sahel 
 
Whilst AQIM may not have directly threatened American security, it did take aim at 
the te ito ial i teg it  of states th oughout the egio . The affiliate s ulti ate, lo g-
te  goal as to o e th o  the apostate  go e e ts which exercised political 
sovereignty in Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia.1160 As its emir 
Abdelmalek Droukdal noted during his 2008 interview with The New York Times, 
AQIM ai ed to es ue ou  ou t ies f o  the te ta les of these i inal regimes 
that et a ed thei  eligio , a d thei  people   eati g a  Isla i  aliphate 
covering these territories.1161 A prerequisite for accomplishing this goal was to expel 
all Weste  i flue e f o  the egio . As D oukdal agai  e plai ed, e seek to 
liberate the Islamic Maghreb from the sons of France and Spain and from all symbols 
of treason and employment for the outsiders, and protect it from the foreign greed 
a d the usade s hege o .1162  
 
The Sahel was a fertile ground for expansion in this regard. It ranked amongst the 
least economically developed regions in the world.1163 States in the Sahel confronted 
a range of socio-economic challenges ranging from food, water, and medical 
insecurities, high unemployment, and rapid population growth. On the basis of these 
halle ges, so e ha e du ed the egio  “ahelista  i  the efe e e to the safe 
haven which al-Qaeda s o e had ee  a le to a e out fo  itself i  Afgha ista  
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during the 1990s.1164 Whilst there is a degree of hyperbole in these claims, AQIM was 
nevertheless successful in contesting the territorial integrity of the Malian state. 
 
The Malian government, like that in Yemen, was unable to project its authority 
throughout its entire borders. The semi-nomadic Tuareg had taken up arms against 
the go e e t i  Ba ako th ee ti es follo i g the state s i depe de e f o  
France in 1960.1165 This eth i  g oup, hi h ade up te  pe  e t of the ou t s 
entire population, felt politically and economically disenfranchised within the Malian 
state.1166 In a gam it desig ed to i i ise the Tua eg s a i osit , Malia  se u it  
forces were withdrawn from the north of country during the 2000s.1167 This security 
a uu , oupled ith o the  Mali s ugged topog aph , p o ided AQIM a  ideal 
safe-haven from which to contest the territorial integrity of the Malian state.1168 
Mokhta  Bel okhta , head of o e of AQIM s southe  igades fo  e a ple, a ied 
i to se e al p o i e t Tua eg t i es, tethe i g the  to AQIM s o it.1169 AQIM also 
deepened its ties to the Tuareg by publicly condemning the Malian governments' 
heavy-handed reprisals in northern Mali.1170 The relationship between AQIM and the 
Tuareg was strengthened by their collaboration in narcotic and people trafficking 
within the Sahel.1171 As Boas has a gued, AQIM should ot just be viewed as a 
predatory, external force in northern Mali, but also as an actor that has managed to 
i teg ate i to lo al o u ities o e  ti e .1172  
 
After squeezing out the Tuareg, AQIM came to exercise a loose suzerainty over much 
of northern Mali from the summer of 2012 until the beginning of Operation Serval in 
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January 2013. 1173  Whilst AQIM s e i  D oukdel a ed agai st the full a d 
i ediate i positio  of “ha i a la , he e e theless i sisted that pla es of d ugs, 
al ohol a d i o alit  had to e losed i ediatel .1174 AQIM similarly worked to 
provide basic social services such as healthcare, water and electricity in the territory 
it controlled.1175 Public order was also to be maintained. As Droukdel made clear:  
 
[t]he aim of building these bridges is to make it clear that our Mujehadin are 
no longer isolated in society, and to integrate with the different factions, 
including the big tribes and the main rebel movement and tribal chiefs.1176 
 
Elu idati g fu the  light o  the affiliate s halle ge to the ep odu tio  of losed 
f o tie s i  the “ahel, these a ti ities e e fu ded th ough AQIM s i ol e e t i  
the illicit trade in drugs, cigarettes, and people, and its kidnapping of Western 
tourists.1177 AQIM is estimated to have raised tens of millions of dollars each year 
through such activities.1178 Beyond this challenge to the territorial integrity of the 
Malian state, AQIM also took aim at transnational access to the egio s oil a d 
mineral resources. 
  
AQIM s challenge to open-doors in the Sahel  
 
The “ahel, it has e e tl  ee  a gued, is o El Do ado i  the sa d .1179 According 
to t o of the leadi g s hola s o  the egio , the e has ee  a idesp ead th of 
“ahelia  i e al a d othe  i hes . 1180  The veracity of such claims need to be 
qualified. Although the region ranks amongst the poorest and least economically 
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developed markets in the world, it is nevertheless the site of several resources which 
are key to the global economy. Of particular note here are the uranium mines of 
northern Niger owned by the French mining firm AREVA. These have provided France 
with forty percent of the uranium needed for its national energy production.1181 
Beyond this, the Sahel is a core trade and is a migration nexus which connects the 
Mediterranean with sub-Saharan Africa. Given this geography, it has the capacity to 
incubate instability which can then spill-over into more important sites of American 
imperialism including the key energy producing states of the Gulf of Guinea.1182 As 
Pai te  has a gued, so e a eas of the glo al south ha e ee  dee ed ital   U.“. 
poli ake s ot e ause of thei  i t i si  i po ta e i  te s of thei  i te al 
resources but because they were strategically located and thus crucial to the control 
of othe  o e i t i si all  alua le a eas .1183 Beyond this, the Sahel was also an 
important site of U.S. imperialism because it contained Algeria, a key energy 
producing state.  
 
Algeria has been recognised by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) as being a 
sig ifi a t sou e  of oil a d gas fo  glo al a kets.1184 Not only is the country the 
largest producer of natural gas in Africa but, with an estimated 12.2 billion barrels of 
proven crude oil reserve, it is the o ti e t s thi d la gest oil p odu e .1185 Europe 
has ee  the la gest e ipie t of Alge ia s ude oil e po ts a ou ti g fo  
approximately 76% of this trade in 2015.1186 Consolidating transnational access to 
these sizeable oil and gas reserves has historically been the primary animator of U.S.-
Alge ia  elatio s. A Ma   epo t itte   the U.“. s Natio al E e g  Poli  
De elop e t G oup, fo  e a ple, di e tl  spelt out the eed to ope  up a eas of 
thei  e e g  se to s to fo eig  i est e t .1187 Indeed, as pointed out by the CRS, 
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U.“.-Alge ia elatio s a e highl  fo used o  ou te te o is  a d Alge ia s oil a d 
gas se to .1188 
 
Whilst AQIM may have not directly threatened U.S. national security, it did take 
deliberate aim at Algerian oil and gas production. Speaking in 2008, Abdelmalek 
D oukdel held up the Alge ia  states  isapp op iatio  of the ou t s oil ese es 
as a ki g a o gst the g eatest ki d of i e a d theft agai st ou  atio , a d 
among the greatest methods of looting and robbery that these robber governments 
a e ha a te ized ith . 1189 As he continued:  
 
the beneficiaries of the energy revenues in the first place are the American 
and European economy, followed by the thieves that are ruling the country. 
The rest is spent to fight the jihad and the mujahedeen by acquiring weapons 
that are directed only towards the chests of the Muslims, and airplanes that 
do t stop shelli g the est hild e  of the atio  i  the ou tai s.1190 
 
Consistent with these claims, AQIM attacked oil production, transportation, and 
storage sites in Algeria. The most well documented of these attacks was the 2013 
strike led by al-Mulathamun - an AQIM splinter group headed by al-Mulathamun - on 
the gas field near In Amenas. This site, which was jointly owned by BP and the 
Alge ia  oil o pa  “o at a h, a ou ted fo  a te th of the ou t s a ual gas 
production.1191 132 foreign nationals were held hostage by al-Mulathamun, including 
7 Americans.1192 Beyond these human costs, the In Amenas attack also disrupted 
Alge ia s atu al gas p odu tio   da agi g t o of the th ee p o essi g t ai s used 
at the facility to prepare natural gas for transportation.1193 By that year, AQIM would 
similarly attack the jointly owned BP and Statoil gas plant near the town of In 
Salah. 1194  In a statement released in the aftermath of this operation, AQIM 
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a ou e[d] to all Weste  o pa ies i esti g i  shale gas that e ill ta get ou 
in a direct way, and we will use all our capabilities to deter you from these projects 
that are ha ful to ou  e i o e t a d a e eje ted  ou  so iet .1195  
 
AQIM s atta ks e e ot est i ted, ho e e , to oil a d gas sites. Othe  e t a ti e 
industries in the Sahel were also targeted, including the French owned uranium 
mines in northern Niger. In May 2013, AQIM orchestrated a suicide attack on the 
Somair mine in the town of Arlit, killing one worker and injuring fourteen others.1196 
Three years prior to this attack, five French nationals had been kidnapped in the 
region including an employee of the Areva Corporation which was the single largest 
i esto  i  o the  Nige s uranium mines. 1197  In response to these direct and 
indirect attacks on its economic interests in the region, France is reported to have 
sent SOF to the region in January 2013 to protect these interests at the same time 
that Operation Serval was getting underway.1198 
 
Re-examining the means of the Obama administration’s military response to 
AQIM 
 
The first section of this chapter traced the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in the Sahel during the War against al-Qaeda. In the second section of this 
chapter, I continued to draw out the political economy animators of the rollout of 
counterterrorism operations in the region: containing the challenge which the 
affiliate presented to the reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors in the 
Sahel. In the third and last section of this chapter, the final three questions of my 
structured-focused comparison are addressed. The aim of my analysis here is to shed 
alternative light on the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. I 
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argue that the Obama administration adopted a reconfigured version of the small-
footprint approach to counterterrorism which employed drones as an indirect - 
rather than direct - tool of U.S. coercive power. As in the Arabian Peninsula and the 
Horn of Africa, military assistance programmes are shown to have been at the heart 
of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. Weaving through my historical 
materialist framework, I then document how the funds obligated under the Section 
1206 and the Global Counterterrorism Partnership authorities worked to fill in the 
cracks in the circuits of global capitalism which were perceived to have been opened 




The guidi g philosoph  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM has 
ee  aptl  su a ised as leadi g f o  the side .1199 Unlike in the counterterrorism 
campaigns against AQAP and al-Shabaab, no drone strikes are reported to have been 
lau hed agai st AQIM o  its asso iate fo es du i g O a a s p eside . As Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan made clear in May 
, it as just a ph si al i possi ilit  that the U.“. ould o du t u ilate al 
counterterrorism operations in the region.1200 Speaking in November 2009, Daniel 
Benjamin reiterated that: 
 
countries [in the region] have made it clear that they do not want the United 
States to take a more direct or visible operational role, but welcome 
assistance from the United States and other third-party countries.1201  
 
As AQIM s g ip o  o the  Mali tighte ed i  late , O a a s ou te te o is  
adviser John Brennan is reported to have met CIA, DOD and DOS officials to discuss 
the possibility of conducting targeted strikes in the country. 1202  These were, 
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a o di g to so e, pe haps the est ad idea a aila le i  Mali .1203 Yet, as AFRICOM 
chief General Ha  pu li l  eite ated du i g this ti e, the e e e o pla s fo  U.“. 
di e t ilita  i te e tio  in Mali.1204 Of all three of the campaigns studied as part 
of this thesis structured-focused comparison, the military response to AQIM thus 
provides the strongest critique of the drone-centrism of the overarching IR and U.S. 
foreign policy literatures. As discussed below, the craft played an important role in 
the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM. Thei  use, ho e e , ould 
be restricted to an ISR capacity. It would be France, not the U.S., which would be 
tasked with conducting the bulk of direct actions against AQIM, with the Obama 
administration providing significant logistical support to this end.1205  
 
MQ-  ‘eape s ope ated  the U.“. Ai  Fo e e e se t to the “ahel at the height of 
the Malian Civil War. They were not authorised, however, to conduct targeted or 
signature strikes as they were in Somalia and Yemen.1206 Co siste t ith [o] e of 
the most st iki g aspe ts of the e pa di g U“ ilita  p ese e i  Af i a , the  e e 
instead deployed in a tactical ISR capacity.1207 In January 2013, it was reported that 
Nige s p eside t Muha adu Isufu had o se ted to A e i a  d o es ei g ased 
in his country to support Operation Serval.1208 Whilst manned ISR operations had 
been conducted throughout the region since 2007, the deployment of drones to the 
Sahel marked a significant expansion of the military response to AQIM.1209 As Walker 
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a d Moo e ha e e plai ed, [d] o e bases, due to the greater political and material 
commitment that they require from both the US and host governments, foster more 
e ta gled a d i di g elatio ships .1210 The unmarked Pilatus PC-12 aircraft used 
as part of Operation Creek Sand required only a handful of contractors to operate 
and were often flown out of austere runways in the desert. In contrast, the 
deployment of U.S. Air Force MQ-  ‘eape s e ui ed ot o l  a fa  la ge  U.“. 
support staff but a more conspicuous basing infrastructure.1211  
 
By July 2013, two MQ-9 Reaper drones were reportedly operating out of Niamey, 
Niger. With an operational range of 1,850 kilometres these craft conducted over two 
hundred surveillance missions in support of French forces in northern Mali. 1212 
Beyond this, the sale of 16 unarmed MQ-9 Reapers was authorised as part of a $1.5 
billion foreign military sales agreement in June 2013.1213 Two of these craft were 
soon reportedly based alongside the U.S. Reapers at Niamey in order to conduct 
surveillance operations. In the words of French Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
the  ould help eli i ate all t a es of al Qaeda .1214 By the following year, the U.S. 
is also reported to have secured access to a second drone base in Niger near the 
ancient mud-walled city of Agadez. 1215  The p e ie  outpost fo  lau hi g 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions against a plethora of terror 
g oups , this ase as su je t to a $  illio  e pa sio  i   hi h e t ed o  
the construction of a new 1,830-meter paved asphalt runway.1216 
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The absence of any drone strikes in the Sahel can broadly be explained as the 
interplay of three factors which shed light on the contextual constraints which 
shaped the O a a ad i ist atio s o e a hi g ilita  esponse to AQIM. The first, 
as the o je tio  of the egio s do i a t po e , Alge ia, to a  di e t U.“ ai st ikes 
and/or SOF raids in the Sahel. Consistent with my earlier argument that the use of 
drone strikes remained contingent upon working through (rather than over) states in 
the global south, speaking at the Eighth Annual TSCP Conference in 2013, the 
Assistant Secretary Bureau of African Affairs Linda Thomas-Greenfield made clear:  
 
[t]he governments and people of the Sahel-Maghreb region are the ones who 
are on the frontlines facing all of these threats and challenges, and they are 
the ones who will ultimately craft the solutions. Our efforts will only go as far 
and as fast as our partners want to – and can – run.1217 
 
The second factor contributing to the absence of direct actions in the Sahel was the 
fear amongst American defence officials that such actions would bring about attacks 
against U.S. military personnel. Du i g a  eeti g et ee  AF‘ICOM s Deput  
Commander Vice Admiral Robert T. Moeller, the U.S. ambassador to Mali, Gillian A. 
Milovanovic, expressed her objection to American SOF embedding with their Malian 
ou te pa ts. Not o l , she i sisted, did su h a  a tio  isk i fu iati g  the Alge ia  
government and undermining their support for U.S. counterterrorism operations in 
the egio . It ould also, she o ti ued, likel  se e as light i g ods, e posi g 
the sel es a d the Malia  o ti ge ts to spe ifi  isk .1218 Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson expressed a similar concern during a meeting 
Eu opea  defe se offi ials i  “epte e   he  he oted that [ ]e do t a t 
                                                          
[accessed 10 October 2017]. This base would also serve as the primary operating base and 
headquarters of the French Forces involved in Operation Barkhane and both countries SOF operations 
in the region. Moore and Walker, p. 704. 
1217  Emphasis added. Linda Thomas-G ee field, Eighth A ual T a s-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Pa t e ship Co fe e e , Department of State, 2013 <https://2009-
2017.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2013/216028.htm> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
1218 Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: BAMAKO _a. AF‘ICOM Deput  Co a de  Muelle  Meets With 
A assado .  O to e  .  <https:// ikileaks.o g/plusd/ a les/ BAMAKO _a.ht l> 




to e o e pa t of the p o le   appea i g to take the lead .1219 The third factor 
which helps explain the absence of U.S. drone strikes in the Sahel was the ability to 
work with and through French forces. Not only was France willing to conduct direct 
military strikes against AQIM but, as demonstrated in Operatio s Serval and 
Barkhane, was also willing to deploy thousands of highly trained ground forces to the 
egio . I  a elatio ship ie ed as e t e el  effe ti e a d utuall  e efi ial   
AFRICOM, this enabled the Obama administration to limit itself to providing logistical 
and material support.1220 When taken together, these push and pull factors enabled 
the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM to e ha elled e ti el  ith 
and through partners, rather than being conducted by American forces themselves. 
 
SOF and PMSC 
 
SOF were active in the Sahel in a training and advisory capacity as early as 2004.1221 
Late  i  Bush s p eside , the “OF p ese e i  the egio  as o solidated as pa t 
of Joint Special Operations Task Force-Trans Sahara (JSOTF-TS).1222 According to U.S. 
Army Lieutenant Colonel Chris Call, "[t]he overarching role of the JSOTF-TS is to 
orchestrate all Department of Defense efforts and activities toward accomplishing 
the TSCTP objectives, which included increasing bilateral and regional capacity in the 
region to defeat terrorist and extremist organizations". 1223  Amongst the J“OTF s 
other core missions, the unit managed more than thirty SOF-led military training 
activities focused on building partner counterterrorism capacity.1224 As explained by 
                                                          
1219  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: PA‘I“ _a. U.“.-France-EU Dis uss “ahel “e u it  Issues .  
“epte e  .  <https:// ikileaks.o g/plusd/ a les/ PA‘I“ _a.ht l> [a essed  O to e  
2017]. 
1220  Da id ‘od iguez, U ited “tates Af i a Co a d  Postu e “tate e t , , p. 7 
<http://www.africom.mil/media-room/document/28035/2016-posture-statement> [accessed 11 
April 2018]. 
1221 In Mali, they led the training of one company of the 33rd Parachute Infantry Regiment on how to 
poli e the ou t s po ous o the  o de . Phillip Ul e , “pe ial Fo es “uppo t Pa  “ahel I itiati e 
i  Af i a ,  <http://a hi e.defe se.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=27112> [accessed 10 October 
2017]. 
1222  Ma  Blu e feld, T ai i g i  T a s-“aha a Af i a , AFRICOM Media Room, 2010 







JSOTF-TS Commander U.S. Army Colonel Nestor A. Sadler, these security assistance 
effo ts o t i uted to a d the o ti ued de elop e t of Af i a  spe ial ope atio s 
units and their ability to better secure the vast regions, both nationally and with their 
neigh ou s, ut also i  thei  a a e ess a d app oa h to a d a o o  e e .1225 
 
PM“C also pla ed a ke  suppo ti g ole i  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to AQIM. 1226  As Reeve and Pelter have argued, contractors were a 
cornerstone of US covert ope atio s o  the o ti e t si e at least .1227 As 
noted earlier in this chapter, they had been active in Sahel from 2007 onward as part 
of Operation Creek Sand: the series of manned ISR operations intended to track 
AQIM s a ti ities i  o the  Mali a d Mauritania.1228 Contractors also provided key 
logistical support to SOF operating across the region. A 2013 solicitation for the Short 
Take Off and Landing Trans Sahara contract issued in support of JSOTF-TS, for 
example, specified the requirement to conduct casualty evacuation and cargo 
transport operations. These were to be performed at all hours of the day from 
i p o ed a d u i p o ed ai field la di g zo es  i  ot o l  states i  the Magh e , 
but Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. 1229  A 2013 pre-solicitation notice 
issued  the U.“. A s T a spo tatio  Co a d si ila l  spe ified a de a d fo  
PM“C to t a spo t A e i a  “OF a ou d the “ahel i  suppo t of high isk a ti ities . 
As part of this contract, PMSC would be responsible for conducting air drops and 
medical evacuations, further speaking to the core logistical support roles which PSMC 
played in the region.1230 Beyond this, military support firms were also likely used to 
train and advise local security forces. A o di g to the DOD s the  ou t  di ector 
for West Africa Army Colonel Vic Nelson speaking in 2004 however, SOF were the 
p efe ed o duits fo  uildi g pa t e  apa it . As he oted ou do t get as u h 
a g fo  the u k usi g o t a to s  e ause:  
                                                          
1225 Blumenfeld. 
1226 For a more in-depth discussion of the use of the American use of PMSC throughout the continent, 
see Moore and Walker. 
1227 Reeve and Pelter, p. 20. 
1228  For a more detailed discussion of this programme, see Whitlo k, U.“. E pa di g “e et 
I tellige e Ope atio s i  Af i a . 
1229 Moore and Walker, p. 697. 





sending in U.S. military forces to conduct training – gu s that sa  U.“. Ma i es  
o  U.“. A  o  U.“. “o ethi g o  thei  shi t – is fundamentally a more 
i po ta t state e t  the U ited “tates: I a  se di g  fo es to help 
ou do this," s. " ell, I e th o  so e o e  at it, the o tractors are 
goi g .1231 
 
As ith the use of “OF the , the e as o e to the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response towards AQIM than just the use of drones to perform ISR operations. PSMC 
were tasked with performing a number of auxiliary roles including the training of 
regional security forces and providing logistical support.  
 
Military Assistance  
 
As has ee  a gued, the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM elie[d] 
largely on bolstering the domestic counterterrorism capabilities of the North African 
and Sahel cou t ies he e these g oups ope ate . 1232  On this basis, direct 
comparisons have been made with the military response to al-Shabaab.1233 Indeed, 
as the 2011 National Counterterrorism Strategy made clear, the Obama 
ad i ist atio  as o itted to olste [i g] efforts for regional cooperation 
agai st AQIM … as a  esse tial ele e t i  a st ateg  fo used o  dis upti g a highl  
adaptive and mobile group that exploits shortfalls in regional security and 
go e a e . 1234  The importance of military assistance programmes in U.S. 
counterterrorism operations in the Sahel has been recognised within the existing 
literature. 1235  As illustrated in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 however, states in the Sahel 
received on average less military assistance than their counterparts in North Africa. 
                                                          
1231 Burgess and Dickson. 
1232 Humud, p. 15. 
1233 Miller and Whitlock. 
1234 DOD, Natio al “t ateg  Fo  Cou te te o is  , p. . 
1235 As Olse  has put it, the U“ st ateg  to a ds the “ahel egio  has ee  ai ed at o tai i g a d 
preventing the spread of extremism mainly by building a military counterterrorism capacity in weak 
states like Mali, Niger, Chad and Mauritania . E phasis added. Olse , O a a a d U“ Poli  to a ds 




The latte , U.“. diplo ati  a les e phasised, tend to look down on the more 
southe l  Af i a  ou t ies as a k a d o  less apa le .1236  
 
Figure 16: Military assistance obligations for states in the Sahel (millions of $), FY 
2009-2016.1237  
 Burkina Faso Mali Mauritania Niger 
Section 1206 $15.5 $1.7 $82.6 $161.4 
PKO $4.8 $156.7 - $37.5 
FMF $0.3 $.5 $1.6 $1.5 
Total $34.6 $171.7 $95.4 $218.2 
 
Figure 17: Military assistance obligations for states in the Maghreb (millions of $), 
FY 2009-2016.1238 
 Algeria Morocco Tunisia 
Section 1206 - $1 $112.6 
Counterterrorism 
Partner Fund 
- - $12 
FMF - $66.3 $212.2 
Total $22.1 $282.7 $437.5 
 
                                                          
1236 See Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: DAKA‘ _a. T“CTP/‘“I Co fe e e: Less Cou te te o ism, 
More Counter-E t e is .  Ap il .  <https:// ikileaks.o g/plusd/ a les/ DAKA‘ _a.ht l> 
[accessed 10 October 2017]. To put the s ale of this dispa it  i to so e pe spe ti e, Alge ia s ilita  
budget ($8 billion) was an order of magnitude la ge  tha  Mali s $  illio . )ou i , The “aha a-
“ahel Quag i e: ‘egio al a d I te atio al ‘a ifi atio s , p. . 
1237  “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Bu ki a Faso , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Burkina Faso/2009/2016/all/Africa//> 
[a essed  Ap il ]; “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Mali , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Mali/2009/2016/all/Africa//> [accessed 11 
Ap il ]; “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Mau ita ia , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Mauritania/2009/2016/all/Africa//> [accessed 
 Ap il ]; “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Nige , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/africa/data/program/military/Niger/2009/2016/all/Africa//> 
[accessed 11 April 2018]. 
1238  “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Alge ia , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Algeria/2009/2016/all/Africa//> [accessed 11 
Ap il ]; “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Tu isa , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Tunisia/2009/2016/all/Africa//> [accessed 11 
Ap il ]; “e u it  Assista e Mo ito , Data: Mo o o , Security Assistance Monitor, 2017 
<http://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/Morocco/2009/2016/all/Africa//> [accessed 




Despite Mali ha i g ee  the ke  site of AQIM s e pa sio  du i g O a a s 
presidency, with the exception of the $156.7 million obligated for the MINUSMA via 
the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO), the state was a comparatively small recipient of 
SFA. 1239  Following the 2012 coup led by the U.S.-trained Malian army captain 
Amadou Sanogo, military assistance to the country was suspended and was only 
resumed in September 2013.1240  This being said, the importance of building the 
capacity of Mauritania, Mali and Nige  to full  o t ol thei  ast te ito ies  as 
jointly recognised by American, French and European governmental officials early in 
O a a s p eside .1241 On the other side of this coin, some of these states held up 
military assistance as a prerequisite for conducting counterterrorism operations 
against AQIM. During his 2009 meeting with the U.S. Ambassador Milovanovic for 
e a ple, Mali s P eside t A adou Ta a i Tou e p o lai ed that Mali as 
prepared to go after AQIM militarily provided partner nations provided required 
military equipment and assistance refurbishing several northern military 
outposts .1242  
 
As was examined in the first section of this chapter, the TSCP was a central 
component of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. Beyond its DOD-led 
train and equip element, the assistance provided via the TSCP spanned five functional 
areas: (1) law enforcement; (2) justice sector reform; (3) public diplomacy and 
information operations; (4) community engagement and (5) vocational training.1243 
As a 2007 diplomatic cable sent from Dakar nevertheless emphasised however, the 
[a]ssista e to pa t e  atio s u de  T“CTP has thus fa  ee  massively skewed 
toward military, intelligence, and security training programmes, which develop 
                                                          
1239 It did, however, receive su sta tial su s of U.“. se u it  assista e du i g O a a s p eside . 
This including $2.4 million in International Military Education and Training between FY 2009 and FY 
2016 and $2.3 million in Combating Terrorism Fellowship Programme. See Security Assistance Monitor, 
Data: Mali . 
1240 Defe se “e u it  Coope atio  Age , U.“. Lifts ‘est i tio s o  Bilate al Assista e to Mali ,  
<http://www.dsca.mil/print/404> [accessed 11 April 2018]. 
1241  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: PA‘I“ _a. U.“.-France-EU Dis uss “ahel “e u it  Issues .  
“epte e  .  
1242 Emphasis added. Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: BAMAKO _a. P eside t Tou e ‘ead  To Ta get 
AQIM With Help .  Ju e .  <https:// ikileaks.o g/plusd/ a les/ BAMAKO _a.ht l> 
[accessed 11 August 2018]. 




partner nation capacity to fi d a d dest o  e isti g te o ist ells .1244 As noted by 
o e s hola , [a] e te pie e of the ilita  apa it -building component of TSCTP 
was having partner nations identify and develop elite and highly capable units 
dedicated to the [counterterrorism] issio .1245 Approximately $288 million was 
allocated for the programme between FY 2009 and 2013.1246 Mali ($40.6 million), 
Mauritania ($34.5 million), and Niger ($30.7 million) were the largest recipients of 
these funds.1247  
 
Unlike in the military response to AQAP and al-Shabaab however, states in the Sahel 
were not eligible for any Section 1207(n) assistance. Instead, the bulk of SFA would 
be funnelled via the Section 1206 and the CTFP authorities. A sample of some of the 
specific programmes which were obligated under each of these authorities has been 
summarised below to contextualise the political economy logic of their use.  
 
Section 1206 assistance  
 
Mauritania ($82.6 million), followed shortly by Niger ($78.6 million), were the single 
la gest e ipie ts of “e tio   fu di g i  the “ahel du i g O a a s p eside . 
The DOD pursued a "layered security strategy" in Mauritania which centred around 
I“‘, maritime and border patrol support and/or training along Mauritania's border 
with Mali and, to a lesser degree, at its maritime borders with Morocco Sahara and 
                                                          
1244  Emphasis added. Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: DAKA‘ _a. T“CTP/‘“I Co fe e e: Less 
Counterterrorism, More Counter-E t e is .  Ap il .  
1245 Warner, p. 77. 
1246  Given that there was not a specific Congressional authorisation or funding stream for the 
programme, the TSCP was funded through multiple DOS and USAID accounts. This included, amongst 
others, the PKO fund, the Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programmes and 
Development Assistance. Whilst the DOD did not direct fund its contribution to the TSCP, it also 
provided funds for the programme via the Section 1206 and Section 1207 authorities. Government 
A ou ta ilit  Offi e, U.“. Effo ts i  No th est Af i a Would Be “t e gthe ed  E ha ed P ogram 
Ma age e t , pp. –9. This figure has been taken from the Government Accountability Office. See 
Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, U.“. Effo ts i  No th est Africa Would Be Strengthened by 
E ha ed P og a  Ma age e t , p. . 
1247 Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, U.“. Effo ts i  No th est Af i a Would Be “t e gthe ed  




“e egal .1248  In both Mauritania and Niger, the bulk of Section 1206 obligations 
centred on buildi g pa t e  I“‘ apa ilit . I  light of Mau ita ia s  e t e el  
li ited ai  a d a iti e apa it , $ .  illio  as allo ated fo  this pu pose i  FY 
2013.1249 These funds, as in Niger, were likely used to purchase a single Cessna Grand 
Caravan EX aircraft which was fitted with an array of sensors.1250 In FY 2011, the DOD 
had also e uested $ .  illio  to e ha e Mau ita ia s I“‘ a d t a spo t apa it . 
These fu ds ould e used to p o ide o e Pilatus PC-6, single-engine turboprop 
aircraft with support package, ai te a e a d spa es  a d ode ize Mau ita ia s 
fleet of BT-67 twin-engine turboprop aircraft. 1251  Beyond these efforts to build 
Nige s a d Mau ita ia s I“‘ apa ilities, “e tio   fu ds e e also o ligated to 
improve their logistical and airlift capabilities. For Niger this included the FY 2012 Air 
Logistics and Communications Enhancement programme ($11.7 million) and the FY 
2013 Logistics Company programme ($8.5 million).1252 In Mauritania, this included 
the FY 2012 Logistics Support Package for counterterrorism ($7 million) and the FY 
2014 Aviation & Medical Capabilities Enhancement ($16.2 million) programme.1253 
$8.1 million was also obligated for Mauritania in FY 2011 as part of the Forward 
Operating Location programme hi h ai ed to help p o ide remote airfield 
supplied capabilities to enable tactical effectiveness and operational reach of elite 
[ ou te te o is ] u its…[ ] p o id[i g] spe ialized ai field e uip e t desig ed to 
suppo t [ ou te te o is ] ope atio s . 1254  The $15.5 million in Section 1206 
assistance allocated for Burkina Faso was used to build counterterrorism and 
logistical capacity.1255  
                                                          
1248  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: NOUAKCHOTT _a. Mau ita ia: La e ed “e u it  Strategy. 9 
“epte e  .  <https:// ikileaks.o g/plusd/ a les/ NOUAKCHOTT _a.ht l> [a essed  
April 2018]. 
1249  Wikileaks, ‘efe e e ID: NOUAKCHOTT _a. Mau ita ia: La e ed “e urity Strategy. 9 
“epte e  .  
1250 Os a  Nkala, U“ to “uppl  Ca a a  Ai aft to Mau ita ia, Nige  a d Ke a , Defence Web, 2014 
<http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36398:us-to-
supply-caravan-aircraft-to-mauritania-niger-and-kenya&catid=35:Aerospace&Itemid=107> [accessed 
10 October 2017]. See also Reeve and Pelter, p. 6. 
1251 DOD, Depa t e t of Defe se “e tio   a d “e tio   ‘epo t to Co g ess O  Fo eig -
Assista e ‘elated P og a s fo  Fis al Yea  . 
1252 “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
1253 “e afi o, “e u it  Assista e ‘efo : “e tio   Ba kg ou d a d Issues fo  Co g ess , p. . 
1254  DOD, Depa t e t of Defe se “e tio  1209 and Section 1203(b) Report to Congress On Foreign-
Assista e ‘elated P og a s fo  Fis al Yea  , p. .  





Global Counterterrorism Partnership Fund 
 
O e  the ou se of O a a s p eside , the “ahel-Maghreb was allocated $221 
illio  i  CTPF fu di g. As oted i  the DOD s udget e uest fo  FY , [t]his 
funding focuse[d] on amplifying [partner nation] Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR), 
logistics, air and ground mobility, and counter-IED architectural frameworks needed 
fo  effe ti e CT ope atio s . 1256  These goals olled o e  i to the DOD s FY  
budget request for the authority which requested funds to build the capacity of 
states in the region in the following areas:  
 
(1) Securing their respective borders; (2) denying access to Violent Extremist 
Organizations (VEOs); (3) conducting effective counter-incursion operations 
to disrupt VEOs; and (4) enabling African partners to interdict illicit flows of 
arms, drugs, money, weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), natural resources, 
and persons that enable VEOs to grow and threaten U.S. and partner nation 
interests.1257 
 
With these funding requests, the DOD sought to build partner capacity in airlift, 
counterterrorism interdiction, command and control, and logistics. A range of 
military equipment was to be purchased with these obligations including cargo 
aircraft, small arms, ammunition, communication equipment, night vision devices, 
and mine detection equipment.1258 
 
The O a a ad i ist atio s use of the “e tio   a d CTPF autho ities as pa t of 
its small-footprint military response to AQIM worked to accomplish more than just 
containing the indirect threat which the Obama administration presented to 
American security. It also worked to armour the reproduction of closed frontiers and 
                                                          
1256 Go e e t A ou ta ilit  Offi e, U.“. Effo ts i  No th est Af i a Would Be “t e gthe ed  
E ha ed P og a  Ma age e t , Government Accountability Office, 2014, pp. 1–54 
<http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664337.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2017]; p.1. 
1257 Offi e of the U de  “e eta  of Defe se, Cou te te o is  Pa t e ships Fu d: Depa t e t of 
Defe se Budget Fis al Yea  FY  , p. . 
1258 Offi e of the U de  “e eta  of Defe se, Cou te te o is  Partnerships Fund: Department of 




open-doo s i  the “ahel f o  AQIM s halle ge to the p a ti es of A e i a  
imperialism from below. As documented above, a central focus of Section 1206 and 
CTPF obligations was building the capacity of regional security forces to find, fix and 
strike AQIM across the vastness of the Sahel. Developing the airborne ISR and airlift 
capacity of Niger and Mauritania was crucial in this regard, and ran parallel to the use 
of drones and PMSC to perform similar operations. Coupled with the funds requested 
via the CTPF authority to bolster the logistical and command and control capabilities 
of these states, “FA helped thi ke  the egio s othe ise po ous state o de s. As 
explained by a spokesperson for the American embassy in Mauritania speaking to Al 
Jazeera in 2014: "[w]e are focusing our efforts on providing the Mauritanian military 
the proper tools, such as aircraft, training, and advanced counter-terrorism 
techniques, that will enable the military to secure the border and react quickly and 
decisively to any terrorist incursion". 1259  I  doi g so, AQIM s th eat to egio al 
se u it , a d  e te sio  t a s atio al a ess to the “ahel s o side a le oil a d 
i e al esou es, ould e o tai ed  dis upti g the affiliate s apa it  to ope ate 
f eel . As as si ila l  oted i  the DOD s FY  CTFP s udget e uest, [t]his 
proposal strengthens partner nation air and ground border security, 
[counterterrorism], and logistical capabilities to enable operations to deny safe 
havens and reduce [Violent Extremist Organizations] transit […] .1260 A similar logic 
i fo ed the DO“ s la ge  T“CTP programme which, between FY 2009 and FY 2013 
alone, was obligated approximately $288 million. As one author has pointed out, 
building the apa it  of pa ti ipati g ou t ies to ide tif  a d espo d to internal 




                                                          
1259 Emphasis added. Mega  O Toole, U“ ‘a ps up te o is  Fight i  Mau ita ia , Al-Jazeera, 2014 
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/07/us-ramps-up-terrorism-fight-mauritania-
20147148214271804.html> [accessed 11 June 2018]. 
1260 Emphasis added. Offi e of the U de  “e eta  of Defe se, Cou te te o is  Pa tnerships Fund: 
Depa t e t of Defe se Budget Fis al Yea  FY  , p. . 




The stud  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM has ade a 
sig ifi a t o t i utio  to the e pi i al i h ess of this thesis  stud  of the ea s, 
animators and continuity of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan 
and Iraq du i g O a a s p eside . The “ahel e e ged as a e  f o tie  i  the 
War against al-Qaeda after 2009, and the absence of any direct strikes, whether from 
drones, manned aircraft or SOF, suggests that the affiliate was not perceived to 
directly threaten American interests (however defined). 1262 In the first section of this 
chapter, the evolution of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the region during the 
War against al-Qaeda was outlined, alongside the military architecture which was put 
in place to condu t su h ope atio s. T o of the ke  atal sts fo  AQIM s e pa sio  
in the Sahel were detailed- the Arab Spring and the 2012 Malian Civil War - alongside 
the broad contours of Operation Serval, the French led military intervention in Mali 
which began in Janua   follo i g the ou t s Ci il Wa . 
 
The se o d se tio  of this hapte , uildi g o  the fi st, ope ed up AQIM s halle ge 
to the practices of U.S. imperialism from below. Whilst the affiliate may have 
threatened regional security, it lacked the ambition to conduct transnational terrorist 
attacks against continental America. This being said, the affiliate did contest the 
reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors in the Sahel. In the aftermath of the 
ou t s Ci il Wa , AQIM aptu ed a d go e ed te ito  i  o the  Mali, 
performing many of the traditional functions of a state. In Algeria, an important site 
of global energy security, the affiliate conducted multiple attacks against oil and gas 
production sites. Other extractive industries in the region were also targeted, French 
owned Uranium mines in northern Niger principal amongst them. Whilst AQIM may 
have not directly threatened American security, it did take aim at two of the core 
practices of American imperialism in the Sahel. 
 
                                                          
1262 ‘i ha d ‘ee e a d )oë Pelte , F o  Ne  F o tie  to Ne  No al: Cou te -Terrorism Operations 
in the Sahel-“aha a , The Remote-Control Project, Oxford Research Group, 2014, pp. 1–29 
<http://remotecontrolproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/Sahel-Sahara-report.pdf> [accessed 




The thi d se tio  of this hapte  u pa ked the O a a ad i ist atio s e ised use 
of the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism to spearhead its military 
response to AQIM. This campaign provided strong support for my critique of the 
drone centrism of the existing IR and American foreign policy literatures, with no 
direct actions being reported against AQIM during Obama s p eside . Whilst 
drones were sent to operate in the region, their use was limited to ISR operations. It 
was instead left to the French to conduct the bulk of direct actions against the al-
Qaeda affiliate. SOF and PMSC were used to provide logistical and operational 
support to U.S. counterterrorism operations in the region. The focus of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQIM, ho e e , a e i  the fo  of ilita  
assistance programmes. Central here were the Section 1206 and CTPF authorities 
which were used to build the indigenous counterterrorism capacity of Mauritanian, 
Malian and Niger security forces. Beyond working to just disrupt, degrade, 
dis a tle a d ulti atel  defeat  the al-Qaeda affiliate, these programmes were also 
shown to have been intended to help strengthen internal stability within recipient 
states a d thi ke  the egio s othe ise po ous state o de s.1263 
 
  
                                                          










The primary aim of this thesis has been to critically examine the means, drivers and 
continuity of American counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq 
du i g O a a s p eside . Wo ki g ithi  the histo i al ate ialist t aditio , it has 
been animated by the following primary research question: 
 
What does the O a a ad i istratio s ilitar  respo se agai st al-Qaeda s 
regional affiliates tell us about the means and drivers of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq?  
 
The gap for this thesis within the existing IR and American foreign policy literature 
as detailed i  the I t odu tio . As as oted, this thesis  o igi alit  lies p i ipall  
in its empirical focus of analysis (al-Qaeda s affiliates  a d its o e a hi g theo eti al 
lens (historical materialism). To the author s k o ledge, this thesis has p ese ted the 
fi st holisti  stud  of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se agai st all three 
of al-Qaeda s regio al affiliates and the first o erar hi g stud  of O a a s foreig  
and counterterrorism policies from within the historical materialist tradition.  
 
Al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates ha e ee  o pa ati el  u de studied i  elatio  to 
the other branches of the al-Qaeda movement, particularly al-Qaeda s o e a d the 
Isla i  “tate. O e of this thesis  o e ai s has been to help fill this sizeable gap within 
the e isti g I‘ a d A e i a  fo eig  poli  lite atu es. The O a a ad i ist atio s 
military response to AQAP, al-Shabaab and AQIM speaks to three important 
developments within contemporary American foreign and security policy. These 
being: (1) the geographical diffusion of the principal focus of the War against al-
Qaeda a a  f o  the e t al attlefields  of Afgha ista  a d I a  to hat the  
Quad e ial Defe e ‘e ie  QD‘  oi ed as a s i  ou t ies the [U.S.] is not at 




a d of A e i a  i pe ialis  o e oadl ;  a d the O a a ad i ist atio s 
retooling of the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention during the era of 
perceived imperial decline which followed the Global Financial Crisis and Iraq War. 
As was traced in chapter 3, the military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates as the 
principal focus of the War against al-Qaeda during the three-year period between 
the drawdown of combat operations against al-Qaeda s o e i  the autu  of  
until the beginning of combat operations against the Islamic State in September 2014. 
The military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates a  thus e u de stood as ha i g 
played a key bridging ole i  O a a s p eside . As the p eside t ade lea  i  
“epte e  , the st ateg  of taki g out te o ists ho th eate  us, hile 
suppo ti g pa t e s o  the f o t li es  which was adopted to fight the Islamic State 
had ee  su essfull  pu sued i  Ye e  a d “o alia fo  ea s .1264  This small-
footprint approach to counterterrorism, as detailed in the last section of this chapter, 
has also e ai ed a  i po ta t pa t of the T u p ad i ist atio s ou te te o is  
policy. 
 
This thesis  histo i al materialist lens has provided the space for a more critical 
reading of U.S. counterterrorism operations in states outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Not only has it shed alternative light on the means and animators of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq but, by tying their use 
to the spatial organisation of American power, the relationship between them. 
Beyond this, as discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter, historical 
materialism has allowed for an alternative theoretically informed explanation for the 
continuity in U.S. foreign and counterterrorism policies after 2009 to be advanced: 
one better able to capture the historical practices of American imperialism and 
military intervention. As shown in chapter 3, there is also a significant gap within the 
existing literature on the substance of, and tensions within, the Obama Doctrine from 
a histo i al ate ialist pe spe ti e. The theo s e phasis o  antithetical social 
forces as a principal target of U.S. military intervention in the global south helps 
e plai  the ad i ist atio s Janus-Faced approach to military intervention in the 
                                                          




global south. This being, its pe ha t fo  leadi g f o  ehi d  a d pu sui g a 
constrained, multilateral response to the state-based security challenges it 
confronted, ut agg essi e e e ise of U.“. oe i e po e  a d illi g ess to lead 
f o  the f o t  agai st al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In short, whilst the existing 
literature has done a good job of capturing many of the different dimensions of 
O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli ies, histo i al ate ialis  has p o ided a 
framework to shed new light on their political economy dimensions. 
 
Having reiterated the gap for, and originality of, this thesis, the principal aim of the 
remainder of this chapter is to summarise its main contributions to the relevant IR 
a d U.“. fo eig  poli  lite atu es. I  the fi st se tio  of this o lusio , this thesis  
contributions to the existing debates on the means, animators and continuity of U.S. 
ou te te o is  ope atio s outside of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s 
presidency are reviewed. The second section of this chapter then outlines some of 
the limitations of this study, and briefly discusses some possible areas for future 
research. This hapte s thi d a d fi al se tio  o side s so e of the i ediate 
i pli atio s of  fi di gs fo  Do ald T u p s p eside , i gi g this thesis to a 
close.  
 
Summary of findings: re-examining the means, drivers and continuity in U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq 
 
This thesis has made timely contributions to the prevailing debates on the means, 
goals a d o ti uit  i  O a a s ou te te o is  poli . It has also made two wider 
contributions toward IR scholarship: (1) it has advanced a richer explanation for the 
use of military assistance programmes tied to the spatial organisation of American 
power; and (2) it has shed light on al-Qaeda s sophisti ated app oa h to economic 
warfare. These contributions are briefly summarised below, alongside the arguments 
which had been made throughout this thesis to support them.  
 
Re-examining the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan 





As it pertains to the debate on the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside 
of Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis has taken aim at the drone-centrism of much of 
the existing IR and U.S. foreign policy literature. As was outlined in chapter 4, there 
a e t o fa es  to this o o  edu tion of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside 
of Afghanistan and Iraq to a single tool of coercive power (drones) and a single 
practice of military intervention (targeted killings). The first (and most conspicuous) 
face of this drone-centrism is the explicit privileging of drone strikes as the 
e t epie e of O a a s ou te te o is  poli . Its se o d less o ious di e sio  
is the disproportionate weight which has often been given to drones at the expense 
of the other instruments of American coercive power employed in U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. Drones strikes were 
shown to have been a distinctive and important component of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in some states outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. They were used to 
de apitate AQAP s a d al-“ha aa s leade ship, a d to thi  out thei  id-to-low level 
operatives. Whilst the relationship between drone warfare and the historical 
practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south is yet to have been subject 
to much critical analysis, drones strikes helped police the challenge which the 
affiliates presented to the practices of American imperialism from below.1265 As with 
military assistance programmes, their use was shown to have been contingent upon 
working through (rather than over) existing governments in the global south.  
 
Whilst acknowledging this, as was documented throughout my structured 
comparison (chapters 5-7), there was far more to the means of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates than just drone strikes. 
Claims such as O a a passes o  a ou te te o is  lega  he e the d o e st ike 
is no longer a tool for counterterrorism strategy, but is ou te te o is  st ateg  
need to be revised, and situated within a more holistic eadi g of oth the DOD s 
defence planning concept (chapter 4) and the observable practices of U.S. 
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ou te te o is  ope atio s du i g O a a s p eside  hapte s ,  a d .1266 In 
the first instance, building on the step-changes in how and where al-Qaeda was to 
be fought laid out in the 2006 QDR, the 2012 Defence Strategic Guidance outlined 
the O a a ad i ist atio s o it e t to de elop[i g] i o ati e, lo -cost, and 
small-footprint app oa hes to a hie e [its] se u it  o je ti es . 1267  This small-
footprint approach to counterterrorism combined drone strikes with more indirect 
efforts to train, equip, advise and assist foreign security forces. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) and Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSC) were also used to 
perform a range of auxiliary training, logistical and intelligence gathering tasks. As 
the moniker suggests, the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism minimised, 
but did not completely eliminate, the U.S. military footprint in the global south. In 
documenting this, my analysis has advanced an empirically richer understanding of 
how, building on the changes put in place late during his p ede esso s p eside , 
the Obama administration retooled the coercive practices of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south during the era of perceived imperial decline which 
followed the Global Financial Crisis and Iraq War. To be clear, the exact configuration 
of this small-footprint approach to counterterrorism varied. It could be tailored to 
reflect the political sensitivities of states within the region (e.g. Algerian opposition 
to direct actions in the Sahel) and the capacity of partners to perform certain military 
tasks (e.g. France in the Sahel and AMISOM in Somalia). This flexibility helps explain 
why, for example, drones were used to conduct targeted and signature strikes as part 
of the military response to AQAP and al-Shabaab, but were limited to Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions in the Sahel. Nonetheless, at the core of 
the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism in both planning and practice was 
the use of security force assistance (SFA) programmes to train, equip, advise and 
accompany foreign security forces. 
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On this basis, this thesis has documented that one inadvertent consequence of the 
essentialization of a single technological development (drones) and a single practice 
of statecraft (targeted killing) has been to wash out the parallel rise of SFA 
programmes as a disciplinary mode of state violence employed alongside (and at 
other times in place of) drones, to police the challenge which al-Qaeda s affiliates 
presented to the practices of U.S. imperialism from below. Drone strikes were far 
f o  the o l  ga e i  to  i  te s of o f o ti g o  t i g to dis upt the al Qaeda 
leade ship  as Leo  Pa etta lai ed ea l  i  O a a s p eside .1268  Rather, as 
Defe e “e eta  ‘o e t Gates ade lea  i  , [a] gua l  the ost i po ta t 
military component in the War on Terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how 
well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern themselves .1269 
Within the historical materialist canon, military assistance programmes have long 
been recognised to have been a key tool for insulating the rule of authoritarian 
regimes who, in turn, maintained stability within their borders.1270 In the case of the 
military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates, the Obama administration relied heavily on 
the Section 1206 Global Train and Equip, Global Counterterrorism Partnership and 
Section 1207(n) Transitional authorities. Funds obligated via these authorities were 
used to build the capacity of local forces in a number of areas deemed important by 
American policymakers. These included Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance, maritime and border security, special operation forces and tactical 
airlift. By drilling down into some of the specific train and equip programmes 
o ligated as pa t of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s 
affiliates, I have also traced how SFA programmes indirectly worked to defend the 
reproduction of closed frontiers and open-doors across the Arabian Peninsula, the 
Horn of Africa and the Sahel. 
 
This contribution to the existing debate on the means of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan a d I a  du i g O a a s p eside  has 
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dovetailed with one of the wider contributions this thesis has made to IR scholarship. 
Working within the historical materialist tradition, a richer explanation for the use of 
military assistance programmes tied to particular spatial organisation of American 
power has been advanced. The exercise of U.S. coercive power through, rather than 
over, states configured to be open to the transnational flow of capital is argued to 
ha e set soft  li its o  ho  all administrations have been able to intervene in the 
global south. The essentially deterritorialized character of American imperialism has 
also eated a pe e ial halle ge fo  A e i a  poli ake s: ho  to o up  the 
da ge ous oid of ope  o  u defi ed f o tie s  without recourse to boots on the 
ground intervention? 1271  Sensitive to these challenges, these military assistance 
programmes has been understood as both a reflection of the limits of American 
power and a tool of U.S. coercive power adopted to try and offset them. In this way, 
they have been theorised as a central breaker that successive administrations have 
attempted to plug into states in the global south were cracks in the circuits of global 
capitalism are perceived to have developed. Two explanations for the centrality of 
SFA programmes i  the O a a ad i ist atio s s all-footprint approach to 
counterterrorism have thus been advanced throughout this thesis: the first, and 
more immediate, the heightened constraints on the means of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south engendered by the Global Financial Crisis and the 
Iraq War; the second, and more structural, tied to how American power has been 
organised spatially.  
 
Re-examining the animators of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq: bringing political economy factors back in 
 
This thesis has also shown that there was more animating the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda's regional affiliates than just 
counterterrorism. By working within the historical materialism tradition, it has 
brought the political economy animators of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside 
of Afgha ista  a d I a  du i g O a a s p eside  i to sha pe  fo us. Histo i al 
materialist scholars have argued that one of the primary targets of American military 
                                                          




intervention in the global south have been antithetical social forces which have 
challenged the practices of U.S. imperialism from below. Of particular importance 
here, given that American power have been exercised through a system of sovereign 
states rather than the direct control of territory, has been two goals: defending the 
openness of markets, resources and labour in the global south (open-doors) and 
maintaining the territorial integrity of stable, if nevertheless often repressive, state 
formations (closed frontiers). This reading of the animators of U.S. military 
i te e tio  i  the glo al south is o siste t ith histo i al ate ialis s  oade  
emphasis on U.S. military intervention as a central conduit for stabilising, and in turn 
integrating, important areas of the global south into a global capitalist order which 
reinforces American primacy. 
 
To this end, this thesis has reached beyond the official justification given for U.S. 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq: namely, that they were 
intended to disrupt, degrade, dismantle and ultimately defeat those who attacked 
America on 9/11, al-Qaeda , a d p e e t a d dete  te o ist atta ks agai st the 
U.S.1272 To reiterate, my argument has not been that the defence of closed frontiers 
and open-doors in the global south (and by extension the primacy of the American 
state and capitalist-market relations) was the only goal animating the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates. I ha e ee  a eful to 
point out that these practices do not by themselves explain the rollout out of 
counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq. What has instead been 
argued throughout this thesis is that these political economy considerations formed 
part of a larger mix of observable and unobservable strategic, security and ideational 
factors which, when taken together, can help us better understand and explain this 
important contemporary trend in American foreign and security policy. 
 
As was examined throughout my structured-focused comparison, all three of al-
Qaeda s affiliates o tested the te ito ial i teg ity of states within the regions which 
they operated: for AQAP this was Yemen; for al-Shabaab this was Somalia; and for 
                                                          




AQIM this was Mali. These actions were consistent with their ultimate goal of 
establishing caliphates stretching across the Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of Africa 
and the Sahel respectively. AQAP, al-Shabaab and AQIM sought to win the consent 
of the local populations which, at diffe e t poi ts du i g O a a s p eside , they 
came to govern. They did so by providing many traditional state functions, including 
policing, administration and the levying of taxes. To this end, al-Qaeda s affiliates 
combined elements of terrorist organisations which conducted overseas attacks 
p i ipall  agai st the ea  e e  ith ele e ts of a  a ed i su ge  hi h 
captured and governed territory within their immediate neighbourhoods. Whilst 
they did so unevenly- measured both over time and in comparison with one another-
all three of al-Qaeda s affiliates a  thus e ead as ha i g o tested the 
reproduction of closed frontiers in and around Africa.  
 
Beyond this, AQAP, al-Shabaab, and AQIM also contested a second core practice of 
American imperialism: the reproduction of open-doors in the global south. This 
disruption went deeper than just dislocating territory from the global system of 
capitalist exchange which the American state has managed since 1945. Al-Qaeda s 
affiliates, as with other branches of the al-Qaeda movement, also threatened global 
energy security. In the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP attempted to disrupt both Saudi 
Arabian and Yemeni oil production, whilst also seeking to disrupt traffic travelling 
through the Bab-el-Mandeb. In the Sahel, AQIM attacked oil and gas sites in Algeria, 
and targeted other extractive industries in the region. Energy production in the Horn 
of Africa is currently negligible. Nonetheless, as was examined in chapter 6, al-
“ha aa s contestation of the territorial integrity of the Somali state was not only a 
barrier to oil production and exploitation within its borders, but also indirectly 
contributed toward the rise of piracy in the strategically important waters around 
the Gulf of Aden.  
 
As it elates to the d i e s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-
Qaeda s egio al affiliates, the se o d contribution to wider IR scholarship has been 
to pierce the dualism which has deta hed u h of the e isti g stud  of O a a s 




the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates o  the overall 
trajectory of the War against al-Qaeda played out in a vacuum devoid of al-Qaeda s 
own ideology and strategic goals. A richer understanding of the animators of 
contemporary U.S. military intervention in the global south can be reached through 
a utuall  i pli ated  u de sta di g of both the U.“.  a d al-Qaeda s age .1273 
To this end, chapter 3 unpacked al-Qaeda s sophisti ated app oa h to e o o i  
warfare. Al-Qaeda and its affiliates were shown to have been committed to a strategy 
of leedi g A e i a to the poi t of a k upt .1274 Three channels were theorised 
to have been pursued to this end: (1) conducting direct attacks against targets of 
economic significance within the continental U.S.; (2) exploiting the particular spatial 
organisation of American power by attempting to tie down American ground forces 
in military campaigns across the global south; and (3) disrupting the reproduction of 
open-doors and closed frontiers throughout the global south (with a particular 
emphasis on disrupting global energy security and governing territory). This 
examination of the political economy dimensions of al-Qaeda s a ti ities akes a 
timely contribution to the wider IR literature for three reasons worth briefly 
recapping here. First, the state centrism of neorealist perspectives has meant that 
those working within the tradition have been unable to capture what al-Qaeda has 
wanted, and the strategy it has adopted to pursue these goals. Second, both the 
neoclassical realist and constructivist informed explanations for the continuity in 
O a a s ou te te o is  a d fo eig  poli  outli ed i  hapte   ha e said little 
about al-Qaeda s agency, and what has driven its continued resistance to the 
American state after 2009. And third, whilst historical materialist scholars have 
argued that al-Qaeda has posed a th eat to the o e i te ests of the A e i a  state , 
exactly how it has done so is yet to have been deeply examined from within the 
canon.1275 This thesis has helped partially fill these gaps within the existing literature, 
and provides a platform for a more comprehensive study of al-Qaeda s app oa h to 
economic warfare and its evolution over time. 
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Re-examining the continuity in U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of 
Afghanistan and Iraq: bringing U.S. imperialism back in 
 
The e isti g o se sus ithi  the A e i a  fo eig  poli  su field is that O a a s 
foreign and counterterrorism policies were defined more by continuity than change. 
Both agent and structured focused explanations for this continuity have been 
advanced to explain this, namely that Obama (a) declined to make; (b) was unable to 
deliver; and/or (c) confronted insurmountable barriers to meaningfully changing U.S. 
counterterrorism discourse and practice. 1276  Both constructivist and neoclassical 
realist scholars have put forward theoretically informed explanations for this 
continuity. The limitations of both these perspectives were outlined in chapter 2. 
Both washed out the larger structures of global capitalism which also put American 
foreign policy in the motion up to, a d du i g, O a a s p eside . As su h, the  
were both unable to capture or explain the defence of open-door access to markets, 
resources and labour as key drivers of U.S. military intervention in the global south. 
Beyond this, both neoclassical realist and constructivist scholars were shown to have 
p i a il  easu ed the o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d counterterrorism policy 
agai st his i ediate p ede esso s p eside , Geo ge W. Bush. Whethe  
intentionally or not, they have thus helped reify the misconception that the 9/11 
attacks marked a fundamental discontinuity in the practices of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south, an assumption challenged within the historical 
materialist canon. 
 
With these limitations of the existing theoretically informed explanations for the 
o ti uit  i  O a a s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli  i  i d, this thesis 
opened this debate up both theoretically (to better capture the animating role of 
material interests via its grounding within historical materialism) and temporally (to 
reach back beyond the 9/11 attacks, and situate the military response to al-Qaeda s 
affiliates within the larger history of U.S. military intervention in the global south 
reaching back to the early twentieth century). To this end, my adoption of a historical 
materialist lens has enabled a i he  u de sta di g of the o ti uit  i  O a a s 
                                                          




foreign and counterterrorism policy to be advanced, one better equipped to 
problematize what these military interventions were for, capture their relationship 
to the historical practices of U.S. intervention in the global south prior to 9/11 and 
explain their relationship to the hierarchical structures of American power. Whilst 
sensitive to the tactical adjustments in how American coercive power has historically 
been projected into the global south and the different pretexts which American 
policymakers have drawn from to justify these actions, historical materialist 
scholarship has shown that the animators of U.S. military intervention in the global 
south have remained consistent. These, as noted earlier in this chapter, have centred 
on stabilising, and in turn integrating, important areas of the global south into a 
global capitalist order which functions to reinforce American primacy. Far from being 
the ha ge-age t  hi h a  e pe ted- or perhaps more accurately hoped- he 
would be, when it came to the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the 
global south, Obama was a president very much within the historical mainstream.  
 
Limitations and paths for future research 
 
This thesis has had a clearly defined theoretical and empirical focus. This was 
designed to answer my primary research question and to substantiate the 
contributions to the existing literature outlined above. As with all comparable 
projects, it would be wrong to pretend that there are not gaps within this analysis. 
These are a product of both space constraints and the scope of my research question. 
In chapter 2, for example, I did not engage with all of the different theoretically 
informed explanations for the animators of, and continuity in, contemporary U.S. 
foreign policy. Neorealist, neoclassical realist and constructivist perspectives were 
focused on given their prominence within the existing literature on the continuity in 
O a a s fo eig  a d ou te terrorism policies. With this in mind, the gap for, and 
o t i utio  ade , this thesis  histo i al ate ialist le s ould e fu the  efi ed 
by engaging with neo-liberal institutionalist and bureaucratic decision-making 
perspectives. Similarly, despite the richness of my empirical analysis in chapters 5, 6 
a d ,  stud  of the ea s of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-




focused comparison examined the counterterrorism dimensions of the Obama 
ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda s affiliates. O  this asis, oth the 
evolution of the counterinsurgency campaigns fought by local forces on the ground 
and ele e ts of the hole-of-go e e t  app oach to combating al-Qaeda which 
the administration claimed to be pursuing were carved out from my analysis. This 
tight empirical focus was consistent with the institutionalisation of the war mode of 
counterterrorism after 9/11 as its dominant expression. Nonetheless, a second 
immediate avenue for building on the theoretical and conceptual framework 
outlined in chapters 2-4 ould e to e a i e the “tate Depa t e t s atte pts to 
address the ideological causes of radicalisation and promote good governance in 
states across the Arabian Peninsula, Horn of Africa and the Sahel. 
 
Three more substantive additional avenues for future research are outlined below. 
Whilst a conscious effort has been made to engage with what I consider some of the 
most pressing shortcomings of this thesis to have been, this is not an exhaustive list. 
What is discussed here are potential- rather than definitive- pathways for expanding 
the temporal, conceptual and geographical scope of my current analysis.  
 
Given my predominate focus on the means and animators of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, this thesis has adopted a loose approach 
to do u e ti g the o ti uit  et ee  the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  
response to al-Qaeda's affiliates and the historical practices of U.S. military 
intervention in the global south. After outlining the historical materialist theorisation 
of the continuity in American foreign policy in chapter 2, this argument hinged on 
documenting how the defence of open-doors and closed frontiers were also goals 
a i ati g the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda's affiliates. 
Acknowledging this, there is clear scope for a more detailed, comparative study of 
the o ti uit  i  O a a s app oa h to ilita  i te e tio  i  the global south. The 
core logic of the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism- minimising the size 
of the U.S. military footprint in the global south through the use of military assistance 
programmes- has immediate parallels in the Cold War period. As it elates to a s 




starting point for any future study. Covert military assistance to anti-communist 
surrogates were a core pillar of the Reagan Doctrine, and the interventions in Angola, 
Cambodia, El Salvador and Nicaragua during the 1980s.1277 Between 1979 and 1991, 
approximately $1 billion worth of military training and assistance was given to the 
right-wing Salvadoran government to fight the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front alone. 1278  The drivers and human rights implications of U.S. military 
i te e tio  i  Lati  A e i a du i g ‘eaga s p eside  ha e al ead  ee  
examined by historical materialist scholars, providing a theoretical starting point for 
any such future study.1279  
 
A deeper analysis of one of the core themes examined in this thesis- how, if at all the 
means of the U.S. military intervention in the global south are retooled during 
periods of perceived imperial decline- could alternatively be reached through a 
co pa ati e stud  of Ni o s a d O a a s fo eig  a d se u it  poli ies. Both 
presidents were elected against the backdrop of perceived crises in American power, 
the consequence of debilitating ground wars in the global south and heightened 
concerns about Ame i a s position within the post-Second World War economic 
order.1280 Following nearly two decades of military involvement in South Vietnam, 
the core of what became known as the Nixon Doctrine was outlined in 1969 and 
foreshadowed much of the Obama Doctrine outlined in chapter 3. 1281  With the 
coming end of combat operations in Vietnam, Nixon pledged that the U.S.  military 
presence in the region would be retrenched, with it no longer assuming the full 
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military burden of policing South Asia against communist incursion.1282 To shore up 
the waning material foundations of American primacy, greater constraint would 
come to govern the deployment of U.S. ground forces in the global south. Security 
cooperation would therefore be allocated a greater place in American grand 
strategy.1283 As Nixon emphasised early during his presidency: 
 
Well, there is a future for American counterinsurgency tactics only in the 
sense that where one of our friends in Asia asks for advice or assistance, 
under proper circumstances, we will provide it. But where we must draw the 
line is in becoming involved heavily with our own personnel, doing the job for 
them, rather than helping them do the job for themselves [...] I want to be 
sure that our policies in the future, all over the world, in Asia, Latin America, 
Africa, and the rest, reduce American involvement. One of assistance, yes, 
assistance in helping them solve their own problems, but not going in and just 
doing the job ourselves simply because that is the easier way to do it.1284 
 
A more detailed examination of how each respective administration retooled the 
means of U.S. military intervention in the global south during this period would not 
only allow for a more in-depth e a i atio  of the o ti uit  i  O a a s foreign and 
security policy, but provide a framework through which to explore an empirical 
puzzle left largely unproblematised within historical materialist scholarship: is there 
any relationship between eras of perceived imperial decline and the type and volume 
of military assistance given to partners in the global south? When coupled with a 
stud  of the ‘eaga  ad i ist atio s use of ilita  assista e programmes, this 
would also allow for a more detailed assessment of what, beyond drone strikes, was 
novel about O a a s small-footprint approach to counterterrorism. 
 
Building on this foundation, a second avenue for future research would be to open 
up the political dimensions of SFA programmes to greater analysis. As outlined in 
chapter 4, programmes to train, equip and advise and accompany foreign security 
forces have an intuitive military logic whose effectiveness can be measured both 
instrumentally in terms of the capacity built in the recipient state and in terms of 
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outcomes, helping foreign security forces to defeat transnational terrorist groups. 
No etheless, as Biddle, Ma do ald a d Bake  ha e o te ded, the politi s of 
[se u it  fo e assista e] [is] e t al fo  its effe ti e ess .1285 U.S. military training, 
equipment and advice does not mechanistically convert into more military capable 
and reliable counterterrorism partners. Their fungibility is conditioned by the agency, 
perceptions and domestic political considerations of the recipient government. Much 
of the military assistance obligated for Pakistan to deny al-Qaeda and its associated 
forces safe-haven within the FATA, for example, is suspected to have either been 
po keted  o upt go e e t offi ials, o  di e ted to st e gthe  the Pakista i s 
military position vis-à-vis India.1286 Prior to the Yemeni Civil War, SFA obligated to 
conduct counterterrorism operations against AQAP is suspected to have been 
misappropriated by the Saleh government to fight the Houthi insurgency.1287 Beyond 
building partner capacity, SFA programmes also advanced a range of political 
objectives as mentioned in chapter 4. A o di g to the DOD s defi itio  of se u it  
oope atio , of hi h “FA is a su set, these a  i lude build[ing] relationships that 
help promote US interests; enable[ing] partner nations (PNs) to provide the US access 
to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and/or to build and apply 
thei  apa it  a d apa ilities o siste t ith U“ defe se o je ti es .1288 
 
My detailed analysis of some of the specific programmes obligated for the military 
response to al-Qaeda affiliates prohibited a comprehensive analysis of their political 
dimensions. With this in mind, a deeper engagement with some of the political 
dimensions of SFA programmes he  used as pa t of the O a a ad i ist atio s 
small-footprint approach to counterterrorism could make two immediate 
contributions to the IR and U.S. foreign policy literatures: it could help shine 
alternative light on their effectiveness, a subject of considerable debate within 
policymaking circles, and allow for a more detailed examination of their relationship 
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to drone strikes. I  the ase of the O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to AQAP, 
there is an argument to be made that SFA programmes worked not just to build 
partner capacity, but as an i du e e t to help se u e the “aleh s go e e t s 
consent to conduct drone strikes within Yemen. As revealed in the WikiLeaks 
disclosure, on multiple occasions after 9/11, Saleh expressed his displeasure with the 
level of military assistance his government was receiving. 1289  As the American 
ambassador Thomas C. Krajeski to Yemen made clear in 2005, Saleh could ultimately 
e ou ted o  to leverage [his] cooperation into further U.S. military, security and 
development assistance .1290 When the political dimensions of military assistance are 
opened up, what may first appear as an ineffective military use of SFA (e.g. the 
collapse of the U.S. train and equipped counterterrorism units following the Yemeni 
Civil War) may need to be qualified if such programmes also worked to modify the 
behaviour of the recipient state in a way which was otherwise favourable to U.S. 
counterterrorism operations (e.g. allowing access for drone strikes). In short, a more 
detailed investigation of the different military, political-economy and political logics 
of SFA, and their relationship to one another, is an area of future research with 
considerable potential.  
 
A third avenue for future research would take the form of a detailed examination of 
the means and animators of U.S. counterterrorism operations against other branches 
of the al-Qaeda movement. As has been documented on multiple occasions 
throughout this thesis, there is a clear gap for, and value to, this holistic study of the 
O a a ad i ist atio s ilita  espo se to al-Qaeda's affiliates. It would be 
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redundant to reiterate these again here. Yet, whilst this thesis has provided a solid 
foundation from which to further the study of American counterterrorism operations 
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq, it is far from the end of the conversation. A sizeable 
gap still exists within the IR and U.S. foreign policy literatures for a critical study of 
this important contemporary trend in American foreign and security policy. Whilst 
two of the largest U.S. counterterrorism campaigns in Africa were included as part of 
my structured focused comparison, a richer understanding of the means and 
a i ato s of a s i  ou t ies the U.“  is ot at a  ith  ould e a o plished  
examining similar operations elsewhere on the continent. The military response to 
the Islamic State in Libya and Nigeria provides particularly fertile area for future study. 
American counterterrorism operations intensified in both states during the last years 
of O a a s p eside . A o di g to the I ter ept s estimates, approximately 550 
drone strikes were launched in Libya after 2011: a figure significantly higher than 
Ne  A eri a s estimates for such actions in Somalia and Yemen during the same 
period.1291 Speaking in 2017, Deputy Secretary of State John Sullivan singled out Libya 
as pe haps ou  g eatest ou te te o is  halle ge i  Af i a .1292 No direct U.S. 
strikes have been conducted in Nigeria. Nonetheless, paralleling its response to 
AQIM, the Obama administration increased the level of military assistance given to 
the Nigerian government in order combat Boko Haram.1293 Like al-Qaeda s affiliates, 
which the group is reported to have received logistical support from prior to pledging 
its allegiance to the Islamic State in 2015, Boko Haram also captured and governed 
territory as a core part of its strategy.1294 Broadening the geographical scope of my 
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current study to examine the means and animators of U.S. counterterrorism 
operations in Nigeria and Libya, given both states oil wealth, would also provide a 
strong test of my argument that al-Qaeda and its offshoots deliberately contested 
global energy security.  
 
Concluding Remarks: Enter Trump 
 
T u p s fo eig  a d ou te te o is  poli ies has ee  su je t to o side a le 
scholarly attention.1295 This debate will only grow in the future. Almost two years into 
T u p s p eside , the fo t  fifth p eside t of the U.“. has sta ped his a k o  the 
ongoing War against al-Qaeda. Immediate points of departure can be drawn with his 
predecessor. Most notably, there have been substantive changes in the discourse of 
counterterrorism, with Trump adopting a far more bellicose approach to explaining 
the need for, and means of, military intervention in the global south.1296 Trump has 
i fa ousl  p o ised to o  the shit out  of the Islamic State, and regularly 
hastised O a a fo  faili g to all out adi al Isla i  te o is .1297 These discursive 
changes have been coupled with a eje tio  of O a a s ge e all  u su essful  
attempts to repair the damage caused to American soft power during the early years 
of the War against al-Qaeda. To this end, not only has Trump promised to fill 
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Gua ta a o Ba  ith so e ad dudes , ut has also publicly called for the 
resumption of waterboarding and other enhanced interrogation practices. 1298 
A o di g to a leaked  d aft of the ad i ist atio s National Strategy For 
Counterterrorism, the DOD s defe e pla i g o ept has also ee  eshaped in line 
ith T u p s A e i a Fi st  a date. 1299  The administration was looking to 
i te sif  ope atio s agai st glo al jihadist g oups hilst also edu i g the osts of 
A e i a  lood a d t easu e  i  pu suit of ou  ou te te o is  goals , the 
document is supposed to have read.1300 This logi  has shaped T u p s app oa h to 
Fo eig  Milita  Fi a i g, o e of the “tate Depa t e t s la gest se u it  assista e 
programmes. As part of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2018 budget proposal, the administration 
sought to reclassify some of the funds obligated for this programmes into loans which, 
unlike the current grant system, would need to be repaid.1301  
 
As outli ed a o e, T u p s ele tio  has ushe ed i  so e ta ti al adjust e ts i  
American counterterrorism discourse and practice. There is, as seen in both George 
W. Bush s se o d te  i  offi e a d O a a s p eside , elasti it  he e. Like his 
immediate predecessor, Trump has attempted to realign the language and some of 
the coercive practices of the War against al-Qaeda to fit with his campaign pledges. 
It is yet to be seen whether, as a chorus of prominent IR scholars have claimed, his 
presidency has fatally undermined the Liberal World Order.1302 What can be said with 
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greater certainty is that the Trump administration has not abandoned the War 
against al-Qaeda as either a pretext for, or strategic framework of, U.S. military 
intervention in the global south. Its financial costs and execution have been 
questioned for sure. Nevertheless, as the 2017 National Security Strategy made clear, 
the ad i ist atio  has e ai ed edded to the o i tio  that Jihadist terrorist 
organizations such as ISIS and al-Qa ida a e dete i ed to atta k the U ited “tates 
a d adi alize A e i a s ith thei  hateful ideolog .1303 T u p s ele tio  ust not 
therefore be read as having heralded the end of the War against al-Qaeda. Returning 
to my periodization of the conflict outlined in chapter 3, it is more accurately thought 
of as marking its latest phase. 
 
As it relates to military assistance programmes, which this thesis has shown were at 
the centre of the small-footprint approach to counterterrorism pioneered during 
O a a s p eside , thei  fu di g has sta ilised at a ou d $  illio  i  FY  a d 
FY 2019. This is a slight fall from the $19 billion obligated for such programmes in FY 
2016, the last full year of the Obama presidency. 1304  This contraction in military 
assistance obligations can be largely explained by cuts to some of the largest DOS 
security assistance programmes.1305 Foreign Military Financing obligations fell from 
$6.3 billion in FY 2017 to $5.1 billion in FY 2018 alone. 1306  DOD obligated 
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counterterrorism focused aid is nevertheless reported to have increased by $2 billion 
during this period.1307  
 
The most notable shift in the means of the military response to al-Qaeda s affiliates 
has been in the comparatively greater use of drone strikes and SOF kill-capture raids 
to fight al-Qaeda s affiliates i  the A a ia  Pe i sula, the Ho  of Af i a a d the “ahel. 
Parts of both Somalia and Yemen were desig ated as a eas of a ti e hostilities  
early in his presidency. 1308  With the restrictions and oversight on direct actions 
having been loosened, the number of airstrikes doubled in Somalia and tripled in 
Ye e  du i g the fi st ea  of T u p s p eside .1309 Beyond this, the first reported 
American combat deaths in both states since 9/11 have been reported during 
T u p s p eside , ith the death of Willia  O e s o i g just te  da s afte  the 
presidential inauguration in January 2017.1310 The size of the U.S. military footprint 
in both states has also been increased, with the total number of SOF active in Somalia 
having doubled to over 500: the largest American presence in the country since the 
Black Hawk Down incident in the early 1990s.1311  
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York Times, 2017 <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/01/world/middleeast/donald-trump-yemen-
commando-raid-questions.html> [accessed 11 August 2018]; Savage and Schmitt. 
1311 Jane Ferguso , T u p s Milita  Es alatio  i  “o alia Is “pu i g Hope a d Fea , The New York 
Times, 2018. See also Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.“. T oops A e o  the G ou d i  Ye e  fo  Offe si e 
against Al-Qaeda Milita ts , The Washington Post, 2017 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/gdpr-
consent/?destination=%2Fnews%2Fcheckpoint%2Fwp%2F2017%2F08%2F04%2Fu-s-troops-are-on-
the-ground-in-yemen-for-offensive-against-al-qaeda-militants%2F%3F&utm_term=.c0b206aca9f4> 
[a essed  August ]; Ta a Copp, U“ Puts Boots o  the G ou d i  Ye e  to Atta k AQAP , 





Whilst at the time of writing in August 2018 there have been no reported American 
drone strikes in the Sahel, the Trump administration has put in place the physical and 
(as importantly) political architecture to roll these out in the immediate future. It was 
reported in November 2017 that the Niger government had authorised American 
drones flying in their country to be armed.1312 Around the same time, Republican 
Senator Lindsey Graham, a senior member of the Senate Armed Service Committee, 
told reporters that he had been briefed by Defence Secretary Jim Mattis to expect: 
 
[…] more actions in Africa, not less; you're going to see more aggression by 
the United States toward our enemies, not less; you're going to have 
decisions being made not in the White House but out in the field.1313 
 
Giving weight to these claims, four American Green Berets were killed in Niger in 
October 2017.1314  Thereafter, the Trump administration confirmed that 800 U.S. 
military personnel were active in the country, supporting a range of counterterrorism 
operations within the immediate neighbourhood. 1315  Military cooperation with 
France in the Sahel has also continued to deepen, with the President meeting his 
French counterpart Emmanuel Macron in October 2017 to discuss the issue. 1316 
                                                          
1312 ‘o e t Bu s a d Lolita Baldo , Nige  App o es A ed U.“. D o e Flights , Real Clear Defense, 
2017 
<https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/12/02/niger_approves_armed_us_drone_flights
_112716.html> [accessed 11 August 2018]. These craft are reported to have been active since July 
2018, Joh  Va di e , A ed U“ D o es up a d ‘u i g i  Nige , Stars and Stripes, 2018 
<https://www.stripes.com/news/armed-us-drones-up-and-running-in-niger-1.538637> [accessed 11 
August 2018]. 
1313 Ka ou  De i jia , U.“. Will E pa d Cou te te o is  Fo us i  Af i a, Mattis Tells “e ato s , The 
Washington Post, 2017 <https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/defense-secretary-mattis-to-
meet-with-sen-mccain-after-subpoena-threat-over-niger-attack/2017/10/20/7a4a12de-b5bf-11e7-
9e58-e6288544af98_story.html?utm_term=.672912ca9b43> [accessed 11 August 2018]. 
1314 Phil “te a t a d Id ees Ali, Pe tago  “a s Fou th U.“. “oldie  Killed i  Nige  A ush , Reuters, 
2017 <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-usa/pentagon-says-fourth-u-s-soldier-killed-in-
niger-ambush-idUSKBN1CB2IL> [accessed 11 August 2018]. For a more detailed discussion of this raid, 
see ‘uk i i Calli a hi a d othe s, A  E dless Wa : Wh   U.“. “oldie s Died i  a ‘e ote African 
Dese t , The New York Times, 2018 
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/02/17/world/africa/niger-ambush-american-
soldiers.html> [accessed 11 August 2018]. 
1315 Donald T u p, Te t of a Lette  f o  the P eside t to the “peake  of the House of ‘ep ese tati es 
a d the P eside t P o Te po e of the “e ate , The White House, 2017 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/text-letter-president-speaker-house-
representatives-president-pro-tempore-senate-2/> [accessed 11 August 2018]. 





There have ee  stu li g lo ks, ost ota l  the efusal to suppo t F a e s 
resolution calling for the direct United Nations funding of a new 5,000 strong security 
force made up of forces from the G5 states of Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania 
and Niger.1317 Nevertheless, as in Somalia and Yemen, the general direction of travel 
has been toward an escalation of U.S. counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, not 
retrenchment.  
 
In conclusion, neither the military response to al-Qaeda s egio al affiliates nor the 
War against al-Qaeda writ large is set to end any time soon. As pointed out in the 
most recent Global Threat Assessment released by the Director of National 
I tellige e, [t]he p i a  th eat to U“ a d Weste  i te ests f o  al-Qa ida s 
global network through  ill e i  o  ea  affiliates  ope ati g a eas .1318 With 
this being the case, the Trump administration-like its immediate predecessor- will 
continue to rely heavily on SFA programmes, drone strikes, PMSC and SOF to contain 
the challenge which these affiliates present to the practices of American imperialism. 
Whilst ad i ist atio  i side s a  lai  to e pu sui g a Fu k O a a  Do t i e, the 
reality as it relates U.S. counterterrorism policy is far different. 1319  Trump has 
a epted the asi  pa a ete s of O a a s ou te te o is  pla ook, put his o  
spin on it, and run with it. As the debate on what his presidency means for the 
evolution of American foreign and counterterrorism policy continues to gain 
momentum, historical materialist scholars are well placed to bring the political 
economy dimension of T u p s p eside  i to sharper focus. The American foreign 
policy subfield would benefit significantly from such an insight, providing a useful 
counterbalance to neo-classical realist, constructivist and neoliberal institutionalist 
perspectives. In short, there is still much left to write, and the study of al-Qaeda s 
affiliates and historical materialism can contribute significantly to these debates.  
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